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THE FAMILY

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THE FAMILY

ITS SOCIOLOGY AND
SOCIAL PSYCHIATRY

BY

JOSEPH KIRK FOLSOM

*Professor of Sociology
Vassar College*



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To My Wife
JEAN RODGERS FOLSOM

PREFACE

This book aims to integrate the various scientific approaches to the study of family phenomena. It attempts to weave cultural anthropology, individual psychology, social psychology, history, sociology, economics, and psychiatry into a unitary *science of the family*. It aims to present: (1) a framework of thought or "point of view," (2) an adequate set of concepts, (3) the important facts and generalizations ascertained through research and other systematic observation, (4) stimulation and guidance toward further research.

The treatment begins with the cultural *approach*, and this point of view governs throughout. The subject matter, however, is concerned predominantly with the modern changes and problems of the family. Primitive and historical family data are presented not as detached bodies of information to be acquired for their own sake, but mainly to establish those modes of thinking which increasingly characterize modern sociology.

In consistence with this cultural point of view, the contemporary problems of the family are analyzed in terms of the logic of cultural change. The drama is not one of old "evils" attacked by new efforts at "reform," but of continuous social change with its ever new maladjustments, followed by readjustments. The picture is a dynamic one. There is never any real issue between change and no change, but only between any proposed change and alternative changes which might effect the necessary readjustment. The social engineer is not like the boatman upon the waters of a lake, holding the power and the duty to choose his course among the several directions of the compass and the additional alternative of anchoring where he is. He is rather like the boatman in the swift current of a stream, whose only real choice is to steer to right or to left, and whose responsibility is to prevent the boat's upsetting.

If this view of the modern family and its problems should provoke in some readers a sense of individual helplessness in the face of the tremendous forces of social change, such persons are invited to give special attention to Part V, dealing with the social psychiatry of the family. It is there shown that the individual can do some-

thing, and has indeed a responsibility. He is responsible for his own life and for the personal relationships into which he enters. Although he may not be able to alter perceptibly the mass currents of change, he can choose intelligently his own role in the family culture and he can help those about him to ride those currents skillfully and happily rather than awkwardly and painfully.

The policy is to print in boldface type the important technical terms where they are first used. Frequently, where a term is used in a loose, scientifically misleading, or analogical sense, it is placed in quotation marks.

The author has presented a great many more statistical facts than he would expect any student to remember specifically. These are intended: (a) to develop *quantitative* "good judgment" in thinking about family problems, in other words, the ability to make a reasonable estimate of the extent of various conditions; and (b) to provide data for future reference as needs arise. It is hoped that the factual content is sufficiently broad to make the volume worth keeping as a book of reference. Statistics, however, are not *ipso facto* significant. In many lines of research a more adequate "qualitative analysis" is necessary before counting and measuring can be worth while. The author has attempted to report significant research findings representing a wide variety of problems and methods, rather than an exhaustive compendium of any one type of research.

To those who will some day find opportunity for research, it is hoped that this volume will indicate needed and promising directions. To others, it is hoped that it will bring an appreciation of the supreme importance of research and of its claim to social support.

The references at the close of each chapter serve the double purpose of indicating authority for textual statements and of providing a general bibliography for the chapter. A brief list of the most general works may be found in the Appendix, and also a few additional items of importance in the footnotes are scattered through the volume.

The author is indebted for various information and advice to Henry Pratt Fairchild, the Editor of the Wiley Social Science series, to Ernest R. Groves, Mrs. Jessie L. Bernard, George A. Lundberg, Dr. William B. Terhune, Dwight Sanderson, Nels Anderson, Robert H. Dann, and Charles C. Peters. He is indebted to Vassar College for its encouragement and excellent facilities toward research, and to many students at Vassar College and at Sweet Briar College

PREFACE

ix

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JOSEPH K. FOLSOM

POUGHKEEPSIE, N. Y.

June 30, 1934.

CONTENTS

PART I

THE FAMILY PATTERN AND ITS SUBCULTURAL BASIS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I. THE FAMILY PATTERN.....		1
II. BASIC DEFINITIONS: CULTURE AND THE SUBCULTURAL..	35	
1. Man		
2. Society		
3. Culture		
III. LOVE AND PERSONALITY FORMATION.....	54	
1. Human needs, satisfactions, and suffering		
2. The nature and kinds of love		
3. Frustration and personality change		
IV. LOVE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: UNIVERSAL PATTERNS	91	

PART II

THE CULTURAL HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE FAMILY

V. THE PRE-HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY OF THE FAMILY...	111
1. Theories of family evolution	
2. A survey of cultural variations in the family	
VI. THE FAMILY IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS.....	144
1. The history of the Euro-American family	
2. Modern European family patterns	
3. Asiatic family patterns	

PART III

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE FAMILY

VII. THE FAMILY IN MODERN SOCIAL CHANGE.....	173
1. The process of social change	
2. The changes caused by mechanical invention	

CHAPTER	PAGE
VIII. THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: MODERN INDIVIDUALISM.....	215
PART IV	
FAMILY PROBLEMS AND MASS READJUSTMENTS	
IX. THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING REPRODUCTION.....	235
1. Introduction to family problems in general	
2. The problem of excessive reproduction	
3. The problem of dysgenic reproduction	
4. The problem of insufficient reproduction	
X. THE ECONOMICS OF CHILDREN AND THE HOME.....	271
1. The care of children	
2. The reorganization of women's labor	
XI. MARRIAGE AND MATE-FINDING.....	312
1. The mating problem: its possible solutions	
2. Marriage and non-marriage in the light of statistics	
3. The problem of selecting partners	
4. Marriage legislation	
XII. DIVORCE.....	356
1. Humane divorce as a proposed solution	
2. Trends in divorce law	
3. Trends in divorce fact	
XIII. THE LOVE MORES.....	396
1. Increasing immorality or changing mores?	
2. The facts of the change	
3. The forces involved in the change	
PART V	
FAMILY PROBLEMS AND INDIVIDUAL ADJUSTMENTS	
XIV. FAMILY DISORGANIZATION AND PERSONALITY.....	429
1. The extent and individual causes of marriage failure	
2. Similarities and differences between mates	

CONTENTS

xiii

CHAPTER	PAGE
XV. MARITAL ROLES, FRUSTRATIONS, AND INTERACTION.....	455
1. Personality patterns and interactional roles	
2. Marital frustrations	
3. The marital interaction process	
XVI. THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION.....	501
1. Children and their problems	
2. The interaction between parent and child	
XVII. EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT.....	532
 PART VI	
THE CULTURAL FUTURE	
XVIII. THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY SYSTEM.....	549
APPENDIX	577
INDEX	585

THE FAMILY

PART I

THE FAMILY PATTERN AND ITS SUBCULTURAL BASIS

CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY PATTERN

Common Sense and Science.—The great majority of educated people in America today are not superstitious. Some superstitions linger among the less educated, but they are certainly less prevalent, and less seriously taken, than a hundred years ago. People who are free from the more obvious and ancient superstitions and from the delusions of cranks are said to possess "common sense." Yet to take a special pride in this possession, or to repeat the phrase "common sense" frequently in discussing human problems, is a dangerous intellectual symptom. In many persons "common sense" indicates not only a freedom from ancient superstitions, but also a "pig-headed" resistance to any further progress in thinking.

A witness in court, it is related, once exasperated a lawyer by his lengthy and complicated answers to questions. The lawyer finally admonished him to answer every question with a "yes" or a "no." When the witness replied that not all questions could be answered that way, the lawyer challenged him to put a question which could not be thus simply answered. "All right," said the witness, "here's a question you can't answer by yes or no: have you left off beating your wife yet?" This lawyer represents a large number of fairly intelligent people who pride themselves upon their common sense. The witness represents the modern scientist who is trying sincerely to throw more light upon the problems of mankind and eventually to make the world a better place in which to live.

THE FAMILY PATTERN

Watson and Green asked 40 students to give their opinions concerning certain questions investigated in Hamilton's *A Research in Marriage* and Davis' *The Sex Life of 2200 Women*. The students had not learned the actual research results. *There was no general agreement between the student's opinions and the research results.* There was enormous personal variation among the opinions. Men were no more or less accurate than women, married persons than single persons, age than youth. The investigators concluded that the selection of a wise counselor on sex matters should be a matter of personal qualifications, which may well be independent of the person's age, sex, or marital status.¹ It is probable that good judgment upon family matters *in general* is also dependent more upon individual thoughtfulness, habits of observation, and technical knowledge than upon the "wisdom of age," feminine "intuition," masculine "reason," or so-called "practical experience."

In the minds of many persons the problems of the modern family, together with most other social problems, can be boiled down to the simple issue: can human nature be changed? There is only one good answer to this question. It is: "What *is* human nature?" "Human nature" is one of those simple phrases which is supposed to have an obvious meaning to everyone with common sense. When the scientist interrupts the discussion to ask its meaning, he is accused of befogging the issue and dragging in a learned theoretical vocabulary to cover up his ignorance. Yet in such cases it is not the scientist, but the impatient layman with his exalted common sense, who is living in a mental fog. He is not conscious of this fog because he has always lived in it.

If we wish intelligible answers from Science, we must learn to ask her intelligent questions. In the human and social sciences especially, a great deal of preliminary work needs to be done before real problems can be solved. The investigators must agree upon what they are talking about. Their units of observation must be defined. The ancients thought the universe was reducible to four simple elements—earth, air, fire, and water. Yet we would never have learned to make the numerous practical products of modern chemical industry by formulas for various combinations of earth, air, fire, and water. The things which appear simple to common sense are often complex in reality, while the really simple *elements* of the universe are not obvious and distinct to sense observation. The first scientist who analyzed water

¹ Superior numbers refer to "References" at the end of the chapter.

into hydrogen and oxygen must have appeared to his lay contemporaries as a very impractical theorist.

“Human nature” is not a simple elemental attribute of human beings. It is a vague term for all the behavior and mental characteristics which are supposedly universal and inborn in mankind. But as we shall see, not everything that is universal is inborn, and not everything that is inborn is universal. “Human nature” is therefore at best a vague term, and there is little profit in attempting to generalize about it. It must be analyzed into simpler elements.

What Is the “Family”?—Likewise the “family” is a term of uncertain definition. It seems, superficially, to be one of the elements into which we may analyze human *society*, other elements being the economic system or industry, the political system or government, the educational or school system, the religious system or church. Yet these five great *institutions* are not simple elements. They may seem, in our society, to be fairly distinct, but when we trace them back far enough, they merge. It becomes impossible to define precisely among primitive peoples, for example, the boundary between the economic system and the family system. The family among most primitive and historical peoples was largely an economic institution; or, to put it another way, the economic system was largely a family institution. An institution is not a distinct unit, but a selected phase of the total network of human relationships.

However, since this book is not intended to describe the whole of human society, we must have some working definition of its field. In brief, it will deal with those relations between human beings which involve: (a) biological reproduction and kinship, (b) the personal and the mass relations between the two sexes, (c) the living of persons together in a common domicile. These relationships roughly constitute what is called the family system; we shall center our attention upon them, but without attempting to make strict lines of demarcation.

A Comparative Analysis of the Family Pattern.—In the insular realm known as Melanesia are the Trobriand Islands, just northeast of Australia. The people of these islands live in a system of family relationships strikingly different from our own. This family system has been described in interesting detail by Malinowski in his *Sexual Life of Savages*.² The title may be somewhat misleading, since the physical sex relations are only a small part of the total picture. Because this description is so much more adequate than most descriptions of primitive family life, it is chosen for our present study.

THE FAMILY PATTERN

The Trobriand Islanders are a primitive, that is, a *pre-literate* people. Their culture is not, however, of the lowest order. They practice agriculture and keep pigs, and are placed upon the second or middle agriculture level in the classification of Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg.³ They are a black-skinned, woolly-haired people, classified physically under the Oceanic branch of the negroid race (geographically remote and somewhat different anatomically from African negroes). Considering the smallness of this population and the probability that it will sooner or later die off or be absorbed into the white man's society, what can be the significance of studying its family system?

The size and the geographic and historic importance of a primitive tribe are no indication of the sociological significance of their ways of life. Strange as it may seem, this study of primitives is one of the most valuable avenues to an understanding of society in general. In recent years sociology and cultural anthropology (ethnology) have come closer together and are now essentially one and the same science. In zoology we do not demand that attention be apportioned to the various animals according to their abundance and the frequency with which we have to deal with them. Such a "practical" zoology might confine itself largely to horses, dogs, and other domestic animals. But he who would really understand animal life can learn more in the zoological garden than in the barnyard, because of the much wider variety of species exhibited. *Primitive tribes are the "zoo" of sociology.*

Let us compare the family system of the Trobrianders with that of our own society. One of the advantages of such a comparative method is that the description of our own culture is made with a very different emphasis from usual. It brings out the points which would be of interest to an ethnologist from some utterly foreign civilization visiting our own. This naïveté about our own society would be quite superfluous if we were dealing with some specific problem. But for our present purpose it is exactly what we need.

COMPARATIVE DESCRIPTION OF FAMILY PATTERNS

Note.—For ethnological terms used in this outline consult Chapter V, section 2.

TROBRIANDS

AMERICA

I. The Control of Reproduction

(1) *The ideology of birth*

These people do not know the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. They believe in a spirit world, inhabited by the rejuvenated spirits of the dead. Every newborn child is the reincarnation of one of these spirits, and is brought to its mother by an older, controlling spirit (godfather or godmother) who is identified with some deceased person. The reincarnated person is not identified with a particular deceased person and is assumed to have lost all memory of his past, but he belongs always to the same clan and sub-clan as in his previous existence.

There are no moral ideas of reward or punishment connected with the ideology of reincarnation, nor ceremonies associated with it.

They believe that the penetration of the vagina by some means is an essential condition for pregnancy, but have no idea that male fertilization is necessary. Their myths suppose women to have existed and to have given birth to children before the existence of men.

These people understand the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. They believe in a spirit world to which the dead go, but these spirits never return. Every newborn child has a spirit or soul newly created by a personal, anthropomorphic Deity who is ruler of the universe. There is no reincarnation. Personal or family status in the spirit world is unrelated to earthly status.

Their mythology supposes man to have been created prior to woman. Mankind began with a single pair, who were created immortal and without need of sexual function or reproduction. By discovering sexual intercourse this pair became sinful and mortal, thus necessitating the carrying on of the race through biological reproduction.

(2) *The relation of social to biological fatherhood*

The "father" of a child is the mother's husband, who helps her to

The social father of a child is also the biological father. He should be

bring it up. Premarital pregnancy (though not intercourse) is shameful, and often leads to the abandonment of a girl by her fiancé, even though he has been the cause. As a matter of fact, pregnancy is a comparatively rare result of the free sex relations before marriage, for some reason unknown even to modern scientists. After marriage fertility is desired and actually quite adequate, but no child of a married woman is attributed to any biological father, even in cases of known adultery during prolonged absence of the social father.

married to the mother and live with her, exercising authority over her and their children. All sexual intercourse before marriage or with other than the married partner is immoral, in varying degrees. Premarital pregnancy is shameful, because it is evidence of intercourse. But subsequent marriage of the sexual partners removes much of the shame, especially if they be married before the child is born. Fertility in marriage is generally desired, deliberate infertility is immoral according to more conservative attitudes, though in most classes it is regarded as subject to personal choice. Any evidence that a child's biological father is other than his social father leads typically to anger of the husband and to investigation; if illegitimacy is found to be true, great moral condemnation falls upon the woman.

(3) *Population control*

There are no contraceptive methods.

Various methods of preventing pregnancy are used, the only one morally approved by all being abstention from intercourse. But effective contraceptive methods have been recently perfected and are used and approved by roughly a third to two-thirds of the population, particularly the more educated classes. The circulation of contraceptive information is illegal though not immoral.

Abortion is possibly practiced, but rarely. Certain herbs are supposed magically to cause premature birth.

Abortion is common, but is immoral and legally punishable by heavy penalties. It is seldom officially discovered and punished, because of clandestine tolerance.

There is no infanticide. Infants,

Infanticide is illegal and immoral,

of both sexes, are always desired, by both parents.

without clandestine tolerance; it is a capital offense like murder in general, and rarely occurs.

In general, children are desired, but the attitude is a matter of individual differences. There is some preference for the birth of male children but no emotional preference for either sex after birth.

(4) *Intercourse taboos in marriage*

Sexual intercourse is morally condemned during the latter part of pregnancy on the ground of injury to the child, and after the birth of each child until the child can walk, there is a magical belief that it will cause the death of the child.

Otherwise, intercourse is regarded as natural and desirable, and as unrelated to pregnancy.

In conservative mores, sexual intercourse is approved only for reproduction, but these mores have been much liberalized. In most classes now there are no moral taboos regarding the time, amount, or motive of marital intercourse. It is considered somewhat dangerous late in pregnancy.

II. The Pattern of Marital Status

(1) *Numerical pattern of marriage*

Marriage is monogamous except for men of high rank or great importance, who generally practice polygyny. The chief motive for this polygyny is to acquire extra wealth, which is necessary for power.

In polygynous families of chiefs there are three classes of wives: older ones inherited from the former chief, with whom there are few sexual relations; women married by the chief in his youth; and younger attractive women married more recently. Political considerations and personal choice govern selection. There is usually a personal favorite among the second group of wives, and sometimes among the third, but the roles of the several wives are

Marriage is monogamous without exception. A marriage to a second partner before the marriage to the first has been legally dissolved is not legally valid, and in addition is punishable under the criminal law, although it sometimes occurs without being brought before the authorities.

Through divorce, however, there exists a system which may be called consecutive polygamy for a certain minority, which is of intermediate rather than of high or low social status.

THE FAMILY PATTERN

determined by their age and personality, and the chief's preference, rather than by law.

The several wives live in separate huts close to that of the chief, each with her own young children. There is no marked jealousy among them or need for them to be further separated. The chief may make his principal abode, outside his own hut, with one of them.

(2) Age differences of mates

In monogamous families the mates are of about the same age.

The husband is on the average about three years older than the wife. There is no moral taboo or legal restriction, but marriages of great age difference are regarded as undesirable, especially when the woman is older.

(3) Supreme control of marriage and divorce

Marriage and divorce are subject to no higher legal control than individual will, the approval of the girl's family, and sometimes informal group judgment.

Marriage and divorce are defined, licensed, and in certain respects regulated, by the governmental authority, which in these matters is supreme. The religious authority and the parental families may practically regulate marriage within still narrower limits through their disapproval, but cannot legally enforce such regulations. The adult is protected by law against coercion by any other power.

(4) Permissibility of divorce

Divorce is permissible on the desire of either party, and is frequent. Usually it is the woman who seeks it, sometimes because of her husband's adultery. Any dissatisfaction with the other party may be the cause; there is no public control or formal adjudication, but informal

Divorce is permissible only through formal legal procedure, upon specified causes which are practically the same for both man and woman, which must be judicially proved, and which vary from one territorial government to another. Adultery is the most univer-

group judgment has some controlling influence.

Childlessness of a woman is not given special weight as a ground for divorce.

Since divorce requires no formal procedure, an actual separation is equivalent to divorce.

Women gain no economic advantages through marriage, but gain social status and supposedly the power to have children.

sally accepted ground for divorce. Desertion for a term of years, and physical cruelty, are valid grounds in most jurisdictions but not in all. The permissibility of a given divorce depends upon technical specifications rather than upon group judgment of its desirability.

Childlessness is nowhere a ground for divorce.

Divorce is always a right obtained by a theoretically innocent party against a party proved guilty of a specific offense. Double guilt and mutual consent render divorce non-permissible.

Married partners may and do freely separate without divorce, but their legal marriage obligations continue and they may not remarry.

(5) The status and motives of marriage and non-marriage

The unmarried men enjoy a lower social status and lesser economic advantages than the married. No persons remain unmarried except because of personal unattractiveness or defectiveness.

There is little or no difference in social status between married and unmarried. About 10 per cent of persons never marry, and this brings no moral condemnation. Many other causes than personal defectiveness or unattractiveness lead to non-marriage.

Women in general gain some economic advantage through marriage; men tend to suffer economic disadvantage. With both, the desire for morally approved love satisfactions is the primary motive. The wish for legitimate offspring is a strong secondary motive, becoming primary with some couples.

(6) Status of the widowed

Widows and widowers have about the same status and love privileges

Widows and widowers have the same social status and love privi-

as the unmarried, except for a required period of mourning, which is more severe and more strictly supervised in the case of widows, and is carefully ritualized. After this period they remarry readily.

(7) Status of illegitimacy

Illegitimate children are pitied because they have no father to nurse and love them. Only those born before marriage are regarded as illegitimate, regardless of biological paternity. Those recognized as illegitimates are readily adopted by kinsfolk and are not especially stigmatized.

leges as the unmarried. A period of mourning for each is regarded as proper, but the ritual is very simple and not strictly enforced.

Illegitimate children are socially stigmatized but have full legal rights, except as to inheritance. The chief stigma falls upon the unmarried mother, because she has broken an important sex taboo. The father, if he can be identified, can be compelled to furnish economic support. The illegitimate children of a married woman are handled variously; they may lead to divorce or be accepted by the legal husband.

III. Marital Selection and the Social Structure

(1) Endogamy

Marriages between persons of high and low rank are generally disapproved but not legally forbidden. There are certain despised pariah districts which are endogamous as to the district. Outsiders will not marry into these districts. The highest sub-clan limits its marriages to two or three other sub-clans.

Marriages between persons of high and low rank are usually disapproved by the high-ranking family. Public sentiment regards them with a certain romantic attitude of approval combined with practical disapproval. Marriages between persons of different religions are disapproved by the church authorities and families. The only legally enforceable endogamy, however, is race endogamy, in certain jurisdictions only. Such black-white intermarriages are comparatively rare.

(2) Exogamy

Marriage with any relative closer than fourth degree (first cousin) is immoral.

Marriage with any relative closer than the fourth degree (first cousin) is illegal and invalid. Marriage with

Marriage within one's own clan is condemned. A very few cases occur, especially in one particular clan; they are not annulled but regarded with contempt. Marriage within one's own sub-clan is impossible and unrecorded. All persons outside one's own clan, except for the endogamous rules stated above, are permissible mates.

(3) *Sib-organization*

The whole people is organized into exogamic sibs (clans and sub-clans). Members of one's own clan are regarded as kinsmen. A man uses a different term for a male friend of another clan from the one he uses for a kinsman. His behavior toward women of his own clan is associated with much decorum and taboo.

There are four clans. The natives conceive of all human beings and spirits as divided among these four clans. To each clan also belong certain animals, plants, and natural objects. The clans are social rather than religious divisions. Totemic animals are not associated with food taboos.

The sub-clans are more strictly exogamous than the clans. Each sub-clan has a definite rank. Altogether there are five or six categories of rank.

(4) *Relation of kinship to territorial organization*

Each village community is owned by one sub-clan. It has its head man, commonly the oldest. If the sub-clan be of high rank, this head man also has power over a whole district and is called a chief.

first cousin is permitted in some jurisdictions but not in others.

Outside the fourth degree there are no rules of kinship exogamy, either legal, religious, or social.

There is no sib-organization. Maternal and paternal kinsmen are recognized in identical ways, except for the transmission of the family name. Degrees of kinship are matters of purely biological nearness. Beyond the degree of first or second cousin, kinship has no social significance.

There is no relation between kinship groups and possession of any village or locality. Small, isolated rural communities tend to intramarry and to have their social relationships somewhat associated with kin relationship.

(5) Preferential mating

The levirate and sororate do not exist. The sororate is disapproved.

The marriage of a man with his father's sister's daughter has special social advantages among families of rank and power, and such a marriage is often arranged through infant betrothal. This is the only form of preferential mating and the only ground for parental pre-arrangement of marriage.

There is no levirate or sororate.

There is no preferential mating.

(6) Personal choice, family approval, and compulsion

The great bulk of marriages are upon the initiative of the young people themselves, who choose one another freely.

A girl's father has the principal responsibility for guiding her to marriage. Her family usually consents to the marriage, and can usually prevent it by economic power, since theirs is the function of providing food for the young couple. The man's family exercises no control over the marriage.

All marriages are upon the initiative of the young people themselves, who choose freely.

Families, however, approve and disapprove marriages, but the limit of their power is to cut off social contacts and inheritance, which is rarely done even when there is disapproval of the marriage. The powers of families are seldom sufficient to prevent a marriage desired by both partners. Family influence upon marriage is somewhat greater on the side of the girl. Cultural sentiments approve love marriages in defiance, if necessary, of the will of families, and the law sanctions and protects such marriages.

Elopements occasionally occur to avoid the hostile interference of families.

There is no wife capture.

There is no match-making save for some informal personal mediation, and some newspaper advertising used by a very few.

Very rarely marriage takes place by elopement in defiance of the will of the girl's family.

There is no wife capture.

There are no match-makers.

(7) Personal qualifications for marriage

There are no formal trials or tests through which a young man must go before marriage.

Marriage is early.
Defective persons usually cannot win mates.

There are no formal suitors' trials. The bridegroom is expected, however, to be able to support the bride economically without other than housework contribution from her.

There are legal age limitations upon marriage, most typically 21 for men and 18 for girls without parental consent, and 18 for boys and 16 for girls with parental consent. In many jurisdictions persons with certain defects and diseases are legally forbidden to marry.

IV. The Transmission of Status and Property*(1) Names*

The family is matrilineal. A person's full name indicates the name of his (matrilineal) clan, his sex, and certain personal characteristics.

The family is patrilineal. A person's name includes the family name inherited from his father and one or more individual names usually chosen from a limited stock list. The total number of these personal names is much smaller than of the family names. Some personal names are characteristically male, others female. They have no reference to the characteristics of the person, but are imitative of the names of favored relatives, or quite arbitrarily chosen. These personal names are chosen by parents and usually ritually bestowed soon after birth.

(2) The transmission of property and rank

A man's property, rights, rank, and duties descend to him from his mother's brother. After maturity he usually goes to live with his maternal kinsmen in their village. Exceptions to this rule are possible only through the personal influence

All property is transmitted according to the "will" of the deceased, which may be quite arbitrary. In case he makes no formal will, property descends to his wife and legitimate children, each child sharing equally.

of chiefs, who try to keep their sons with them, and who sometimes secure such a privilege for a son permanently by marrying him to his father's sister's daughter.

There are, in the United States, no ranks, titles, or other special privileges which may be inherited. With minor exceptions all property rights refer to material goods and land.

(3) Economic and protective obligations

A man's economic duties are to his sisters, to whom he carries their food supply even after their marriage. He and his wife in turn are fed by the wife's brothers or male kinsmen.

A husband is responsible for the economic support of his wife and children. Secondary responsibility falls upon other relatives in accordance with their nearness, regardless of whether maternal or paternal. The wife's kinsmen have as much power as the husband's kinsmen.

(4) Marriage and the balance of economic exchange

The man does not buy his wife. There are mutual wedding gifts, but these exchanges are valued for their own sake, as part of a cultural pattern of reciprocal giving. Economically they tend to cancel. The predominant economic advantage of marriage is meant to be to the man rather than the woman. The compensating advantages to the woman are social; she gets a husband and protector so that she may have children and someone to help care for them.

There is no wife purchase or bride price. The two families contribute gifts to the newly married pair according to their ability. The bridegroom is mainly responsible for accumulating such property as may be desirable at the beginning of marriage; this is his individual rather than his family's responsibility. The bride and her family customarily provide certain kinds of household equipment.

(5) The ritual of marriage

The marriage is ritualized as follows: (1) the girl's parents signify consent by asking the boy (who has already been having sexual relations with the girl) for a small present; (2) after some interval the girl, instead of returning home, remains all day with her husband, taking meals at the home of his parents, this constituting the public declaration; (3)

The marriage procedure is: (1) The boy proposes marriage to the girl. He does this usually only after she has shown some evidence of fondness for him, but there is no disgrace if he proposes prematurely or unsuccessfully. A girl must not directly propose; the boy must take the initiative at each step toward closer relations. (2) The girl ac-

there is a series of complicated gift exchanges between the families, the larger gifts occurring after the following harvest, during which time the couple is "honeymooning" at the hut of *his* parents; (4) after the harvest is the building of the new home, usually in the boy's mother's village.

cepts, usually first making sure of the consent of her parents; in certain classes the boy formally asks the consent of the girl's parents. (3) The engagement is announced to friends; in the upper classes this is done with some ritual. (4) After the engagement the partners must be more or less exclusive in their comradeship. (5) After a few months or a year formal authorization of marriage is obtained from the government authority, and the marriage is soon thereafter consummated by a definite ceremony performed by a governmental or religious officer. Until this ceremony has taken place either party is free to break the relationship. After the ceremony it may be broken only through divorce or annulment procedure. The ideology of the ceremony is religious, the essential union of the partners being regarded as an act of the Deity. (6) On the night after the marriage ceremony the partners sleep together for the first time. Before the ceremony they may not morally be alone together in any situation for a whole night, although they may eat and play and spend whole days alone together throughout courtship. Not only intercourse but also the more intimate bodily contacts are now for the first time moral. (7) The partners then usually take a honeymoon of a week or more away from friends and relatives, indulging freely in all types of love behavior. This is supposedly the climax of romantic love. (8) The time and place of founding the new home are matters of individual choice and convenience. It is the bridegroom's responsibility to provide the

new home, normally within a short time after marriage.

V. Segregation Patterns

(1) *Location of the new home*

Marriage is patrilocal though matrilineal. The young man takes his wife to live with him in his own maternal village (not his father's village where he was brought up). Each village consists of: (1) the adult males of a particular sub-clan which owns the village, (2) their wives and younger children who belong to other sub-clans, (3) unmarried, widowed and divorced women of the owning sub-clan, (4) commoners who claim residence in the village on mythological grounds or as part of hereditary service to the chief.

The husband's occupation is the main determining factor in the location of the new home. In farming communities the new family tends to locate patrilocally more often than matrilocally.

(2) *Composition of the typical household*

In monogamous families, husband, wife, and their younger children live together in a hut. Other relatives sometimes live with them.

Husband, wife, and their children until maturity live in the same home. Other relatives may live with them but this is regarded as undesirable.

(3) *The housing of adolescents and unmarried*

At puberty children leave their parents' home, especially the boys. Boys go to live in bachelors' quarters, girls to live with older maternal female relatives except when living with boys in the bachelors' quarters.

Adolescents tend to be segregated in special quarters, the bachelors' houses, of which there may be several in a village. These are located in the inner circle of the village with the storehouses, apart from the huts

Both boys and girls remain in the parental home till marriage or occupation takes them elsewhere. In the business classes boys leave sooner because their occupations more often take them away from home. In conservative groups it is regarded as desirable for the girl not to take an occupation which requires her leaving home, but to remain at home helping in housework and engaging in courtship with possible husbands under parental supervision.

of married couples. In these, unmarried youths, with some widowers and divorced men, live with their mistresses, whom they possess in temporary exclusiveness and do not share. These bachelors' houses are owned by groups of boys, the eldest being the titular owner. When liaisons break up, it is usually the girl who moves, to another bachelors' hut or to a home of her parents or maternal relatives.

(4) Domiciliary sex-segregation

There is no general segregation of the sexes in respect to living and sleeping arrangements. It is shameful for a boy and girl to eat together before marriage, though not to sleep together. After marriage there is no segregation of the sexes except in certain work activities.

A woman is separated from her husband during the last month of pregnancy and for a time after childbirth, living at her father's or maternal uncle's home. She may not eat with her husband during this period.

(5) Sex-segregation in play and public activities

Pre-pubescent boys and girls play together and also in groups of a single sex, according to inclination.

Adolescent youths and girls during the daytime and in public are mostly found in two separate groups.

While certain ceremonies are performed by one sex alone, there are few at which both sexes may

There are bachelors' quarters for unmarried young people, but these everywhere involve rigid segregation of the sexes. They are normally used only by persons working or studying in communities away from their parental homes.

There is a general, morally imperative, segregation of the sexes as to sleeping rooms from puberty through the rest of life, except for married couples. There is no sex segregation with respect to eating. It is not immoral or shameful for any male to eat alone with any female.

Segregation of the sexes in leisure and play is greatest between the ages 8 and 15, being less before and after this. At no time is it a rigid and general requirement; it is enforced, however, at certain schools and institutions. The ideology regards segregation in play and study from 12 to 18 as rather desirable.

There are practically no ceremonies or public occasions which exclude one sex either as performers

not appear together as onlookers. At garden-weeding, shellfish collecting, water-fetching, and childbirth, men are excluded.

or onlookers. There are one-sexed recreational organizations, but these are joined and attended by individual choice.

VI. Roles of the Sexes

(1) *Sex division of labor*

Exclusively masculine occupations are war, hunting, fishing, canoe-building, and overseas expeditions, trade with foreign tribes, wood-carving, tailoring their own clothing, heavy garden work, tree-tending, timber-cutting.

Exclusively women's occupations are shellfish collecting, cooking (except on expeditions and on special occasions), water-fetching, making mats, amulets, belts, garden-weeding, pig-tending.

Both sexes engage in the care of young children, the making of shell ornaments, nets, and water vessels.

Almost exclusively masculine occupations are the actual fighting in war, police work, seamanship, mining, lumbering, the metal industries, the heavier farm work, preaching, and the law.

Almost exclusively feminine occupations are most housework, especially cooking, sewing, and laundry, and the care of children.

All occupations legally, and the great majority morally, are open to both sexes, although one sex usually predominates heavily in numbers. Even in the almost exclusively one-sexed occupations, the sex limitation is less sentimentally valued than by most primitive peoples. The entrance of women into highly masculine occupations is resisted because of the chivalric attitude of protecting women from danger or hardship, and also by male jealousy of the increasing freedom of women. The entrance of men into highly feminine occupations is not resisted by the women but regarded as mildly shameful by both sexes.

The work of men is decidedly heavier than that of women, probably equal as regards hours, and probably greater in interest and excitement.

Women are especially numerous

The work of men is somewhat heavier and more monotonous than that of women.

in the lower mental occupations (clerical), in teaching, and nursing. They are relatively few in manual occupations except those in the home or those recently removed from the home to the factory. Women tend to be associated with textiles and foods, men with metals and wood products.

(2) Sex division of property

Certain kinds of property are peculiarly feminine, such as water vessels and the tools of feminine dressmaking. Weapons, nets, axes, dancing ornaments, canoes, live stock, and real estate are masculine properties. Each uses and repairs his own property in the home; property is not regarded as collective.

No particular kind of property is peculiar to either sex. All property is individual, and acquired through gift, inheritance, or purchase. Most of the household property is practically treated as family collective property although legal title to it is individual.

(3) Rank and power roles

Women exercise the same privileges and rituals of rank as do men, such as food taboos, receiving of salutes, wearing of ornaments.

They do not have political power, are never chiefs.

Women are regarded as the progenitors and as the original human beings. It is considered desirable to have a large number of women in the group.

Though there are no legally recognized ranks; social class prestige is enjoyed by women equally with men. Neither sex *ranks* above the other.

Women were excluded from political power but have recently been admitted to it, and hold some, but relatively few, high offices in government.

(4) Personal conflict and accommodation between the sexes

In personal quarrels physical violence is used by both sexes, women being more often the aggressors. There is no peculiar right of wife-beating nor special taboo against it.

The greater physical strength of man is socially institutionalized beyond its actual biological importance. By differential muscular training this becomes further increased. There are taboos against the use of physical force by men upon women, and against heavy physical labor by women. Wife-

beating is illegal and in most jurisdictions a ground for divorce. Husband-beating, on the other hand, is regarded humorously.

Neither sex has a superior legal right to use physical violence against the other. All violence by women is regarded as unwomanly, violence by men toward men as natural and manly, but subject to regulation, violence by men toward women as "unchivalrous" and cruel, and as requiring intervention by another man on the woman's behalf.

There is no right to kill anyone under any circumstances except in war, legal executions, and in certain self-defense situations.

A man may legally kill his wife for adultery but seldom does. Sometimes he or his kinsmen kill the paramour. He usually becomes reconciled to his wife.

There is no chivalric attitude or idea that women are morally superior, or entitled to more protection than men, except as regards pregnancy and childbirth.

Women tend to be excused more than men for all crimes except sex violations, for which they are in general punished more severely, by law or by public sentiment.

VII. The Role of Children

(1) *Location of responsibility for child care*

Father and mother both care for children, the father performing many intimate duties.

The mother gives most of the care to children at all ages. Older boys, however, receive some special attention from the father.

There is no cruelty toward children, nor infanticide.

A young child is chiefly under the care of its own parents.

Older children, the father, and female relatives often assist in the care of young children, but their role is secondary to that of the mother. In the business classes special servants and institutions take over some of the work of child care.

(2) *Discipline and power*

There is no idea of discipline or child-parent obedience. Either a

Children are disciplined, and trained with the ideal of absolute

parent or child may strike the other when angry, parents, however, treating the child according to his lesser strength. The idea of deliberate punishment of the child in cold blood is rejected.

The power of parents over children is informal and gradually wanes as they grow older.

(3) Emotional relations of elders and children

Parents have great affection for their children.

The father's affection is particularly notable. The relation of a boy to his father is always friendly and affectionate and without any element of coercion or discipline, whereas the relation of a boy to his maternal uncle is one of duty and obedience.

obedience to parents. Corporal punishment is used, ideally in cold blood; it must not be excessive or dangerous.

Parents have affection for their children, variously mingled with a desire to dominate them and to use them for the projection of their own ambitions. The mother's affection is supposedly and probably actually greater. Affection tends to be strongest between parent and child of opposite sex. The boy's attitude to his father is one of dutiful obedience often combined with a repressed jealousy, hatred, or rebellion. His attitude toward his mother is one of tender affection. Girls are more evenly divided as to parent pref-

(4) Labor role of children

Children and adolescents assist abundantly in the work of their elders but without responsibility or compulsion. They rest and play when they wish.

Children have minor duties in housework, and at the age of 14 or 16 may go to work outside the home to assist in family support. In farm life they assist with considerable responsibility. A sharp ideological line is drawn between work and play; all work is regarded as somewhat distasteful while all play tends to be useless for purposes beyond itself.

At maturity one is free to choose his own occupation and place of work.

(5) Adoption and foster parentage

Adolescents are readily transferred to the homes of kinsmen, and children are so transferred in the case of death of a parent, or if illegitimate. The adoption of a young child by other adults when his parents are living is, however, not usual, since there is a strong personal affection between parents and children.

Adoption and foster parentage are used only for children whose parents are dead or suffer from some economic or social disability. Biological parentage gives a proprietary right and responsibility which is seldom willingly surrendered.

(6) Specialized educational functions

There is no formal education of children by a special class of adults in special places. They learn the customs and practical knowledge of their elders through observation and informal contact.

All children from 7 to 14, and some of those from 4 to 7, and from 14 to 25, are educated by a specialist class of adults in special buildings during the greater part of the day. About 24 per cent of the total population are young persons attending school.

Boys and girls are not segregated during education except in certain kinds of schools patronized mainly by the upper classes.

(7) Pregnancy and birth rituals

There is an elaborate series of rituals attending pregnancy and childbirth. About the fifth month of the first pregnancy, a long fiber cloak is ceremoniously put upon the woman, attended by public bathing and magical adornment. These ceremonies are performed by women only, maternal kinswomen of her father. The ideology of this ceremony is that it whitens the woman's skin, which symbolizes and encourages the sexual abstinence which she must maintain, even as regards her husband, until after the child can walk. About the eighth month of any pregnancy she must go to the house of her

Pregnancy and childbirth involve no ritual, but only a scientific medical procedure. A midwife or a doctor is always called in at childbirth. More recently, childbirth is being transferred to hospitals, and more expert medical assistance is used.

father or maternal uncle. Many food taboos are placed upon the pregnant woman.

There is a brief ritual at the naming of the child, which ritual, ideologically, dedicates the child to the Deity and improves his status in the spirit world.

(8) The ritualization of puberty or maturity

There are no puberty ceremonies.

There are no general puberty ceremonies. There are ceremonies attending the movement of a child through the school system, regardless of age; ceremonies attending the joining of the church, which often occurs about the time of puberty; and ceremonies of social "debut" in the upper classes for girls near the age of 18. Changes of costume occur during early adolescence.

VIII. Love patterns and taboos

(1) Pre-pubertal amorous behavior

Sexual life begins among children of 5 to 10. These play erotic games in mixed groups, and retire in pairs to secluded spots in the bush for love-making to the extent that they are physiologically capable. Adults and parents do not interfere, but are complacently amused. It is not proper, however, for children to carry on these activities in the house.

All sexual behavior on the part of children is prevented by all means at the parents' disposal, although some masturbation takes place in secret. For the sake of prevention it has been usual to cultivate in the child, especially the girl, an attitude of horror or disgust toward all aspects of sex.

(2) Role of tender love and affection

The tender feeling is especially prominent between father and son, and strong between parent and child generally.

Tenderness between brother and sister, as well as sex, is immoral and abhorrent.

The tender feeling is especially prominent in mother toward infant, between mother and son, secondarily between brother and sister, and in any or all heterosexual pairs within the family group. There is also some homosexual tenderness among

the female family members, much less among the males. Tender feelings are in general encouraged and idealized. The attitude of a wife toward her husband should be primarily one of tenderness, that of the husband toward the wife should contain much tenderness but may include more passion (now changing).

(3) *Role of romantic (cardiac-respiratory) love*

In adolescence a great deal of excited or romantic love is associated with the sexual affairs. This romantic sentiment is conditioned to unusual situations, tribal festivities, the full of the moon, changes of costume, and perfumes. It is associated mainly with temporary sex relationships.

In adolescence, romantic or excited love without passion is idealized. Passion is felt, but even as a feeling it is disapproved in the girl. The romantic attitude, however, is encouraged, and idealized in literature. Actually the adolescent tends to experience a series of intense romantic relationships. Ideologically the intensity of the last and permanent affair which leads to marriage is overvalued and the previous relationships are made to suffer by comparison. The individual constructs a rationalization of his past love life which is satisfactory to him and his partner in the present, but which may depart considerably from reality. This rationalization is a compromise between adventure and wide experience on one hand and the ideal of permanent, exclusive love on the other.

Adventurous and novel situations are important as romantic stimuli.

(4) *Premarital sexual love*

In adolescence both boy and girl typically live through a series of passionate love affairs with sexual intercourse. These are carried on at first with a great deal of seclusion, but in later adolescence tend to be

Premarital intercourse is immoral though not abhorrent. It tends to acquire a forbidden-fruit value like that of intercourse with a classificatory "sister" (member of same sub-clan) in the Trobriands. Violations

more permanent affairs, less concealed, and carried on in the bachelors' quarters. There is no disapproval of these relations; they are sometimes carried on under the parental roof.

are supposedly prevented by the supervision of the girl's parents, the taboo on all-night absence, the general segregation of sleeping rooms, and the taboo upon nudity in the presence of the opposite sex. Being alone together in a sleeping room, or in the nude, or in certain specific costumes, is regarded as presumptive evidence of intercourse, although other situations equally facilitating intercourse are not so regarded.

In certain radical circles premarital intercourse is increasingly tolerated; in the more conservative groups the custom of chaperonage is still used to supervise premarital interaction. There has been a tendency to inculcate a sex-abhorrence sentiment in girls, which functions as a substitute for chaperonage.

A sharp moral distinction is drawn between completed intercourse and all preliminary sexual stimulation and behavior. The taboos upon the latter have relaxed much more than those on the former.

Sexual intercourse with the betrothed partner is less condemned than that with other persons, but is supposed to spoil the romance and to give the marriage a bad emotional start.

Tabooed sexual behavior is more severely condemned if it is distributed among several partners than if it is confined to a single illicit partner. Such multiple sex relations are much more severely condemned in girls than in boys. In boys they are secretly admired, in girls regarded as shameful.

Although sexual liaisons become more serious and lasting in later adolescence, both partners continue, however, to indulge in occasional free relations with others, until marriage. These relations with others than the now publicly known partner must be decorous and clandestine. One does not appear in public with, or show unconcealed interest in, another than the recognized

partner, and one shows some anger and jealousy at the partner's infidelities. Too frequent infidelity leads to breaking of the engagement.

(5) *Adultery*

Extra-marital intercourse of either a married man or married woman is regarded as improper and is typically reacted to by a display of anger by the injured party. How far this anger will go depends upon personalities and circumstances. It may lead to the killing of the unfaithful partner or paramour or his being driven by insults to suicide. Reconciliation is usual, however, and no special stigma fastens to the occasional adulterer, though the frequent adulterer may be publicly scorned.

Clandestine adultery is, however, frequent, especially during the absence of the mate. Female adultery is not so readily detected as among civilized groups because an untimely birth is never regarded as evidence thereof.

Extra-marital relations are probably more frequent, and less disapproved, on the part of married men than of married women.

Adultery with a chief's wife is especially desired and especially dangerous.

All adultery is taboo. Its legal consequences are the same in the case of an unfaithful husband as with an unfaithful wife, except in some states which judge the wife somewhat more severely. The offended party, if innocent himself, may secure divorce, but may not use physical violence upon the offenders. In the mores, however, adultery which involves a married woman is regarded as worse than that involving a married man and an unmarried woman. The man is often excused on the theory of his greater sexual need, while the woman is condemned on the theory that her adultery is pure wantonness. A basic motive is the man's fear of having children not his own in the family; a woman has no similar fear in case of her husband's adultery. A man's attitude toward his wife is more possessive than that of a wife toward her husband. There is also a code of personal superiority (honor and respectability) which forces a husband to react dramatically to his wife's adultery regardless of his inner feelings. To tolerate it meekly leads to his being held in contempt.

Here, too, a sharp moral line is drawn between completed intercourse and other sexual behavior, the latter being increasingly tolerated in extra-marital relations.

(6) Prostitution and the commercial aspects of love

There is no special class of prostitutes, though some men and women are notoriously more promiscuous than others.

There is a special class of commercial prostitutes. Ideologically these were supposed to act as a polyandrous safety valve for excess male passion and thus to enable the great majority of women to live within the sex mores. Prostitutes are socially degraded and sharply distinguished from virtuous women. Recently the distinction has become less clear. A new, intermediate, and more respected class of sexually free women is arising. These are neither wholly promiscuous nor wholly monogamous; some of their relations have commercial and some purely emotional aspects.

In all sex relations gifts are given by the man to the woman. In marriage his assistance to wife and in the care of children are regarded as paying for his sex privileges. Yet sexual relations are mutually desired and mutually satisfying. The gifts and services rendered by the man to the woman serve as symbols rather than as economic motives to induce the woman to sex relations.

(7) Occasions of special amorous license

Groups of adolescent boys, or girls, make occasional adventurous expeditions to other villages where they are entertained sexually by the girls or boys of that village. The actual sex relationships are by personal mutual choice and not indiscriminate. Such expeditions commonly lead to jealous quarrels between the boys of the two villages and between boys and their regular partners in each village.

There are no generally recognized times, places, or occasions which permit exceptions to the mores of intercourse. The person rather than the occasion is morally important. There are situations, however, which permit unusual secrecy or anonymity and therefore more violation of taboos. Violations are especially frequent in the case of men traveling away from home, and in large cities generally.

The individual boy, in love with a girl of another village, often goes there alone and by stealth to make rendezvous with her.

Inter-village sex relationships, established either by group expeditions or individual journeys, often lead to more permanent relationships or marriage.

On festive occasions certain erotic games are played in public by adolescents. At these there is some relaxation of the taboos which conceal amorous behavior.

Dancing is not by couples, and has no amorous significance.

Dancing is by couples and serves as an important erotic stimulus and as a means of social contact between the sexes. It permits a public intimacy of bodily contact not otherwise approved even in private, save between engaged or married couples.

There are no periods or occasions of sexual license participated in by married women, except, reputedly, in certain of the Southern islands, where public sexual orgies are said to occur.

(8) Sexual hospitality

Sexual hospitality, that is, the willing relinquishment of rights of sexual exclusiveness to visitors, occurs only in the case of unmarried girls, whose lovers permit them to entertain trading expeditions and visitors to a village mortuary wake. There is no sexual hospitality in marriage.

All sexual hospitality is taboo. It is more contemptible to tolerate the illicit intercourse of one's mate or persons under one's control than to commit it oneself. Even when a person tolerates or approves the physical unfaithfulness of his married or unmarried partner, he tends to assume the outward pose of ignorance rather than of knowing permission.

(9) Concealment of amorous behavior

The act of sexual intercourse is always concealed. The fact thereof

The act of sex is always concealed. But caressing, kissing, and

is also kept secret except as between unmarried lovers and their regular mistresses. Certain erotic gestures and contacts are permissible in public between unmarried adolescents on certain occasions and in games.

It is very shameful for a man and wife to show either erotic or affectionate behavior in public. The man may not even hold his wife's arm while walking with her. The supreme insult to a man is to mention verbally his sexual relations with his wife, although these are wholly proper.

(10) Sexual conversation, information, and symbolization

There is a great deal of sexual conversation and ribald joking, even where both sexes are present, but there are circumstances under which this must be restrained or refined in terms, as in the presence of people of rank. Personal reference to the sex life, licit or illicit of those present, is usually improper and insulting.

many forms of sexual stimulation are frequently carried on within the sight of others. The essential taboo seems to be upon any exposure of, or verbal reference to, the genital organs or their specific reactions. But a *stimulus* which arouses such reactions is not on that ground taboo, nor is there any taboo upon verbal reference to the feeling of passion, if expressed in non-genital terminology. There results a tendency to condition passion to many indirect stimuli, which both help and hinder normal sex behavior after this becomes legitimate.

Erotic behavior in public by a married couple is considered as an amusing superfluity but not shameful. Their affectionate behavior is idealized, often photographed, and used as a public symbol of faithful and virtuous love.

Sex, without personal reference to persons present or their friends, is a common topic of joking among groups of one sex, especially males, and also, with certain conventions of expression, before public audiences. In private mixed groups and unmarried couples sex joking and conversation have been strictly taboo, but this taboo is weakening.

Serious and purposive conversation about the details of sex has been, until recently, avoided, even between mates and between parent and child. Now this is becoming common and approved, but is still limited by taboos upon direct reference to the sex relations of particular persons.

It is more or less improper to refer even to the fact of a sexual relationship between two named persons, whether licit or illicit, except where the woman involved is a prostitute or known to be promiscuous, in which case the matter often leads to free and jocular conversation in male groups.

(11) *Sex in the arts*

The sex motive is completely absent in dancing and decorative art. Certain petty arts (making of string figures) are frankly sexual in their symbolism. Several folk tales deal with sexual incidents and some with incest. Art and folklore do not function as sublimations of repressed sex desire in general, but of specific sex repressions such as incest taboos and adultery taboos.

Sex is an important motive in most of the arts, being expressed usually through symbolisms and in terms of its non-physical aspects. Romantic love and parent-child affection are frequent themes. There is little artistic expression of perversions or of incest desires, but much of the desire for the more normal sex and romantic relationships both within and without marriage. Greater freedom to use sex for amusement is allowed on the stage before heterosexual audiences, or in literature, than in heterosexual conversation.

(12) *Modesty taboos*

The genitals are the central locus of modesty.*

The only everyday clothing worn is a pubic leaf by men and a short grass skirt by women. The removal of these is taboo in public, and normally involves sexual excitement or invitation. There is little variation in the modesty taboos. Men may be completely nude in a male group on a fishing expedition.

The genitals are the central locus of modesty.*

The modesty taboos until recently required the almost complete concealment of the body, but with great variations according to time, place, occasion, and fashion. The conflict in women between the desire to be sexually and socially attractive and the desire to avoid the shame of immodesty, is a conspicuous and absorbing phenomenon of social interaction. It leads to striking varia-

* Not true in all cultures. The exposure of navel, buttocks, mouth, or feet is sometimes equally or more immodest.

Personal beauty is cultivated by both sexes, but it is much used in the interest of economic and superiority motives as well as of sex motives.

tions of costume and to a most elaborate set of minor rules and taboos of dress. Feminine violations of modesty are stimuli to high emotional excitement, leading to moral condemnation and also to secret envy by other women and to the sexual stimulation of men. Among males the modesty taboos are much more constant. Male violations are regarded not as forbidden fruit, but more as an insult to women and a stimulus to the contempt of other men. The male body is dressed for respectability rather than beauty. Women are attracted by personality, strength, and ability, rather than by the esthetic qualities of men. On the other hand, in women, esthetic attractiveness is *the* main source of sexual attractiveness, and sexual attractiveness a main function of esthetic cultivation.

(13) Sex as a value

Sex experience in general, apart from the specific taboos, is regarded as inherently desirable for its own sake. Paradise is conceived as a place of free and esthetic sexual life. Considerable time is spent in love-making, and magic is used for its success. Skill in sexual intercourse is cultivated.

All sex experience is regarded as a concession to human weakness, as something of a lower order which may be used in the service of higher purposes, but is not inherently valuable. Paradise is non-sexual. The most idealized human experiences are not passionate, although they may involve romantic or tender love. Sexual intercourse itself tends to be brief, lacking in skill, unsatisfying to women, and divorced from the more ideal aspects of love. (The situation is changing.)

(14) Sexual initiative and success

Over-aggressiveness in sex is regarded as contemptible in either man or woman, but especially in woman.

Sexual aggressiveness is regarded as natural in men, shameful in women. Sexual intercourse with a

Unusual success in love on the part of a man, if not achieved by aggressiveness, but by magic and personality, is envied and often leads to the jealousy of other men.

Success in love affairs is attributed to the use of systems of love magic rather than to personality, ability, or appearance.

woman by force, against her will, except with a wife, is a major crime.

Success in love is attributed to beauty in the case of women, to physical strength and somewhat to beauty in the case of men, and to "personality" (attractive behavior) in both.

(15) *Sexual perversion*

True sexual perversions, as distinguished from erotic preliminary acts, are rare, and regarded with amusement rather than horror.

True perversions, found in a small but self-recognizing minority, are regarded by the majority with abhorrence. Variations in the erotic preliminaries of married intercourse have been regarded somewhat disgustedly as perversions, but are coming now to be regarded as legitimate and desirable.

There are defective and unattractive persons, older women, etc., with whom intercourse is regarded as disgusting and impossible.

(16) *Incest taboos*

Sexual intercourse of a man with a classificatory sister (member of same sub-clan) is immoral, but the taboo is often violated with the help of love magic. The violator may boast of it in certain circles and become the object of envy. Punishment of the act when publicly discovered varies with the conditions. If it provokes sufficient scandal it may lead to suicide of the violator. Commonly it is tolerated quietly. Legally and verbally the act is equivalent to incest with a real sister, but it is not actually abhorrent.

The relationship of a boy to his

Incest within three degrees of biological kinship is abhorrent. Beyond this degree forbidden sexual relations are immoral rather than abhorrent.

mother is one of affection and bodily contact, gradually diminishing with age.

Abhorrence attaches to mother-son or father-daughter incest, but these are regarded as unnatural and unlikely. No great psychological conflict seems to occur with reference to them as with reference to brother-sister relations, which carry a much greater horror. To refer to possible mother-incest is only a mild insult bordering upon a joke.

Chief's sons frequently have adulterous relationships with their father's wives other than their own mothers. The reaction varies with circumstances; there is no strong taboo.

It is immoral for a man to have sex relations with his wife's sister, mother, or other near female kin, and also with his brother's wife. These taboos are additional to the general adultery rules and the exogamous rules.

The strictest taboo upon actual sex relationships is the brother-sister taboo. This is a matter of abhorrence, not merely of immorality or illegality. A man must not look at his sister, nor must he know anything about her love affairs or her contemplated marriage. Yet he is her guardian and protector and provides her with food throughout life.

A myth of brother-sister incest is one of the important parts of the tribal mythology. It portrays the incestuous relation as having some innate and secret desirability but always abhorrent.

To mention the possibility of sex relations with his sister is the second worst insult to a man. To say

The strictest horror taboo is upon mother-son incest.

There are no taboos upon affectionate love, and there is some privileged familiarity of social relationships within the family group. The incest horror taboo alone is trusted to prevent these privileged relationships from becoming sexual.

There are psychoanalytic and mythological evidences of a rather general repressed incestuous desire toward parents and siblings of opposite sex. Mother-son incest coupled with son-father hatred is the most typical pattern.

that he resembles his sister is also a serious insult. To call attention to his resemblance to his brother or other maternal kinsmen is insulting. But it is quite permissible to remark upon resemblances of a person to his father or paternal kinsmen, although there is believed to be no biological connection.

(17) *Avoidances and familiarities*

There must be extreme avoidance between brother and sister and special decorum of behavior between persons of the same sub-clan who are of opposite sex.

The relation between a man and his father's sister or the latter's daughter is privileged. It is symbolic of all that is sexually lawful; it permits intercourse, even when the woman is married. The presence of such paternal kinswomen suggests license and calls for sexual joking. One's sister, who suggests the opposite, should never be present at the same time.

The incest taboo is not supported by rules of social avoidance; on the contrary, unusual familiarity of social contact obtains between close relatives, whose sex relations would be incestuous.

There are no privileged familiarities save those of close kinship and of voluntary friendships.

There are no general taboos on the choice of friends. Married persons may have friends of the opposite sex but must avoid all appearance of sexual, romantic, or other love which involves bodily contacts.

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* Starred items are of more general importance.

CHAPTER II

BASIC DEFINITIONS: CULTURE AND THE SUBCULTURAL

1. MAN

Man versus Culture.—Is human nature different as between Trobrianders and Americans? Does heredity or environment cause their differences?

What do we mean by "human nature"? What do we mean by "cause"? Since "human nature" is an ambiguous term, we had best avoid it. Most sociologists substantially agree on the following points. First, races and peoples obviously differ in physical characteristics, and probably differ in temperament, that is, in those general characteristics of behavior which depend upon anatomy, gland physiology, blood chemistry, and so on. Such traits as quickness versus slowness, overactivity versus sluggishness, cheerfulness versus sadness, are at least partly temperamental. These biological and temperamental differences are or may be inherited through the germ plasm. Second, the above-mentioned, inheritable differences have nothing to do with differences in customs, social organization, values, or ways of thinking. All of these latter characteristics are, like languages and material tools, *external* to man himself; they are parts of culture or civilization. Any known culture could be practiced by any known race or people. If Trobriand infants could be exchanged at birth for American infants, each would acquire as readily as he does now the habits, customs, beliefs, attitudes, and values of the society in which he is *reared*, just as he would acquire its language. There would be no inborn tendency to "revert" to the culture of his unknown biological parents.

We may compare a human race to a piano, and its culture to the piece that is played upon it. Pianos, to be sure, differ somewhat in their structure (anatomy). In consequence, they differ also in the quality of sound produced (temperament). But the musical composition which may be played upon a piano has nothing to do with the quality of the instrument itself. Any composition of the species "Euro-American piano music" can be played upon any normal piano

of the species "Euro-American standard piano"; no individual piano within these limits has any special predilection for any special kind of composition.

Phenomena Occur in Patterns of Several Different Orders.—Modern science views the phenomena of the world as patterns or configurations. A piano is a certain space-pattern or arrangement of wood and metal. A musical composition is a time-pattern, a sequence of sounds. *Some* piano is indeed essential to the production of the music, but any piano will do. If we wish to learn why this particular piano sounded out this particular composition, we cannot find the answer by examining the piano itself. Instead, we find the answer in the printed sheet of music before the player, or in the pattern of the perforated roll inserted in the automatic player mechanism. By the same token, the behavior of a human being could not exist without the living human body which produces it; but the pattern of his behavior has nothing to do with his constitutional characteristics. His behavior pattern is like a piece played upon a musical instrument. It is determined by two sets of environmental patterns: first, the culture in which he is reared; second, the history of his peculiar individual experiences. These environmental or experience patterns register themselves upon his brain in the form of minute pathway patterns, which are acquired and subject to change, not inherited.

Structure, Function, and Change.—Patterns may be classified into: (1) patterns of structure, (2) patterns of function or short-time process, (3) patterns of change or long-time process. Structure is what *is*; function is what the structure *does*, usually repeatedly within a limited time period; change is what *happens* to both structure and function over a long period of time. Again, there are two *realms* which must be considered for the present, the individual and the social. Both are phases of the larger realm of life, called the *organic*. (As we shall note later, there is also an *inorganic* and a *superorganic realm*.) Each of the three kinds of patterns applies in the study of each realm, giving us altogether six groups of pattern-concepts. These are:

Individual structure	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{anatomy (constitution, largely inherited)} \\ \text{personality (minute brain pathways determining behavior)} \end{array} \right.$
Individual function	— behavior
Individual change	$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{growth (a biological process, determined by inner chemistry)} \\ \text{learning (determined by environment or experience)} \end{array} \right.$

- Social structure or relationships
- Social function — interaction processes
- Social change processes

In both realms, structure determines function. There can be no functioning without a structure, and no functioning of a kind which the structure is not built to produce. Function, however, influences the structure which produces it. It may leave this structure relatively unchanged so that it can continue functioning indefinitely in the same pattern, or it may change the structure. In the latter case we have a change process.

The bodily structure and the *gross* nervous structure of an individual change through the growth process. The *minute* nervous structure and the behavior patterns which are determined by it change through the learning process. The growth process is largely governed from within, although it may be influenced by food and disease. It consists in physical and chemical changes which are more or less generalized throughout the body. The learning process, on the other hand, is governed mainly from without, by environment. Environment does not govern learning through any direct physical contact. It does so only through the *stimuli* and *combinations of stimuli* which it provides, and only those which actually register upon the individual's sense organs. Thus growth is fairly predictable and more or less the same in all individuals, whereas learning or behavior change is unpredictable, depending upon the chance combinations of events in the environment.

Learning is possible because of a certain power which these minute brain patterns possess *to be changed* by stimuli.

Conditioning.—The most elementary pattern in the general learning process is conditioning. The general nature of this pattern has been known since the Greeks, but it was Pavlov who first gave it scientific precision, in his experiments upon dogs.

An animal, for example, is suddenly confronted with a red light. He makes no reaction beyond the ordinary reactions of attention (turning the eyes, moving the ears, inhibiting other movements temporarily, etc.). These attention reactions we ignore; they are immaterial to the problem. Let this same animal be given an electric shock. To this stimulus he makes a very specific reaction, he jumps, draws back the stimulated limb, and so on. Now suppose that on several occasions the red light is flashed at or about the same instant that the shock is given. The animal of course reacts as he always does to the electric shock. Now let us try the red light without the shock. Our animal reacts as if the shock were given. He has trans-

ferred a reaction which formerly was connected to the shock alone, to the red light with which it originally had no connection. A new pathway has been formed in his nervous system, called a **conditioned reflex**. The electric shock was the **original stimulus**, the light the **conditioned stimulus**.

Conditioning, of course, requires that there be some original stimulus-reaction connection to begin with. These original or inborn connections are relatively few and simple. They are called **reflexes** proper.

By this process of conditioning simple inborn reflexes develop into acquired attitudes, sentiments, interests, likes, and dislikes; blind drives and urges become wishes with definite goals and purposes; new experience is gained; techniques of living are learned; attitudes change; wishes acquire substitute goals; the unorganized behavior of the infant becomes the personality of the adult.*

Behavior and Personality.—Behavior itself is function or process. It is something which *takes place*, rather than something which *is*. Yet, as we have seen, it depends upon minute structural patterns in the nervous system. These are not structures in the sense used by the neurologist; they cannot be identified by dissection and the microscope. They may consist in infinitesimal space relations between nerve endings at the synapses, or among certain molecules and atoms in the nervous tissue analogous to the molecular arrangements which distinguish a magnetic from a non-magnetic substance. The exact nature of such structure is unknown. All that we know is that *some* structural change goes with every change in function. Great differences in function may be determined by infinitesimal differences in structure. The hypothetical structural pattern which determines the whole behavior of a person is called his *personality*. Personality is thus the structural, or "is"-aspect; behavior is the functional, or "does"-aspect. In practice "personality" seems to mean about the same thing as "total behavior." However, it emphasizes potential behavior rather than the behavior which actually takes place. Thus a man's personality may be said to be courageous even though for years he

* Throughout the whole learning process and the development of personality, a principle operates which may be called the **principle of psychic economy**. This, in essence, means that changes of behavior occur in the direction which gives the most satisfaction or pleasure, or the least pain or dissatisfaction. Thorndike calls it the "Law of Effect." It may be simply an aspect of conditioning, in connection with inborn emotional patterns. A full discussion is given in the author's *Social Psychology*, Chapters II and III (see general references at end of this chapter). Compare also Freud's "pleasure" and "reality" principles (this book, Chapter III, ref. 8, Healy, p. 58).

has no opportunity to show courageous behavior. Courageous personality means that he *would* behave courageously if the appropriate situation were to present itself. When we say "would behave" we mean something more than a metaphysical abstraction. We mean that there is a real, material structure within his nervous system which is so built as to produce that behavior upon the proper stimulus.

Personality may be thought of as composed of wishes, attitudes, and habits of movement. A wish is the organization of pathways toward a goal. It is not the pathways involved in some particular act, but a larger system of pathways guiding many acts. What gives it its unity and cohesion is the goal.

An attitude is also a neural pathway pattern, latent or inactive part of the time, but ever ready to guide behavior when the appropriate stimulus arises. It is defined by the psychologist as an incipient or abbreviated act, perhaps a gesture, as a tendency to act or feel in a certain way toward something. It is that state of "being all set" to act in a certain way. Attitudes are the master keys to the multifarious and specific acts which we carry out in our daily behavior. An attitude differs from a wish in that it is not necessarily organized around a goal, but around any situation or stimulus, any object or phase of the environment. Attitudes and wishes cross-section each other, so to speak. When an attitude involves potential emotional reactions centered about some object, it is frequently called a sentiment or sentiment-attitude.

Kinds of Goals or Satisfactions, the Four Wishes.—A goal is never a mere object, but always an object (or situation) *in a certain relation* to the self. This relation as well as the object is necessary to satisfy the wish. Thus, to say that a person's goal is water, that he wishes water, is vague. He may wish to drink water, to see a body of water, to swim in water, or he may be looking for some water to put out a fire. Here are at least four kinds of goals: thirst satisfaction, esthetic contemplation, athletic exercise, and an instrumental goal. An instrumental goal is one which does not in itself give satisfaction, but is merely a step toward a further goal. The man who seeks water to put out the fire may be wishing the personal honor of doing a valiant and helpful deed, or he may be seeking someone's physical safety, or perhaps he has merely neglected to take out fire insurance.

W. I. Thomas classifies human wishes under the following four heads.¹ Common synonyms are given for each.

Security: safety, certainty, relief from anxiety.

New experience: adventure, novelty.

Recognition: superiority, ego-satisfaction, victory, attainment of status, ambition.

Response: love, personal intimacy, fellowship. Includes sex satisfaction.

These are not four specific wishes, but four types of satisfaction. They are not even four types of objects, but four types of relation between self and object.

Thomas' theory is that all four of these types of satisfaction must be achieved in order to permit a happy, adjusted personality, and that satisfactions belonging to one of the four classes cannot be substituted for those in another class. This is true, but it does not go far enough. If a person can be assured some one recurring and satisfying experience in each of these four fields, he will not necessarily be happy and well adjusted. Individuals differ greatly in their *specific* goals, and every one of several specific goals may be essential to happiness. One man gains superiority satisfaction only through business; another has staked his whole ego upon being successful as a Don Juan. To one woman, security means chiefly a bank account; to another, knowing just where her husband is after working hours. One girl's wish for new experience is satisfied if she can see a new moving picture every week. Another must do this and also see it with a different escort. Another may require five different types of experience to satisfy this wish adequately. To one man a good wife is sufficient response satisfaction; a second is unhappy without frequently seeing his mother also; a third may want a mother, a wife, and a mistress.

Each personality, indeed, is a unique *pattern of specific wishes*. We may get some idea of this pattern by asking the person to describe what he considers a completely satisfactory year of life, and asking him to describe a completely satisfactory week-end. Two persons may have *equally strong* wishes for love: yet one may wish love as a daily experience, another may wish to enjoy it intensively at intervals and to put it utterly out of his mind during the intervening time. One person craves to have his adventures thrust upon him by surprise, another to seek them deliberately at certain times and to avoid them at others.

2. SOCIETY

Social Interaction and Social Structure.—The individual is not the highest organization, the largest unit, of *life*. Consider the flock

of wild geese in the sky. They behave as a unit. They always fly in this characteristic, wedge-shaped formation. The identity of the leader may change, they may change places, but the formation is still kept. Here is something that our military drill masters yearn for and seldom get in such perfection. Certainly these birds are not many but one! Such is an "interaction pattern."²

Burgess has called the family "a unity of interacting personalities," and much of the important research on the family, particularly that promoted by the University of Chicago, uses this as its background picture.² The relationship between the behavior of one individual and that of others is known as social interaction. Interaction, like behavior, is a pattern of function or short-time process; but it belongs to the social and not the individual realm.

Although the same words are often used in both senses, we must carefully distinguish between behavior and interaction. Behavior can be practiced only by an individual. Of course several individuals can behave in the same way at the same time. This may or may not involve interaction. Interaction never refers to the behavior of an individual, but to the *relation* between his behavior and the behavior of others. *Quarreling* and *conflict* are interaction concepts. No individual can quarrel by himself, nor can he quarrel with another if the other makes no resistance. When he does succeed in quarreling, the word "quarrel" does not describe his *behavior*. This may be fisticuffs, or spoken words, or letter writing. Neither does "quarrel" imply merely that two persons are behaving in the same way. They may behave in very different ways. A very successful family quarrel may be conducted by one standing and screaming with rage, and the other coolly sitting in a chair and making sarcastic remarks. "Quarrel" refers simply to the fact that each intentionally and directly *opposes* the other.

As behavior is to personality, so is interaction to social relationships or social structure. Interaction, like behavior, is a process which varies with the moment. But there are certain stable, long-run characteristics of the interaction among a group of persons, which may be regarded as structural. They are structural in fact, because they con-

* Interaction patterns or processes include, among others, competition, conflict, rivalry, mutual gratification, accommodation, and assimilation. For definitions see Folsom, *Social Psychology* (references at close of this chapter), Chapters VII-IX, and Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Society*, University of Chicago Press. The most important point is the distinction between competition and conflict.

sist in certain constant relationships among the neural pathway patterns of the several individuals. We may imagine the pathway system of the individual to be extended and to make contact with those of other individuals through the medium of *interstimulation*. Then the whole group of individuals becomes a structural pattern of *potential interaction*. They may not be acting at the moment, but we know that their individual attitudes are "all set" to bring about a certain interaction whenever a precipitating stimulus occurs.

We see a family of five, for example, enter a railroad car and take somewhat separated seats as best they can. To all appearances they are merely so many separate individuals, no more closely interrelated than are others in the car. But let the mother open a lunch box and the group immediately assumes a certain arrangement, the children gathering eagerly around the mother, the father urging them to go back to their seats and to await orderly distribution. When the father makes a move indicating the approach to their destination, the others become attentive, put on their hats, and follow him. In other words, even during their apparent isolation there existed a social structure among them, consisting of neural pathway relations, which was "set" and "ready" to determine a definite form of interaction.

Dr. Jacob Moreno of the New York State Training School for Girls at Hudson has reported a most interesting graphic method of describing another form of social structure pattern within a group of 500 girls. Each person is represented by a point. A red line from *A* to *B* with an arrow pointing toward *B* indicates that *A* likes *B*. A black line represents dislike, a blue line indifference. Seven thousand inter-personal lines appear on the chart. Such a chart represents potential interaction, in other words, social structure. The name "psychological geography" has been applied to it.⁸

There are processes of change in social structure and social interaction, analogous to the change processes of growth and learning in the individual realm. These will be discussed at length in Chapter VII.

Interaction Is Both Cause and Effect of Personality Differences.—If we put two strong, vigorous male animals together, especially in a group with females, there will, in many species, be severe fighting. The conflict does not continue indefinitely, however. Sooner or later one becomes dominant and the other submissive. We say that a polarization of behavior has taken place, one going to one extreme, the other to the other. The change of behavior from attacking and attempted dominance to quiet submissiveness takes place, like any other behavior change, through the learning process. Repeated inflictions of pain by the victor condition the defeated individual against

further aggression. He becomes trained to submissive behavior because this proves to be the most successful escape from the unpleasant situation. The victorious animal, on the other hand, learns that a little more show of aggressiveness forces the other into submission and thus offers the least painful solution for himself. A little less aggressiveness leads to new challenges by the other and hence to renewal of unpleasantness.

What determines which animal shall be the victor? Relative strength or energy, other things being equal. But the accidents of the first encounter may have a great deal to do with the final outcome. Whichever animal incurs the greater pain during the first few fights is likely to become conditioned toward submissiveness.

Similar processes are observed in human groups. An investigator, observing nursery school children, found one child who was the leader in 95 per cent of all the group situations in which he participated, while another was leader in only 5 per cent. Thus the first was getting about 19 times as much training in leadership per day as the other. *Slight* original differences in energy or motivation may lead to great differences through learning. Chance differences in behavior at the outset may assign several persons to their permanent roles in the interaction process. Repeated performance of an interactional role changes the behavior pattern of the individual, makes it more constantly and accurately adapted to the role. Thus, interaction itself determines the growth of personality. Individuals become specialized in personality through their interaction with one another.

If the male animals which were placed together had both been much smaller and weaker the same results would have occurred. An interaction pattern depends upon the *differential* between two individuals rather than upon any absolute characteristic of either.

It is only in a few kinds of interaction patterns such as mob action that the several individuals behave in the same way and reinforce one another through similarity. Most interaction processes involve *differentiation* or specialization of the behavior patterns of the participating individuals. Such differentiation may be only temporary, as when one becomes the speaker and others the listeners at a family party. Or it may be a cumulative and permanent differentiation, as when one spouse becomes gradually more talkative or assertive, the other more quiet or submissive. Again, the differentiation may be the cause or the effect of the interaction process. Usually it is both, as in the examples presented above.

3. CULTURE

Tools or Artifacts.—As a result of human behavior and human interaction arise two new types of phenomena quite unknown in the subhuman world. One is the tool or artifact. The sum total of tools or artifacts made by mankind, from the simplest chipped flint arrowhead to the Empire State Building and television apparatus, is known as the **material culture** of mankind. Material culture also is patterned. Each tool, each machine, each building has its characteristic pattern by which its parts are combined. There are also patterns in which these individual tools are arranged in reference to one another. Thus, we have the typical arrangement of the *farm* with its various buildings and fields; and of the *city*, with its skyscrapers in the center surrounded by a retail business area, then by flat and apartment-house areas, and finally by the single-family house area on the outside. We have typical patterns of furniture arrangement in a living room, of seats in a theatre, and so on.

Symbols.—The other new type of phenomenon which arises as a result of human behavior and interaction is the symbol. The simplest type of symbol is the spoken word. This, like a tool, is a direct product of behavior, but it functions in a different way. Its usefulness lies not in its effect upon the material environment, but in its power to communicate.

Symbols may be used correctly, or incorrectly, as when one says, "Them ain't by home." But if one uses the correct language pattern, "They are not at home," it is still possible that he may be lying. In other words, he may be communicating a false thought-pattern by a correct language-pattern.

Thought-patterns, systems of thought, or **ideologies**, are the larger systems of symbols (thought, spoken, or written) by which human behavior is guided. The relation of a word to the object it represents, and the relations of one word to another, belong to the language system. The relation between an inter-word relationship and the inter-object relationship it represents belongs to the thought system. Religious philosophies, sciences, and "practical wisdom" are thought systems. The body of systematic knowledge in a book or in a man's mind, and a fictional narrative, are thought systems or parts thereof. Most thought systems are acted upon as representations of reality. Some, however, are false pictures of reality, acted upon as if they were true. Others are recognized frankly as imaginary.

Culture, Rather Than Man, the New Departure of Evolution.

—For untold eons the processes of inorganic evolution (change) went onward. There was no life. Then, when a certain stage of complexity had been reached, there emerged a new form of structure, the **organism**, and its new kind of process, **life**. Organisms continued to change slowly toward greater complexity; this process we call organic or biological evolution. Evolution led finally to Man. Man, at least until the time of Darwin, considered himself a "new deal" in the process of evolution, a leap to a higher plane, in the sense that the first one-celled organism was an utterly new kind of phenomenon. When biologists demonstrated the continuity of evolution from one organic form to another, there was great consternation among thinking men. Was man, after all, merely a more advanced animal, and nothing more? If so, was there a higher form of life still to evolve?

The discovery of biological evolution temporarily obscured a greater truth of which man had long been aware, but which he had never been able to express very well. Modern sociology and anthropology are reviving that old truth again and giving it a scientific validity. Namely, man does represent a new deal in evolution, but this innovation of nature does not lie in man as a physical structure, nor in the processes of man's body. The new phenomenon is a *product* of man. It is **culture**, or the **superorganic**.^{*4}

The essence of the superorganic is tools and symbols. Nothing of this order has ever existed before. Man may or may not prove to be the last step in the process of organic evolution; that process goes on so slowly that within the brief span of history it is difficult to observe any great degree of change. But at some point in the biological history of man, human behavior and interaction processes gave rise to a new evolutionary process on a superorganic plane. *This* process is proceeding with comparative speed. We have the archeological records of superorganic evolution from the flint pick and the fire drill to the radio and the airplane.

"Non-Material" Aspects of Culture.—Culture includes in addition four kinds of phenomena which are not artifacts or symbols. They are: (1) certain behavior-patterns; (2) certain attitudes, wishes, or personality-patterns; (3) certain interaction-patterns; (4) certain social-structure-patterns. Yet these classes of phenomena belong to the individual and social organic realms. They existed among animals, before there was any culture.

* Animals apparently transmit some traits of behavior imitatively from generation to generation, and hence may be said to possess rudimentary cultures. Practically, however, culture is peculiarly human.

Thus, the realm of culture or the superorganic seems to overlap somewhat the organic realm, although it is clear that certain phases of culture, such as tools, are wholly in the superorganic realm. The distinction between culture and non-culture will become clear, however, when we consider the process of *imitation*.

Imitation Distinguishes the Cultural from the Subcultural.—The real question is, *what* behavior, interaction, etc., is cultural or superorganic, and what belongs to the individual or social organic realm? What is the test? The real distinction is this: if any given behavior, or interaction, becomes standardized, if it is repeated or reduplicated by many persons, in other words, if it becomes a model for more or less wholesale imitation, then it is cultural. If on the other hand it is not generally imitated, but arises spontaneously on each occasion, independently of other occasions, it is subcultural.

There are two ways in which a widespread trait or pattern of human behavior or interaction may arise. First, it may be produced independently in a great many places by the human bodily structure and the structure of the environment because these conditions which produce it are similar in a great many places. Second, it may be produced by chance combinations of circumstance in only one or a few places, but from there may spread by imitation to other places. If its origin be of the first type, we may call the trait *subcultural*; if of the second type, *cultural*. Actually there is no sharp dividing line between the two. But the extreme cases are easily distinguished. The nursing of a child by its mother and the seeking and following of the mother by the child are extremely subcultural. The practice of the couvade (described below) and the customs of chivalry are extremely cultural.

Roughly speaking, a universal trait is apt to be subcultural and a subcultural trait tends to be universal. The correspondence is not perfect for two reasons. First, a trait, if it originated early enough, may have become universal through world-wide diffusion from one single point of origin. The alphabet, for example, is almost universal among literate peoples, yet has been proved to have originated at a single source. The same may be true of some behavior and interaction traits, but proof is lacking because we cannot trace the history of such traits as easily as we can the history of symbol traits. Second, a trait may be subcultural but yet limited to a particular kind of environment. Traits arise not out of the human bodily structure alone, but also from the interaction of that structure with the environment. It is possible that the use of floating logs to cross streams is subcultural,

but of course it can occur only where there are logs and streams. In general, if a trait be universal *within a particular kind of environment*, it is probably subcultural. If, however, it be limited to a certain area, and absent in other areas where the physical environment is similar, the trait is probably cultural. Eating bananas is probably subcultural, although limited to a banana-producing environment. But tending herds is cultural; it does not occur everywhere that such animals occur. The Chuckchi tend herds of reindeer. The Eskimo, in a similar environment, hunt them wild, but do not domesticate them.

“Subcultural” expresses the meaning which many people intend by the term “instinctive.” “Instinctive,” however, is a misleading term. It implies that the given trait is set up in the neural pathway structure by the growth process. Such is not true of the great majority of subcultural traits. They are much more complex than is any biologically organized behavior pattern. Walking, and other patterns of the same order of simplicity, may be instinctive. But fighting, gregariousness, and love-making are of a higher order of complexity. They involve conditioned reactions; they are arrived at only through learning.

In brief, the subcultural differs from the cultural not in that it is necessarily universal, nor that it is inborn rather than acquired. The subcultural is all that is inborn plus all that is acquired, *independently of imitation or tradition*, by a group from its own experience with its environment and with group life, and which does not become a model for imitation by another group or generation.

(1) *Behavior Patterns*.—We see a man carrying a large package. He holds it with one arm and hand against his chest. On a long trip the fatigue of certain muscles may lead him to shift the weight to his shoulder or his head, still holding the package with one hand. This behavior is quite spontaneous. It is the result of his own trial-and-error learning. We learn these muscular techniques individually and independently. We are guided only vaguely by watching others. Each man has his own walk, and his own technique of carrying burdens, differing slightly from that of others. Such a behavior pattern, therefore, is subcultural. In so far as it is similar between one man and another, the similarity is a result of body structure, weight of object, and similar conditions of learning.

But now suppose we see a man carrying a heavy burden skilfully balanced on his head, without touching it with his hand. This behavior, though it requires longer practice to learn, could be, and probably is, learned by some individuals independently and uniquely. It

could be subcultural. However, a traveler in Italy sees working people repeatedly and predominantly carrying burdens on their heads. In central Europe he sees practically everyone carrying burdens upon their backs, walking in stooped posture. *Uniformity* of behavior *within a region* or a well-defined group of persons, coupled with consistent differences *between regions* or groups, indicates culture. Indeed, it is possible, as one travels northward, to see the head-balancing behavior fade out gradually, just as the olive tree and the Italian language fade out, to be replaced by other organic and superorganic patterns.

(2) *Interaction Patterns*.—A couple of two-year-olds are tugging violently upon a toy pail, each trying to take it away from the other. Angry screaming emerges from both. One occasionally frees a hand from the pail and uses it to beat the other child. Here is an interaction pattern of the conflict species. It is probable that neither child is influenced very much by having seen other children fight for a toy. Each behaves according to his own individual trial-and-error experience. The interaction ceases or changes when one gets tired; or a third party brings a new stimulus into the situation. Farther down the beach one may see another pair of children fighting over a toy. The interaction pattern there is similar in some respects to the preceding, in other ways different. Both similarities and differences are determined by the individual conditions. The interaction is mainly subcultural.

But when older persons fight, one sees certain definable and regular uniformities within definable groups. Boys commonly fight with fists; girls seldom do. In certain immigrant groups men habitually beat their wives and the wives answer with words and tears. In the American business class marital conflict is "simply not done" that way; but there are acceptable forms of sarcastic dialogue, of going to one's room and locking the door, of walking out of the house in haughty pride. In China a mistreated wife is privileged to cry out her wrongs from the housetops, an effective weapon with which the overbearing husband must reckon. Again, a wronged party may deal an unanswerable blow by committing suicide on the doorstep of the wrongdoer. These interaction patterns are obviously cultural. When a spontaneous subcultural interaction becomes customary or cultural, it is sometimes said to become institutionalized.

(3) *Personality and Attitude Patterns: Values*.—Certain phases of every personality are cultural. One can see in his physician, for example, the "typical doctor" pattern of attitudes, habits, and verbal phrases, even though the great bulk of the man's personality is quite

unique. There is the "American" personality with its typical American attitudes, even though it be only a small fraction of the total personality of any American. Quite uniformly, for example, American men hate to be kissed, even on the cheek, by another man, while with Frenchmen, quite uniformly, another attitude prevails.

Each of us has many attitudes peculiar to himself, such as a unique sentimental fondness for a certain spot on the map, associated with his past history. Again, each of us has attitudes which he shares with a certain number of other persons, but which he developed quite independently of those other persons. Someone may have an attitude of extreme interest in photography; somebody in the next street may have a similar attitude, and they may get together in an amateur photographers' club. But the attitude is essentially personal or individual, and the club is merely the segregation or selective assembly of persons who happen to have the same personal attitude in this one matter. It is not an attitude which is common to a whole family, or to most of the members of a church, or to the members of a community, or to any *pre-existing* group of persons.

Other attitudes are common to all or most of the members of some pre-existing group; that is, a group which existed before the attitude and was not formed by the gathering together of people who already had the attitude. Such may be called **group attitudes**. These exist, like personal attitudes, only *in* individual personalities, not in some mystical group-as-such. But they differ from personal attitudes in that they are established and preserved in each member through his interaction with the other members. The interest in photography would become a group attitude if the photographers' club were to bring in new members lacking the interest and then proceed to develop that interest in them, or if it made efforts to preserve the enthusiasm of old members who were drifting away. Groups which have important group attitudes are families; religious sects; occupational groups such as doctors, lawyers, and farmers; social classes; groups which have been through a common experience, such as the veterans; gangs; colleges and schools; political parties and groups. Group attitudes are held also by whole regions, such as "The South"; by whole nations; and finally by large or small culture-areas, such as "Euro-American-Christian civilization," or "South China," or the "Plains Indians."

A cultural attitude is a group attitude of any group which can be said to have a culture of its own distinct from that of other groups. No uniform delimitation of such a "cultural group" can be

made; the boundaries will vary according to the phenomena we wish to study or compare. In some respects even a single family may be regarded as having its own unique cultural attitudes, but generally speaking the term is used mostly with reference to much larger groups of human beings, and particularly regional or national groups, or whole "peoples." The object or goal of a cultural attitude is a cultural value.

For example, most of the American business class, comprising 20 to 25 per cent of the population, probably shares an attitude of disapproval toward a man's coming to dinner in his vest and shirt sleeves, whereas most of the farming and working class feels no such distaste. Here is a genuine culture-attitude difference, although the picture is of course blurred somewhat by the numerous members of each class who, partly from *personal* taste, have adopted the cultural attitude of the other class in this respect. Again, nearly all Americans abhor the polygamist, while most Chinese regard him as simply more fortunate or wealthy than his fellows.

The Concept of Culture Destroys the Distinction between Artificial and Natural.—"Culture" has become, through the work of anthropologists and, later, sociologists, a most important scientific concept. At the same time, our concept of "nature" has grown wider. Nature used to mean the realms of phenomena below human activity, and was divided into inorganic (physico-chemical) and organic (biological realms). After explaining the biological structure and evolution of man as an animal, "natural" science stopped. Then later, the study of the behavior of individual human beings, known as psychology, became scientific, and so man's "mind" came to be regarded as a part of nature as much as his "body." Finally, the relationships of human beings to one another and the cultural products of their behavior have come to be regarded as no more "unnatural" than the preceding phenomena. With this inclusion, the term "nature" becomes too broad to be useful. There is no observable phenomenon which is not a part of nature. Phenomena may be classified simply as inorganic, organic, or superorganic; they are all natural in the original sense of the word. The ruin of an ancient stone temple is as much a product of natural forces and as available to scientific study as is the buried skeleton of a mastodon or a vein of coal between two strata of shale.

The term "human nature" has also become vague and confusing. It originally meant those parts of human behavior and personality which were determined by the growth process, the inborn parts. After the modern discoveries of animal and child psychology, this definition

was found to leave a pitifully meager content for "human nature." So some psychologists revised the definition to include some of the results of learning as well. The real distinction which is meant when people use this term is the distinction between the subcultural and the cultural phases of human personality. It is not the distinction between heredity and environment. The subcultural or "human nature" phases include much more than heredity. They include the learned results of *universal experiences*.

The Origins of Culture: Invention.—A culture may have certain traits which are unique and original with that culture, and not imitated from another culture. Still, these have been imitated by the present generation of people in that society from the previous generation. But how about the first generation which ever practiced some culture trait? Each culture trait does have an origin, and the process of originating is called invention, or innovation.

The invention of new culture traits, including mechanical devices, patterns of social relationship, and other things, is familiar to all readers of history, and takes place today. The new pattern, however, is not really a cultural innovation unless it is accepted by other persons than the inventor and enters upon a process of being imitated and handed down to succeeding generations.

When two similar traits *A* and *A'* are invented independently of each other, we speak of parallel invention or parallelism. One of the surprising conclusions of modern anthropology is that parallelism is comparatively rare in human history. Cultural diffusion was slow in the prehistoric world, but it was usually fast enough, in the case of important and complex traits, to spread such traits throughout the world before local inventors could originate the trait independently. In the case of simpler traits invented in the very early periods, such as fire-making, the bow-and-arrow, and stone axes, there was probably more parallelism than among the traits originating in later ages.

An interesting controversy exists concerning the origin of the *couvade*, a custom by which the father goes to bed upon the birth of his child, while the mother tries to resume her normal activities immediately. This custom existed in Egypt and the Mediterranean region; it survived until recently among the Basques of the Pyrenees. It has also been found among modern primitives in Brazil. Outside of these two regions there are few evidences of its existence.⁵

The older, psychologizing, school of anthropologists reasoned that the *couvade* was a "natural" reaction to a certain stage in the development of human knowledge. Namely, when man first discovered the nature of the

BASIC DEFINITIONS

fatherhood relation, which is not obvious like motherhood, he would experience a sort of surprise. Some primitives, as in Australia, do not yet understand the relation of sexual intercourse to reproduction. When a woman bears a child they claim that this is due to her having visited some sacred spot. The new enlightenment, it is claimed, would "naturally" lead to some ceremony by which a father would advertise his relationship to a child and establish a claim upon it, and the most "natural" choice of ceremony would be to imitate the behavior which the mother normally shows on the occasion of the childbirth. This explanation assumes parallelism or independent invention.

The diffusionist school of anthropologists, as typified by Graebner and Elliot Smith, maintain that the couvade was invented only once and hence that its existence in Brazil proves former communication between that region and the Mediterranean. Any such invention, they say, is due to the accidental coincidence of several circumstances, and such a coincidence is not likely to happen more than once in human history. If the result seems "natural" in the sense that it fulfills a certain purpose, satisfies certain desires, so does the wheel seem a very natural device for transportation. Yet it took ages of human experience before the principle of the wheel was put into application; and throughout America, even in its highest Indian civilizations, it was utterly unknown until Europeans brought it.

Modern anthropologists take a midway position. They believe the couvade could possibly have been invented two or more times independently. At the same time they favor a diffusionist explanation wherever there is no great obstacle to diffusion and the two patterns are similar in details. As to the couvade they still reserve judgment, the decision hanging largely on the possibility of early communication between Brazil and the Mediterranean.

In any case, a new pattern of human activity or construction, whether it was invented only once or at several times and places, becomes a part of culture only through being imitated or transmitted.

Summary: the Composition of Culture.—To summarize, culture includes the following:

Practically all of:

Artifacts or material culture

Symbol systems { systems or ideologies

Those patterns which are passed on by tradition or diffusion, of the following types:

Functional Patterns

Behavior

Social interaction

Structural Patterns

Personality { wish or goal patterns
attitudes

Social structure

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CHAPTER III

LOVE AND PERSONALITY FORMATION

1. HUMAN NEEDS, SATISFACTIONS, AND SUFFERING

Culture Patterns are Dissimilar Means to the Attainment of Similar Ends.—We return to the question propounded at the beginning of the preceding chapter. What causes the Trobrianders to have a family system so different from the Americans? We have now, it is hoped, dispelled from our minds the old idea that the difference is one of inborn or constitutional nature. Rather, the difference is cultural. It is the result of their differing histories, of their differing circumstances of invention, diffusion, and migration.

But another side of the picture must not be overlooked. First, both peoples, and indeed all peoples, have *some* family system. Second, all family systems, however different, satisfy certain basic and universal human needs: the care and feeding of the young child, sex desire, continuity of affection, intimate co-dwelling companionship. In other words, there are certain subcultural, universal behavior patterns, interaction patterns, and values, beneath the variety of culture patterns. We may picture the several cultures of the world's peoples as houses built upon similar foundations but with greatly varying superstructures.

Culture the Servant of Biology, yet Varies Independently of Biology.—Does the above picture mean that man satisfies his basic needs in the cellar of his culture-house, so to speak, and that the upper stories of the house are unessential to his life? Are the variations in the superstructure the plaything of imitation and chance innovation, without relation to basic human needs?

No, the varied cultural patterns, as well as the more uniform subcultural patterns of human activity, satisfy human wishes. They may vary widely, but human needs fix limits to their variation. Culture does not exist independently in its own right; it is the servant of individual human beings. *Its function, in other words, is biological.* How is it possible to reconcile this statement with the idea given in the last two chapters that culture is external to man and varies from

place to place and time to time without corresponding variations in human nature?

There is no real contradiction between these two principles. If human needs or wishes are similar the world over, they may be satisfied by similar means the world over, or they may be satisfied by different means in different places. Culture differences are possible because in many spheres nature affords several means to the achievement of the same end. If the end be always the same and if there are alternative means to its satisfaction, obviously the end itself does not determine the choice of the means. That choice is determined by history and accidental happenings *within the realm of means*, in other words, the cultural or superorganic realm. The *number of possible adjustments* provided by the environment is important.¹ Where the environment permits only one way of satisfying a need, such as thirst, all peoples who survive must necessarily discover and use that method. They must all drink water. The method is therefore subcultural. But where alternative possibilities are provided by the environment, one method may be chosen by chance and perpetuated by imitation to the exclusion of other methods. The perpetuated method must then be called a culture trait.

Needs, Wishes, and Drives.—Let us examine human needs. These have been classified in many ways; a convenient classification is:

I. Physical needs.

1. Hunger.
2. Thirst.
3. Need for warmth and shelter.
4. Need for rest and sleep.
5. Need for bodily exercise.
6. Other needs.

II. "Mental" wishes.

1. Security.
2. New experience.
3. Recognition (superiority).
4. Response (love).

No sharp distinctions can be drawn between needs, wants, wishes, desires, and so on. Always the same fundamental process is involved. A condition of disequilibrium arises in the body tissues or chemistry. This condition is called a drive or a tension.

The precise nature and location of many of the drives are not definitely known. Much experimentation is going on to secure more definite knowledge. It was formerly thought, for example, that the hunger drive was the condition in the empty stomach itself. But Carlson injected the blood of a starving dog into another which had just been fed to satiety. Immediately in the well-fed dog hunger contractions began.² Again, it was thought that the male sex drive consisted in mechanical stimulation of the sex organs by the accumulation of semen or by external friction. Investigators, however, have found that much tissue can be removed from the external sex organs of animals without affecting the drive, and that, on the other hand, the injection of specific sex secretions (in one experiment the injection of blood from a pregnant female) suddenly re-arouses the sex drive in an animal previously deprived of the hormones.³ The trend of thought is now toward a chemical rather than a mechanical theory of the hunger and sex drives. They are believed to consist in the exciting action of specific chemical substances in the blood, known as hormones, upon various nerve centers.

Several investigators have been attempting to measure the strength of drives. It has been found that individual rats differ enormously in the strength of sex drive. The method of measurement is as follows. The male rat in a cage is given access to a female which is in heat. But to reach her the male must cross an electric grid which gives him a shock, or he is punished by being suddenly dropped through a trap door into cold water. Some animals are thus quickly trained to avoid the female in the cage situation, to inhibit sex. Others continue the effort despite repeated and intense punishments. The number or intensity of punishments necessary to bring about inhibition measures the strength of the sex drive.⁴ If the animals of a single species show such individual differences, it would seem that human beings might differ similarly, in strength of sex drive, not as a result of training alone, but of their bodily chemistry. These chemical differences might be the result of heredity, or of feeding and growth factors.

Drive, Satisfaction, Suffering, Emotions.—The animal body is so organized that a drive stimulates behavior which will tend to satisfy or *relieve* the drive. Thus a well-fed animal tends to be quiet, and satisfies his need for rest, while a hungry animal, even if somewhat in need of rest, is apt to be overactive. His need for food is *more* imperative than his need for rest, and his restless locomotion tends to satisfy this need because it brings him into many different places, in one of which food is eventually likely to be found. Only the most general behavior patterns for satisfying needs are inborn; the specific method is learned by trial and error. Whatever satisfies or relieves the drive is called the *goal* of the drive. The animal, first experiencing a drive, does not know what the goal is; he keeps on trying different movements until satisfaction comes by accident. The

object which satisfies the need makes an impression on the brain, it is "remembered" and more quickly found on the next occasion.

When a need or drive is satisfied there is a change in the inner physiological conditions which, in human experience, we call pleasure or satisfaction. Important types of pleasure or pleasant emotion are the satisfaction of hunger, sexual activity, skin contacts with another human being with or without sexual excitation, laughter, and sudden relief from pain or fear. Pleasure is "good" for the life and growth of the body. Indeed, it is possible to hold, philosophically, that all "good," in the last analysis, is pleasure, if we understand that to mean the total pleasure of all persons concerned in the long run, and not the immediate pleasure of one individual.

On the other hand, unpleasantness or suffering occurs when a need goes for considerable time unsatisfied, and also when some emergency needs fail to get immediate satisfaction. These unpleasant conditions are the essence of all "evil." If long continued they do harm to the body and personality, yet they are necessary because they prompt the individual to change the situation which is causing the suffering. Unpleasantness or suffering involves: (1) local pains and discomforts, (2) general bodily disturbances or unpleasant emotions. The latter are of four main types: (1) fear or anxiety; (2) anger, irritation, or annoyance; (3) anguish, grief, depression, or in mild form, "boredom"; (4) disgust or repulsion (derived from nausea). When these unpleasant emotions occur without any local bodily pain or disorder, but rather as conditioned reactions to ideas or external situations, we speak of them as mental suffering.

Physiological research has shown that most pleasant conditions and reactions are accompanied by the action of the cranio-sacral division of the autonomic nervous system, and that most unpleasant conditions or reactions, at least if they are severe, are accompanied by the action of the sympathetic division of the automatic nervous system. (This has nothing to do with the ordinary use of the term "sympathy.") Thus there is a definite physiological distinction at the basis of the experience distinction between "pleasure" and "pain," although the details of this relation are not yet completely understood and agreed upon. The pleasant, cranio-sacral system of behavior generally involves slow regular heart action and respiration, low blood pressure, active digestion and salivary secretion, constriction of the iris, readiness to sexual stimulation and to smiling or laughter. These conditions, in other words, *tend more or less to go together*. They are sometimes called the appetitive system of behavior. On the other hand, the unpleasant, sympathetic system involves, more or less, rapid heart action, disturbed and increased respiration, high blood pressure, "stalled" digestion and dry mouth (due

to inhibited salivary secretion), dilation of the iris, undue perspiration, inhibition of all sexual behavior with temporary impotence in the male, and a tense rather than a smiling face. An especially significant feature of this defensive system of behavior is the secretion of adrenalin, which stimulates heart action, liberates sugar into the blood from the liver, temporarily overcomes fatigue, and thus provides the body with extra energy to meet external emergencies.⁵

Love Satisfactions Peculiarly the Goal of the Family.—The function of the family, as of any other part of culture, is to satisfy individual needs, or, in other words, to provide pleasure and to minimize suffering. No institution serves exclusively any one need; it contributes to all. Yet each institution serves some needs more than others. The family system *indirectly* satisfies all kinds of needs; but its more remote and indirect functions could be performed by other institutions. Its more direct and immediate goal, however, which could not well be achieved by any substitute institution, is the satisfaction of the wish for response or love.

Let us therefore examine in some detail that group of human needs or wishes which is called love.

2. THE NATURE AND KINDS OF LOVE

The Freudian Concept of Libido.—Once love was a theme mainly for poets. Freud took it down from the skies and put it under the microscope of science. He decided that all kinds of love, sexual and non-sexual, infant and adult, normal and perverted, and many other derived "passions" and "instincts," are composed of one and the same kind of energy. To avoid technical quibbles over the precise meaning of "love" and "sex," he invented a new word, "libido." Every individual has a reservoir of this libido energy, which may be expressed through various channels, but which is all the same thing at the source. That libido energy is said to be primarily "sexual" in character, whatever that may mean.

It is impossible to prove or disprove such a broad theory. Intelligent criticism must be specific.

First, what is this libido? Has Freud discovered anything new? Much antagonism to Freud is due to the fundamental role in human behavior which he assigns to sex. Much of this antagonism may be discounted as a survival of Victorian prudery. Puritan Anglo-Saxon culture has been very careful to distinguish sexual passion from "true love." The continental culture in which Freud was reared is not so careful about this distinction. The German "Liebe" is broad

in its implications; it assumes the possibility of sexual passion as a harmonious component of a larger affection. Laying aside all this, however, there are logical grounds for questioning Freud's libido concept. Two questions arise: first, is the libido distinct from other driving forces of human behavior; and, second, is it a unity within itself?

There is only one source of energy for all human behavior, and that is the burning of the transformed food materials in the tissues of the body. There is no "mental" or "nervous" energy as distinguished from physical, unless it means that infinitesimal fraction of energy which is used up in the process of conduction of impulses through the nervous system from sense organs to muscles. The energy we use in our *reactions*, including those prolonged unpleasant reactions of much force but little motion which we call "tension," is muscular and not "nervous" energy. All the nervous system does is to *release* that muscular energy. The energy used in the nervous system itself is relatively as small as that used by one's finger in pressing the button which sets off a charge of dynamite.

The libido must therefore be broadened to include *all* motives, drives, stimuli, or it must not be regarded as a sum of energy at all. We shall regard it, not as the energy or source of energy, but as a system of pathways through which energy flows. This system of drives, stimuli, neural pathways, reactions, and so on, we shall call simply *love*, thus avoiding the controversy over "libido."

No sharp distinction is possible between love and other behavior systems, as no sharp distinction is possible between family and other human relationships. We shall discuss whatever seems germane to our central interest.

The Original Stimuli to Love Behavior.—The realistic way to disentangle the threads of behavior is to begin with the biologically adequate (i.e., unconditioned or original) stimuli. To do this, we must talk about specific sense organs and parts of the body. F. H. Allport distinguishes the sexual reflexes from "sensitive zone reflexes." The biological stimulus to the sexual reflexes, he says, is, in the male, the mechanical pressure from an accumulation of semen in the seminal vesicles.⁶ But, as noted above, chemical stimulation by certain hormones in the blood seems to play a more essential role. However, sex behavior is not a single reaction to a single stimulus. It is a chain of reactions, each producing new stimuli which raise the excitement to a still higher intensity. Wherever the initiating stimulus may be located, the first reaction seems to consist of movements to bring the

genitals into contact with some object which will still further stimulate them by friction. The complete process is not carried out till puberty, when the various organs and neural pathways are fully matured.

The biological stimuli to the sensitive zone reflexes are rubbing, patting, rocking, contact with the warm skin of another person, and so on. The original reactions include smiling, and "cuddling" movements to maintain and increase the stimuli. Certain skin areas, called sensitive zones, are peculiarly sensitive to these stimuli: nipples, arm pits, mouth, and so on.⁷ Freud calls these "errogenic zones." According to Abraham, who has carried out the Freudian theory of erogenous zones into somewhat greater detail, there are six substages in the "localization" of the libido, normally as follows:⁸

1. Oral-erotic stage—infancy.
 - (a) Lips (sucking).
 - (b) Gums and teeth (biting).
2. Anal-erotic stage—infancy.
 - (a) Pleasure in defecation.
 - (b) Pleasure in retention of feces, and urethral pleasure.
3. Genital stage.
 - (a) Phallic or early genital—normally established by end of infancy.
 - (b) Complete genital primacy—reached at puberty—masturbatory impulses awaken.

Other Freudian writers mention the skin, the muscles, the eyes as erotic zones in some individuals. Sadger regarded the extreme pleasure of some persons in athletic activity as muscle-eroticism.⁹

Interconnections of Love Reactions may be Conditioned, Not Inborn.—That human beings secure pleasure from these various stimuli cannot be doubted. Also it is obvious that the capacity to secure pleasure through genital stimulation fully matures much later than the other behavior patterns, and normally becomes the source of most intense pleasure after maturity. It is natural that when a more intense pleasure becomes possible, the other sources of pleasure become relatively less important. But the theory that all these pleasure patterns are tied up by some inborn connection other than the cranio-sacral nervous structure, which also activates digestive reactions, or that they are successive expressions of one and the same *kind* of motive (libido), is a pure assumption. Such an assumption can be proved only by neuro-anatomical evidence, not by the behavior and life history evidence upon which the Freudians rely.

This life history evidence for the innate unity of love is inconclusive

because almost any behavior connection can arise by conditioning. To be concrete, every child derives pleasure from nursing. This is part of his hunger-and-feeding pattern. It is of course inborn. Any individual whose inborn connections did not lead toward food-taking and pleasure from food-taking would not survive. By conditioning it might be expected that contact of the lips with a warm soft object would become a more or less pleasant stimulus, even when no food was required or received, without necessarily involving the genital organs. Now, in our culture, at least, the custom of kissing the lips of a person of the opposite sex is within limits a socially approved way of securing pleasure. The early childish conditioning of the lip-stimuli favors the development of such a cultural attitude, although it does not guarantee it. Oriental culture, in a measure, conditions kissing to disgust reactions, and trains persons to secure pleasure through rubbing noses instead. Our own culture unconditions or inhibits the pleasure of man kissing man, which pleasure, as far as the early simple conditioning goes, should be as great as that of kissing the opposite sex. It is doubtful that a person could tell, without his eyes, ears, or nose, the sex of a person he was kissing.

By another sequence of conditionings, the individual in our culture learns to secure pleasant excitement of the genital organs through various skin (not necessarily genital) contacts with the opposite sex. He may learn, indeed, to secure this pleasure from the very imagination of such contact, before it has occurred in actuality, through verbal education (symbolic conditioning).

The individual has become conditioned to get pleasure reactions from the body of a person of the opposite sex through two separate channels: the nursing-oral-kissing channel, and the sex-hormone-genital-skin-contact channel. These originally separate channels are bound to become connected through conditioning, for they function simultaneously during "petting." The activation of either channel will lead to impulses toward using the other channel also. How far each impulse will be carried out depends upon what cultural taboos or special personal inhibitions may be present. Whether kissing originally had anything to do with "sex" or not, it would tend to become sexual, that is, to produce genital excitement. By the same token we find that in some persons genital excitement stimulates a flow of saliva, which reaction, no one will deny, originally belongs to the hunger-feeding behavior system. Non-sexual love may lead to sexual, sexual to non-sexual, and love may even lead to hunger, but these

sequences may depend more upon the patterning of stimuli in the environment than upon inborn neural patterns.

According to Freudians, in adolescence and maturity the oral and anal "components," which were once the main channels of libido expression, become subordinated to the genital component and more or less detached therefrom. In some individuals, however, these stimuli continue into adult life to be abnormally important sources of pleasure, occasionally rivaling or exceeding the genital source. Such cases are called "arrests of development," "fixations upon infantile level," or in case there is a going backward after partial emancipation from them, "regressions." It is possible to explain all these phenomena, however, without assuming any peculiar inborn connection between oral, anal, and genital channels. The connections as well as the de-connections may be learning processes rather than biological growth processes.

Kinds of Love Behavior.—Whether the connections between the different patterns of love are innate or acquired, they exist. The Freudian concept of a more or less unified love behavior system may be descriptively true, although false in its theoretical explanation. One who is not an orthodox Freudian will view this unity tentatively, realizing that certain alleged elements of the love system may prove to be more closely connected to other systems of behavior, and that other elements may be added.

Let us now analyze the love behavior system as it appears in maturity. Much of the vagueness found in discussing love is due to the confusion of three different bases of classification. Love reactions may be classified: (a) according to the goal, or object of love; (b) according to the overt or muscular reaction involved; (c) according to the inner emotional (glandular, cardio-vascular, genital, etc.) reaction involved. A classification on one basis does not at all correspond to one on another basis, yet we are constantly confusing them in everyday parlance. To say, "Of course I don't love her as a wife, but as a sister," may be a conventional way of saying that there is no genital excitement. Or it may mean simply that he treats her as he does his sister. Or that he treats her as most men do their sisters, which might be a very different thing. To say that a woman has a sort of motherly love toward her husband means what? It is not enough explanation to say that she acts like a mother—comforts him in sorrow, attends to his alimentary and comfort needs with undue devotion, and so on. Something more is implied. There is a "quality of feeling," in everyday language, which distinguishes mother-child

love from mate-mate love. But that "quality" must be analyzed, by introspection or otherwise.

Love Classified according to Goals or Objects.—According to goals, love may be tentatively classified as: love toward opposite-sexed parent, same-sexed parent, siblings, other relatives, children, mate, same-sexed friends, opposite-sexed friends, and so on; love toward animals, toward things. Whether an emotion whose goal is a lifeless thing should be called love is a matter of definition. But it seems that the feeling some persons have toward certain possessions and keepsakes is the identical feeling which would be called love if its goal were a person. Some individuals love "nature." The feeling some persons have when they view a beautiful sunset is certainly similar to feelings which are called love when directed to persons. If we use our terms consistently, we must recognize that inanimate things are sometimes truly *loved*.

The Freudians divide love, according to its objects, into three classes, in order of their chronological development.¹⁰

1. **Auto-erotism**, an infantile cathexis (direction of expression, conditioning) in which the infant gets satisfaction from parts of his own body, as in thumb-sucking and masturbation, but without conscious recognition of the distinctness of self from the outside world.

2. **Narcism**, or love of self as a recognized entity, distinct from the outside world (after the classical story of Narcissus); includes love of own body.

3. **Allo-erotism or object cathexis**, love of external objects, including parent love, homosexual and heterosexual love.

They hold further that in falling in love with a person of opposite sex two types may be observed: (1) the narcissistic type which is a displacement of narcissistic self-love onto another person, and in which the person selected resembles the self in some significant respect; (2) the dependence type, which is genuine object love, seeking a person who satisfies one's needs, perhaps supplies what one lacks in oneself. The dependence type, it is said, resembles more nearly the relationship to the parent of opposite sex, and, barring conflicts which might arise out of this resemblance, is the more likely to be lasting.

Love Classified according to Overt Reactions.—Second, love may be classified according to the overt behavior or treatment of the loved object. Various degrees of personal intimacy from letter writing to sexual intercourse may be distinguished. It is unnecessary to enumerate them here. Culture prescribes a certain degree of intimacy

for each kind of love-goal. Thus a brother-sister relation should involve occasional kissing but not of the passionate kind; love between American male friends may be expressed by back-slapping, and so on. Of course the secret behavior of two persons toward one another may differ from the conventional.

Classification of Love according to Inner Reactions or Feelings.—The overt behavior of a love relationship, even that which is practiced in secret, does not necessarily reveal the emotional behavior or "feeling." The kiss which a man gives to a woman friend may look like the kiss he gives his aunt, but it may feel very different. Even sexual intercourse may occur in association with several different kinds of feeling.

We need a classification of love feelings or attitudes. Such a classification seems, at first, easy to make, but is apt to become confused with object classifications. It must stay within the realm of physiology. Strangely enough, there is a shying away from physiological terms, which is more likely to happen in the non-genital than in the genital realm. We are being educated to talk about sex physiology in a matter-of-fact way, but when it comes to affection, the "higher" forms of love, we still speak in vague terms. We still find it difficult to admit that such noble feelings have any physiology.

The following classification is offered quite tentatively:

1. Sexual or genital love.
2. Oral love.
3. Dermal or tender love.
4. Cardiac-respiratory or excited love.
5. "Fondness" or non-localized love.
6. Anal eroticism.

(1) Sexual Love.—It might be a simple and convenient distinction to say that love, or pleasure, is sexual whenever the genitals are directly or indirectly stimulated, and that whenever they are not involved the pleasure is non-sexual. If a man were to enjoy ever so much the sight of the female body, but without any reactions in the genital zone, his pleasure would be non-sexual. If on the other hand he were to experience even mild genital reactions from whipping his dog his pleasure would be sexual (in this illustration, a case of sadism).

Genital pleasure, or passion, may be secured either through biologically adequate (contact, friction, warmth, chemical hormones, or internal pressure) stimulation of these organs directly, or through their conditioned stimulation through vision or thought processes.

There is a great deal of confusion about the nature of sexual "perversions." In the first place, it should be noted that the great majority are due to unusual circumstances of conditioning and not to biological abnormalities. There are a few homosexuals who have some of the biological characteristics of the opposite sex, or possibly the hormones of the opposite sex. An accident of nature very rarely produces a hermaphrodite, or person of intermediate sex. The great majority of homosexuals, however, are anatomically and chemically normal persons who have been unusually conditioned. The Freudians distinguish two kinds. The one has acquired through circumstances an unusual attachment to the parent of the same sex and in his later love life seeks a person of that same sex. The second type formed an attachment to the parent of opposite sex. He is so strongly fixated on this parent that he cannot substitute another person unless that person closely resembles the beloved parent. But this awakens incest feelings. His only defense is to seek a person of his own sex, thus avoiding altogether the conflict between parent love and incest horror.

There are probably many other circumstances, besides these two Freudian situations, through which a person's love desires may be conditioned to his own sex. Homosexuality is not all of a few kinds. There are many patterns and degrees. The sex feelings themselves may be heterosexual and the other love feelings homosexual, or *vice versa*. Many combinations exist.

Abnormal methods of using the body of the opposite sex in sexual gratification are sometimes spoken of as perversions. Modern sexologists on the whole regard these as not undesirable as preliminary acts, provided normal coitus remains the preferred method, and no mental conflict is produced in either party.

Two common types of "perversion" are **sadism** and **masochism**. Sadism is the conditioning of sexual reactions to cruelty, the person himself being actually or in imagination the one who inflicts the pain. Where the person gets satisfaction from suffering the pain, or imagining himself as so doing, he is said to be a masochist. Some small degree of sadism seems to be normal to men, and of masochism to women, but in plenty of cases these attitudes are reversed. **Exhibitionism** is sexual pleasure from exhibiting one's own body, especially the more tabooed portions. **Voyeurism** is sexual pleasure from seeing the exposure of others. **Fetichism** is sexual conditioning to some particular part of the body, to some article of clothing of the opposite sex, to some object disconnected from a person altogether. One man is reported as getting his chief sexual satisfaction from being alone at a certain location along a country road. It would seem that the sexual reactions could become conditioned to almost any stimulus. To the person so conditioned, the given stimulus is sexual, regardless of how unexciting it might be to other persons. On the other hand, there are many persons who are not at all sexually excited by stimuli which do excite the majority. These unusual sex conditionings are abnormal only in the social sense. They are

abnormal because few people actually do become conditioned in such ways. But the process by which it occurs is the purely normal process of conditioning. All that we can say is that such persons have been exposed to unusual combinations of stimuli, either through external circumstances or through the accidental vagaries of their own thought processes.

It is conventional to speak of these sexual idiosyncrasies in veiled terms and with a certain attitude of horror or repulsion. As a result the nature of a given case is often greatly misunderstood. It should be noted that any of these objects can be an object of non-sexual pleasure. One's overt behavior does not reveal to the observer just what kind of feeling he has. Intense interest in an object or situation does not indicate that the pleasure is sexual. Second, there is a difference between deriving a preliminary, mild sexual pleasure from an object, and using it for the attainment of final sexual gratification (orgasm). Many more objects are used in the first way than in the second. Finally, we do not know the whole story unless we know whether the touch, the sound, the sight, or the mere thought of an object is the stimulus which produces the given sexual reaction. The "object" may be a complex situation. Many persons derive sexual pleasure from imagining various kinds of situations. No one person or thing in the mental picture, but the whole complex of circumstances, is erotic. A certain picture, or the reading of a printed description, may serve as a stimulus to initiate these erotic thought processes. In such a case the picture or print in itself is only indirectly a sexual object.

Harvey, summarizing the questionnaire and interview findings of Davis, Dickinson and Beam, Hamilton, and Pearl, computes the median frequency of coitus in marriage among the more intelligent classes as approximately eight times per month, with the middle 50 per cent of the cases ranging from three to fifteen times per month.¹¹ Information about the farming and working classes is needed.

(2) **Oral Love.**—A second kind of love feeling is that which one gets from the "deep" kiss. It is essentially Freud's "oral" love. According to Freud it arises from the infantile pleasure of sucking the mother's breast. If anyone's scientific curiosity is not entirely overwhelmed by his other emotions, let him sometime, when he thinks, "I love —," introspect upon his feelings at the moment. If there is a strong feeling of an impulse to kiss the person in question, if that feeling seems to be the principal one in the consciousness of the moment, then the love is at least partly oral in character. The oral element is a prominent feature of love life in early adolescence. It probably remains predominant longer in girls than in boys. It must be remembered that oral love means direct pleasure from oral contact *without* genital excitement. When passion occurs, the oral contact

becomes a facilitating conditioned stimulus to that passion, while the peculiarly oral pleasure itself is subordinated. The so-called modern petting craze is not altogether oral love. It is in large part sexual love stimulated by oral contacts, and other body contacts, stopping short of completed intercourse. True oral love is better represented by early kissing experiences, among children or young adolescents who have not yet connected these experiences with genital stimulation.

Freud thinks that oral love is originally connected with genital love, that it is simply an early stage in the development of love in general. He thinks the normal thing is for it to remain connected to genital love, but as a preliminary and subordinate feature. Its disconnection from the genital love occurs in the family group, he thinks, as a protection against incest, at the behest of culture. That is, children *learn* to love parents and siblings orally *without* genital excitement, since the latter is sinful and incestuous. This, according to Freud, necessitates strain and conflict in the individual. But, according to another interpretation, culture does not break any in-born connection; it merely prevents an acquired connection from forming.

(3) **Dermal Love.**—A third kind of love feeling may be called tenderness or dermal love. Introspection reveals a "tender," sensitive feeling in the skin, especially of the face, arms, and chest. One feels impulses to stroke gently the loved person, to hold her (or him) close to one's body with a very light, delicate contact, or with a brief mild squeeze limited to the arms and chest. There is no feeling of an impulse to rub, explore, or manipulate vigorously the skin of the other person, or to bring all parts of one's own body into contact, as in the case of passion. To one introspector the thought of tenderness brings a sensation of light tension in the biceps muscles and sensations in the skin of the inner surface of the arms. This suggests again the impulse toward a light embrace, or the lifting and holding of a baby. McDougall has identified tenderness with the parental emotion.¹² He makes it one of his seventeen innate tendencies. It may be a mechanism for slowing down the usual speed and vigor of muscular movements to avoid injuring the young. The one outstanding characteristic of tender behavior is the slowness of movements which are usually much more rapid, and the use of just-necessary force instead of that excess force commonly used to insure the success of a movement. Many normal movements of mature animals would injure their young unless there were some generalized *gentling* process.

Such a generalized inhibition may possibly be inborn, though the specific stimuli and movements are learned.*

Again, through these gentle movements in relation to the body of another individual, certain skin sensations are felt which are quite different from the sensations obtained under greater pressure. Psychologists have shown that the sense organs of light pressure are definitely separated from those of deep pressure. The light touch sensations produce a pleasure all their own, which does not necessarily become conditioned to genital excitement. This pleasure seems located in the skin or vaguely in the chest. On the other hand, vigorous pressure and manipulation of another's body yields no comparable pleasure of its own. It becomes pleasurable only when it becomes a conditioned stimulus to genital excitement; and this happens normally only when the person so touched is one not included under the sex-repulsion taboo. The average father gets a love pleasure from the light touch of his child's cheek against his own, but not from heavy pressure and friction.

(4) **Cardiac-Respiratory or Excited Love.**—What does it feel like to be "in love"? If one has the sexual, the oral, and the dermal feelings all together toward another person, is he in love with that person? If you are a thoroughgoing introspector, you will find that something else is necessary. To be physiological, again, an element of *breathlessness* is necessary. "In-loveness" implies catching of the breath, a deep sigh, a feeling about the heart, as if it had stopped, followed by palpitation or rapid beating, a feeling akin to fear. Shivering and trembling sometimes accompany these reactions. Then there is the *thrill* reaction, which may be a kind of muscular trembling, or a circulatory disturbance. Introspection localizes it in the chest, abdomen, and arms; it seems to involve a sudden increase of energy due possibly to liberation of endocrine hormones into the blood. Some persons, perhaps, have never experienced it, and have been good lovers in the other three ways. But those who have experienced it know what it is. The writers of popular fiction have a deeper insight into some things than is usually credited to them. Again, why does ancient tradition locate love in the heart; not in the lips, skin, or genitals?

Let us call this cardiac-respiratory, or excited, love. In this state, we are excited, alert. Of course the condition is not a continuous one. It flares up now and then, whenever some stimulus occurs reminding

* One notes with interest the *playful* biting of dogs, in which the force used is rather accurately controlled at a degree which just avoids breaking the skin.

us of the loved one. It may last, however, in mild form, for considerable periods of time. Under these circumstances the feeling is likely to take on more the character of a dull ache, a feeling of pressure in the chest. This, again, is a cardiac-respiratory disturbance. The more acute symptoms are akin to fear, the more chronic symptoms to anguish. Careful examination of a person in the active state of excited love would probably reveal the sympathetic nervous system functioning more than the crano-sacral. The behavior in general is allied to the defensive, unpleasant system. But, obviously, keen pleasure is derived from certain nuances, interludes, or results of the behavior and renders it quite worth while. The situation resembles somewhat that of bob-sled running and other physical "thrills." Fear is stimulated, yet keen pleasure is gained by the sudden or periodic relief of the fear. It is the pleasure of excitement.

In the moments and hours dominated by excited love there may be little of the other kinds of love feeling. The desire for sexual contacts seems remote. Extensive kissing and touching seem out of place: one does not want oral or genital pleasure particularly, one uses the occasional kiss merely to revive and intensify the cardiac-respiratory thrills. One thrills at the mere presence of the beloved person and at receiving her (or his) undivided attention. There is sometimes a feeling of elevation or "lift" like that experienced after climbing a mountain, when the forced breathing of the ascent gives way to the slower, deep breathing of comparative relaxation. There is a great deal akin to feelings of reverence, there is an attitude of submission, of "looking up to" the beloved. Sometimes the feeling is the same as that in religious ecstasy.

The Temporary Nature of Cardiac-Respiratory Love: Infatuation.—This cardiac-respiratory pattern is especially characteristic of the early stages of a love relationship, especially among young or unsophisticated persons. They may thank their lack of sophistication for this opportunity to experience one of life's keenest pleasures. It is often called "infatuation," "falling in love," "love at first sight," and so on. Popular parlance tries to make a distinction between "mere" infatuation and love. By "mere" infatuation is evidently meant an excited love attitude which fails to lead to the other kinds of love. *Excited love cannot endure.* It is a transitory phenomenon. This is because it is essentially dependent upon the *novelty* of the stimulus. We have seen that it is a pattern belonging in part, at least, to the defensive system and innervated through the sympathetic. It is never entirely pleasant; the slightest hitch in the drama of events,

the failure of something to happen when the emotions call for it, brings fear, anguish, and even anger. It is well known to interfere with the appetite, a fact which attests its defensive, sympathetico-neural character.

By the principle of psychic economy any such behavior tends to eliminate itself. Like fear, it diminishes in intensity as the stimulus becomes more familiar. Love grows less exciting with time, for the same biological reasons that the second run on a fast toboggan slide is less exciting than the first. The diminished excitement, however, may increase the real pleasure. Extreme excitement is practically the same as fear, and is unpleasant. After the excitement has diminished below a certain point, however, pleasure will again diminish, unless new kinds of pleasure have meanwhile arisen.

In the normal course of falling in love, these other kinds of pleasure increase as the excitement diminishes. For example, the brief occasional kiss for thrill only gives way to the more frequent and voluptuous kissing which yields oral, dermal, and genital pleasure. In the early stages the pleasure lies chiefly in the *thought* that "he (or she) actually did kiss me." In the later stages the pleasure lies more in the kissing itself. Scarcity values diminish while quantity values increase. Finally the lover finds himself bound to his partner by oral, dermal, and genital love, but with the excited love vanished. The love reactions he now enjoys are not transitory and self-eliminating like excited love. They belong entirely to the appetitive system. They do not diminish through constant use any more than do the pleasures of eating decrease through years of familiarity.

Sometimes the decrease of excited love is not accompanied by the forging of these other love bonds. It may be because one partner refuses to permit sufficient oral, dermal, and genital stimulation (not necessarily through genital *contacts*, however). Or it may be that there is no lack of these pleasures, but that some feature of the behavior of one partner angers or disgusts the other, and these emotions of course tend to inhibit all pleasure reactions. It may be that the partners are not "suited," which means, essentially, that some aversion (previously conditioned reaction or attitude) of the one personality meets with just that characteristic in the other person which arouses it. Now their friends say that they were "just infatuated." But that "infatuation" was no different from the excited love which initiates many a successful courtship. The difference lay in the interaction processes which followed the infatuation. To predict these would require a very wise person.

The Sequence of Love Reactions: Courtship and Marriage.—In normal, conventional courtship, the oral pleasures are the first to develop as excited love cools. At first there will be pure oral pleasure. Then the oral stimulus will arouse more and more genital reaction. Under recent cultural attitudes this has been more true of the man than of the woman. The woman was inhibited against all genital excitement by early training; the man was trained to expect genital reaction but to conceal it from the woman, to keep it within certain bounds, and to seek no direct stimulus to it. If it came about through kissing and petting within certain conventional limits, it was all right, but one must not seek to intensify it by further bodily contacts. Today, we are aware, there is some change in cultural attitude in this sphere, so that the woman may conscientiously allow herself to feel passion to the same extent as the man, if she controls its expression.

In late courtship more extensive body caressing was tolerated, in which the whole pleasure was genital rather than oral, although any such pleasure was not supposed to be carried to the point of orgasm. In late years, there has been a growing attitude among some young people which tolerates this carrying out of passion to the climax, but through methods short of actual coitus, leaving the girl still a "technical virgin." This changed attitude is a matter of serious concern among sexologists. Some hold that it is harmful in that it trains people to bad habits of sexual satisfaction, that after marriage it will be more difficult to enjoy normal coitus. The change has one very beneficial corollary: namely, the attitude that whatever pleasures are obtained should be the same on both sides, and not mainly a masculine monopoly. But its total effect cannot be judged without much more serious investigation than has heretofore been given it.

After marriage, of course, the predominating source of pleasure becomes passion, stimulated by its more direct and normal methods. Oral pleasure becomes a preliminary and an adjunct. It is possible also that the tender attitude becomes stronger and more important after marriage than before, and that it intensifies with age, the partners coming to feel more and more toward each other as a mother feels toward her baby. This, however, is a matter of great individual differences.

One of the most interesting facts about married love is that the cardiac-respiratory love of the early days may be revived through novelties of circumstance, including reunions after temporary absences. It probably can never be as prolonged an experience as in the beginning, but its occasional revival may add much zest to life.

In rare cases, marriage may not result and the partners may be separated for a long period; yet the love between them may be renewed at a later date under changed circumstances, with all the excitement that went with the first falling in love.

The Meaning of Constancy in Love.—Thus on the reaction side love is an ever-changing attitude. If "constancy" in love means faithfulness to the same person, then we must be prepared to accept a great inconstancy of physiological reaction. Those lovers who are most tolerant of such changes of feeling toward each other are the ones most likely to achieve permanency of love relationship. We must be prepared to accept the fading out of excitement, to accept the growing importance of passion even if at the expense of the "purer" and "more elevated" feelings and at the expense of the "innocent" kiss whose pleasure is entirely oral. We must be prepared for cyclical diminutions of passion itself, and for increases in "motherly" feelings. The beauty of all this is that, if we do not develop irritations about these changes, we often come back again and again, in cyclical fashion, to previous combinations of feeling. It is one of the supreme experiences of life to be told by one's partner on some occasion years after marriage, "I feel toward you now just as I did that day we had lunch in ——."

On the other hand are those persons, like the Don Juans, who are constant in the sense of being faithful to a particular feeling of love, while the identity of the beloved must continually change in order to maintain this same feeling. We may have our choice.

Tragedies Due to an Unscientific Ideology of Love.—Our cultural attitudes are imperfectly adjusted to these facts of the love process. Two common kinds of tragedies result. One is that of the young people who marry because of excited love before they give the other kinds of love sufficient test. In this class also are those who, although they do not marry, yet grieve over the loss of something which in its very nature was transitory.

The other tragedy is jealousy because one's married or unmarried partner develops a new "infatuation." This new excitement does not necessarily mean the weakening of the permanent love. It is a reaction which in its very nature can occur only to a novel stimulus. It is conventional for the jealous partner to think that his (or her) failure of some sort is the cause of this new excitement. This is apt to be false; the more serious failure usually comes after jealousy has set in. The change of attitude, the withdrawing, the bitterness, on the part

of the jealous one, cause the new excitement to develop into something more important than it would otherwise become. The triangle requires adjustments by all parties concerned. Culture has placed most of the burden of this adjustment upon the infatuated persons, whereas such a person is no more able to behave rationally than is a jealous one.

The Romantic Complex.—With modern civilization we have the romantic complex, which is held by many to be an innovation in culture. It is generally assumed that there is some peculiar kind of love which gave rise to this romantic complex. Lester Ward and other sociologists have held that the chivalry complex of the Middle Ages was the source. Before that, mankind knew sexual love and the conjugal love of duty combined with sex, but did not know the modern romantic love of free choice. Later writers assign the specific origin to the French troubadour complex of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, rather than to chivalry *per se*. Today we feel much less safe than did the early sociologists in identifying particular culture complexes with particular feelings. We are not at all sure that there is any new emotion in romantic love. There is no doubt, however, that a certain patterned combination of emotional attitudes, social relationships, and literary expressions originated in the late Middle Ages, and has in part formed the basis for modern romanticism. These sub-patterns seem to be especially characteristic:

1. The elevation of mate love to a plane of idealization higher than that of parental love, filial love, or other family love. The relationship between lovers takes precedence over obligations to the larger family group or the community. It, and not duty, is institutionalized in marriage.
2. Great stress on the excitement or cardiac-respiratory love, which is stimulated by novel, esthetic, and adventurous situations of first acquaintance, and which is supposed to be the beginning of all true love. The wish for adventure is closely tied to the wish for response.
3. Sexual love supposedly absent until excited, dermal, and oral reactions are well established. When it develops it is not given direct artistic expression as are the other three reactions, and is clothed with a symbolic rather than a sensory value. The sexual relationship is never recognized or alluded to except in idealized terms. Oral and tender love must be throughout marriage above the sexual. Theoretically there is perpetual courtship.
4. Free choice of mate, even in defiance of parental will. Difficulties overcome in achieving the union add to its emotional value. Each person is supposed to have an "affinity" who will be immediately recognized when met (love at first sight).

The Romantic Sequence of Love Feelings.—There are certain practical consequences of this pattern. One is that romantic love is intensely monogamous at *any one time*. Yet, essentially, its loyalty is to *love* rather than to a person; so that, when two persons cease to maintain the romantic love relation, divorce is thought to be not only permissible, but a duty to the highest morality. Marriage without romantic love is anathema to the romanticist. Another consequence, and one responsible for much needless unhappiness, is the failure to recognize the many varied sequences of interaction which do lead to happy unions. Romantic love calls for this sequence: excited love, free choice, oral and dermal love, sexual love, marriage, then sexual intercourse but without abatement of excited, oral, and dermal love. Any deviation from this sequence supposedly spoils the magic of romance. If choice is made coolly and intellectually without the preliminary "love at first sight," that is not romance. The newer romanticism cares less about the time of marriage in the process but, still, it is intensely solicitous that intercourse should follow the other love reactions. It is only the attitude toward the importance of the marriage ceremony which has been changed in the last few years; the attitude toward the love process remains much the same.

Human experience reveals that "unromantic" love sequences can and do occur without preventing the growth of a thoroughgoing love. Successful love affairs occur in which the first emotion may be purely oral pleasure from a friendly experimental kiss, or a wave of tender feeling aroused by the other person's being in need of some help, or even pure passion. Tenderness may be a result as well as a cause of passion. Competent sexual intercourse tends to lead to tender feeling in both partners even if such feeling was absent at the outset, provided both are completely free from the guilt attitude in regard to their intercourse. Marriage does not always overcome this sense of guilt, when persons have been badly conditioned or educated in regard to sex. A mere intellectual acceptance of the rightness of sex will not necessarily do away with this guilt attitude. It goes deeper than that.

Romanticism Emphasizes Cardiac-Respiratory Love.—If there is any type of love feeling that is especially characteristic of the romantic complex, it is excited love. Perhaps the significant feature is the presence of this kind of reaction in the male partner. Rarely before chivalry, or in non-European cultures, do we find such artistic and literary expression of an attitude of reverence and excited humility on the part of a man in response to a woman. In the popular literature today it is the thrill, the palpitation, the excitement of first acquaint-

ance, the birth of love in a fear situation or a curiosity situation, which characterize our romanticism. D. H. Lawrence, who idealizes sexual behavior, definitely does not express this complex. But, also, a thoroughgoing description of tender feelings or of the emotions connected with caressing would be out of place in the popular romantic literature. It would seem that the only emotions whose literary description is really tolerated are the defensive emotions. Thrills, tremblings, palpitations, misgivings, fears, jealous "passions" (not passion at all, but anger), anguish, coldness, and bitterness may be dwelt upon at great length. But these are merely emotions surrounding love; they are mostly sympathetic-neural patterns. The pleasant reactions stimulated through the crano-sacral are not orthodox themes for literature; they are too "sensual." Yet it is only they which make love worth while except as an ephemeral thrill.

Puritanism and Romanticism Separated Sexual from Other Love.—The typical male of our recent culture was trained to make a discrimination between sexual and tender feeling. Indeed, he learned, through masturbation, that the purely sensual gratification was possible without recourse to any person. If he tried to satisfy his sex desire through a personal object before marriage, he usually did so through the person of a prostitute. Culture did not let him develop tender feelings toward prostitutes. He learned, instead, to despise the very person who was the source of his gratification. Culture trained him to anticipate a higher, purer relationship with a wife. After attaining this nobler love, he might, on occasion, again revert to prostitutes. But this, the physical unfaithfulness, from the standpoint of the male sex, was not a real unfaithfulness, because the illicit action which he secretly indulged would be for the sake of a gratification of an entirely different kind. It would be better after marriage to do without the "lower" love, but if one could not, one could keep it utterly separate from the "higher." The common result was that the man expected his wife to show sexual behavior of a much more restrained type than the prostitute, while he himself failed to awaken her full sex passion because of his perverted sense of delicacy. Married sex relations, in certain social classes, at least, became a tender but lukewarm ritual, in which the passion of the male only was regularly satisfied, and even his satisfaction obtained without resort to the more voluptuous and thoroughgoing stimulations.

One may assume, with Freud, that tenderness and sex are innately bound together, and have been forced apart by culture. Or one may

assume that sex and tenderness, though innately separate, tend to become conditioned together on a subcultural level, and that culture here prevents this normal fusion. The practical result is the same. Our recent culture prevented the thoroughgoing union of these two reactions. But experience shows that they do tend to unite when the individual is left free to develop his wish goals without cultural restraint. Such a natural union would seem to offer a better chance of a harmonious, integrated love life.

(5) **Fondness or Non-Localized Pleasure.**—A fifth kind of love feeling might be added. It is the pleasure that one gets from the mere presence of another person, from conversation and other social interaction without bodily contact. It is the feeling, ideally present in our culture, between mature family members other than mates. It is the feeling involved in warm personal friendship. If a non-family, heterosexual friendship is limited to this feeling, it is often called "platonic." The platonic feeling is not peculiar to this kind of relationship. The term merely indicates that the relationship is one which ordinarily leads to stronger feelings, but in this case does not.

The physiology of this friendship-love is difficult to describe. It seems to be merely generalized pleasure to which the visual and auditory stimuli from another person are the conditioned stimuli. It is the same pleasure reactions, which, when the conditioned stimulus is non-personal, we call "interest." Perhaps the best name for the feeling itself, a name which would be independent of the kind of object which aroused it or of the circumstances of its arousal, would be *fondness*.

(6) **Anal Eroticism.**—In order to cover the entire field of libido as the Freudians see it, we should mention a sixth group of feelings, which they call anal and urethral eroticism. These are simply the childish sense-pleasures associated with excretion. The reason for including them here is that, as the Freudians have shown, they become overdeveloped in some persons and have important influences upon the general personality. Such an anal-erotic individual, according to Freud, develops certain personality characteristics. These are: (1) orderliness (including bodily cleanliness, reliability, conscientiousness in petty duties); (2) parsimony; (3) avarice. Narcism and sadism are also commonly associated with anal eroticism. T. W. Mitchell says: "The part it [anal eroticism] plays in the formation of character is one of the most astonishing discoveries of psychoanalysis. Probably no one ever encounters psychoanalytic teaching in this matter for the first time without regarding it as false and

preposterous, and yet no one who has carefully investigated a case of obsessional neurosis can ever doubt its truth.”* In the present writer’s view, these feelings are not a part of some originally unitary love-behavior-system, or libido, but, arising from their own local and separate origin, may become linked by conditioning to other parts of the personality, including the love system. We may disagree with the Freudian basic philosophy of the matter, but still accept the Freudian view of its practical importance in personality. It is important, certainly, in the training of children and the interaction between parents and children. The role of a child in the family may be determined by his experiences in early sphincter training, and through this role such traits as stubbornness and self-love developed.

How Culture Regulates Love: Cultural Differences.—To recapitulate, love or libido feelings may be classified as sexual (genital), oral, dermal, cardiac-respiratory (excited), non-localized, and anal-erotic. Each of these feelings is assigned by culture to certain limited classes of objects. Culture is less successful in regulating feelings than in regulating overt behavior. But, still, a great deal of regulation is achieved by cultural barriers which prevent certain conditionings. Other regulation occurs after the improper conditionings have been made, through the sense of guilt, repressions, and other processes which we shall later discuss. Such repression of once-established connections entails much suffering to the individual.

Cultures vary enormously in the roles which they assign and prohibit to the various types of love feeling. Words indicating emotions are less translatable than those referring to external objects. For this reason most descriptions of love in another age or country leave us in great uncertainty as to the precise nature of the feelings involved.

For example, does the exaltation of filial piety over married love in China mean that a Chinese does not actually *feel* toward his wife as does a Westerner, or merely that he does not advertise that feeling in literature and conversation? Does it mean that more tender feelings are directed toward parents and that the mate is the object mainly of sexual passion? Such is our usual conception of Chinese love, especially in view of the fact of childhood betrothal. How can a person, we think, really love one whom he is practically forced to marry? Yet such reasoning is inconclusive.

* *Problems in Psychopathology*. Quoted by William Healy, A. F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Knopf, 1930, p. 319.

Langdon-Davies writes of the Spanish woman as one who lavishes upon her sons a love which in our society would go toward the husband.¹³ The man, it would seem, has his tender relationships more with his mother; the woman, with her sons; while the husband-wife relation is more limited to sexual love. Again, Spanish ideology seems to clothe the extra-marital liaison with considerable romance and adventure, and the man probably obtains romantic satisfactions in this way which in Anglo-Saxon culture are obtained through courtship and marriage.

Some American Statistics in Regard to Love Affairs.—Dr. G. V. Hamilton's 100 men and 100 women subjects had had on the average 6.8 heterosexual love affairs per person, counting from earliest childhood to the present and including the affairs which led to marriage and those after marriage, if any. These figures were practically alike for the two sexes. The mode of termination of these affairs was as follows:¹⁴

	Per cent
1. Marriage between the lovers	15
2. Geographic or social separation (usual with pre-adolescent affairs)	20
3. Drifting apart without any particular event	12
4. Transfer of affection by subject to another	9
5. Dissatisfaction of subject with object person	13
6. Terminated by object person (reasons not given but probably would come mostly under 4 and 5)	10
7. Loyalties to other persons, including mates	2
8. Interference of family or friends	3
9. Quarrels, misunderstandings, wrongs done	4
10. Never reciprocated	6
11. Death of object person	1
12. Not yet terminated	4
13. Other causes	1
	<hr/>
	100

Twenty-one per cent of the men and 24 per cent of the women (all were married) were at the time of the study in love, or debatably so, with outside persons (other than relatives). Fifteen per cent of the men and 14 per cent of the women gave unqualified yes answers to this question; the qualified answers of the others were nevertheless indicative of a definite extra-marital attachment. Twenty-nine per cent of the men and 41 per cent of the women had at some time had

extra-marital love affairs, while 28 per cent of the men and only 24 per cent of the women had committed adultery.

Of the total of 1358 love affairs reported to Dr. Hamilton, the extent of intimacy reached (outside of marriage) was as follows:

	Per cent
No demonstration of affection	34
Holding hands, exchanging presents	11
Kissing and embracing, not consciously erotic	18
Erotic "petting" but no specific stimulation of sex organs	9
Specific stimulation of sex organs without intercourse ...	8
Sexual intercourse	14
Uncertain answers	6
	<hr/>
	100

We have taken inventory of human needs and wishes, especially of the love life. This inventory is a relatively static picture; it shows us what desires and motives are operating at any one moment. We need also a dynamic picture, that is, a picture of how motives and personalities *change*.

3. FRUSTRATION AND PERSONALITY CHANGE

Spontaneous Changes in Personality.—There seem to be two kinds of personality changes: first, those which take place, as it were, freely and spontaneously; second, those which take place under some sort of pressure, as a result of interference.

The free changes of personality, according to the Freudian system, are the ways in which the libido normally develops, in the absence of frustration or restraining forces. They include the shifting of pleasure emphasis from the oral to the anal and then to the genital zone, the changes from auto-eroticism to narcissism and then to object-love, from love of opposite-sexed parent to love of a potential mate. The expression of the libido through a particular channel is called **cathexis**. Thus when libido goes toward outside objects (mostly persons) instead of self, there is **object-cathexis**. When libido refuses to change but stays fastened stubbornly to some goal, we have **fixation** or **arrest** of development. When it moves backward to some earlier goal, we have **regression**. From a non-Freudian view, these changes may be described as a series of conditionings brought about by certain changes of environment which normally occur in the child's life. But the Freudians tend to look upon these developments of the personality as inner growth processes.

From the present author's standpoint, the concept of "growth of personality" is misleading. The only true growth of personality is the biological maturation of the body and nervous system. Learning to walk, the development of sexual function at puberty, and the increase of general intelligence, may indeed be regarded as growth. They depend upon actual maturation of tissue. But the great bulk of specific personality changes after the first year or two are learning rather than growth processes. They are determined by environmental situations rather than predetermined from within. Psychology is tending away from the belief in innate stages of personality development, each stage calling for a specific kind of work or play. The theory of recapitulation made famous by G. Stanley Hall, that the individual lives through a series of stages like that through which the race passed in its biological evolution, is no longer taken seriously. The successive changes of interest and activity which seem to characterize the average child are no longer regarded as a series definitely fixed by inner growth. The older psychologists believed that it is normal in adolescence to pass through a period of emotional "storm and stress." Margaret Mead, studying Samoan childhood, found that such storm and stress as exists there is rather during pre-adolescence when children are responsible for their baby brothers and sisters, and at the same time denied the freedom and privileges of adolescents. After adolescence begins there is greater emotional satisfaction, better adjustment. Miss Mead concludes that the Euro-American adolescent period of conflict is a cultural and not a biological phenomenon. It is due to the conflicting stimuli with which our culture surrounds the individual at that period of his life.¹⁵

To be sure, there are sequences of behavior change which are more or less uniform throughout the mass of individuals in a given culture, and others which are more or less uniform throughout mankind. Practically every child learns his name before he knows right from left, can count to thirteen before he can repeat six digits backward, can make mud pies before he can drive a nail, enjoys Wild West movies before he enjoys a psychological problem play, and so on. But these sequences exist either: (1) because it takes more time to learn some acts than others, (2) because some activities require greater general brain development than others, or (3) because culture assigns certain activities to certain ages.

Constrained Changes of Personality: Dynamisms.—Personality change is not always free and unrestrained. There is conflict within the personality; one wish interferes with another. There is conflict

between the personality and outside obstacles. The changes which take place under these conditions are more complex. They are the Freudian dynamisms (once called mechanisms).¹⁶ The path of "normal" development, whatever that may be, is blocked, and some wish is forced by frustration into some other channel. The Freudians conceive the "id" as the wishful part of the personality which develops under its own inner drive, while the "ego" is the interfering, restraining, guiding, and controlling agency. The dynamisms are thus changes in the libido expression of the id, enforced by the regulating ego. A non-Freudian might say that these dynamisms are simply *reconditionings* which take place as a result of the frustration of *any* wish by any *other* wish or outside obstacle.

Free changes are analogous to the ways in which the branches of a growing tree develop when there is plenty of room and no interference. Dynamisms are like the growth of this same tree when it is closely hedged about and shaded by other trees, or when one branch interferes with another, or when one branch is cut off by an outside agency and its growth energy thereby transferred to other branches. This analogy, however, must not be pursued into detail, for personality change is not a growth process.

The Difference between Spontaneous and Constrained Changes Is Relative.—The difference between free and constrained changes in personality is a relative one. If a certain wish goal disappears gradually while another gradually appears, the change seems free. There is no sudden frustration, no suffering. Such a change occurs when a girl gradually loses her love reactions to one man while she becomes more closely attached to another. The change is a painless substitution. Suppose, however, that she is suddenly deprived of the first man while she is in love with him. Suffering occurs. There must be a forced readjustment or dynamism. She may *displace* her love (substitution) to another man who happens to be available. But if no such man is available, she may *sublimate* her "libido" into artistic pursuits or the love of children or of her work. Or she may *convert* the libido to a physical reaction and develop an hysterical paralysis, headache, mannerism, and so on.

The essential difference between free and constrained changes seems to be in the relative speed of two processes—first a primary or initiating process, and second a readjusting or secondary process. In the illustration above, the process of falling out of love with the first man might be the primary or initiating process. Still, if the falling in love with the second man followed closely upon it, there might be little

frustration and it might not even be known which process was primary. In another case the falling in love with the second man might be the initiating process. If the secondary process follows closely on the heels of the primary, the change seems free. But if the primary process takes place much faster than the secondary, there will probably be maladjustment and some suffering. If the girl falls out of love faster than she falls in, there will be a temporary period in which her love wishes are inadequately satisfied, and readjustment may take place through several kinds of activities and desires which, to appearance, at least, are outside the love field. On the other hand, if she falls in love faster than out, she will pass through a period of conflict between two love goals, which may be just as painful as the other situation. This also may lead to various abnormal developments of personality in the effort to relieve the strain of conflict. It can, indeed, lead away from the apparent love field altogether. We then have the curious spectacle of a person, having more than usual opportunity for love satisfaction, yet retreating from and suppressing normal love behavior. Yet such a paradox indeed occurs, such are the processes of human personality.

Dynamisms Economize Suffering.—Healy, Bronner, and Bowers have listed seventeen dynamisms: displacement, transference, condensation, unconscious phantasy, repression, reaction-formation, projection, isolation, undoing, conversion, introspection, identification, sublimation, rationalization, idealization, and dream work.¹⁷ To these might be added regression, which the Freudians conceive mainly as a characteristic of the free, unconstrained activity of the libido; and compensation, which is an Adlerian rather than Freudian concept.

All these dynamisms are patterns of conditioning or unconditioning (the development of a conditioned inhibition, or the breaking down of a once-formed conditioning by a new conditioning). From one point of view it seems needless to postulate seventeen or more concepts where one might be sufficient. These differ, however, in the *kinds of* conditioned stimuli to which a reaction is attached, or in the locus of the split which occurs in a behavior pattern.

In psychoanalytic terms, "The very specific processes by which the unconscious Ego attempts to take care of, or to defend itself against, Id urges, desires, wishes, are properly to be discussed under the head of dynamisms.

"Dynamisms are various unconscious devices for the mastering of inner stimuli, that is, for eliminating or reducing tension. They are processes conceived as existing as a result of the activity of the pleas-

ure and reality principles. Freud speaks of them as making paths which will ultimately put an end to or avoid 'pain.' Dynamisms are used by both normal individuals and neurotics, only the degree to which they are employed characterizing the two groups."*

Dynamisms are methods of readjusting to the frustration of wishes. They render the frustration less painful. The frustrating situations which are important from the standpoint of psychoanalysis are not external things like mice and mosquitoes, traffic signals, screaming babies, and falling downstairs. They are the internal, symbolic stimuli from which we cannot get away. They are our own ideas: humiliating memories, mental reminders of our own weaknesses, follies, and failures, gloomy forebodings, the knowledge of what might have been but now can never be. The only way we can get away from these stimuli is by some *internal* readjustment. We cannot deliberately forget. But by chance occurs some course of thinking, some attitude, or even overt muscular reaction which does bring relief. The nervous system, by the principle of psychic economy, tends to perpetuate that happy technique. Do you ever have the feeling that there is some unpleasant idea in your mind but that you cannot remember what it is? When in such a state you are in the first stages of a Freudian repression or dissociation. How do you react to this: do you try to recall the unpleasant idea or to keep it forgotten?

Dynamisms the Result of Conflict.—The suffering which leads to dynamisms usually involves conflict of motives, or, in Freudian terms, a conflict between the id and the ego. Conflict means simply that the two motives cannot both be satisfied. One or the other must be blocked or frustrated. It is essentially the frustration which causes the suffering and the dynamism. But is not the conflict sometimes between a single wish and an outside obstacle? In the simplest terms, yes; but such outside obstacle nearly always brings a second motive into play, because it usually requires the making of a decision. Only rarely do we meet with an outside obstacle which leaves open just one possible course of thinking and acting. When that happens the suffering is usually short-lived and the readjustment normal. Commonly, however, the decision as to action is made quickly because there is no other course, yet thought processes of regret or remorse or uncertainty continue to vex one after the practical decision has been made. One wishes to do the practical thing and to accept the fact that he has

* W. Healy, A. F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, Knopf, 1930, p. 198. By permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

done it, yet at the same time he continues to wish that the whole situation were different.

A conflict of unemotional, *unmotivated* thinking processes, however, is not a true mental conflict. If you believe one minute that it is going to rain and the next minute that it is going to be a clear day, and you vacillate from one belief to the other, you certainly have a conflict of ideas or thinking, but you do not necessarily find it unpleasant. You suffer only when you *care*. To care is to wish something, to have a motive.

Certain of the Freudian dynamisms and other terms which will be mentioned from time to time may be briefly defined here.

(1) **Repression or dissociation** is the forgetting or eliminating from "consciousness" of the unpleasant idea, which, however, may continue to give trouble in "unconscious" ways.

(2) **Reaction formation** is the attempt to overcome a painful or anti-social motive or idea by developing the opposite attitude consciously. It tends to result in *ambivalence*, that is, "contradictory emotional attitudes toward the same object either arising alternately, or existing side by side without either one interfering necessarily with or inhibiting the expression of the other."* Thus a jealous person may show an undue and effusive kindness toward the object of his jealousy, and at the same time feel a secret hatred.

(3) **Displacement** is the substitution of another object, goal, or idea, for the original object of an emotion, while the emotion itself remains the same. It is, of course, a form of conditioning. For example, a patient shows an intense self-reproach over a trivial dishonesty. The analyst, sensing the disproportion between the emotion and its alleged stimulus, finds that the original stimulus to the emotion is a sexual experience. This experience, however, has been forgotten or repressed as a means of psychic economy, the dishonesty is substituted, and is now the only reason the patient can remember for his self-reproach. Although his suffering is still great, it is presumably less than it would be if he were to remember the sexual experience.

(4) **Transference** in a broad sense is a displacement of *love* feelings from one person to another, a substitution of one love goal for another, both goals being persons. Inability to transfer means fixation, which endangers the mental health if it occurs before the permanent mate has been found. Freud himself prefers to confine the use of the term *transference* to the physician-patient relation which is established in psychoanalytic therapy. The analyst, it is said, must

* Healy *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

get "transfer" in his patient before he can cure him. That is, the patient must develop a certain emotional attitude toward the doctor which leads him to pour forth his ideas without inhibition.

(5) **Unconscious phantasy** is the expression of wishes in day dreams and in certain childish expressive play. Just what is unconscious about these is hard to say. Evidently it is the connections and deeper meanings which are unconscious.

(6) **Identification, projection, and introjection** are displacements involving the idea of *self*. They are achieved by re-defining the limits of self. The distinctions between them are not entirely clear. In general, identification means getting a vicarious satisfaction out of the wish satisfactions experienced by other persons. The ordinary reader of fiction identifies himself with the hero, or, if a woman, with the heroine. The story usually brings to the principal characters a powerful satisfaction which resembles some satisfaction desired by the reader for himself. Unable to secure such satisfaction at the time, at least in the same superlative intensity as portrayed in the story, the reader accepts the hero's satisfaction as a substitute goal. Again, as Kimball Young points out, parents tend to seek satisfaction of their own frustrated wishes through the achievements of their children. That is, they *identify* themselves with their children and *project* their own desires into the latter.¹⁸ This becomes harmful to the child, whose own life goals may be very different from the achievements necessary to give vicarious satisfaction to his parents. This identification, as a means of satisfying one's own wishes through another person, must be distinguished from love, in which the desire is to possess or to maintain intimacy with the other person for himself, and not for what he achieves. By the identification process many wishes other than love are satisfied.

Introjection is the incorporation of a part of the environment in the concept of self, as when one thrills at a victory of his own school or nation. It is essentially a form of identification.

Projection is, in a sense, an opposite process, although the mechanism of satisfaction is essentially the same. It is the casting out from the idea of oneself unpleasant ideas which really belong there. One "projects" one's own guilt upon others, ascribes to others the base motives he himself possesses but cannot bear to admit. Here too, the person meets a frustration by changing the mental boundary lines of "self." One may be satisfied with himself but dissatisfied in love. In that case he tends to find a love object to which he can attribute his own qualities, a person resembling himself in some significant

way. He projects his *self* into this other person. What really belongs to himself, and probably does not exist in the other, is imagined to exist in the other, and thus the person gratifies his self-love under the disguise of object love. Since this seeming object love is socially more acceptable than frank self-love, the mental trick leads to increased satisfaction, or it reduces the unpleasantness of recognizing one's own egotism. This type of love is called narcissistic as distinguished from object love, and belongs to an earlier stage in the development of the love life. Some persons, however, go through life without getting beyond narcissism.

Narcissistic love is closely related to the wish for recognition or superiority. This wish is not explicitly a part of the Freudian psychology; it is implied among various other concepts. Adler and W. I. Thomas and many other thinkers consider it a distinct and important concept. When we say a person's wish for superiority dominates his wish for response, we mean somewhat the same thing as Freudians mean by narcissism. However, a carefully planned research is necessary to demonstrate the exact relation between the two concepts.

(7) **Sublimation** is the substitution not only of a new goal object but of a different type of satisfaction, a different way of using the goal object. Technically, it is the use of non-sexual satisfactions as substitutes for sexual. The goal object, however, retains a certain resemblance to the original object, while the nature of the satisfaction changes. Thus, a child sublimates an incestuous desire for the parent by changing it into a desire for tender love only. The religious celibate sublimates his whole sex urge into the service of God. The worship of the Virgin Mary supposedly acts as a sublimation for many of the sexual impulses of male Catholics. Sublimation differs from reaction formation in that the energy flows in the *same direction* as that of the original, repressed impulse, but, metaphorically speaking, is aimed higher.

W. S. Taylor has carefully studied the sex life of forty single men in a Catholic institution which requires celibacy. He concluded that there was no real sublimation in the Freudian sense. There was a transfer of energy from activities leading to sexual goals to other activities. But this was just plain bodily energy, not any specific sex energy or libido. Again, the men occupied themselves busily with non-sexual interests, thus reducing all the conditioned sex stimuli to a minimum. They saw and heard as little as possible that was related to sex; they directed their thinking as much as possible into non-sexual channels. Of course these methods did not take care of the inborn chemical drive to sex, and of certain inevitable conditioned stimuli. This

irreducible minimum of sexual desire was relieved through actual sexual behavior, such as masturbation and involuntary nocturnal orgasm. There was no evidence of any kind of behavior which was stimulated by the sexual drive and yet did not involve the sex organs.¹⁹

Taylor does not deny that absorption in non-sexual activities goes with a decrease in sexual behavior, and that the new activities may often resemble sexual activities in their goals (love of humanity substituted for love of a woman, for example). If anyone wants to call this sublimation, let him do so. Sublimation may be thought of simply as a specific kind of change in the behavioral use of time, not as a transfer of a specific kind of energy.

(8) Compensation is a dynamism much stressed by the followers of Adler, who represents, like Jung, an unorthodox offshoot of the psychoanalytic school. Adler thinks that the main drive in human life is not love, but the desire to be superior. This desire is stimulated or intensified by any failure or personal weakness which seriously frustrates a wish. The failure or the weakness causes an inferiority feeling or complex. This leads to an effort to compensate. It is analogous to the enlargement of a bodily organ, like the heart, to compensate for a valve leakage. Compensation, like sublimation, carries forward the energy of the original wish in the original direction. The substitute goal is of the same character as the original goal. The compensation must be related to the nature of the frustration or weakness. This relation may be of several kinds, however. The student who after much effort fails to make the football team may compensate by becoming its manager. He might also compensate by making the wrestling or baseball team. He would be less likely to seek compensation, however, through becoming an honor student or a ladies' man. These goals are too remote from the original. Compensation differs from sublimation in that its original goal involves superiority rather than love. It is a fighting dynamism. Carried to a pathological extreme, it becomes *paranoia*.²⁰ This is a usually incurable psychosis ("insanity") characterized by delusions of persecution, extreme suspiciousness, and the maintenance of normal thinking in fields not related to the delusions and the inferiority feeling.

(9) Rationalization is the substitution of one intellectual conception of a situation for another, less satisfying conception of the same situation. This shifting of the intellectual scenery is achieved through a reasoning process. It differs from ordinary reasoning processes in that it is driven and also guided by a motive. That is, one conclusion of the reasoning process is far more satisfying than alternative con-

elusions; and hence one tends to arrive at the satisfying conclusion even in spite of evidence which causes other persons, lacking this motive, to conclude differently. As Freud says, in rationalization the ego is defending the id.

W. I. Thomas uses the phrase "definition of the situation."²¹ The same external situation will be defined differently, and hence reacted to diversely, by two different persons or cultures. What is defined as abduction or rape in our culture might be defined simply as legitimate wife capture in another culture. People are quite willing to kill one another over a difference in definition of a situation. The white doctor in *White Shadows in the South Seas* could not understand why the natives fell upon him when he made amorous advances to the princess. Was she not rendering him even more intimate personal services than were the other girls to whom he had made love with impunity? As far as he could see, the situation was the same, but the natives defined it quite otherwise. She was the *princess*.

Rationalization substitutes one definition of a situation for another. Usually both definitions must be within the limits of the culture in which the person is living. A young man deserts his fiancée, for example, for another girl. He tries to escape the pain of remorse by rationalizing that he did it for the fiancée's own good. He was not the right mate for her and it was his duty to leave her. He could not successfully rationalize it in our culture by saying that she was found to be a distant kinswoman belonging to his own "clan." Always there must be *some* evidence to support the rationalization, although it may be judged by an unbiased majority to be the weaker evidence. In many cases a rationalization may actually agree with the unmotivated judgment of observers. But it is nevertheless a rationalization if arrived at wishfully.

(10) **Conversion** is the use of an abnormal muscular reaction (or inhibition) to relieve a frustration. It is the dynamism which gives rise to *hysteria*. It takes the form of paralysis, functional blindness, headache, congestion of blood in some area, digestive disturbances, and so on. Every society contains a certain number of hysterical or functional paralytics, who have no organic trouble, who can move the paralyzed limb under biological, reflex stimulation, but who cannot consciously do so. These persons are often cured by faith, sudden emotional shocks, or psychoanalysis.

How can these physical symptoms be used as substitute goals to satisfy repressed wishes? A person who has a strong wish to kill a hated enemy, for example, cannot successfully repress this abhorrent

impulse; but again, he dare not express it. Some day he is under unusually great conflict. He can feel the id tension in his arm which wishes to strike the hated person. There is the opposing pull of his ego which wants to restrain the act. Then suddenly, because of some peculiarity in his nervous constitution or habits, the arm goes limp. He cannot use it at all. He has solved the problem. The unethical wish is to some extent relieved, the paralysis itself serving as a substitute goal. The ego is also satisfied for now it no longer has to repress the threatening id impulse. The paralysis lasts because it is less unpleasant than the conflict.

Freud thinks that conversion symptoms are mainly the "displacement of genital impulses onto apparently indifferent parts of the body."²² But the conversion process certainly occurs as a solution of wish conflicts which involve no sexual element. Shell shock is an example. The soldier fears to advance further toward death, yet his ego-ideal of courage refuses to let him stay back. He is under tremendous emotional conflict. A nearby bursting shell solves the problem. He is thrown down and stunned perhaps, but uninjured. If he only *were* injured there would be no more conflict. He would be a hero without further danger. He finds that it is difficult to arise. He *must be* injured! His motives are too much for him. He is paralyzed because of the tremendous psychic advantage of being paralyzed. He is quite honest about it. If he believed himself well, there would be no relief for his conflict. Therefore he does actually believe himself injured. The phenomenon is related to hypnotic phenomena.

When the Armistice was made known in November, 1918, many cases of shell shock in army hospitals suddenly recovered. This does not mean that these men had been consciously pretending injury. They could not help it that their nervous systems had learned the hysterical technique of escaping conflict.

The Freudian substitutive dynamisms are said to differ from ordinary conditioning in that the substitution is unconscious. The subject does not know and cannot recall any experience of substituting one reaction for another, or one stimulus for another. Behaviorists say that these Freudian substitutions are merely emotional (or other) conditionings *without* the *verbal* conditioning which usually accompanies learning.

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* Starred items are of more general importance.

CHAPTER IV

LOVE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION: UNIVERSAL PATTERNS

The Family as a Subcultural Pattern of Social Interaction.—It has been said that the family is an institution or part of culture. To be sure, every culture has a family system. In so far as these systems differ they are largely cultural. In so far as they are the same throughout mankind they are largely subcultural. Any cultural phase of the family system may be expected to change, perhaps disappear. But in so far as the family shows universal subcultural features we can predict its permanence in human life. What, then, is subculturally universal about the family system? There are five patterns of interaction or social structure which may be tentatively regarded as such: (1) the heterosexual relationship, (2) some degree of permanence of heterosexual relationship between two individuals, (3) some sexual avoidances, (4) mother-child love and to some extent other love relationships between members of family, (5) the incest taboo.

Universal, Subcultural Patterns of the Family System: (1) Heterosexuality.—The predominant method of satisfying the sexual drive in a mature individual is through copulation with a mature individual of opposite sex, who is also at the time actuated by the sexual drive. Lest this seem a needless statement of the obvious, it would be well to remember that there are other methods by which satisfaction is frequently obtained, such as masturbation. One of these other methods could theoretically become the principal method, were it not for the fact that there are certain *universal, permanent* conditions which favor the normal method. This is what is meant by saying that the normal method is subcultural rather than cultural.

This universal interactional pattern of coitus involves certain universal behavior and personality patterns. First, most individuals develop an attitude pattern in which the body of a person of opposite sex becomes a supremely desired object, preferable to all other objects. Second, through conditioning, the touch, smell, sound, or even sight of such a body comes to produce certain forms of milder but more continuous pleasure, and these non-genital pleasures derived from

the presence of the opposite sex tend to dominate over most other sources of pleasure. Third, there is a certain gradient of pleasure, namely, the nearer the interaction approaches to actual coitus, the higher the degree of pleasure. Just where it ceases to be "mental" and becomes "physical" pleasure is a meaningless question. We have seen that this distinction is not scientific. All pleasure involves a functioning of the crano-sacral nervous system and of the muscles and glands in certain ways; it is both "physical" and "mental." There are differences in intensity in the relative degree of functioning of different parts of the body, and in the stimuli which arouse these reactions. But none of these differences is accurately describable as "physical-versus-mental."

With civilized human beings it appears that, in all men and about half the women, completed coitus involves an orgasm. It is thought that with less civilized peoples the orgasm may occur always in women. Observation of animals seems to indicate that the female less frequently and constantly feels the drive, and permits coitus only when she is able to experience orgasm. It may be that civilized women are the only females who violate this rule. We do not know.

Is There More Sexual Drive in the Male than the Female?—There is today much challenging of the old theory that the sex drive is biologically stronger or more frequent in men than in women, despite the animal evidence which supports this theory, at least as to frequency. Modern sexologists claim that passion has been repressed in woman by culture, and that when this taboo is removed, woman will desire sexual intercourse as much and as frequently as man. The evidence for this is that many women, trained to think of sex life as normal and valuable, have actually developed high frequency of desire and ability to enjoy sex as men do, and that psychoanalysis has revealed unconscious repressions in many other women who have been sexually frigid.

While we are awaiting more definite research evidence on this point, however, it is well to consider what the answer to the question will mean if and when we get it. Does it make any difference whether there is an inborn sex difference in passion, provided both sexes can be *trained* to an equally satisfying and healthy sex life? The newer evidence does point toward equality of *capacity* for sexual function and enjoyment. But still it may be true that the chemical, biological drive is far less frequent in women. Capacity to enjoy, and biological drive, are two different things. There is no logic, or principle of symmetry, or of justice, in biology, which would lead us *a priori* to ex-

pect an equal endowment of the sexes in this respect. Organic Nature's method is to locate excess capacity at certain strategic or critical points. She is wasteful. She provides reproductive cells, for example, enormously in excess of those which can actually be used. No particular harm results from this excess, but an occasional deficiency might lead to elimination of the species which had such a deficiency. By the same token, it is quite according to organic Nature's method to place an excess of sex drive in the male and to limit the sex drive of the female to those seasons when reproduction is possible. This insures that no female capable of reproduction will be neglected by males. As a result the race goes on, and the organic goal is satisfied. That the males have a great excess of passion does no harm to the race. Even if they spend that excess in "abnormal" or "perverted" sexual activity, no harm is done. By and large such perversions do not prevent the use of sexual function in the normal manner whenever opportunity therefor is available.

The quantity of sexual activity in man can apparently vary through a wide range without biological harm. Such harm as does follow from extremely frequent or infrequent sexual function is a more complex sort, which must be studied in terms of wishes, frustrations, social conflicts, and so on. Very little light is to be obtained by going back to biology.

Capacity for Sex Enjoyment May Be Equal Although Drive Is Not.—From the human point of view, the question is not how organic Nature intended us to use sex. It is, rather, how can we use sex to provide the most satisfying human life? It is the purpose and glory of man to outwit organic Nature, to use her means for ends which she never intended. It happens occasionally that human purposes are pursued in such a way as to defeat the essential biological goals of perpetuating the race and maintaining health. This happens, for example, when men practice birth control to the extent of actually reducing the population, or when venereal disease is spread by uncontrolled sexual relations. But those who would seek the remedy for these evils by "going back to nature," by "conforming to nature's laws," have embarked upon a fruitless and meaningless quest. We have seen that "nature" includes human interaction and culture as well as the organic or biological realm. Just what is meant, then, by the "ways of nature"? The human method, or the *humane* method, which means essentially the same thing, is to make whatever adjustment is necessary to remedy the particular harm, with a minimum of frustration of human wishes. Man, possessed of scientific knowledge,

can find many different solutions of any problem. The best solution is the one which yields the minimum of frustration and the maximum of satisfaction to all individuals affected thereby. This is not usually the solution which would have been followed by animals, or by children, or by primitive men. These simpler solutions are "natural" only in a very narrow sense of the term "nature." In the broadest sense, whatever is the best solution, *on the level of human purposes*, is also the most natural solution.

Heterosexuality Is Not Inborn, but Subculturally Acquired.—The preference for the opposite sex is not inborn. It is learned in animals through trial and error, and in men partly through cultural, verbal teaching.¹ A minority of human individuals grows up to be homosexual; a few become sexually fixated upon non-human objects or become auto-erotic. Kempf, from observing primates, reports that homosexual interests predominate and normally precede heterosexual until adulthood is well established, the homosexual interests being more common in the male. The transfer to the heterosexual object is a delicate process and must not be inhibited by fear. Reversion to homosexual behavior occurs in isolated groups of males or females. Monkeys will often adopt other kinds of animals such as kittens or dogs for sexual satisfaction.² Stone, experimenting with rats, found that the *movements* of the female seemed to be the adequate stimuli to the male to induce copulation. He removed eyes, olfactory and gustatory sense organs and *vibrissae*, and partially desensitized the ears. The rats, thus deprived, nevertheless copulated, if placed in contact, at the same age and in the same way as normal animals. The earliest copulation observed was at the age of 64 days. It was found, however, that movements of another male simulating those of a female provoked the sex act. The conclusion is that the skin senses and certain deep sense organs are responsible for the coitus pattern.³ Every-day observation of male dogs indicates much homosexual experimentation.

All of this evidence shows that the sex act itself is indeed determined by inborn neural pathway patterns which automatically mature at certain ages, regardless of the environment. But the *goal* of sex, the object chosen for satisfaction, is in no way represented by such inborn patterns. It is acquired by learning. Is it not surprising, however, that the great majority of animals do *learn* to be heterosexual? No more surprising than the fact that a drop of rain falling in the Minnesota woods finds its way to the Gulf of Mexico, without being equipped with any special finding apparatus of its own. Con-

sider two facts. One is the fact of exploratory behavior, of ceaseless experimentation when not fatigued, which is common to all animals. The other is the fact that the sex organs of the opposite sex and the same species usually provide the mechanically most perfect contact for the completion of the sexual act, and that this opposite-sexed animal is also actuated by a similar drive which is most perfectly satisfied by the same interaction process. Sooner or later most animals find this sex object which gives easier satisfaction than any other. Once found, this goal (the opposite sex) becomes a conditioned stimulus, an aim to behavior, which is thenceforth sought in preference to all other goals. The principle of psychic economy explains the process.

With human beings this physical experimentation is largely circumvented through symbols. Although few parents tell their children the details of the method of sex satisfaction, the very emotional secrecy by which the subject is surrounded stimulates the child toward getting the information long before he has any drive to use it. Throughout culture the child absorbs an atmosphere of attitudes surrounding the opposite sex, steering his emotional education in the heterosexual direction.

The love preference for the opposite sex is thus not inborn, but acquired subculturally and universally (by all societies although not by all individuals) through universal processes of social interaction.

(2) **Continuity of Love-Interaction.**—Nowhere is there a complete promiscuity of heterosexual coitus. The tendency to repeat coitus with, and to remain for a season in proximity to, a specific individual of the opposite sex, is universal and subcultural. It exists with most birds and mammals. It is not always monogamous, but always there are specific mate-relationships which long outlast the sexual excitement of the moment. It is no more necessary to assume an inborn desire for permanent union than an inborn preference for the opposite sex. The phenomenon is readily explained by principles of emotional conditioning and interaction. When an individual has gained sexual satisfaction, he develops conditioned pleasure reactions to the sight, sound, and other stimulus patterns from the particular individual with whom he had coitus. This conditioning gains an advantage and a priority in his neural pathway system over any pathway leading toward another individual. There is always some difficulty, or at least uncertainty, about beginning sex relations with a new partner, and relatively less difficulty about repeating the experience with the original partner. The uncertainty lies partly in

the less-known behavior of the new partner, and partly in the danger of conflict with rivals of one's own sex. The conditioned pleasure resulting from intercourse, again, causes the two individuals who shared the experience to remain in each other's proximity even when the sex drive is not active. *Some degree* of permanent mating is thus subcultural.

(3) **Sex Avoidances; Their Subcultural Causes.**—A certain minimum of sex avoidance is universal and subcultural. The incest taboo is a specific case of this and will be discussed later. For the present we are interested in the causes of sex avoidance in general. One such cause is the unwillingness of the desired partner, usually a female. Male animals soon learn that it is no more practical to secure satisfaction through an unready female than through another male. Kempf reports that female monkeys adopt catatonic (fixed abnormal) postures to resist male advances. One observed female, by this method, caused all the males to abandon her without satisfaction. She was then examined by the investigator and found to be menstruating.⁴

Some have suggested that the lack of sex desire immediately following satisfaction leads to a dislike of anything which calls for further sexual activity at that time. This might seem more true of female animals than of males, since all the latter need do is simply to fail to make advances. With humans, however, there are symbolic and other conditioned stimuli which often lead a male to attempt sexual approach even during these short periods of time when his physical drive is incapable of being aroused. The impotence shown on such an occasion may cause his loss of a desired female or frustrate his wish for superiority. It might be expected that he would develop certain habits of avoidance, such as absenting himself from females, during such periods. Some psychologists have attributed the whole philosophy of sexual asceticism and the whole structure of sexual taboos to overindulgence. Man, being a thinking animal, sometimes makes a mental connection between a lassitude which may inhibit his full strength in some emergency, and the fact of his having indulged recently in sex. He reasons that sex indulgence is a cause of weakness, and develops a conditioned attitude of dislike for sex, on a higher brain level, which conflicts with the recurring sexual desire on the more biological level. Sometimes the conditioned avoiding attitude, supported by a cultural ideology, wins for a considerable period, and even for a lifetime.

Human experience shows, furthermore, that sexual desire does not continue to increase indefinitely as sex abstinence continues. In time

the intensity of desire diminishes, one becomes habituated to a sex-less life, relieved only, in the case of the male, by occasional, involuntary, nocturnal orgasms. Experience shows also that, when sexual satisfaction is dangerous, or infrequent, or uncertain, complete habitual abstention is easier upon the emotions than is a policy of constant alertness toward rare opportunities. A month's absence from each other is much more sexually frustrating to married persons than it was to those same persons when they were celibate.

Another cause of sexual avoidance is conflict. Male animals commonly fight over a female, and the loser learns to inhibit sexual approach toward that female, as he learns to inhibit pugnacious behavior toward the male who repeatedly defeats him in combat. Pain and fear inhibit sex biologically. Some male animals, owing to weakness or chance circumstances, must necessarily acquire many more such avoidances than do others. The fact that males fight with one another for the possession of females lends additional support to the theory that the sex drive is more frequent and continuous in the male. Even though there be a female for every male, yet there is competition among males for sexual opportunities. Even among polygynous animals this is true: one male is able to take advantage of all the opportunities offered by a group of females, and he fights the encroaching male who reduces his satisfaction.

It may be questioned why, among infra-humans, a male knows that another male is the cause of his reduced satisfaction. Of course he cannot reason, or symbolize, about this. But in the normal course of events there will be many occasions when his approach to a female will be repulsed by her unwillingness and when *just previously* he has observed another male with her. The frustration experience and the sight of the other male thus become fused by conditioning. He develops a habit of attacking the other male whenever he intrudes, regardless of the sexual situation then existing.

Among humans these various circumstantial causes of sex avoidance become readily connected, through the thought system, to a wide range of stimuli quite beyond the imagination of animals. Many of these connections originate by chance, but are yet perpetuated through culture for long periods despite their uselessness and irrationality. There grows up a host of sex taboos: taboos against particular persons, against particular places, times, circumstances. Almost any system of sex taboos can survive provided it leaves free *enough* opportunities for sex satisfaction. It is easy to train sex avoidance habits in any given direction provided enough other direc-

tions are left open. There need be no inherent logic or rationality in the particular taboos; they may arise out of chance circumstances. If a group happens to be defeated in battle and it happens to be called to their attention that one of the members has recently had sexual intercourse with a woman of the ABC clan, or a woman with red hair, or at the full of the moon, or under any particularly *definable* circumstances, all the blind forces of sexual avoidance may become attached to this circumstance and lead to a permanent taboo.

Subcultural Limits to Cultural Sex Mores.—What is "enough" sexual satisfaction for a given group? There seems to be a wide range of tolerance. The upper limit would be a rate of sexual indulgence so high that it would lead to satiation, impotence, and the consequent growth of avoidance habits. The lower limit would be a sex suppression so frustrating that it would lead to wholesale secret violations and thus defeat itself. Within these wide limits the precise rate of sexual intercourse may be determined by culture. Ascetic cultures would fix the rate near the lower limit; erotic cultures near the upper. In general it might be said that if all members of the female (because less passionate) sex are kept adequately satisfied, then, subculturally, there is "enough" heterosexual intercourse, and that the excess passion of the other sex *may* be forced into abstinence or into non-heterosexual modes of satisfaction. In our culture this excess male passion is in part taken care of through birth limitation, which leaves more of the women's time available for sex, and through social inducements leading women to accept more intercourse than they biologically crave. These inducements consist mainly of the traditional appeal of marital duty, and in lesser degree, of the practice of the male purchasing sexual privilege from female, explicitly or indirectly. Very recently a new method of adjustment has begun, namely, the education of women to find greater pleasure in sex.

But as regards the great unmarried and celibate section of our female population the situation is quite different. It is, in fact, a rather unique social phenomenon, viewed in the broad perspective of history and geography. Here the sex behavior rate is not even high enough to satisfy the biological cravings of the less passionate sex. It is below the lower subcultural limit. It is possible that never before were so many women permitted to live so far into maturity before beginning the sex life, or so many to pass through life without beginning it at all. Under these conditions the cultural sex taboos are placed under an unusual strain and are showing signs of breaking down under the pressure of subcultural forces.

Subcultural Sex Avoidance Becomes Cultural Sex Taboo.—Although sex-avoidance or sex-restraint habits are a product of subcultural conditions, they become institutionalized into cultural *taboos*. Subculturally a sex avoidance is a practical adjustment to conditions, and therefore would tend to vary in its intensity as the conditions varied. But culturally, the avoidance becomes crystallized and rigid. According to the stricter rules of our culture, for example, it is no more permissible for a man with an invalid and undersexed wife to have sex relations with unmarried women in a community where there is a great excess of female population, than it is for the husband of a highly sexed wife to seek extra-marital relations in a community where there is a great excess of males, and no celibate females. The sex *taboo* ceases to be a flexible adjustment to conditions, but acquires an inherent value of its own, which is more important than the subcultural needs which gave it rise.

Nevertheless, subcultural conditions are always exerting pressure upon cultural patterns and causing them to adjust slowly as conditions change. Not all the sex taboos of culture are of equal force. In terms of actual social *attitudes*, there are degrees of permissible and non-permissible, although in the written law and the publicly avowed mores there is only right and wrong. The formal code is black and white; the quietly spoken code that most closely governs behavior is of various shades of grey.

We may distinguish at least three definite grades of sex taboo. One is the *sex-repulsion* taboo. To violate this is horrifying and disgusting. In many communities it leads to lynching. It is the kind of taboo which forbids incest, sex relations with children, and some forms of homosexuality. A second is merely a *sex-prohibitory* taboo. To violate this incurs only shame, disgrace, humiliation. There is no disgust reaction, and what fear there is, is a fear of discovery rather than of the act itself. To some extent there is tolerance if the violation be not openly advertised. A violation may lead to murder by an aggrieved individual, but not to any concerted public retribution. A large minority of the public secretly approves the violation and would behave likewise if given opportunity. Of such grade is the ordinary taboo upon intercourse outside of marriage. Individuals and circumstances, of course, differ. Women in our recent culture have held something like an incest horror toward all sex violations, some of them even toward legitimate sex relations; while men have been much less horrified, except at the thought of illicit relations by their own wives and family females.

A third grade is the *sex-concealment* taboo. Here the act itself is fully tolerated; there is a reaction only against its being seen, or against its being made known through some particular channel. Such a taboo exists against even "legitimate" sexual behavior in our culture. This *sex-concealment* taboo is also probably a product of subcultural conditions. Fear inhibits sex. It would be natural to conceal sexual activity to avoid possible attack by an enemy or a rival. Not all cultures have the *sex-concealment* taboo in the same degree as our own. In Samoa, for example, parties of younger children spying upon the consummatory love-making of adolescents are apparently a common phenomenon; and before the white man took control, the defloweration of the virgin princess was a public ceremony.⁵

(4) **The Parent-Child-Emotional Bond.**—Mutual, prolonged attachment between mother and offspring is a universal, subcultural phenomenon among the higher animals. To what is this due? Certainly animals do not *know* that their race perpetuation requires feeding and caring for the young. Formerly they were supposed to do it "instinctively." But just how much of this mothering behavior is specifically inborn is increasingly dubious. Plenty of cases of abandonment, cruelty, and even of eating one's own young, are reported. Mother birds will rear offspring of another species as readily as their own, a fact of which certain birds like the cowbird take advantage (whether by some inborn neural pathway, or by an animal culture tradition, we do not know). Cases are known of chickens rearing puppies, and so on.

Among mammals there is a biologically determined interaction process whose significance has been given insufficient attention. It may account for a great deal of maternal behavior. Namely, the mother's breasts become distended at the time of birth, and the nursing of the young relieves this physical discomfort. The nursing is presumably a pleasant experience to the mother as well as to the offspring. By the principle of conditioning, it would be expected that mother and offspring would feel pleasure in being near to each other, and would tend to avoid separation, for considerable time after the actual nursing had ceased. From the standpoint of the offspring, all the pleasant experiences of their young lives are provided by the mother and mostly in the visible, audible, or tactual presence of the mother.

Most young mammals, by the end of the nursing period, are capable of locomotion speedy enough to follow the mother wherever she goes. It is to be expected that they would follow this individual who is a

conditioned stimulus to all pleasant experiences. No animal mother, even if she dislikes the offspring, has the purpose, persistence, and technique which would be necessary to escape from the pursuing offspring.

These considerations do not prove that *no* inborn behavior patterns are involved in maternal and filial behavior. They merely suggest that conditionings acquired in the course of social interaction may explain much that was formerly attributed to specific, ready-made "instincts." Certain drives may be inborn, while the specific objects and stimuli to which they are connected are acquired. -

The attachment between father and offspring is less close and permanent, but in general exists. Among birds the father helps in building the nest, sitting upon the eggs, and feeding the young. Possibly paternal attachment is a secondary result of the continued sex desire of the father for the mother. Even so, the young might become a conditioned stimulus to the father's pleasure which could outlast even the death of the mother.

Here some readers may think that we are putting animal parental and filial love on a rather low plane and may hope that some explanation of a higher order may be found in the case of humans. Indeed there is another human explanation. It is culture. Parental love is one of the leading attitudes or values of our culture. Every child is brought up to believe in it. Every mother is prepared in advance to direct her tender emotions toward her child; she even loves it in imagination before it is born. However, the unscientific person will not be much better satisfied with this theory that a mother loves her child because she is taught to do so, than with the theory that she does so because of the pressure of distended mammary glands. He must needs find a metaphysical explanation.

The tracing of any human ideal to simpler and lowly origins does not destroy the value of the ideal. A rose is composed of carbon and water, but why should knowledge of this chemical fact destroy our ability to appreciate the rose, even when we reflect that carbon is also the substance of lamp black and chimney soot? If we do experience such a disappointment, it is a sign of a faulty education.

The relationship between mother and child is merely the strongest of several other, similar emotional relationships which develop within any group constantly living together. The father-child relation, the relations among brothers and sisters, and among other persons living together are normally of the same emotional character, though less intense and more subject to disruption by other circumstances. In general they may be described as tenderness without sexual desire.

(5) The Incest Taboo.—In all human family systems there is an incest taboo. It is a sex-repulsion taboo, supported by horror and disgust, whereas many sex taboos involve only the fear of being discovered, coupled with more or less desire to violate the taboo secretly.

Incest is sexual intercourse with a person of some close kinship. Just what this degree of kinship is is defined differently by different cultures. With us it applies generally to relatives closer than fourth degree (first cousin). With primitive peoples having a clan-and-totem system of relationships, there is a taboo upon marriage or sexual intercourse with any person of one's own clan, even though the actual degree of kinship be remote and the residence in a different village. In rural South China, the men of a given family name, who constitute the bulk of the male population of a given village, are obliged to get wives with a different family name and therefore from other villages.⁶ In other words there is a system of *patronymic* clan exogamy. Cases are reported, however, in which a man marries a distant member of his own patronymic clan after having her name changed.

Lowie says:

There are no tribes which countenance the mating of parent and child, and where brother-sister unions have been recorded they are not the result of primitiveness but of excessive sophistication. . . .

It is not the function of the ethnologist but of the biologist and psychologist to explain why man has so deep-rooted a horror of incest, though personally I accept Hobhouse's view that the sentiment is instinctive . . . while the aversion to marriage within the group of the closest relatives may be instinctive, the extension of that sentiment beyond that restricted circle is conventional [i. e., cultural], some tribes drawing the line far more rigorously than others. For example, the Blackfoot of Montana not only discountenance the marriage of cousins, but look askance at any union within the local band "because there is always a suspicion that some close blood relationship may have been overlooked."⁷

On the other hand, many tribes in West Australia *require* a man to marry his maternal uncle's daughter (i.e., one of the two cross-cousin relationships). They forbid marriage with the maternal aunt's daughter (parallel cousin). Many tribes would permit marriage with a first cousin who belongs to a different clan or kinship group and forbid it with a tenth cousin who belongs to the same clan. However, it appears that usually less horror attends incest violations with these biologically remote relatives.

* Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, pp. 15, 16. By permission.

Incest Taboo Is Not Instinctive.—The theory that incest horror is "instinctive" breaks down under the analyses of modern psychology. Such an instinct would imply an inborn neural pathway connection between "close relative" and "sex avoidance." Psychology knows of no inborn mechanism by which the neural pathway system could discriminate between all "close relatives" and "other persons of opposite sex." To this the instinctivist replies that the precise application of the rule has to be learned, but that the emotional force or motivation which supports the attitude is inborn. But to what *stimulus* is *inborn* horror connected? That is the question. There may be inborn horror. But there is no inborn horror of *anything*, as far as the evidence goes, except loud noises, sudden loss of support, as when starting to fall from a high place, and perhaps other physically dangerous, non-visual stimuli. To be horrified at sex contact with relatives requires conditioning just as does the fear of the *sight* of a menacing revolver or of any other complex visual stimulus. Incest horror is inborn, only in the sense that all horrors are inborn. This tells us nothing of why any one horror should be more universal and ineradicable than any other. The answer to that question is found in the environment, including the conditions of human interaction, and not in the biological structure of man himself. The incest taboo is, in its *universal* phases, subcultural, but not instinctive.

Westermarck's Theory of Sex Novelty.—Westermarck holds that there is an inborn connection between familiarity and sex avoidance.⁷ The sex instinct, in other words, is predisposed toward excitement by new individuals and toward inhibition by familiar individuals. What are the facts of experience? Certainly continued propinquity of a man and woman, without sex relations, leads to increasing desire for those relations, when there are no mental inhibitions. Familiarity breeds sex desire, not aversion. But if the desire is gratified, and the monogamous union continues for some time, the partners sometimes grow less passionate toward each other and more susceptible to stimulation by third parties. This may be due to excessive frequency of intercourse with each other, or to growing mutual irritations arising from non-sexual causes. But this indifference to the familiar partner is temporary and self-regulating; otherwise it would make monogamy impossible. Again, it cannot explain the incest taboo (because that operates before any sex relations have occurred with the familiar person, as a preventive of such relations) unless we make the tremendous assumption that mankind actually practiced incest to the point of satiety and disgust, and as a result of this experience estab-

lished a universal, everlasting taboo to prevent a repetition of the experience!

Freud's Theory of Universal Incest Desire.—The Freudian view, on the contrary, is that incestuous desire is subculturally more natural and primary than is the desire for sex novelty. Incest desires represent a normal stage in the personality development. There comes naturally a time when the child will direct his sexual feeling toward the parent of opposite sex. It is this normal and universal tendency which explains the universality and power of the incest taboo. As Flügel says, "alongside of the horror [of incest] there exists an attraction towards incest which corresponds in intensity to that of the horror itself."⁸ According to the Chicago Vice Commission, out of 103 girls examined, 51 reported that they had received their first sexual experience at the hands of their father.⁹

The Supposed Harmful Results of Inbreeding.—Westermarck explains the development of the "instinctive aversion" to incest by natural selection. Tribes which did not have it, he theorizes, practiced incest, and therefore died out owing to the bad biological results of inbreeding. But as Flügel says, "the supposed ill effects of inbreeding in men and animals are by no means as yet universally admitted."¹⁰ East and Jones, summarizing the evidence, concluded that inbreeding in itself is not productive of ill effects, but is harmful only when there are bad hereditary qualities to be transmitted.¹⁰ At the same time they admit that outbreeding is relatively more advantageous. But if, as Flügel puts it, "the evil effects of inbreeding are so relatively slight . . . then it is not easy to understand how such a widespread and powerful human characteristic as the aversion to incest can have arisen *solely* as the result of natural selection, working through the bad effects of incest or the superior advantages of outbreeding."¹¹

Interactional Theories of the Incest Taboo.—The culture-stressing ethnologists, such as Wundt, McLennan, Spencer, and Avebury, held that incest horror is the *result* rather than the cause of exogamy, and that exogamy is a result of various *non-sexual* factors in human society. McLennan, for example, held that males were in excess in primitive society, that they were therefore in competition for mates, and were driven to wife capture as the chief means of securing a mate. As a result of this custom it became degrading to

* J. C. Flügel, *The Psycho-Analytic Study of the Family*, London, L. and V. Woolf, Hogarth Press, 1926, p. 202.

† Flügel, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

marry a home female. But the conditions he describes are by no means universal in primitive society, and it is difficult to see how the practice of neglecting the available endogamous mate in order to capture an outsider could become a *universal* culture pattern.¹¹ Again, it is difficult to see why the incest horror is as true of civilized peoples and primitives without any organized system of wife capture or exogamous marriage as it is of peoples with those customs.

Flügel thinks that the universal incest taboo is a result of several forces in combination. He admits some influence to the causes stressed by Westermarck and McLennan, but adds several others, of which the following seem important:

(1) Sexual jealousy, the tendency of the father to monopolize the sexual relations of his own mate against any encroachment by his son, and a corresponding though less violent attitude of the mother in relation to her daughter. As a result the child grows up in fear of punishment at the hands of a jealous parent, and learns thus to inhibit sexual desire toward his opposite-sexed parent. He also, having some love for his same-sexed parent, dislikes to cause sorrow or injury to that parent.

(2) Gregariousness and the interests of the larger social organization discourage the permanent concentration of love within each narrow family unit.

(3) Individual development requires getting away from these family love bonds.

(4) The general sex taboo attitude lends its force to the incest taboo, since this is one of the earliest concrete expressions of sexuality on the part of the child.¹²

Vetter holds that there is a universal tendency on the part of parents to check sexual expression by their children within the family group, because this would be incompatible with the authority necessary for control over the children.¹³ This explanation is like the first one above described under Flügel's theories, except that it stresses the parent's desire to control, to satisfy his superiority wishes, rather than to defend his sexual monopoly.

When we examine the mass of incest theories in the light of the newer psychology and sociology, three leading ideas seem to emerge. First, it is unnecessary to find any one supreme disadvantage or race-killing consequence of incest. The mere fact that there are *many* disadvantages of different kinds, and that there is only *one* countervailing advantage, namely, the immediate wish satisfaction of the individual, seem to load the dice in favor of the taboo. Second, the great practical ease and convenience of incest, in view of its many disadvantages, require an unusually strong emotional barrier against it.

No cold-blooded external police control, no mere esthetic attitude of good taste, would be sufficient to prevent it. Third, the "disadvantages" which are chiefly effective in erecting the incest barrier are not the debatable disadvantages to the race, but the more immediate and obvious social disadvantages, such as the conflict within the family which incest tends to produce. In short, we may regard the universal features of the incest taboo, not as some special instinct or force of "human nature," nor yet as a culture trait which has universalized itself through killing off those tribes which failed to accept it, but as a result of the convergence of many forces, both behavioral and interactional.

Parent Love Can Be a Dominating Motive without Being Sexual.—The Freudian belief in the universality of unconscious incestuous desires follows naturally from the Freudian belief that sexual reactions and other love reactions are innately connected. If, however, we agree with Allport that there is at least one separate origin (i.e., sensitive zone reflexes) of love other than genital reflexes, we cannot regard incestuous desire as biologically inevitable.

It is not even clear that in cases where abnormal parent fixations take place, genital reactions are always involved. Tenderness, or dermal satisfaction, is in itself a strong pleasure. An extreme fixation of this reaction upon the parent may prevent the personal separation which is necessary to developing new love relations, even though the genital reaction be not aroused by the parent. Such an interference is readily recognized in other relationships. Many a woman, for example, remains sexually faithful to a husband for whom she feels intense maternal (tender) affection but who is unable to arouse her sexual passion. She may at the same time be sexually excited by another man. But she sacrifices her genital pleasure, because under the cultural conditions it would interfere with the affection bond to her husband. In this case culture permits and encourages her getting passion satisfaction from the same person as affection satisfaction, but the desired fusion nevertheless does not occur. A psychoanalyst might indeed suspect that the husband was "unconsciously identified" with a father or brother and therefore an "incest barrier" was operating. Such cases, however, have been cured by the training of the husband in physical sex technique, which fact makes the Freudian interpretation dubious. The Freudians attach much "unconscious" meaning to the oft-expressed desire of young children to be married to the parent of opposite sex. This seems to a non-Freudian no evi-

dence of a universal incest desire. Young children often play with the idea of marriage without any concept of its sexual implications.

Parent Dependence May Be More Important than Parent Love.

—Among the psychoanalyst leaders, Jung breaks away from the orthodox Freudian position in this respect. He holds that the principal motive in the child's love of the parent is a dependence or security motive rather than a sexual motive. The child is at first absolutely dependent on his parents for the satisfaction of all his desires, for food, warmth, and so on. With more or less painful effort he gradually learns to satisfy his desires himself. It is his non-love desires rather than his love desires in which he must become independent of other persons. The most common failure in personality development is this failure to achieve independence, this shirking of the "life task."¹⁴

According to Jung, in the parent-dependent type of child or adult this failure often symbolizes itself in dreams and through attitudes which appear sexual on the surface. If such a person, for example, dreams of something related to incest, Jung would in many cases interpret the sexual aspect as only a symbol of the dependence aspect. In its extreme form, indeed, dependence is a desire to crawl back into the mother's womb.¹⁵

To this, Flügel, representing the more orthodox Freudian theory, replies that a symbol is usually less abhorrent than the thing it stands for. A symbol is conscious, and therefore tolerable. It must stand for something *less* tolerable to consciousness, and therefore repressed. Now in our culture incest is much more abhorrent than is prolonged dependence upon parents for non-love needs. It is unlikely that a person would symbolize the less abhorrent desire by one that is more abhorrent.¹⁶

Do we get anywhere as a result of this argument? Perhaps the following thoughts might be helpful. First, these psychoanalysts are arguing about processes in general, as if they occurred in the same pattern in all individuals. Jung's interpretation may be correct for certain cases, Freud's for others. It is possible that there is a selection (unconscious, shall we say!) of cases by which each therapist gets the cases which most conform to his theory. Jung and Adler have shown that in many instances the central conflict is non-sexual, although the same Freudian dynamisms may apply to it. An individual whose chief personal conflict concerns his dependence or his inferiority rather than his sex life may fear to face his inferiority more than he fears incestuous tendencies, even though the majority of individuals might feel differently. Many disputes boil down to

this: which case is more typical? The analysts cannot answer this because they keep no statistics. This is their great weakness. Their most admirable case methods need to be supplemented by some statistical treatment. It is humbly suggested that the psychoanalytic aversion to statistics needs to be psychoanalyzed.

Strength of Taboo Not an Index of Strength of Desire.—The strength and universality of the incest taboo do not necessarily prove that incest desire develops or would subculturally develop in a majority of individuals. If it existed even in a small minority, its actual and feared consequences, operating as they do against so many other goals and purposes involved in family life, would be sufficient to lead to an incest repulsion on the part of the majority which itself had never had the incest desire in its conscious or its unconscious. The strength of the taboo against murder does not indicate that we all have unconscious desires to murder. It would seem rather that the murder taboo is strongest where actual murder is least frequent, as in England and Massachusetts, for example, compared with Florida, Tennessee, Cuba, or Sicily. A strong taboo against murder is evidence of a high social valuation of those goals which murder interferes with. It is not evidence of a high desire to murder. The Freudian argument runs: where a desire is strong, it requires a strong taboo to repress it into the unconscious; therefore, where there is a strong taboo, there must be a strong, repressed desire in the unconscious. The second proposition does not necessarily follow from the first. It is like arguing that the more timid a person is in approaching the edge of a precipice, the more he unconsciously desires to jump off.

Now according to the author's interpretation oral love is originally separate from genital. But it commonly becomes fused with the genital love through conditioning. However, it is possible to maintain a purely oral attitude toward any definite class of objects, without genital excitement, if there is a general inhibitory attitude at the outset. The child does not need to develop incestuous sexual desire and then repress it. Cultural training may prevent his developing it in the first place. The incest taboo, in most persons, is a barrier which prevents a certain easy connection from being made, not a device to repress that connection into the unconscious after it has been made.

The Family Romance.—A universal pattern of the family system, according to Freud, is the love of the son for the mother and of the daughter for the father. The first is known as the **Oedipus complex** and the second as the **Electra complex**, after the well-known Greek mythological characters exemplifying these attitudes.

This heterosexual parent love, according to the Freudians, is incestuous since it is part and parcel of the general libido system which involves actual sex desire, at least when sufficient maturity is achieved. From a non-Freudian point of view one might say that it is not originally sexual but tends to become associated later with sex feeling. Allport makes such an interpretation.¹⁷ Assuming either interpretation, it becomes necessary to repress this love, or at least its more intense phases, and upon this repression are founded many of the neurotic ailments of mankind. Through frustration the child comes to develop an antagonistic attitude toward his parent of the same sex, which also must be repressed, but which sometimes breaks forth in parricide as symbolized by the Oedipus myth.

In Trobriand society the social relations between the child and his elders are fundamentally different from those in Euro-American society in which Freudian theory was developed. In Trobriand Island society, as Malinowski shows, there are no evidences of an Oedipus complex, but there is strong evidence of an analogous repression in the relation between the boy and his maternal uncle. There are no myths of parricide, but there are mythological and realistic indications that boys often hate their maternal uncles and perhaps unconsciously wish to kill them. The situation is readily understandable. At puberty the boy must leave his father, who has reared him and given him great affection, and go to live in the village of his uncle, from whom he receives his status and property, and to whom it is his duty to render obedience. The father tries to keep his son as long as possible, and some chiefs manage to keep theirs in spite of the prevailing custom.¹⁸

Certainly this uncle-hatred cannot be interpreted as sexual rivalry, but is rather a general rebellion against authority. The boy naturally wants to continue all the pleasures associated with his childhood home, including his affectionate relation to his father as well as to his mother. The uncle symbolizes the frustration of these wishes, and hence tends to become an object of hatred. By the same token, it is probable that much or most of the son-father antagonism in our society is due to the father's general role as austere authority and frustrator of wishes, rather than to his frustrating the specific wish for the mother. It is suggestive that in Germanic and North-European countries generally this austere role of the father and the obedience role of the son are more pronounced than in America. It is in those countries that Freudian psychology had its birth.

Freudianism, as a general dynamic theory of human wishes and frustrations, is essentially sound. It represents an epoch-making con-

tribution to science which is strengthened and made even more significant by the kind of criticisms leveled at it in this chapter. The specific criticism involved in our present discussion is that Freudians tend to assume culture to be a constant and to be more a result than a cause of the family interaction processes which they have so well revealed. Rather, the present writer would say, culture patterns are determined by a great many causes outside of family relationships and the love behavior system, and these culture patterns then force the family and love relationships into certain specific channels.

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PART II

THE CULTURAL HISTORY AND GEOGRAPHY OF THE FAMILY

CHAPTER V

THE PRE-HISTORY AND ETHNOLOGY OF THE FAMILY

1. THEORIES OF FAMILY EVOLUTION

General Comparison of Primitive and Civilized Family Systems.—America's material culture is far more advanced and complex than that of the Trobriands. Also, a description of the American economic system would require much more space than a description of the Trobriand economic system. Yet, in comparing family systems, America does not seem to require a much greater space than does the more primitive people. Family systems in general have a certain complexity, a certain wealth of detail in their pattern, which is much the same in civilized as in primitive societies. Civilization does not *elaborate* the family system as it does the material culture and the economic organization. In some respects many primitive family systems are more complicated than our own. On the other hand, it cannot be said that the family system as a whole tends to become more impoverished as civilization advances. It grows thinner in spots, but more elaborate elsewhere.

We are not sure whether or not the family culture permits wider latitude of personal behavior as civilization advances. It may perhaps do so in the most modern, liberal civilizations. Rousseau held that primitive man was free and "natural" in his behavior. He inaugurated the doctrine of the "happy savage." Later, Spencer, Westermarck, and others, who studied primitive life in the concrete, came to the opposite conclusion. Namely, they asserted that primitive man was the slave of custom, enjoying less personal freedom than do we. Primitive customs were different from ours, but they had to be obeyed more strictly than we obey ours. The most recent view of primitive

life takes neither extreme position. Malinowski, who best represents this modern view, shows that his Trobrianders violate their mores just as we violate ours, and that the penalty for violation differs with the circumstances as it does with us. He narrates several cases of scandal among his Trobriand friends, and the stories read very much like episodes in our own society. Sometimes the offender "gets away with" a violation of the strictest taboo, and sometimes he pays the extreme penalty. A Trobriand youth violated the exogamy taboo by repeated sexual relations with a "classificatory" sister. Although this violation was known to several persons, nothing was done about it until the girl's regular and legitimate lover became jealous. Then the offending youth was insulted and humiliated until, by jumping from a tall palm tree, he committed the required suicide.¹

What Culture Patterns Are Characteristically "Primitive"?—Can any generalizations be made as to how civilized family patterns differ from pre-literate family patterns? Many of such generalizations as have been made are unsound, because they assume our Euro-American system to be typical of all civilizations, and ignore the fact that China, Japan, India, the Mohammedan world, and Soviet Russia are also true civilizations. Surely it would be unsound to generalize from the comparison made in Chapter I between a single civilized and a single primitive culture. Yet from a wide and unprejudiced view of several cultures the following tentative statements may be offered.

1. The ignorance of paternity, and the failure to give the biological father a major role in relation to the child, are confined to primitive cultures, but not to the most primitive.
2. Magical control of biological processes diminishes, and scientific control increases, with advancing civilization.
3. There is a tendency for kinship relations to be less specifically discriminated, and less socially important, in civilized societies.
4. In civilized cultures there is generally a supreme organization of power known as government, which enforces a code of more or less formal and written law. This legal code is somewhat differentiated from the more informal group mores, so that "legal" and "illegal" cease to be, as they were with primitive peoples, the exact equivalents of "right" and "wrong." The governmental power is differentiated from the family and religious power, and from the powers inherent in mere *rank*. It may override these other powers at certain points and may protect or persecute certain kinds of individual behavior independently of these other powers.
5. Only in civilized cultures is there a differentiated institution (the school) for the education of the young.

These points might be boiled down still further into three generalizations: (1) civilization reduces magic and animism, and assigns greater role to common-sense and scientific procedures; (2) civilization tends to replace the kinship organization of society by an organization based upon definite geographic boundaries, military and legal power; (3) civilization brings external storage of symbols (writing and records) and develops specialized institutions (schools, etc.) for the teaching and use of these new symbolic techniques. These changes are not peculiarly related to the family system, but are rather changes in the general culture.

Most attempted comparisons between primitive cultures in general, and civilized cultures in general, in regard to specific family patterns, are unsound. If we consider all the historical and ethnological evidence we cannot be sure that cultural evolution involves any consistent trend toward greater monogamy or polygamy, toward greater or less sex freedom, toward greater or less equality of the sexes, toward greater or less freedom in the choice of mate, toward a stronger or weaker bond between parent and child.

Theories of Family Evolution.—In the past, sociologists have tried to formulate a theory of the evolution of the family. It was thought that some one formula might cover the history of the family everywhere.²

(1) **The Classical Theory.**—The first thinkers to formulate such a general law of family evolution were Plato and Aristotle. Their main thesis was that the family was at first patriarchal, as was decidedly true of the early stages of their own civilization. In 1861 Sir Henry Maine presented this theory to a later generation of sociologists. The earliest Greek, Roman, and Hebrew history seemed to betoken a patrilocal, patrilineal, formally or informally polygynous family. Women-centered families seemed to be a product of civilization and sophistication; the father-centered family was more primitive and natural and hence the original form.

(2) **The Evolutionary Theory.**—In the late nineteenth century the study of primitive peoples was first carried to the point of careful observation. At the same time archeology was revealing history much anterior to Romulus, Homer, and Abraham. Evidence appeared to show that human society had not been originally a patriarchate. In fact, it seemed more probably to have started with something like matriarchy, or at least a woman-centered family. Bachofen, in *Das Mutterrecht*, put forth the new theory. Spencer, Lewis Morgan, McClellan, Lubbock, and Tylor contributed. The burden of their

theory in general terms was that the original condition of man was a very loose family life approaching sexual promiscuity, in which the mother-child bond was the only stable and certain family relationship. Under conditions of poverty and scarcity there tended to be female infanticide, leading to a surplus of males. This led to polyandry. Then with increasing food supply the sex ratio decreased (i.e., females increased), man could afford to keep more women as a luxury, polygyny developed. Finally, maturing ethical ideals and the demand for justice led to monogamy. During the earliest stages of promiscuity and polyandry the woman-child relation was the center of the family. The father's relationship was at first unknown to the primitive mind, the child was personally related to its mother only, receiving general protection and food supply from all the men of the group. Under polyandry the identity of the father was of course uncertain. But under polygyny, with a surplus of women and of wealth, and an obvious identification of fathers, the center of power in the family was transferred to the man. He became the owner of his wives and children as well as of his herds. He was now sure what child was his, and while leaving the young child in its mother's physical care, he assumed the right to control its destiny. This theory has been called the evolutionary theory of the family and is particularly associated with Herbert Spencer.

The evolutionary theory was based upon much more evidence than was the earlier patriarchal theory. One kind of evidence was the frequency with which ethnologists were reporting matrilineal systems of relationship and matrilocal families among the primitive hunting peoples. These facts, conjoined with the frequency of the paternal family among pastoral peoples and in early civilization, lent support to the hypothesis that the mother-centered family was earlier. The evolutionary theory, however, was not based upon observed evidence alone. It was not entirely an inductive theory. The evidence could have been interpreted in other ways. Two general thought-patterns of the time were partly responsible for the interpretation that was chosen.

First, the theory of *general* evolution, resulting from Darwin's work, had taken scientific men by storm. It was natural to interpret all change in terms of evolution. Herbert Spencer's great contribution was to apply the principles of biological evolution to the evolution of society or culture. Since biological evolution proceeded by a series of stages passing gradually from one form of life to the next, the same process was assumed to be true of culture. In Tylor's words,

"the institutions of man are as distinctly stratified as the earth on which he lives. They succeed each other in series substantially uniform over the globe, independent of what seem the comparatively superficial differences of race and language, but shaped by similar human nature acting through successively changed conditions in savage, barbaric, and civilized life."³

Morgan put the evolution of culture as a whole into three stages: savagery, barbarism, and civilization, with several subdivisions of each. He held that every society must pass through these stages in the given order, just as every child must pass through the same stages of growth.⁴ As we shall see later, these early social evolutionists were gravely mistaken as to the nature of the cultural process.

The second controlling thought-pattern was the prevalent attitude of regarding civilized man as the antithesis of primitive man. Civilized man was monogamous, therefore primitive man must have been the opposite, in other words, promiscuous. This notion reconciled in a way the new scientific doctrine of evolution with the older religious attitude. Man might have evolved from a brute, but, after all, it was comforting to see *how far* he had evolved.

One important bit of deductive reasoning in the evolutionary theory was as follows. Since early man *could not* have understood reproduction, and modern man does, there must have been a time when man first discovered that he equally with woman was responsible for the birth of a child. This discovery *would tend* to awaken in the man a possessive attitude toward the child, and a desire to dominate and control in the family relations to which before he had been indifferent. The couvade has been interpreted as symbolizing this new discovery.

(3) Westermarck's Theory.—Then Westermarck carefully went through the accumulated data upon primitive peoples and came to a very different interpretation. The main pattern he could see in all these primitive data, from lowest to highest tribes, was monogamy. Cases of promiscuity, polyandry, and polygyny seemed to him merely temporary aberrations, which were not any more common in the lower than in the higher stages. He considered also the mammals and the birds, and found monogamy there. Especially among the apes he found it. He concluded that man had not evolved toward monogamy, but had always been fundamentally monogamous. Other patterns were merely pathological and temporary developments. Healthy, normal human nature would sooner or later eliminate them, or it would degenerate and the degenerating group would die out.⁵

As Calverton has pointed out, the late Victorian intellectuals seized upon Westermarck's theory with great enthusiasm. It was more comforting than Spencer's theory, because it gave a perfect sense of security about human nature.⁶ After all, then, even though man might have evolved physically, his moral character has been essentially constant. Although occasionally going astray, he has always preferred monogamy, as did even his animal ancestors. Here, at least, was one principle of life which could be regarded as fundamental and unchanging.

Westermarck was seriously biased in his use of the animal evidence for monogamy. He overlooked much evidence to the contrary. He also placed undue stress on the fact that monogamy is practiced by the *majority of individuals* in most primitive tribes. This is beside the point. It is not the majority practice of monogamy, but monogamy as a compulsory standard, about which the main controversies have centered. Westermarck was also guilty of dangerous reasoning when he held that the universal trait of male jealousy *would tend* to maintain monogamy. This illustrates the common fallacy of psychologizing about culture.

Calverton has held that both the Westermarckian and the evolutionary theories were rationalizations motivated by the dominant cultural ideals of the era in which they were brought forth. Both theories were used by moralists; contemporary mores were unconsciously at work in producing them.

(4) There is today a fourth theory, or, perhaps better, a lack of theory, concerning the origin and evolution of the family. The prevailing thought of today resembles the evolutionary theory in holding that the mother-child relationship is the most fundamental, and that the father-child relation, the *permanent* husband-wife relation, or the husband-and-two-wives relationship are secondary. In a sense, then, it points toward some degree of early matriarchy and promiscuity. The most thoroughgoing presentation of this theory is Robert Briffault's three-volume work, significantly entitled *The Mothers*.⁷ We have already noted to what extent the various family relations may be regarded as subcultural. But the present-day theory utterly rejects the Spencer-Morgan formulae of universal or natural stages of development. It is not at all convinced, as Spencer was, that the matri-lineal pattern preceded the patrilineal, or that polyandry in general preceded polygyny, or that looser sexual relations preceded more regulated relations. Regarding monogamy it agrees in a way with Westermarck, that monogamy has been present at all stages and is

not more characteristic of high civilizations than it is of hunting tribes. But the present-day theory, unlike Westermarck, does not look upon compulsory monogamy as a "norm" from which other forms are pathological variations. It does not know what the norm is.

The present-day theory accepts cultural change, but regards this as a very different process from biological evolution and from the biological growth of an individual. Cultural change follows different sequences in different areas. It depends always upon chance combinations of circumstances. It cannot be described by a universal formula or a single curve like the curve of bodily growth.

Ethnologists today are interested in rather specific questions. They do hope to discover general principles, but these general principles are of a very different sort from those which Spencer and Westermarck and Morgan so enthusiastically pursued. The specific kind of problem which interests anthropologists today may be illustrated by the following passage from Lowie:

Though no attempt is made here to exhaust the extant varieties of orthodox marriage, one more additional type may be cited. It is characterized by the marriage of a man not with his mother's brother's daughter, but with the daughter of his mother's mother's brother's daughter. . . . Restricted to Australia, it occurs both in the central and western sections, its area of distribution adjoining that of the cross-cousin marriage.*

The Value of the Ethnological Study of the Family.—The student may fail to see in these very technical ethnological discussions any significance for the present and the future of the family. He may crave a comprehensive statement of the old-fashioned kind which gives some meaning to the myriad of recorded facts. He wants to know in simple terms whence the family came and whither it is going. "What is it all about anyway?" expresses a common attitude. To some such inquirers one might reply that a simple mind requires a simple explanation. But there are others to whom such a reply is not fair, because they may have intelligence and eagerness for knowledge and yet hesitate to devote time to a study whose goal and significance they cannot see.

Therefore, let it be frankly stated, that the study of the family systems of primitive peoples has only an indirect value in understanding the present family system, in adjusting ourselves or friends to this system, or predicting its future. But this indirect value may be greater than the formerly supposed direct values. The value consists,

* Robert H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 38. By permission.

first, in learning the *how* of social processes rather than the *what*, *where*, or *when*, and in acquiring a certain inoculation of the mind against fallacies. The objective is not to learn facts as facts, but to acquire methods of thinking. If one is going to reason seriously about the family, he needs a set of mental tools that are fit for a mature and intelligent mind. "Common sense" is not enough.

The more we study the facts, the less we can see any grand scheme of evolution of the family system. But at the same time we gain an insight into the *ways in which changes occur*. We thereby become able to make somewhat better than a fifty-fifty guess as to what the next change may be. If we can visualize more clearly the next step forward, even though we do not see the distant goal, science will not have been in vain. That seeming clear vision of the whole road behind and ahead, which the older philosophies gave us, was but a mirage. We give up this whole system of false knowledge; in return we gain a few fragments of real knowledge.

Second, the study of the primitive family gives us a feeling for the limits of variation of human family patterns. We become better able to distinguish myths and absurd predictions from possible realities. To use an analogy, there are many strange forms of animal life. How, then, can we be reasonably sure that centaurs and three-headed elephants never existed or will never exist? Not by deductive reasoning, but by inductive knowledge of the animals which have been actually observed. This concrete experience gives us some idea of the limits of biological possibility. Similarly, a wide acquaintance with actual cultures gives us a sense of the subcultural limits of cultural possibility.

The study of primitive peoples teaches that, whenever some grotesque and seemingly dangerous trait arises, such as sexual hospitality, it always carries its strict limitations which prevent its becoming a general rule of life. The Chuckchi, for example, are reputed to practice sexual communism. To those advocating sex freedom in our own society, this appears as one bit of evidence that such a state is indeed satisfactory to human nature. Closer investigation shows that the Chuckchi "promiscuity" consists of small groups of not over ten men each, who agree to share wives in common. However, no two members of such a group belong to the same camp. The motive is evidently to provide sexual satisfaction when a man is away from home, and a man rarely has opportunity to exercise his potential rights. Furthermore, bachelors, who would seem to need such a privilege more than married men, are rarely admitted to such agreements, probably because they have nothing to contribute in return. Again, brothers do not enter into such agreements

with one another. It is apparent that such a custom, limited as it is, does not destroy the essential fact of individual marriage, and the basic *principle* of sexual exclusiveness in marriage. That such a custom could have been practiced for an indefinite period without leading to a still greater degree of promiscuity, illustrates the tremendous regulating power of culture over sex behavior.

The "Psychologizing" Fallacy in Judging Culture-Patterns.—Cultural patterns may appear to have the same intrinsic reasonableness, the same self-evident justification, the same sacred inviolability, as do subcultural. Our feeling toward a practice furnishes no evidence as to the *necessity* of the practice or as to whether or not a substitute is possible. The ethnologically unsophisticated person will tend to regard any custom of his people as springing from inevitable laws of human nature. This sense of inevitability and naturalness attaches to customs which are peculiar to one's own society, as well as to customs which are nearly universal among mankind. For this reason psychological arguments about the value or necessity of customs are dangerously misleading.

Psychological reasoning, or "psychologizing," about culture,⁸ is the practice of interpreting alien customs (behavior and social relationships) in terms of our own cultural sentiments or values, which we naively assume to be universal.

An American audience witnessed a presentation of an ancient Hindu play, the *Svapnavasavadatta* of Bhasa. Here the king, after mourning his supposedly deceased wife, marries a second wife, through whom a valuable political connection is obtained. Then his first wife reappears, and confronts him in the presence of the second. The Western audience, although familiar with the cold fact that bigamy is permissible, does not expect such a solution under these very realistically portrayed circumstances, so appealing to its own cultural sentiments. Certainly such a fine king, who so tenderly and sincerely mourned his beloved wife, could not submit her to such an ignominious role. Certainly one of these women will withdraw from the picture. The first will commit suicide, or depart, or the second will abdicate. The obviously high character of both calls for some such noble resignation. Again, one thinks there may be a fight. The drama has been so far peaceful, but there lurk in it the germs of conflict. The situation, for example, had been secretly "framed up" by the Prime Minister for political advantage and maybe vengeance is going to fall upon him. It is quite consistent with Western nobility of character to fight under such conditions. One's honor requires it. The last solution one dreams of is a happy bigamy. In the absence of cultural sentiments it is, of course, the simplest and least painful solution. But the Western values make it emotionally impossible and grotesque. Yet it is

exactly the solution which occurs. It occurs quickly, easily, without conflict, and results in the unmitigated joy of all parties.

The audience gasped with surprise. It was already familiar with Oriental polygamy as a custom. But it had imagined this custom to be correlated with the feelings which Americans would have if they tried to practice polygamy. It had imagined polygamy to involve a more or less constant strain of jealousy, requiring some special taboos or conventions to control this jealousy. It had imagined the polygamy to be associated with a certain male harshness and sexuality, militating against the more ideal and tender feelings known in Western marriage; and vaguely hoped that the "higher type" of Oriental man would avoid the custom. But now the audience learned for the first time what polygamy means in Oriental emotions. It acquired *empathy*, or emotional insight, into what it had known only objectively.

A knowledge of psychology alone, however extensive, is insufficient for the interpretation of alien customs or of nascent changes in our own customs. It should be combined in the same mind with ethnological knowledge and ethnological empathy.

To say that psychology does not explain the family pattern is not to deny that this pattern has its psychology. That is, there are always strong feelings tied up with the social relationships of the family. But these feelings are results more than causes. They adjust themselves to whatever pattern the social structure may take, within certain wide subcultural limits. The child is brought up expecting to experience certain feelings toward the several persons in his environment. In perhaps nine cases out of ten, he develops the feelings he is supposed to develop, and looks upon them as part of the order of nature. The love-wish-patterns of individuals, and the love-interaction-patterns of the family groups, are the results rather than causes of the cultural or institutional pattern. Only the most elementary aspects of love are subcultural.

Another fallacy may be committed even by those in command of the ethnological evidence. This is to draw sweeping conclusions as to "human nature" from majority practice as disclosed by ethnological surveys such as that made by Hobhouse and colleagues.⁹

Even if a very small minority of small tribes stands as an exception to some widespread pattern of human behavior or interaction, such a pattern loses its claim to universality and hence to a certain subcultural imperativeness which might otherwise be attributed to it. If a given pattern is followed by the great majority of *peoples*, we may indeed argue that this pattern represents a better adjustment *under most conditions*. But we cannot argue that the rare alternative

patterns are psychologically abnormal, that those tribes which practice them are "queer," "degenerate," or "pathological." Some individuals in every society may be insane, but no *whole society* is insane, even if it be composed of only a hundred individuals.

2. A SURVEY OF CULTURAL VARIATIONS IN THE FAMILY

I. The Control of Reproduction: Biological and Social Fatherhood.—There are traits, even more widespread and fundamental than compulsory monogamy, which nevertheless are found not to be universal. Such a trait is the linkage of biological with social fatherhood. Among the Nairs of Malabar, for example, the father-husband role is split into three separate parts. There is, first, the ceremonial husband, who marries the girl with religious ceremony when she is eleven or twelve years of age. This "husband" is then dismissed and never again comes into the picture. Then, after the girl reaches puberty, comes the lover, who is the biological father of the children. He is usually a younger son from Namburuti Brahman groups in the vicinity, among whom no younger son may legally marry. However, this lover-father has no legal or social status; his children belong entirely to their mother. Finally, it is the mother's brother who actually lives with the mother and children and plays the role of social father. If such a pattern of life were in violation of "instinct" or any inborn biological pattern, it could not be carried out consistently and regularly even in this one small people.¹⁰

In Indonesia, Melanesia, and New Guinea there are tribes which give no social status to the biological father. In Borneo there are peoples among whom the husband must always visit his wife secretly. Where the biological father is not socially recognized, his identity may or may not be known. Many tribes do not appear to understand the biological cause of reproduction. When a woman has a child it is attributed to the fact that she has visited a certain sacred spot or performed a certain ritual. Among the polyandrous Todas, that husband who performs the bow and arrow ceremony at the birth of a child is regarded as the legal father of the child. Which husband is the true father may be unknown. As we have seen, the Trobrianders deny the father's role as progenitor, although they permit him to live with the mother and to care for the children.¹¹

Even the maternal relationship is in some cases minimized, though no cases are known in which a mother does not for a time, at least, care for her own children. In Tonga the father's sister, instead of the

true mother, is the social mother. In primitive Montenegro it is conventional to deny the child's relation to its mother and to assume publicly that it belongs entirely to its father.¹²

II. The Patterns of Marital Status: Polygamy in General.—Polygamy means plural mating and includes polyandry, polygyny, and group marriage (a rare and questioned phenomenon).

Polyandry, or plurality of husbands, as a pattern of *marriage* is comparatively rare. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found it in only 31 tribes as against 378½ for polygyny and 66 for absolute monogamy. Polyandry would seem, deductively, to be correlated with a high sex ratio. Among the Todas, one of the best-known polyandrous people, this is true. Actual censuses taken showed from 127 to 259 men for every 100 women, varying with the particular group studied. This high sex ratio was maintained by the practice of female infanticide. As this custom decreased under white influence, the sex ratio dropped from 140.6 in 1871 to 127.4 in 1901.¹³ According to earlier theories, this female infanticide is usually a result of poverty. The idea is that on the very margin of existence a male has a somewhat better chance of keeping alive and of aiding the group to keep alive than has a female. The tribe, realizing this, kills some of its girl babies. This *a priori* assumption is itself a debatable one. But, furthermore, in the Toda case, there is no evidence of such economic necessity. They are no nearer starvation than many other tribes to whom female infanticide is anathema. They are a pastoral people, and pastoral people usually practice polygyny!

Polyandry also occurs among the agricultural, but not the nomadic, Tibetans. But these people do not practice female infanticide, except where they have been influenced by the nearby Chinese. Yet these Chinese who practice female infanticide are never polyandrous but have a certain amount of polygyny. The expected correlation does not hold in these cases. All we can say is that polyandry *would be favored* by a high sex ratio and polygyny by a low sex ratio, if all other forces were eliminated. But there may be other forces in a situation which are stronger than the particular force one is investigating. Among these forces is the inertia or persistence of a culture-pattern because of the conditioning of human emotions to it, long after the external conditions which favor the pattern have changed.

If the sex ratio were the main *cause* of the numerical pattern of mating, then a change in the sex ratio should produce an appropriate change in that pattern. What happened, then, when the Toda sex

ratio dropped as a result of their discontinuing the killing of girl babies? We might expect there would be less polyandry and more monogamy as the sexes became more equal. *Some* change had to take place. The one that did take place was this: where formerly three brothers shared one wife, now the three brothers tend to share two wives! Instead of adopting more monogamy they have taken to a form of *group marriage* in which the multiple-husband pattern still holds good.¹⁴ There are usually several different ways of adjusting to a given social change.

Now if we think a little further along these lines, we can see that it is reasonable to suppose that polyandry is often the *cause* of female infanticide and a high sex ratio, rather than a result. The actual cause of polyandry in any given group is unknown. It is known that there is no single, universal cause. In Tibet, the evidence suggests that the desire to transmit an estate undivided, instead of dividing it among several male heirs, had something to do with it. The property-inheritance system is sometimes a result and sometimes a cause of the mating pattern.

Polygyny (plurality of wives) is very common but is seldom practiced by more than a minority of the men of a group. Among the reindeer Koryak, Jochelson found that only 6 per cent of the men had two or more wives each, and a single one had three.¹⁵ In Kulp's Chinese village only 14 out of the 182 families were polygynous.¹⁶ Statistical evidence upon most polygynous peoples is lacking, but it is reasonable to suppose that there have been occasional times and places where excessive warfare and captured women made it possible for a majority of the men to be polygynous.

Polygyny may be the cause or the result of a low sex ratio, or it may be carried on *in spite* of a high sex ratio, from other causes. It has been held that when peoples change from a hunting to a pastoral mode of life they change from polyandry or monogamy to polygyny. The old theory was that man has a greater advantage than woman in a pastoral society because only he can handle the cattle. Woman can perform equally well in gardening and root-gathering, which require no rapid movement, but man is biologically more mobile and hence better able to control animals. In a pastoral society animals are the chief source of food, as they are not in most other cultures; therefore man becomes the chief provider. The chief provider is able to dominate. So man got the habit of dominating woman, and therefore could compel her to accept polygyny. The frequent

amassing of large wealth in the form of cattle further promoted this polygynous tendency. It was possible to support more than one wife.

Moreover, herdsmen, being nomadic and having their chief property on hoofs instead of in barns, have an advantage in attacking an agricultural people. The history of the desert borders is a history of periodic raids by nomadic herdsmen upon peaceful villages. The village is seldom altogether destroyed; the herdsman simply robs the villager of stored-up food and gets away. The villager cannot retaliate, except when his culture develops to a much higher degree than that of the nomad. Only then can he sally forth and "clean up" the desert, as the French have done to some extent in Africa. In nomad raids it is possible to carry off women as well as food, so the powerful pastoral group gratifies its polygynous appetite and becomes further wedded to the custom.

Does polygyny decrease with cultural evolution? Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found the correlations shown in Table 1. Thus

TABLE 1*
Percentage of tribes who practice:

Any permissible

Kind of economic culture	General polygyny, i.e., permissible to all who can afford it	the previous col- umn plus cases of conditional or class-restricted polygyny	Monogamy without permissible exception	Total
Lower hunters.....	29	86	14	100
Higher hunters.....	32	94	6	100
Dependent hunters.....	33	89	11	100
Lower agriculture.....	18	77	23	100
Middle agriculture.....	43	82	17	100
Higher agriculture.....	64	89	11	100
Lower pastoral.....	53	93	7	100
Higher pastoral.....	74	26	0	100
All pastoral.....		96½	3½	100
All other peoples.....		88	12	100

(by unweighted averages)

* Adapted from L. T. Hobhouse, G. C. Wheeler, and M. Ginsberg. *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples*. London, Chapman and Hall, 1930, p. 160.

it is statistically proved that there is a correlation between polygyny and pastoral culture. The relation, however, is not as striking as earlier theories held.

If these figures be arranged in order of a scale of advancing culture, without regard to the *kind* of culture, they appear as follows. We give here only the monogamy column.

Culture	Percentage of tribes monogamous
Lower hunters.....	14
Higher hunters.....	6
Dependent hunters.....	11
Lower agriculture.....	23
Lower pastoral.....	7
Middle agriculture.....	17
Higher pastoral.....	0
Higher agriculture.....	11

These data fail to show any tendency for monogamy to increase as civilization advances. Of course the large major civilizations such as Europe and China are not included here. But the "higher agriculture" in this list includes tribes which use the plow and irrigation. They stand relatively very high in the whole scale of cultural evolution. These results do not controvert Westermarck's point that the majority of *individuals* are monogamous. Indeed they support Westermarck's assertion that monogamy is as frequent with the very primitive as with the more advanced peoples, and refute Spencer's theory of a gradually increasing monogamy. They utterly repudiate, however, Westermarck's final interpretation, because they show that at all stages of development mankind does not value monogamy sufficiently to make it an obligatory standard.

Is Polygyny Less Natural than Monogamy?—Both monogamy and polygyny are, from the subcultural point of view, quite "natural" developments. Both occur among mammals and birds, monogamy being apparently predominant among the highest apes. It is impossible to say that one is more fundamentally rooted in human nature than the other. The approximate equality of the sexes at birth furnishes a subcultural condition which would tend toward the development of monogamous habits, without the presence of any specific instinct. But there are other basic facts that are equally biological. One is the fact that men differ in strength, ability, and bodily attractiveness; another is that men are physically stronger than women; another is that men have more frequent sexual drive or at least a greater tendency to react to this drive by the active seeking of the opposite sex. Given these three biological facts, an interaction process would tend to develop on the subcultural level by which the stronger, more sexual, more able, or more attractive men would appropriate more than their mathematical share of the women. Then, reacting subculturally to interference with their wish satisfactions, they would attempt to monopolize these women, to hide and to guard them from other men. A mating pattern such as illustrated in Figure 1 would tend to develop.

We note a certain tendency toward the Asiatic polygynous sex relation

pattern even where the formal pattern is monogamous. That is, the wealthier and more powerful men actually do gain *control* of a disproportionate share of women. It is they who keep mistresses while also having wives. It is they who leave opulent widows, who support idle daughters, employ female servants and business assistants. Even though the great bulk of these relationships may not involve sexual behavior on the part of the wealthy men, the whole effect is to transfer a surplus of women to areas of higher social privilege and prestige, where the total number of men who will be considered as maritally suitable by such women is smaller than the number of the women themselves. Women tend to gravitate toward the seats of power and wealth, leaving a dearth of women in the areas of hardship. The result tends toward

both polygynous sex relations and female celibacy in the more privileged groups, and polyandrous relations and male celibacy in the great outside areas. But male celibacy exerts a greater protesting pressure than female, and the result is usually prostitution or other polyandrous love arrangements, where males are in excess, whereas an excess of females does not so often bring an analogous result.

Pursuing further this theoretical reasoning, it would seem that neither monogamy nor polygyny could persist indefinitely. Under polygyny, the sexually underprivileged men might learn to




FIG. 1.—Normal Mating Pattern under Male Dominance, Class Inequality, and a Sex Ratio of 100.

accept the power of the over-privileged, taking what satisfactions they could get by stealth, favor, or by purchase from the less desirable women. But sooner or later the strong men would go too far with their monopoly of women, would pyramid too high the privileges flowing from their strength. Then the whole structure would topple; there would be a revolution of the underprivileged, and a redistribution of sexual rights along with wealth and power in general. In wars and revolutions generally, there is a strong tendency toward rape. Rebels take special delight in seizing women who have been protected and monopolized, whether polygynously or not, by the former lords and masters. After the revolution and the restoration of order, we might expect the class then in power to establish strict monogamy to prevent the recurrence of inequality in sexual privileges. But new inequalities of wealth and power would arise, leading to clandestine polygyny of the more powerful, and the cycle would begin again.

If there is any theoretically "natural" or "normal" law of mating, it would seem to consist in such a recurring cycle of change rather than in either monogamy or polygyny as an unchanging pattern. To find polygyny normal "because *men* are naturally polygamous," or to find monogamy normal "because their highest ideals are monogamous," is to think in terms of an individualistic psychology which ignores social interaction.

In actual history such cycles of change have occurred, probably many times, but without any regularity, because of the enormous variation of circumstances and the persistence of culture patterns after they have become ill-adapted to conditions. Some peoples have doubtless maintained polygyny for a longer time and in greater measure than would normally be possible, through maintaining a low sex ratio. This has been achieved through repeated conquest of alien tribes, the enslavement of the captured women, the killing or castration of the conquered men, and the death in battle of considerable numbers of the conquerors themselves.

It is a great error to suppose that the chief motive to polygyny is always sexual and its chief difficulty is always sexual jealousy. The Kikuyu wife asks, "Why do you not buy another wife?" An Athabaskan chief may have several wives whom he uses chiefly to transport goods. A Kai chief's wife welcomes a second wife to help her perform her social obligations; and sexual desire can be so easily gratified outside of marriage that it by itself furnishes no incentive to polygyny. One of the commonest motives is the desire for more offspring, or the barrenness of the first wife.¹⁷

The Stability of Marriage.—Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found marriage indissoluble in only 4 per cent of tribes (271½ tribes giving information). In 48 per cent divorce is so easy that these authors regard it as obtainable "at will" by either party or by mutual consent. In 23 per cent it is reported to be at the will of the husband only. In 24 per cent divorce is allowed only under conditions such as infidelity, desertion, cruelty, or barrenness. The conditions may be different for the two parties, but neither is free to divorce at his or her own will. Divorce at will of wife only is practically non-existent. Only two tribes are mentioned as having such a pattern. Superficially it appears that in 70 per cent of all primitive tribes divorce is a matter of personal discretion, either of the husband or both parties, while in 30 per cent of the cases it is subject to specified conditions. It is impossible to judge the real situation from such figures, however. Even where divorce is said to be at will, public opinion may keep divorces to a low figure. To say that a person may do something "at will" may mean merely that there is no standardized formal penalty for doing it. But there may be a very real penalty.

Lowie says: "Difficult as it is to generalize, we shall not go far

wrong in stating that while the primitive family is not nearly so loose a unit as the theoretical power to divorce might suggest it is nevertheless on the whole considerably looser than our own, though its instability diminishes markedly after the first years of matrimony.”*

Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg find no correlation between the stability of marriage and either the degree of advancement or the kind of economic culture.

III. Marital Selection and the Social Structure.—Endogamy is the rule that one must marry within one's own caste, or other group. However, it does not permit marriage of close kin. The group within which marriage must occur is rarely a sib or other kinship group. It may be a large class or *half* of the tribe. Usually it is a social caste or class. India definitely requires caste endogamy. This rule, however, specifically forbids the marriage of a woman to a man of lower caste than herself, but does not in like measure restrain the marriage of a high-caste man to a low-caste woman. This is restrained by social disapproval rather than by religious doctrine. There is a great deal of unwritten and loosely defined endogamy in Euro-American culture. In parts of Europe it takes legal form as far as the church is concerned, in that a Catholic may not marry a Protestant or Jew. This rule is usually relaxed provided an agreement can be made as to the religious education of the children. But in the unwritten social mores it may exert considerable pressure. A somewhat looser regulation disapproves the marriage of a European aristocrat to a person “below his station,” although of late even royalty have been violating this rule with much publicity. In America, despite our democratic ideology, this caste feeling still exists. It becomes an absolute taboo in the South as regards inter-racial marriages. There a white person cannot contract a legal marriage with a negro, and in many states a negro is one in whom there is the slightest trace of black blood. In the North such marriages, though legal in many states, are against the mores, and lead to social degradation.

Exogamy means that one must marry outside of some group to which he belongs. Every people has some degree of exogamy because certain close relatives are prohibited partners. Relatives nearer than first cousin are, with a few rare exceptions (such as brother-sister marriage in Egyptian royalty), always under the incest taboo. Beyond that, the custom varies in very specific ways. One may marry a first cousin of the proper designation, but may be forbidden mar-

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 69-70.

riage with a member of one's own sib whose blood relationship is too distant to be traced.

Sib Organization.—Exogamy, when it goes beyond the incest taboo upon very close relatives, is usually sib-exogamy. That is, "one's own group," which one must avoid in marriage, is a group of real or hypothetical kin who are related through either the male line (patrilineal), or through the female line (matrilineal), but not both. Matrilineal sibs have been called *clans*, patrilineal sibs, *gentes* (singular, *gens*). It is simpler to call them both sibs. A *sibling* is, thus, one's blood brother or sister; or in sib-organized tribes, a member of one's own sib. Thus one is born into one's sib; it is not changed by marriage or place of residence. In some societies, however, it can be socially changed by adoption.

A sib usually has a name, and this name is in some cases attached to every member of the sib. In other cases the person's sib is merely a matter of common knowledge, as is the fraternity of a college undergraduate, but not mentioned as part of his name. Our so-called family names are not really family names but sib names, because they denote our relationship only through the male line. A true family name should include the name of one's mother's family as well, but to continue such an inclusive practice would be obviously impossible, because the number of a person's names might double with each generation. The universal need to *identify* an individual in terms of kin, without using an indefinite number of names, seems to be one basis of the sib pattern. We are not, however, a sib-organized people, because the name is our only sib bond. With a few very special exceptions in the immediate family, there are no rights, duties, or marriage prohibitions which apply to the father's kin differently from the mother's kin. The family proper is bilateral. In so far as it extends beyond the small group consisting of the married pair and their children, the family extends to mother's kin and father's kin alike. But the sib is unilateral.

Many peoples are matrilineal or patrilineal, in that they give a greater recognition to the mother's kin or to the father's kin within a limited circle of known relatives, but still do not have a sib organization. Other peoples are sib-organized throughout. That is, a limited number of sibs are extended to include the whole tribe, and every individual is definitely known as belonging to one of these sibs.

In ordinary sib-organized tribes, the great majority of persons in the tribe are of course potential mates. In some tribes, however, the exogamous group becomes half the tribe. The Winnebago are divided

into two patronymic* exogamous sibs. Such a scheme is called **dual organization**, and the two sibs **moieties**.

One of the most interesting exogamous systems is that of the Kariera of Australia. The tribe is divided into two moieties, which we might call *A* and *B*, and each moiety into two classes, 1 and 2. Children belong to the father's moiety but to the opposite class of that moiety. Matings thus occur as follows:

<i>Man</i>	<i>Woman</i>
<i>A</i> 1 marries <i>B</i> 1 and their children are <i>A</i> 2.	
<i>A</i> 2 marries <i>B</i> 2 and their children are <i>A</i> 1.	
<i>B</i> 1 marries <i>A</i> 1 and their children are <i>B</i> 2.	
<i>B</i> 2 marries <i>A</i> 2 and their children are <i>B</i> 1. ¹⁸	

Sib-organized peoples are loosely called **totemic** peoples, because commonly the sib is named after some animal or natural object known as a totem. The members of each sib have a special attitude toward their own totem, which is different from the attitude of other persons. There is no universal way of expressing this attitude, however. Sometimes there is a taboo against the eating of the totem animal by the members of the sib, while others may freely eat it. This is far from universal, however. In other cases, all members of a tribe refrain from eating the totem animals of all the sibs. In this case we may suspect that subcultural forces will see to it that the totems are carefully selected so as not to risk starvation. Sometimes, however, the sib has no totem, but is given a name merely designating some supposed characteristic of its members. The Crow sibs, for example, are called "They-bring-game-without-shooting," "Bad-war-honors," "Bad-leggings," and so on. In some tribes each sib is assigned definite hunting lands. In others each sib has its own special ceremonies. In Siberia each sib sometimes has its own shaman or religious seer. Among the Winnebago each sib has a specialized duty, the Bear people exercising police functions, while the tribal chief is always chosen from among the Thunderbirds.¹⁹

Kinship Terminology.—Sib-organized tribes have what Lowie calls a **Dakota terminology** of kinship terms. This system, which is characteristic of the Dakota and Iroquois, uses the same word to mean father's brother as that which means father, but it uses a different word for mother's brother. (The word meaning father sometimes is extended to all of the father's male kin.) It has the same word for mother's sister as for mother, but a different word for father's sister.

* When it is wished to indicate that the *name* specifically is transferred through the male or female line, without regard to other privileges, property, or status, we speak of **patronymy** or **matronymy**.

This may be contrasted with our own system, in which "uncle" means either father's or mother's brother, while "cousin" means any relative beyond the third degree. The Dakota pattern of tying up the father's male kindred by the use of a single term naturally follows from the fact that these all belong to the same sib.²⁰

The older ethnology regarded kinship terms as survivals of previous states of marital relation. In Hawaii, for example, no distinction is drawn between maternal and paternal kin. The single term "makua" designates both parents and all their brothers and sisters, a qualifying word being added to indicate whether the given relative is male or female. From this, Morgan inferred that there must have been in earlier days an intermarriage of brothers and sisters. If one's maternal uncle were called by the same kinship name as one's father, then there must have been a time when one's maternal uncle *could have been one's father*. In other words, it was a period of incestuous promiscuity. The idea was that kinship terms survive after the social relationships they indicate have changed.²¹

Later ethnologists reject this assumption. The term "father" may not mean "procreator" but merely some particular group of blood kindred. In this case all the near kindred of the parents' generation are given the same term. It is not entirely different from our practice of calling both mother's and father's brother by the same term "uncle." A much greater number of primitive tribes use separate terms for the mother's and father's kin, after the Dakota system.²²

Preferential Mating.—There are tribes which prescribe whom a person shall marry instead of whom he shall not marry. They limit the potential mates under certain conditions, at least, to a few individuals or even to one. They do not require that he remain unmarried; a substitute is possible if the socially correct mate dies or becomes unavailable. The taking of the prescribed mate may be limited to certain conditions, or sometimes optional. Such a system is called preferential mating. The most common forms of preferential mating are the levirate and sororate.

These are more common, and probably older than the sib-pattern. Tylor found the levirate in a third of all primitive tribes known to him, and Lowie says that later investigation makes it more frequent than that.²³ The levirate is a pattern in which a man's wife is taken over, upon his death, by the man's brother. The junior levirate, in which only the younger brothers are thus responsible, is the more common form. It is only in a few cultures that brothers may share

the woman at the same time. The sororate is the taking by a man of his wife's sister, usually only the younger sisters. There are two forms: the restricted sororate, in which such a marriage occurs only upon the death of the first wife; and the simultaneous sororate, in which the man has the several sisters at once. Sisters older than the wife are usually excluded, presumably because they are apt to be married already to other men. The simultaneous sororate is more common than the corresponding type of levirate for the same reasons that polygyny is more common than polyandry.

The sororate and levirate must not be interpreted as *privileges*. They are as much, or more, *duties*. They are partly devices for taking care of certain women, and partly results of the primitive concept which makes a *group* of sisters, or of brothers, a unit. The levirate and sororate tend to go together. They tend to produce the same kinship terminology as does the sib system.

Among the Pawnee, a younger brother has sexual relations with his older brother's wife without formal marriage, and is taught to love her as he does his own wife.²⁴

Another form of preferential mating which may more frequently prove compulsory to the individual, is cross-cousin marriage. First cousins are cross cousins when their two sibling-parents are of opposite sex. If these two siblings are of the same sex, their children are parallel cousins. A man may have two kinds of female cross cousins, his mother's brother's daughter and his father's sister's daughter. These two relationships sometimes coincide through the previous marriage of one's mother's brother to one's father's sister. Where this is not the case, the more usual rule is that the man must marry his mother's brother's daughter, rather than his father's sister's daughter. This form of marriage choice appears at scattered points in every continent, but is true of only a minority of tribes in each. It seems to have a center of distribution in southern Asia, which suggests some diffusion. But its appearance at widely scattered points suggests that it has also been independently invented in many places.²⁵

IV. The Transmission of Status and Property: Maternal and Paternal Systems.—The evolutionary theory held that the matrilineal family preceded the patrilineal. It explained that at first only the mother of a child was known, and that after the discovery of fatherhood the man assumed ownership of the family and gave the child *his* name. The causes which led to patriarchy also lead to patri-

liny, patrilocal* residence, and polygyny. The data obtainable by Hobhouse do not always distinguish matrilocal from matrilineal, and patrilocal from patrilineal. In only 7 per cent of the tribes was there definitely reported to be patriliney with matrilocalism, or matriliney with patrilocalism, the great bulk of these cases being in the latter class. It seemed reasonable to assume that most matrilineal tribes are matrilocal and most patrilineal tribes patrilocal. In another 12 per cent of the tribes, there was some other mixed pattern of descent which could not be called definitely matrilineal or patrilineal. The tribes were then regrouped as maternal (matrilineal or matrilocal without any reputed inconsistency), paternal (patrilineal or patrilocal without any reputed inconsistency), and intermixed. The correlations follow:

Numbers of tribes (not per cent)

	Maternal	Paternal	Intermixed
Hunters.....	30	18	22
Pastoral.....	1	10	3
Agricultural.....	44	47	19†

† Hobhouse *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

There is thus a very definite tendency for pastoral cultures to have a father-centered family pattern, and some tendency for the hunters, who are the most primitive, to have a mother-centered pattern. If we eliminate the pastorals, however, who live under conditions favoring patrilocalism, the correlation between stage of development and the system of tracing descent is very weak. The lowest hunters show 23 definitely maternal to 14 paternal tribes; the highest agriculture, 20 maternal to 24½ paternal. Certainly no universal law of evolution can be found here.

If one is looking for such a law, it is further disconcerting to learn about a number of relatively advanced tribes which have preserved a matrilineal system. The matrilineal Iroquois are more advanced than the neighboring Algonkin tribes which are patrilineal. In North America generally, north of Mexico, the matrilineal tribes are on a higher level than the patrilineal. The great majority of hunting tribes which have *not* developed a sib organization are patrilocal. Lowie says:

To sum up. There is no fixed succession of maternal and paternal descent; sibless tribes may pass directly into the matrilineal or the patrilineal condition; if the highest civilizations emphasize the paternal side of the family, so do many of the lowest; and the social history of a particular people can-

* When the young married couple settles in the man's home or community, the family is said to be patrilocal; when in the woman's, matrilocal.

not be reconstructed from any generally valid scheme of evolution but only in the light of its known and probable cultural relations with neighboring peoples.*

But even Hobhouse's rough statistical correlations lose much of their significance when we come to analyze "maternal" or "paternal" family. Tylor has shown that the great majority of peoples really have a mixture of paternal and maternal patterns, although it may be possible, as Hobhouse has done, to classify them as predominantly one or the other. There are at least four traits of a completely maternal system: (1) matronymy, (2) matrilocal residence, (3) the inheritance of property through the female line, (4) the avunculate, or the holding of chief authority over children by their mother's brother rather than by their father. The older ethnologists assumed as a matter of course that all these traits went together in one general culture complex, but more careful work has shown that they are so frequently inconsistent that no such general complex can be asserted. Even the transmission of property is often split, some kinds of property being inherited through the male and others through the female line.

Diffusion versus Stages of Evolution as Explanatory Principle. —Tylor noticed that the couvade is present among peoples of mixed descent but not among the strictly maternal or paternal peoples. He reasoned that the couvade characterized the change from the maternal to the paternal system. But as Lowie points out, there may be certain correlations between traits without any uniformity in chronological sequence.²⁶ Ethnologists are gradually learning that certain pairs of traits do or do not go together, while at the same time they learn that we cannot take several traits and make any general rule as to the order in which they will develop. The chief reason for this lack of regularity in cultural evolution may be diffusion. Each tribe even in the primitive world is constantly exposed to influences from neighboring tribes. A given trait may spread through a region, being adopted by many tribes, some of which are at a low and some a high stage of development. This does not mean that a tribe will accept any new trait that comes along. Cultures are singularly resistant to new customs which do not fit into their existing pattern. But there are always several points at which a culture is susceptible to influence from its neighbors.

Some of the very primitive tribes which do not yet know the con-

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 185. By permission.

nection between intercourse and paternity are patrilineal. This is true of certain Australian tribes and of the Toda and Torres Straits Islanders.²⁷

It is true that the Greeks, Romans, and Hebrews were patrilineal and that the peoples who today make up the bulk of the world's population are descended from patrilineal tribes. This, however, may be a geographic accident. The primitive tribes of Siberia are practically all patrilineal. The predominant patriliney of Europe, Asia, and Africa may be the result of wide diffusion of a trait which just happened to get started in a region where diffusion was more rapid than in other parts of the world. In several traits of culture, Europe and Central Asia show a certain wide uniformity which suggests that the tribes of these continents experienced much migration and contact from an early date. In America, parts of Oceania, and southeast Asia, on the other hand, there has been preserved a greater diversity of cultures, probably because of the slower development of transportation and communication, and the less frequent churning up of population by migration.

Matrilineal descent is no longer believed to be evidence of a former state of matriarchy, a hypothetical condition in which women supposedly played the same role of superior power that is played by men in most cultures. Various peoples do give unusual powers to women. Among the most extreme cases is that of the Khasi, where women own all the houses, real estate, and prized family jewels, and transmit them from mother to daughter. In one locality a woman holds the position of pontiff, and her successor is chosen by a group of female kin. Yet, in this same tribe a husband may kill an adulterous wife taken in the act, and the head of the household is always male. Among the Iroquois, women arranged marriages, owned property, nominated and impeached chiefs, but they never held a place in the supreme council of the league. In general the treatment of women in matrilineal societies is no better than in patrilineal. And as Lowie says, a genuine matriarchate is nowhere to be found.²⁸

The Methods of Securing a Mate.—Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg found by their statistical method that in 70 per cent of all tribes (numbering 434 altogether) marriage involves some consideration given for the bride, either in the form of true purchase, gifts, a period of service rendered by the bridegroom to the bride's family, or exchange for another bride secured by the bridegroom's family for some member of the bride's family. The tendency to give consideration for the bride increases as we go up the cultural scale. It holds

good in about 60 per cent of the lower tribes and 80 per cent of the higher. Bride purchase, which is one of the forms of "consideration," increases from roughly 25 per cent in the lowest to 70 per cent in the highest, and shows some correlation with pastoral culture. It is most frequent in the two pastoral groups and in the highest agricultural group. Wife capture, on the other hand, is frequent only with the lower hunters, about a fourth of which practice it. On all the higher levels of culture it is of negligible frequency, occurring in altogether about 9 per cent of all tribes.²⁹ Perhaps we can generalize that orderly economic procedure and relationships tend to increase as culture advances. As we have seen before, the most certain differences between primitive and civilized family systems are in those patterns which involve the economic or social system in general, rather than purely the family organization.

The same investigators also ascertained whether the consent of the bride to her marriage is or is not required: for 103 tribes the data yielded a definite yes answer, for 81½ no. There is a definite correlation with economic culture. A considerable majority of agricultural peoples require consent; a considerable majority of hunting and also of pastoral tribes do not.

Several methods of acquiring a mate may be possible in the same tribe. Lowie says:

A Crow may get a wife by buying one or by inheriting his brother's widow, he may enter an alliance of love without payment or legitimately acquire additional spouses through the sororate after purchasing the eldest daughter in the family, or capture an alien woman in an attack on a Dakota camp, or under special conditions legitimately take away a tribesman's wife if she has previously been his mistress.*

The buying of a bride with money or service is, however, a form which may harbor very different meanings. In some cases the bride's kin provide a dowry which is greater than the bride price. In such cases it is more reasonable to hold that it is the bridegroom who is purchased. In the majority of peoples, however, the net economic payment seems to be from the man's to the woman's family, which may reflect the basic biological and subcultural fact of man's greater aggressiveness. Among the Thonga, when a family buys a bride for its young man, paying in cattle and hoes, the bride price is supposed to pay not only for the woman but for her offspring. If she dies childless, her husband's family may reclaim the bride price; if he

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 25. By permission.

fails to pay the price, her children belong to her family. Again, if his wife elopes, he may claim as a substitute a bride whom the other family may have bought for its son.³⁰

But among the Kai peoples of New Guinea, though a bride price may be paid, still the wife owns her own property and her children, and the husband must pay her family if he breaks her pottery. He must also do an equivalent amount of work in return for his wife's economic services.³¹

V. and VI. Segregation Patterns and the Rôles of the Sexes.—The status of women has been a matter of considerable interest. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg by their tribe-counting method find that "the position of women in the simpler societies is not favorable as judged by modern standards." There is, moreover, "no substantial change according to grade or type of culture except that the unfavorable tendency is accentuated in the pastoral state."³² Woman is inferior in 73 per cent of the agricultural and 87.5 per cent of the pastoral tribes. The regional variation is more marked than the variation according to grade of culture; Asia scores highest, then, in order, Oceania, South America, North America, Africa, Australia, on the scale they made to measure the position of women. This scale was made up by considering: (1) whether the husband has a right to chastise the wife, (2) whether the wife is protected by her own kin, (3) whether the women do the harder work or the work is fairly distributed, (4) whether the wife is reported as generally equal or not equal in power, (5) whether or not women participate in government.³²

Lowie, who is interested in the specific patterns more than the statistics, shows that:

First of all, it should be noted that the treatment of woman is one thing, her legal status another, her opportunities for public activity still another, while the character and extent of her labors belong again to a distinct category.†

In West Siberia and China woman does not add materially to the food supply and she is also held in an inferior status. Formerly the one fact would have been regarded as the cause of the other. But in South America and South Africa where women plant and harvest they are nevertheless inferior, and among the Vedda and Andaman Islanders where women contribute only moderately to the food supply

* *Op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

† *Op. cit.*, p. 186.

they rank as men's equals in society. A Kirghiz woman may be bought and sold, and divorced at the will of her husband, yet she shares in the tribal festivities, pays visits to other communities at her pleasure, and is not unfairly burdened with work, since the men till the soil, secure food, and tend the cattle. Lowie shows that there is a definite attitude toward woman which is spread through a number of contiguous peoples in Siberia, indicating probable diffusion. This attitude is that woman is property, but it does not involve their seclusion. In Australia, Melanesia, and New Guinea, there is another widespread attitude which stresses the segregation of the sexes. Here, women are excluded from public life and from ceremonies, and sometimes do not even eat with their husbands. In North America there is no segregation of the sexes except near the Pacific coast, which fact may indicate diffusion from Asia. As Lowie says:

Only in Alaska have the Eskimo men a house from which women are excluded; only among the Northern Athabaskans are girls segregated from boys and women barred from attendance at any dances; only in California do we encounter men's societies comparable in the jealous exclusion of the female sex to the organizations of Melanesia. The reason why the Hupa men sleep apart from the women is probably that they have had cultural relations with other Californian populations which favored that arrangement.*

VII. The Rôle of Children.—The care of children by their own parents is sometimes abbreviated by culture. Thus, in the Andaman Islands, though faithful monogamy is the rule, there is so much adoption and transfer of children that the social family unit ceases to correspond to the biological. The children, after living for a time in one foster home, are then transferred to another, and so on indefinitely. The children are visited occasionally by their natural parents, and relations of mutual obligation continue between them and all their "parents" past and present. Thus a child is insured against orphanage, neglect, or dependency such as occur in our society.³³ In Samoa the same end is achieved in another way. Ten to twenty persons, including several married couples, may live in a household, and all the children then living in that household are equally protected by the ruler of the house regardless of their biological origin. Moreover, when mistreated and also in other cases they leave their own households temporarily to live with neighboring relatives, who assume a parental responsibility for them.³⁴

One of the most interesting patterns is *teknonymy*, the naming of

* R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society*, Liveright, 1925, p. 197. By permission.

parents after their children. Tylor knew of thirty peoples who practiced this custom. Among the Ewe, for example, when a child is born, its parents are henceforth addressed not by their own names, but as "Father (or Mother) of K—."³⁵

The rôle to which children are trained varies enormously. Among the Manus people of Melanesia the child is taught to be skilful in swimming and climbing, and is imbued with such an extreme respect for property that he even comments upon the possible ownership of a morsel of food seen floating about in the water. On the other hand, he strikes and insults his parents with impunity.³⁶ In Samoa, though trained to give a decorous respect to elders, he is allowed to run about freely in parties which spy upon adolescent love-making and gather to witness the process of childbirth. Free sex play is tolerated and even encouraged among children in many peoples. In Samoa, children of about six to twelve are made responsible for the supervision of their younger brothers and sisters, and devise various methods to prevent the latter's annoying adults. When adolescence comes, the child is relieved of this responsibility and enters upon a more interesting and less burdensome life.

VIII. Love Patterns and Taboos: Affection.—Sometimes the tender love emotions are directed toward persons of one's own sex, toward one's parents, or children, while only sexual passion is directed toward the mate. Again, as in nineteenth century Anglo-Saxon culture, there is a tendency to emphasize the tender attitude between man and wife, and to conceal or restrain passion, with the frequent result that the sex relation often becomes most highly satisfying outside of wedlock.

Extra-Marital Sex Relations.—In no people is sexual intercourse in practice confined exclusively to marriage. There are wide differences as to the extent and the toleration of extra-marital intercourse. Generally speaking, it is tolerated before marriage more freely than afterwards. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, counting all the tribes for which information on this point was obtainable, classed 56½ as condemning and 67½ as condoning premarital unchastity. They do not give comparable figures for adultery, but found that in 48½ out of some 500 tribes there was public punishment for adultery. The sentiment which permits a husband to punish his wife privately for adultery, in some cases even by death, is much more widespread than is this public punishment. The above investigators found 41½ tribes in which there was some wife-lending or exchange, including sexual hospitality, and 8 tribes having "ceremonial unchastity." In general

they found "unchastity" to be more frequent in the hunting cultures than in the pastoral or agricultural.³⁷

It is difficult to say what unchastity means when the term is applied to a culture radically different from our own. Thus in speaking of polygyny we do not say that it is unchaste because we recognize that it is fully approved by the society which practices it. Yet among many peoples premarital sex relations are no more disapproved than is polygyny. To be logical, we should apply either the standards of approval of our own society, or the standards of the tribe we are studying. Hobhouse tends to imply, through his choice of terms, a sort of intermediate standard which gives "due faith and credit" to the mores of alien peoples in some matters but not in others. We need to know more about the different grades of approval and disapproval among non-Euro-American peoples. They, no more than we, evaluate behavior as morally black or white. Again, whereas our culture makes a sharp moral discrimination between marital and extra-marital relations, other cultures often make discriminations within the extra-marital sphere which seem as important to them as our standards do to us. For example, a Crow Indian belonging to one of two rival military organizations may, during a limited period at the beginning of each spring, steal the wife of a member of the other organization, *provided* that he was formerly on terms of intimacy with that woman.³⁸

Sexual Perversions.—Homosexuality has been given a normal and recognized role in culture. Among the Greeks, whom we regard as highly civilized, pederasty was common and recognized. The sex life of a leading male citizen might be divided between his wife, a *hetaira* or publicly appearing, intellectual woman companion, and a boy.

Social Avoidances and Privileged Familiarities.—Lowie, after studying the attitudes and practices between near of kin in a wide range of primitive tribes, generalizes that "social and sexual restrictions go hand in hand." In other words, to whatever person one's sexual approaches are especially forbidden, toward that person also, generally speaking, custom requires some special restraint in conversation or social intercourse. Lowie also arrives at the converse generalization, that "licensed familiarity obtains between potential mates."³⁹

Parent-in-law taboos are frequent. For example, among the Yukaghirs in Siberia, a daughter-in-law must avoid looking into the face of her father-in-law or her husband's elder brother, and a son-

in-law must likewise not look into the face of his father-in-law or mother-in-law. Freud explains parent-in-law taboos as devices to aid the repression of incestuous desires. Lowie makes two criticisms of this theory: first, that the taboos have a very capricious distribution, being present, for example, among the Navaho Indians and absent among the neighboring Hopi; second, that the attitude associated with the taboos is one of respect and not one indicative of mental conflict between hostility and incestuous desire. The right kind of explanation is sociological rather than psychological. Tylor makes an approach to such an explanation by showing that the mother-in-law taboo is correlated with matrilocal residence. His statistics, however, are questioned. Lowie shows that diffusion is important, but that the culture patterns of a tribe in matters of residence and so on may determine whether or not the tribe will imitate the given taboo when exposed to its diffusion.⁴⁰

Lowie tells an anecdote regarding a Kirgiz woman who was prohibited from using the common words for lamb, wolf, water, and rushes because they formed part of the names of her relatives by marriage. One day she was obliged to tell her husband that a wolf was carrying off a lamb through the rushes on the other side of the water. She expressed herself in some such terms as these: "Look yonder, the howling one is carrying the bleating one through the rustling ones on the other side of the glistening one!"*

The Diffusion of Family Patterns.—In general, geographic diffusion seems to be a better principle than stage of development in explaining why any given tribe has certain family patterns. Diffusion is far from a complete explanation, however, since many of the traits show a very scattered distribution. Many seem to have originated independently at several points, and to have diffused from those centers to some neighbors but not to other neighbors equally near. A tribe does not automatically imitate every custom it observes among its neighbors. Whether it will imitate or not depends upon whether its existing culture-patterns are favorable to the reception of the new trait.

Harriet Behrend and Josephine Perry at Vassar College have plotted on maps the principal Hobhouse data on family traits. They found several interesting geographic concentrations: monogamy is prevalent in Indonesia and polygyny especially prevalent in Africa; the great bulk of the wife-lending tribes are confined to Australia, Africa, and North America. Although Hobhouse gives data on some

* *Op. cit.*, p. 85.

400 tribes, the data on most of them are so incomplete or uncertain as to make generalizations dangerous.

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CHAPTER VI

THE FAMILY IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CIVILIZATIONS

1. THE HISTORY OF THE EURO-AMERICAN FAMILY

Let us now trace briefly the history of our own Euro-American family system. This history is interesting and important in itself, but is no longer regarded as a universal series of evolutionary stages through which all cultures must pass. Other societies have probably experienced quite different sequences of stages.

Pre-Ancient Civilizations.—The civilizations of Egypt, Sumer, and the Aegean region, in the period between 3000 and 1000 B.C., may be called *pre-ancient* to distinguish them from the more familiar ancient civilizations of Greece and Rome of 1000 B.C. to A.D. 400. In pre-ancient Egypt, at least, there was nothing of the patriarchal pattern which characterized ancient civilizations. Women participated freely in government and social life. Cleopatra, though belonging to a later period, represented this Egyptian tradition which was in such contrast to the culture of Rome. Women banqueted with men; the goddess Isis took precedence over the god Osiris. In marriage contracts the man was obliged to stipulate in advance the support he would give his wife. A wife was described by one writer as "glad and gladdening like the midday sun."¹ The husband was counselled to "be not hard on her, for she will be more readily moved by persuasion than force." Men in Egypt were often named after their mothers; this matrilineal tradition greatly surprised the Greek historian Herodotus.

In Babylon there were customs of ritual or sacred prostitution. Priestesses in the temple gave themselves to men who entered.

Ancient Civilizations: The Greek Family.—The Aryan peoples, who came from the North and founded the civilizations of Greece, Rome, Persia, and India, had a patriarchal, patrilineal family pattern. After these newer civilizations had become established, family life and the status of woman appeared much changed. We do not know the details of this change. It was more probably the result of the diffusion of Aryan traditions than an adjustment to new economic

conditions. Speaking generally of the Greek, Roman, and Hebrew cultures of 1000 to 0 B.C., they were patriarchal, the father originally having power of life and death over his wife and children. He could freely divorce a wife, could take concubines and resort to prostitutes, but the wife had no such freedom. The wife was confined to the home and menial duties; she did not dine, or appear in public, with her husband. There was no semblance of chivalric or romantic love. Here we have a pattern essentially like that of modern China and the Mohammedan realm. Let us note its national variations.

In the Greek variety, there was monogamy in the sense that only one wife enjoyed full status. But concubines were permitted, as in China. In addition there were the *hetairae*, prominent in Athenian life. These were intellectual, refined women living in sexual freedom, who dined publicly with men and wielded considerable influence in government. Many great statesmen enjoyed especially close and affectionate liaisons with them. The homosexual love of boys was also a recognized custom. Society was a men's club. Women, however they were treated in actuality, were verbally pronounced to be inferiors. Hippoanax remarked that a wife gives a man two days of happiness, the day of her marriage and that of her death. This should be contrasted with the Egyptian verbalization noted above. Even the radical Socrates advised men to talk little with their wives. Children were under the paternal power and could be married without their own consent. Infanticide by exposure was permitted. It seems, however, that the father did not enjoy such extreme powers in Greece as in early Rome.

In Sparta, women had greater power, but society was regulated by a eugenic ideal. Weak infants were exposed to death in order that the race might be strengthened. Boys were taken from the family home and reared in military barracks.

The Roman Family.—The early Roman family was more monogamous, concubinage being more limited. But it was also more intensely patriarchal, the father having power of life and death over the whole family. We do not know how far this legal power was carried in actual practice. At marriage the wife was ceremonially brought under the family gods of the husband and lost all legal connection with her own family, a pattern suggestive of modern China. Cato the Censor expressed the status of women when he said: "If you were to catch your wife in adultery, you would kill her with impunity without trial; but if she were to catch you in adultery she would not dare to lay a finger upon you, and indeed she has no right."²

The Roman family of A.D. 200 was very different. Because Rome was the leading civilization during much of this period, the changes may be attributed largely to the inner processes of culture rather than to diffusion from other cultures. Diffusion from the older and more intellectually sophisticated Greek civilization, however, doubtless had some influence. These changes included a decay of the *patria potestas* or power of the father, a partial equalization of women with men, a general increase in sex freedom and divorce, and an individualistic, pleasure philosophy of life. By A.D. 200 the rigorous, uniform family pattern had given place to celibacy on the part of some persons and sexual promiscuity among others. Infanticide and abortion became common. Children were freely transferred and adopted, and their parents could control them by no greater power than chastisement.

Many writers have pointed out certain similarities between late Roman culture and our own. The point of the comparison is often an effort to show that the loosening up of the family pattern by individualism and pleasure-seeking will lead to national disaster. Some have attributed the fall of Rome to her decadent sexual morality. We must suspend judgment as to the predictive value of Roman cultural evolution. Although certain patterns and sequences of Roman change are repeating themselves today, it should be noted that Rome lacked some of the most important culture traits of modern civilization: machinery, scientific biology, and contraception.

The Hebrew Family.—The Hebrew family was frankly polygynous, as were other Asiatic cultures in contrast to European. There are some evidences of an earlier matriarchy. The first five books of the Old Testament contain some detailed accounts of Hebrew family mores. The incest taboo was quite complicated with respect to various degrees of kin and in-law relationships, and enforced by severe penalties. Many sex violations were punishable by death. The levirate was common. The power of the husband over the wife was death in the case of adultery, but otherwise more limited than in Rome. An interesting taboo was the prohibition of a man's remarriage to his divorced wife after she had belonged to another man, or if she had been divorced for barrenness or bad reputation.

At the time of Christ polygyny was passing away. Monogamy is conventionally thought of as one of the basic principles of Christianity. It is notable, however, that monogamy was a characteristic and early pattern of Europe rather than of the region where Christianity was born, and that Jesus himself made few pronouncements about

sex mores. The intense emotional correlation between Christianity and monogamy today must be regarded as the result of a gradual fusion of culture patterns in Mediterranean Europe, rather than as one of the main principles of original Christian doctrine.

The Early Christian Family.—In the early Christian era there was a reaction against the liberal family pattern of late Rome. Instead of taking the form of a return to the earlier Roman pattern, it turned in the direction of celibacy and general asceticism. Celibacy was the most honored state, but it was "better to marry than to burn."³ Asceticism came in part from India and Egypt. It offered a novel way of handling the sex desire. Jewish incest taboos also, which had originated in a homogeneous, semi-nomadic people where there would be strong temptation to marry kin because of the small size of the group, were transferred to the very different culture of urban Rome. Theodosius, for example, burned at the stake first cousins who married.

Christianity checked infanticide and abortion, restricted divorce, and gave greater physical protection to women and children and to dependent persons generally. But it did not make for the social equality of women. It tended rather to silence them and to revive certain traditions of the inherent sinfulness and Troublesomeness of woman-kind. These were well supported by the Asiatic legend of Eve the temptress, which Christianity had carried with it from the Hebrew culture. Saint Paul says: "For a man indeed ought not to cover his head, for as much as he is the image and glory of God: but the woman is the glory of the man."⁴ "Let your women keep silence in the churches; for it is not permitted them to speak; but they are commanded to be under obedience, as also saith the law."⁵ "For not Adam but the woman was deceived by the serpent and therefore in transgression."⁶

The Teutonic Family.—While Rome was rising, decaying, and falling, and serving as a melting-pot for Egyptian, Indian, Persian, Hebrew, and Greek cultural traditions, a very different culture was evolving in the north of Europe among Teutonic and other peoples. This culture is known to us, before the fall of Rome, only through its material artifacts and through the descriptions written by certain Greeks and Romans such as Julius Caesar. With the invasion of Rome by the northern barbarians, this culture began to make itself felt and to fuse with the Roman-Christian culture.

It appears that one outstanding difference between this North European and all *ancient* historical cultures was the higher status

given to women. Kings sat on thrones beside their queens as they had in Egypt. The wife was never given over to the complete control of her husband as in the Mediterranean area. The family was not matrilineal, yet the mother's kin played an important role. Also the father had less absolute power over his children. Until the eleventh century in Europe a father could give his daughter in marriage without her consent, but from then on, under Teutonic influence, the custom of *self-gifta* increased. This was the free giving of herself in marriage by the bride. (Yet we still say in America in the more conservative wedding ceremonies, "Who *gives* this woman?") At the same time it became more common for the bridegroom to give the bride price to the bride herself instead of to her family.

The Middle Ages: The Church and Feudalism.—In the Middle Ages two influences tended toward a certain uniformity of culture through Europe in spite of the greater decentralization and disorganization of political control. These were the church and feudalism. The church functioned by way of genuine cultural diffusion. It was an internationalizing influence. It converted the remaining barbarians to Christian patterns of life. It crystallized the early Christian ideology of celibacy and asceticism into the canon law, which was applied, so far as possible, everywhere. The church was the only pan-European power. It gained the principal control over the sex life of all Christians. For these matters were regarded as spiritual rather than political. Under the canon law of the church, divorce was forbidden except for adultery, and then no remarriage was permitted.

By A.D. 1000 complete celibacy of the clergy was established, although, as we know, there were periods of wholesale violation. Monastic orders were established and large groups of persons relinquished heterosexual love in return for greater security and peace of life in other ways. We shall never know just how far sexual abstinence was actually carried out in practice. It is common to regard all religious celibacy past and present with a certain cynicism. But, as we have noted many times before, a cultural ideology is very important even though it be seldom observed in one hundred per cent purity. Celibacy has been and is followed by large numbers of persons of both sexes. The sex drive is powerful, but it is not imperative, and it differs greatly among individuals. If all the actual celibates of today were to be assembled together in certain institutions and be rewarded, honored, and advertised for the behavior they now practice because of necessity, convenience, or fear, we might have an imposing mass of evidence as to the possibility and desirability of

celibacy. As Ruth Benedict has pointed out, each culture has a certain dominant drive which determines its major patterns.⁷ The goal or the personal behavior pattern thus idealized may be strictly followed by only a minority of individuals. There are many who cannot, will not, or do not follow the ideal; but they must live under a certain veil of obscurity and secrecy, or, in extreme cases, as social outcasts. Their personalities do not count.

The other influence toward uniformity was feudalism. This was politically a dividing rather than a uniting force, but it produced similar effects in the four corners of Europe through its similarity of social pattern. It reduced the masses of the people to serfdom and put the power into the hands of local and territorial landowners rather than of centralized national governments. It cultivated a widespread, pan-European aristocratic culture differentiated from the culture of the common people. It involved in places the *jus primae noctis*, or right of the lord to the person of any new bride among his serfs.

The Rise of Chivalry and Romantic Love.—Yet it was in this aristocratic feudal culture that a certain novel pattern of momentous influence arose. This pattern, chivalry, was a love-pattern associated with rivalrous courage, a code of personal honor, and migratory exploits. These exploits reached their zenith in the Crusades, stimulated by the Christian ideology of recovering the Holy Land from the infidel.

The love-pattern of chivalry was extra-marital but at first non-sexual. It was the attitude of the wandering knight toward the wife of his noble host, and it expressed itself especially well when the host was absent upon some expedition. The lord usually married his lady with property considerations in view. The chivalric lover, however, was guided by his emotions alone; he truly loved. This was the first idealization or overvaluation of woman which had occurred in many centuries in that culture area. It was closely associated with poetry and song. As described, this love attitude seems to have involved a great deal of the cardiac-respiratory feeling. There was an attitude of submissiveness or reverence to the woman. This feeling played a very different role from the one it plays in the modern romantic complex, for it was not associated with marriage nor expected to lead to marriage, as the story of Abelard and Heloise illustrates.

The Renaissance.—The Renaissance brought a revival of sexual freedom along with Roman art and literature. The *Decameron* of Boccaccio expresses the cynicism and hypocrisy of this period of cul-

tural change. In South Europe the church made an adjustment, by various subterfuges, to the growing liberalism of family mores. In the North, however, the main drive was for political freedom, and the hypocrisy of the clergy and of South European culture was capitalized for political ends. The church lost control of marriage in the North; the clergy, including Martin Luther, proclaimed their independence by marrying. Henry VIII of England arranged his successive marriages in defiance of the Pope. The Protestants proclaimed that marriage was a civil and not a religious institution. They appealed for authority to the text of the New Testament. They permitted the clergy to marry, the divorced to remarry.

In England of Elizabethan times there was, as in Italy, an outburst of sexuality in literature, which may be presumed to be some indication at least of a more libertarian code in private life. The early English novel and drama were full of sexual allusions and of jests about sexual irregularities.

Puritanism.—But a new pattern of greater rigor was soon to grip England. This was Puritanism. It was a movement on the part of the merchant class to attain wealth and power. With the developing and elaborating commercial activity and the discovery of new lands across the sea, new roads to opportunity and personal satisfaction appeared. One of these roads was emigration. Another was to take advantage of the growing complexity of trade. It was found that by skilful business dealings and thrift a man could raise his economic status and material standard of living. Such a road to prosperity had never before been open to so many people. It became a new cultural drive.

People found that this new goal was best attained if love life and the pursuit of pleasure were simplified. One could not be engaged in complicated liaisons of love and at the same time reach one's maximum success in business. Again, the aristocracy were pleasure-loving and licentious. The merchants were despised by the aristocracy; they reacted by scorning the aristocratic culture. They turned also against the Church of England, with its pomp and ceremony and its control over marriage, which they so despised in the Roman church. They set out to "purify" the church, to simplify its ritual and incidentally lessen its burden of expense upon them. The idea was that all institutionalized luxury be abolished, in order that the individual might devote his whole means to the acquisition of private property, which he might then use for satisfaction as he saw fit. It was natural to support these economic motives by a religious ideology which was

conveniently at hand. The Puritans turned back to a simpler, less materially luxurious, less ritualized Christianity.

The Puritan movement influenced the family pattern in both a backward and a forward direction. On the one hand it reduced the power of the church, and contributed to individual liberty. Milton protested against the canon law which permitted divorce for physical adultery but not for "wrongs and grievances of the mind." Cromwell's Marriage Act required all marriages to be referred to a justice of the peace, required the publication of the banns, and the consent of both parties. On the other hand, Puritanism tended back toward patriarchy. It tended to bolster up the power of the individual husband rather than of the wife. The ideology of Milton and Knox was patriarchal. Knox once said, "An empire of women is the most detestable and damned amongst all enormities that this day abound upon the face of the whole earth."

The Social Psychology of Puritanism.—This same attitude toward women had appeared when early Christianity took over Roman civilization, and at other points in history when a new simplified cultural drive was attacking an older luxurious and sophisticated culture. It can perhaps be explained by certain subcultural conditions which may be stated very broadly as follows.

Where women have much freedom and independence, and there is a great deal of freedom and art about love, love consumes a great deal of time. The principal item is not the time spent in physical love-making, although this also requires more time than is usually given it in order to secure its greatest values. The larger item is the time spent in social preliminaries, in rivalrous activities to win the favor of the opposite sex, in traveling, watching, and waiting incidental to the courtship process. Although both sexes may enjoy the esthetics of courtship and the excitement of amorous intrigue, women's behavior tends to prolong and elaborate these activities, men's to abbreviate them. This is partly due to the subcultural roles of the sexes in courtship. In periods of great social stress and effort, men feel even more than usually a time conflict between their amorous interests and their other objectives. They react to this pressure of time by seeking to abbreviate and simplify the courtship process without, however, giving up sexual satisfaction, while women under similar strain would be more likely to lay aside sex altogether. When man reproaches woman as the "temptress," he is not annoyed by the satisfaction she gives him, but by the time and effort which she compels him to invest in securing this satisfaction; for he is under great competitive pressure to use this time and effort in other ways. He projects his inner conflict by blaming woman, and seeks to reduce her to her "rightful place" by forcing her to become either a docile wife or a convenient prostitute. There are three

ways in which men might economize on the cost of courtship: celibacy, complete promiscuity, and monogamous marriage with completely docile and faithful wives. Puritanism favors the last.

In France, after a short régime of revolutionary license in which the lower classes affected to enjoy some of the privileges for which they had beheaded the aristocracy, and after a régime of sex equality, came the stabilizing Code Napoleon. This restored somewhat the powers of the male. It decreed, for example, that a man might secure divorce for his mate's adultery, but not so the wife, unless the man brought his mistress into the home. French women settled down again to the home. They have since enjoyed less political power but probably as much informal social influence as their Anglo-Saxon sisters.

The Union of Puritan and Chivalric Ideology: Victorianism.—Anglo-Saxon Puritanism took a somewhat different course. It combined in a unique way with the old chivalric tradition, leading to that cult of idealized feminine purity so characteristic of the Victorian age. In this culture even men were forced to restrain or conceal the sex motive to a degree hitherto unparalleled. The taboos extended themselves also to the things which might be merely seen or heard by virtuous womanhood. It became customary to apologize or ask permission for tobacco smoking, and to call a leg a "limb." Even the stage and the novel had to be de-sexualized.

The Industrial Revolution and Feminism.—During this period women continued, however, to gain economic and political power. Their chivalric position of privilege was an asset in this struggle. They could not be treated roughly. True enough the chivalric attitude broke down somewhat where women became militant suffragists and where they competed vigorously with men for business positions. But it never broke down enough to offset completely the advantage they had at least in the middle class of society. In the working classes, indeed, there set in an impersonal exploitation of women through low wages and long hours.

In the nineteenth century began a genuine, class-conscious "woman movement" led by women. The objective has been to secure full legal and political rights with men.

The great moving force in the last hundred years had been the Industrial Revolution and the resulting factory system. This gave women opportunities for independent employment outside the home, which they had not enjoyed before. Marriage became to them less economically necessary. This at first was an added advantage in their

struggle for power. They could accept a man on their own terms. The liberalization of divorce laws and the decline of church authority made it easier to get rid of a man who did not live up to the woman's ideal. The increase in divorce was due in part to the higher standards of behavior required by women. The increased freedom and leisure of women in the upper classes contributed greatly to the woman movement and to women's humanitarian activities.

The feminism of thirty years ago was partly concerned with uplifting and purifying men. Women trained in Victorian cultural attitudes set forth to enforce these attitudes upon the whole of society. They did a great deal to reduce cruelty to children and to establish humanitarian agencies and ideals. At first they were concerned greatly with alcohol and prostitution and other such obvious symptoms, so offensive to the Victorian culture. Later they have turned their attention more to the underlying economic causes of social problems.

The Newer Feminism.—But the direction of effort has changed. Had Victorian virtue been a natural, subcultural characteristic of women, they might have pushed society much farther toward asceticism. They had less physical need for marriage than did men, and no more economic need. They could have demanded a high price. But the goal they were pursuing was an artificial one for which men were originally responsible. It collapsed. Women found that they needed men emotionally more than had been realized, even though they might need them economically less than before. A new ideology, stressing healthy courtship and marriage, cultivating the art of love in marriage, has replaced the older ideology of militant independence of women. On its extreme fringes, indeed, the newer feminism calls for equality in sex freedom, placing its "single standard" upon the traditional male level rather than upon the Victorian female level.

At the same time something unforeseen has happened in the economic sphere. While woman became economically more independent of man, man also became economically more independent of woman. The Industrial Revolution freed both from the necessity of home life as a means of comfortable living. Although woman continued to enlarge her economic opportunities, she still found that man could earn higher wages and earn them more continuously. To compete for the hand of an able, well-paid man offered to most women a greater hope of raising their standard of living than did a personal career. It offered emotional satisfactions as well.

In the meantime has come birth control and the reduced size of families. How far this has reduced the actual burden of child rearing

is difficult to say, for in the small families more care is lavished upon the few children, and higher standards of feeding and medical care are followed. The nervous strain involved in living up to these higher standards seems to be greater than that suffered by farming and laboring families with three times the number of children. But one definite change is certain: with the small family has come a greater personal emotional attachment to children.

Lester Ward once called the family a device for the subjection of women and children.⁹ To this part truth, one should add that it was also a device for mutual aid in the process of scraping together the means of subsistence. But the family in modern Euro-America has come to stress quite different functions. Its economic value is greatly reduced, and its value in keeping women and children under paternal control is well-nigh vanished. The family is now an agency for the cultivation of love, both mate love and parent-child love. It has also become, in the business class, a vehicle for that social climbing (Veblen's "competitive consumption") which is today one of the main sources of superiority satisfaction.

Hornell Hart has devised a combination score or index to measure the status of women and children in different societies. His index stood at minus 40 points in early Roman days, rose to plus 55 in the Roman empire period, then fell to minus 20 about A.D. 600, rose gradually to plus 20 at about A.D. 1700, and rapidly to plus 90 at the present time.¹⁰

Variations of the Family System within America.—Calhoun, in a three-volume work, has shown how family patterns differed among the colonies in accordance with the group cultures in Europe from which the settlers came, and how all patterns were modified somewhat by the frontier conditions. On the whole, however, our patterns are a continuity from the dominant English culture.¹¹

Within American society today there is a great variety of family patterns. There are regional variations; but the more important variations are those among social classes and sects within each region. Thus we note the chivalrous valuations and low divorce of the South, the thrift traditions of the New England family, the patriarchal attitudes of the European immigrant family and of the native rural family, the woman-centered and child-centered family of the business class suburbs, the liberal sex attitudes in large cities, the polygynous traditions of the Mormons, the high divorce of the West which in areas of high sex ratio implies a sort of successive polyandry, and the

tendency toward premarital sex life, lack of sex repression, and high employment of married women among negroes.

2. MODERN EUROPEAN FAMILY SYSTEMS

Regional Differences.—Europe, like the United States, is part of the great culture area occupied by Euro-American or Christian civilization. Certain fundamental culture patterns such as monogamy and the school education of children are practically universal throughout this area. Yet within Europe, even more than within the United States, the family shows many regional, class, and religious variations. Some of them are exceedingly local. In Slavic peasant Europe, for example, there are villages where prenuptial unchastity is severely frowned upon, and other villages not far away where it is even connived at by parents eager to find mates for their daughters.¹² Certain broader differences, however, may be distinguished.

Roughly, Europe may be divided into three great sub-areas as regards family culture: the North, the South, and the East. These areas have no clear boundaries. Most typical of the North is Scandinavia; of the South, Spain; of the East, Russia. The North is characterized, *relatively speaking*, by sex equality, non-seclusion and moderate physical labor of women, chivalry, a single standard of sex behavior, easy divorce rather than tolerated adultery, late marriage, secular control of marriage and divorce, scientific infant care, and rigorous child discipline. The South is characterized by sex inequality or patriarchy and some seclusion of women from public activities, moderate physical labor of women, more male jealousy and possessiveness with less chivalry in the attitude toward woman, a double standard of sex behavior, secret adultery rather than easy divorce, at least in the man, early marriage, church control of marriage and divorce, unscientific infant care, and a less austere child discipline. The East is characterized by sex equality, a minimum of seclusion and segregation of women, severe physical labor of women, lack of chivalry, wife-beating, highly variable but relatively equal standards of sex behavior. In the other respects it resembles the South more than the North. England, with its still lingering traditions of puritanism, a culture complex which never fully established itself upon the continent, is in some ways rather unique.

North Europe in general has the old Teutonic tradition of sex equality and gives its women the greatest independence. Wieth-Knudsen expresses a vigorous protest against the North European "woman and her control of man," which contrasts with the respect

of woman for man in South Europe and the Orient.¹³ If he were to observe the American situation, he would probably protest still more vigorously. In the Mediterranean region the family pattern is more patriarchal. France is the one remaining major nation which has not given women the vote; Russian women took readily to public duties after the revolution but they also work in the fields as hard as if not harder than the men; in the northwest of Europe women have achieved both independence and protection from the more arduous forms of manual work. In the southeast of Europe we find influences of the Mohammedan pattern of extreme seclusion of women.

Revolution has made drastic changes in the family pattern of Russia. If by Russia we mean the urban communistic culture, it is of course the most extremely atypical of all European family systems. The mass of the Russian people, who are peasants, have not altogether accepted the new family patterns.

In Spain and in Latin-American countries which have not, like Mexico, revolted against the Spanish and Catholic traditions, there is a more extreme patriarchy, absence of divorce, franker double standard of sex conduct, a more intense mother complex and brother-sister affection. Langdon-Davies says that the Spanish woman is like the English woman of many generations ago.¹⁴ But there is reason to believe that these characteristics do not represent merely time stages in the change from agricultural to industrial civilization. They are in part geographic differences, independent of stages of evolution. Spain was influenced by eastern patriarchal patterns through the Moors, whereas Germany and Scandinavia at all stages have been under the influence of early Teutonic traditions of sex equality.

Diffusion of Western European Culture.—The failure to appreciate these geographic culture differences is partly due to the fact that "backward" countries are becoming more and more like the "advanced" or industrial countries. If Czechoslovakia, for example, becomes culturally more like France or America as it becomes more industrialized, one naturally supposes that its former unlikeness was due to the fact that it had not yet become industrialized, and that all cultural differences are so many stages in a universal process of evolution. But this taking on of West European and American family patterns by backward countries is due more to cultural diffusion than to laws of inner cultural growth. Because industrialization led to sex equality and the romantic complex in America, one cannot be sure that industrialization in Spain or Bulgaria would have the same effects if there were no America to set an example. There is, indeed,

a strong drive in backward countries to imitate the non-economic patterns of Western Europe and America long before their economic patterns have correspondingly developed. In China, in fact, as La Piere and Wang have pointed out, Western ideology in many respects is being taken over before Western material culture has developed sufficiently to produce that result "automatically."¹⁵ The same can be said of Turkey. Its recent adoption of monogamy is certainly not a result of its growing industrialism, for the industrialism is indeed not appreciably greater than before. It is rather the direct borrowing of Western legal codes, including monogamous marriage.

Class Differences.—Interwoven with these regional differences are class differences. In European aristocracy throughout the continent are certain chivalric traditions which make woman a protected plaything. It is in the same class that a woman can lead a life of known unchastity and still maintain a certain kind of prestige. This pattern may possibly be related to old traditions in which even wife-lending was practiced in honor of illustrious guests, and in which to be the mistress of a high-born man was not at all less preferable to being the wife of one of more lowly origin. Among the middle and lower classes, on the contrary, this tradition has been less influential.

The Patterns of Marital Status.—Nowhere in Europe is there recognized polygamy. Recently it existed in the extreme southeast, under the former Turkish rule. Europe, except for Soviet Russian cities, has less divorce than America. In France and Scandinavia, however, the theory of divorce is more liberal than in the United States, although the actual rate is less. In these countries marriage and divorce are more completely free from religious control than elsewhere. In Scandinavia, divorce by mutual consent without specified cause introduces an element lacking in most of the Euro-American area. In revolutionary Russia the still more extreme principle of divorce *at the will of either party* now holds. But the general tendency in Europe is toward a greater permanence of marriage than here. In church-controlled Catholic countries divorce is low or practically absent. Adjustment to marital incompatibility is made in other ways. Probably there is really less incompatibility. It is interesting that England, the first country to revolt successfully against Catholicism, has remained more true to the church doctrine of indissoluble marriage than have countries like France, Czechoslovakia, and Mexico, whose populations are still nominally Catholic. The real religious difference between countries is not so much that of Catholicism versus Protestantism as it is of established versus disestablished church.

Marital Selection.—In general, European parents take more initiative in the marriage of their children than do American, and the romantic free-choice complex is less deeply established in the popular mores. Property considerations still guide marriage, and in some countries there are match-makers. The amount of property brought by each partner into the union is a matter of importance. Yet all this is not to say that the majority of European marriages are for the sake of property rather than love. Nowhere in Europe can a young man or woman be forced to marry against his or her desire as can be done in the Orient. The essence of the difference is that in Europe young people are encouraged to fall in love with partners within their own property class, and they are not so stimulated by an ideology that calls for love *in defiance* of family convenience. It is doubtful that any great number of them are conscious of an opposing parental will. But the romantic complex is much weaker than here.

The Rôles of the Sexes.—In most of Europe the woman performs more arduous physical labor than in America. She works in the fields and carries heavy burdens on her back or head. One sees commonly, in Central and Eastern Europe, women working as hod carriers for male bricklayers, women laborers with pick and shovel along the railroads under a male foreman, women hoeing fields of beets, women sweeping the floors of factories and removing trash. One sometimes sees a woman helping a dog to haul a wagon through the streets. These conditions are less characteristic of England and France; they are most characteristic of Russia. The employment of women outside the home in America is a recent development, and has been controlled somewhat by the chivalry complex. It puts women largely into clerical work and into certain branches of factory work such as the textile industry. In Europe the extra-domestic employment of women is of much broader scope in the manual occupations and is not regulated by chivalric attitudes; on the other hand, their employment in the mental and directive occupations is more closely limited by the tradition of male superiority. Only recently are women coming into teaching and clerical work. About 37 per cent of the public school teachers of Czechoslovakia are female, as contrasted with 84 per cent of American teachers; only 22 per cent of the personnel of banking and finance is female in Czechoslovakia. Occupational statistics of the industrialized area of Czechoslovakia (Bohemia and Moravia) show nearly 50 per cent of all persons engaged in gainful occupations, while in the United States and also in agricultural regions such as Slovakia, the percentage is 40 or less.¹⁶ The difference is due largely

to the great industrial employment of women. In our textile cities such as Manchester, N. H., and in southern mill villages, also about 50 per cent of the population is gainfully occupied, for the same reason.¹⁷

The homes of Europe are smaller and simpler affairs than ours. There is less elaboration of comfort and of esthetic detail. Although any given task requires more labor because of the lesser machinery, there are fewer tasks to be performed for the sake of luxury and comfort. When a home does adopt standards of living above bare necessity, as in the middle classes, it is customary to employ one or more servants, which practice of course swells the employment figures. A servant is normally to be expected in a business class (brain working, "white-collar") family in Europe, whereas in America only a third of the business class has full-time servants.¹⁸

The Rôle of Children.—The large family group, in which three generations and several married pairs normally lived in the same home, persisted longer in rural Europe than in America with its isolated farming. Control by grandparents, the sharing of the care of young children by adults other than their own parents, and by older children, and the idea of family rather than individual property, are features which still linger in rural Europe although they are well-nigh obsolete in America. In general, European children are trained to a more deferential attitude and a more military obedience to their parents and toward adults in general. A European male adult was heard to remark that he would like to thrash a boy who was making so much noise whistling on the public street. European children, though not employed outside their homes substantially more than American, are expected to make most of their time useful to the family when not in school. There is little of the segregated children's activities and juvenile culture complex which are so prominent in America. European ideology does not call so much for the special treatment of children as a class or for the organization of a separate play life for them. It makes children more a part of the general family life.

This difference is partly due to the great wealth of America and the taking over by machinery of so much work which was especially suitable to children. The telephone, for example, has greatly reduced the need of juveniles for carrying messages; the automobile, central heating and water supply systems eliminate much of the petty fetching and carrying of older days. There is another factor of great influence in American life. That is the tendency of the business class

father to take pride in the leisure and consumptive activities of his wife and children. He may go into tantrums when he pays their bills, but at the same time he is glad to know that their appearance and their good times compare favorably with those of other families in his class; of this attitude the wife and children take pleasant advantage.

Probably in no civilized country does the father of a family have less power over its activities than here. He may no longer beat his wife, and even the corporal punishment of children is closely limited by cruelty laws and watchful social agencies. But the power to inflict corporal punishment is not the sole bulwark of power. The father's absence from home during the entire day, his competitive preoccupation with earning a living, militate against his real ability to influence what goes on in his home. In the American business class, especially in the suburban commuter zones, the mother becomes the real head of the family, to an extent elsewhere unparalleled in civilized, patrilineal cultures. The mother controls the use of leisure time and of the bulk of the family income, and of each she has more at her disposal than elsewhere. European social thinkers are more impressed by this pattern than by almost any other which they observe in American family life.

Love-Patterns and Taboos.—The conversation and ideology on the Continent never departed so far from the realities of sex as in Anglo-Saxon countries. This does not mean that Continentals freely discuss sex matters in all groups. In the Polish peasantry, for example, sex and even love must not be mentioned in courtship. The difference, which has now largely broken down, lay in the public and literary recognition of sex. There are other indications, however, of fundamental differences in the ideology of sex-differences which still persist.

European attitudes toward sex and love may be thought of as guided by six different patterns. First, there is puritanism, centering in England and influencing in considerable degree Germany and other portions of the northwest Continent. Second, there is the non-puritan but highly possessive and jealous attitude pattern of Spain and the Mediterranean region. Third, there is the pattern of the Central and East European peasantry, centering in Austria, with its toleration of sex relations in courtship and tendency to postpone formal marriage until after pregnancy or childbirth. Fourth, there is the supposedly French attitude which tends to glorify love for its own sake and not as a prelude to marriage, tolerating a limited and discreet sex freedom among both married and unmarried and deplor-

ing jealousy. This pattern would seem to be descended from medieval chivalry, and perhaps has its cultural center in Paris, although it is found in large cities everywhere and has affected the English upper classes. It does not characterize the masses of the French population. Fifth, there is the Roman Catholic ideology with its indissolubility of marriage and its celibate priesthood, which, however, has adjusted itself to the varying patterns among the peoples it has attempted to control, and which has really controlled marriage and divorce much more than actual love behavior. Sixth, there is the Soviet Russian pattern of completely free but unglorified love. This Russian pattern is not wholly due to the revolution, although it is true that revolutions in general tend to promote free love for the time being. The seeds of it were present in the old Russian culture, for this was lacking in three factors which have influenced Western Europe: puritanism, South-European institutionalized jealousy, and the Roman Catholic ideals of sacred celibacy and indissoluble marriage. On the other hand, the Russian upper classes had been influenced by French ideas of chivalric love, and the Russian peasantry was like the Central European in its tolerance of premarital sex relations. These patterns have variously influenced the several regions and social classes of Europe.

In peasant Central Europe there is a pattern which approaches a single standard of chastity more closely than do the traditions of Southern Europe or of the aristocracy. In rural Poland and Czechoslovakia premarital intercourse is condemned or condoned equally in both sexes. In the older rural culture, which is fast dying, young men in parts of Czechoslovakia wore feathers in their hats before marriage. If unchastity were discovered the offending youth had his feather forcibly removed and he was thereafter taunted with a term indicating that he was no longer virgin. The girl who had been unchaste was obliged to change her head dress and to attend church with the married women instead of with the unmarried girls.¹⁹ These attitudes, however, differed enormously within small distances. Alongside this tradition was one which tolerated extreme premarital lovemaking under the parental roof, often called *bundling*.²⁰ This consisted in spending part of the night together under blankets partly dressed, or some similar practice which could be outwardly differentiated from the complete freedom of married couples but which yet often actually led to sex relations and premarital pregnancy. The custom of bundling was carried to America and practiced in colonial New England.

The center of this premarital tolerance seems to lie in the Danubian region. In 1927 Austria held the European record for illegitimacy, with 25.2 per cent of her births illegitimate. Detailed study indicates that it is the rural districts there which have the highest rates, particularly where there are large agricultural holdings employing only family members and servants. Practically no stigma attaches to illegitimacy, which seems to be largely a custom of deferring formal marriage until after the birth of a child.²¹ It is from this region that a large part of our immigration of 1890 to 1920 came. Their illegitimacy rates in America are much lower, being less than those of the native American population, but higher than the Italian.²² Austrian illegitimacy rates have risen since the World War, but for decades have stood higher than those of most other European countries. The high-illegitimacy area extends over through Germany to Scandinavia, Sweden usually showing one of the highest rates on the Continent.

In contrast stands the Mediterranean pattern. Illegitimacy rates have been generally much lower in Italy than in Central Europe. In Sicily the sex mores are enforced by the fear of the vendetta. Marriage is early, and premarital intercourse is said to be rare, because daughters are jealously guarded by their fathers.²³

Dr. Emilio Mira recently questioned Spanish married couples as to what they would do upon discovering spousal unfaithfulness. One hundred eighty-seven husbands would try to surprise the adulterers in *flagrante delicto* and then seek a divorce, 49 would fight a duel with the interloper, 21 would kill the wife, 8 would kill her lover. One hundred eighty-five wives would leave the unfaithful husband without telling their friends the reason, 18 would challenge the mistress to a duel, 11 would kill the husband, 5 would kill the mistress.²⁴

In Mediterranean countries, and among the conservative groups in France, chaperonage is more important than elsewhere. This is particularly true of the upper classes. Business class families are unwilling to permit their daughters to seek a position away from home, or to be entertained by a suitor outside the family home. In Spain the courtship supervision reaches perhaps its extreme, and daughters of the upper classes are guarded from free social contacts with men before betrothal. The practices of the upper class of a given culture have a certain importance even though not followed by the majority of the people. They set a certain standard and express an ideology which has influence throughout society.

In general the south of Europe institutionalizes jealousy and links personal honor strongly with family possessiveness. It tolerates acts

of violence in defense of honor. These attitudes are here the chief bulwark of the mores, while in the north the ideology of the sinfulness of sex plays a larger role. The controls over Mediterranean love behavior are external and do not get "underneath the skin" as does the inner control of puritanism. The Mediterranean tends to assume that sex relations will inevitably take place wherever the vigilance of supervision is relaxed. He is like the East European in having no inner taboos upon sex. It is said that Latin brides, in contrast to Anglo-Saxon brides, adapt readily to sex life because they have been brought up to think of it, not as something inherently disgusting, but rather as a desirable thing denied them before marriage by a jealous and vigilant environment. It is suggestive that in both Russia and Mexico the sexual rights of *prisoners* are recognized, whereas in Germany this is a problem in the stage of formulation and in Anglo-Saxon countries unthinkable. In the Federal Penitentiary of Mexico has been established the practice of *visita conyugal*. This is under medical regulation, and is not limited to marriage, although change of partner is rarely permitted.²⁵ In old Russia, the punishment of exile to Siberia did not necessarily involve deprivation of love satisfactions, for wives and mistresses frequently followed the prisoners and lived in the vicinity of the prison camps with access to their men. Russian prisoners are now permitted sex-leaves under certain conditions.²⁶

In general, the tendency on the Continent has been to permit and to regulate rather than officially to forbid prostitution. In Germany this tolerance has been more or less indirect and hypocritical; in France and Italy, it was frank and open. Also on the Continent generally the keeping of a mistress by a married man has been less severely condemned and hence necessitated less concealment. There was on the Continent no late-Victorian women's movement attempting to enforce sexual regularity upon the male sex in the name of the single standard. As regards women's behavior, Anglo-Saxon countries drew a sharp line between the virtuous and non-virtuous which to a large extent cut across class lines. Perhaps the most significant "single standard" is this sentiment that all *social classes* should be judged by the same standard in their sex behavior. The Continent, in sex as in other matters, has tended more to recognize different standards for different classes. Unchastity might be regarded with kindly tolerance, and in fact expected, in a girl of one social rank, while severely condemned in one of higher rank.

3. ASIATIC FAMILY PATTERNS

The Patterns of Marital Status.—There is a certain broad unity of family culture throughout the civilized countries of Asia which is worth sketching, even though the details differ enormously from region to region. This unity is perhaps based upon the central pattern of polygyny. Asia has carried over polygyny into a stage of high civilization. Whether polygyny is compatible with an industrial civilization is a question which may never be answered. As Asia takes over European industrialism, she also tends to take over European monogamy. We cannot conclude from this that industrialism *necessitates* monogamy. There may or may not be some strong functional connection between the two patterns.

The great majority of families in Asia are probably monogamous. In the South Chinese village studied by Kulp, where concubinage is quite respectable, only 14 out of the 182 families were polygynous.²⁷ Because the sex ratio is seldom far from the normal 100 except under conditions which lead to an abnormally high death or migration rate for one sex, the majority of men can secure only one wife. Where many men are not married at all, but make use of prostitution, somewhat more polygyny is made possible than the simple sex ratio would indicate. Unfortunately, statistics of sex ratios and marital status are not available for most of Asia. It is significant that whereas, a few years ago, there was reported one recognized prostitute for every 906 of the population in London (about the ratio of doctors to population in the United States), a ratio of one to 582 in Berlin, 481 in Paris, and 437 in Chicago, the ratio was one to 277 for Tokio, 258 for Peiping, and 137 for Shanghai.²⁸

Asiatic prostitution is even more taken for granted than is European as a necessary part of the social order. But, unlike the European prostitute, the Asiatic prostitute is not relegated permanently to that status. She may afterwards marry respectably. In Japan, daughters of poor families become geisha girls voluntarily or upon parental pressure in order to ease the family finances. To do so is an act of filial duty, honorable rather than otherwise, and may result later in a conventional marriage and elevation of status.

Again, the function of the East-Asiatic prostitute is not exclusively sexual. She is, especially in the person of the Japanese geisha, an esthetic entertainer of men, a provider of amusement and of non-tactile pleasures as well as of bodily contacts. In China, it is said, many poor men visit houses of prostitution for the sake of this com-

panionship alone, drinking tea or wine with the girls, and not paying the higher fee which is charged for spending the night. Prostitutes thus perform social functions which in Europe are performed by conventional women; the latter in the Orient are under seclusion.²⁹

In Asia, age, as well as wealth and power, tends to give a man sexual privilege. The tendency is for older men to appropriate younger women. This prestige given to age follows in part from wealth and power but represents to a large extent an independent culture pattern. It is not everywhere present. In our own culture there is more or less sentiment against great disparity of age in marriage or sex relations. There is a sentiment that love privileges belong primarily to the young, and the old man who uses his greater wealth to win a woman against a younger rival is looked upon with a certain disfavor. In Asia generally the sentiment is otherwise. In some classes in India, indeed, the age domination is so great that wives are normally half a generation younger than their husbands.

The greater age of husbands receives some biological support from the fact that women mature a few years earlier and pass out of the reproductive age much earlier than do men. It is by no means certain, however, that older women must lose sexual attractiveness and desire as early as they are conventionally supposed to do in many cultures.

Marital Selection.—Marriage in Asia is less a matter of free choice than in even the most conventional European families. In India and China the young are betrothed long before they have any power to choose. In China they do not have any social contacts and sometimes do not even see each other until the wedding day.³⁰ In India, culture frowns upon the marrying of a person toward whom one has felt love, for that is not the path of duty.³¹

Segregation and the Roles of the Sexes.—The Asian polygynous pattern is also highly patriarchal, patrilocal, and patrilinear. The man has typically the power to divorce at will, although practically he is subject to public opinion; the wife has no such power, although practically she may often return to her parents. The culture also secludes and segregates women to a degree unknown in Europe. Woman's place is in the home or the harem. This seclusion, of course, applies mainly to the upper-class women, whereas those of the lower classes may appear considerably on the public streets or in the fields as laborers. It is a matter of observation that women are not seen in the open as frequently in Turkey as they are in similar agricultural countries of Europe. And in North China, though foot-bound women are sometimes wheeled or carried into the fields to weed the crops,

their bound feet and cultural requirements generally keep them much more closely confined than women anywhere in Europe. In South China there is less segregation. But even there Kulp found that though women make marketing trips to nearby cities, and trips to gather certain products at a distance, their social contacts on such excursions are much limited.³² In China a man typically feasts and entertains his guests without the presence of his women folk except in the capacity of servants.

Burma is a notable oasis of feminine freedom and non-seclusion.

The Family in Islam.—In Mohammedan cultures tradition gives essential equality of status to the several wives. In the upper classes, at least, there is a life of ease and comfort for the women; the work outside the home is largely done by men and animals. Seclusion from the public is the rule, and when it is necessary to leave the home the women, until recently at least, were veiled. The ideology is that the women are choice possessions who must be carefully guarded even from the lustful eyes of other men. Prostitution is not characteristic of Mohammedan culture, the brothels of Constantinople being largely European products. Islam places a certain intrinsic value upon every human being; there are no degraded classes as in India, slaves are theoretically eligible to win freedom and power. A slave girl in the old Mohammedan cultures could be elevated to wifehood with the full respect of all. Imagine this happening, for example, to a mulatto slave girl of our own older South!

The Family in China.—In China the first, who is the betrothed, wife enjoys a superior status. The rest are "concubines." All form a hierarchy, each having privileges denied the next lower. The concubines are chosen at will, for their youth or beauty.

Life is not easy for women in China. They are somewhat less secluded and more hard-worked than Mohammedan women, less protected by their own families from the possible arbitrariness of their husbands.

In China there is an idealization of father-son love, and a tender reverence for the old men. The family pattern of China is closely tied up with ancestor worship. Like many primitive peoples, the Chinese have a system of exogamous sibs or clans. These are patrilineal and patrilocal, and the sib group corresponds in some measure to the locality group. In the village studied by Kulp, practically all the men belonged to the same sib and had the same family name; their mothers and wives had all come from other sibs and originally other villages; their daughters would marry and leave the home

village. The important ceremonies are connected with ancestor worship; in these the women are merely spectators and not participants. Children are betrothed by their parents at the age of 10 to 12, but unlike the case in India, they are of fairly equal age and do not marry until about 20. Marriage means the girl's leaving her parental sib and coming to live permanently with her husband's kin, although, actually, visits to her home are permitted. The idea is, however, that she is under the authority of her husband in all matters. Woman, it is said, passes through three ages. In the first she is under the authority of her father; then, under her husband; finally, if he dies, she is subject to her son. Male children are outwardly preferred, their arrival a cause of rejoicing. Girl babies are deplored, and there is a tradition of female infanticide. Kulp, however, could not find any record of a known case of infanticide in his village.³³

Despite this cultural over-valuation of the male sex, Kulp found that parents actually came to love their girl children with great tenderness, and that the mother is highly revered. These facts illustrate a frequently noted principle, that whenever culture stresses or institutionalizes a certain sentiment at the expense of another which is an equally natural product of subcultural interaction, the deplored sentiment or attitude actually does exist in considerable frequency, but is concealed by verbal negations. Outwardly we love whatever persons we are told to love by our culture: our father in China, our mother in India, our wife or sweetheart in America. Actually we love whomsoever our particular personal experiences lead us to love; and this differs more as between individuals than as between cultures.

There is a taboo against the remarriage of widows, although nothing like the degradation of widows which occurs in India. In Kulp's village there were 69 widows and only 4 widowers.³⁴

Reproduction to the limit of capacity is a duty. The leading cultural drive is to beget many sons to the honor of one's ancestors. At funerals families hire mourners in order that the procession be large and impressive.

In China the family system merges with government and the economic system. It is difficult to say where one leaves off and another begins. Although there is a national government organization with a code of civil law modeled upon European lines, the great majority of Chinese individuals are in practice subject to the authority of their family elders and have little contact with civil law or government. The central government holds the village elders responsible for the behavior of individuals within their communities. These vil-

large elders are in fact family elders, for the typical village is a male sib, which may be subdivided into religious families, that is, groups which have a great deal of common ancestor worship. These again may be subdivided into economic families, practicing a joint economy, although not always dwelling in a single house. The economic families again subdivide into natural families, that is, groups consisting of a man and his wife (and occasionally concubines) and their children. Obedience to the father and other male ancestors and elders is obligatory throughout life. Decisions such as those in regard to the sale of property, the taking of a wife, the building of a house, which a Euro-American of twenty-one years of age could legally make for himself in defiance of parental will, must be referred to one's family elders.

In the cities these patterns are rapidly changing. Women are being educated; there is free courtship and right of divorce to woman as well as man. According to a code recently enacted the duty of a wife to obey her husband is no longer recognized, and women may dispose of their own property without the husband's consent. It will probably be some time before the new civil laws will be enforceable in practice in the rural areas. The individual living under the traditional family régime may have rights which are theoretically protected by the national government, but his personal safety may demand that he not appeal to the courts against local family authority.

The Family in India.—India is particularly notable for the seclusion and degradation of widows. Until the British stopped it there was the custom of the suttee, by which a widow committed suicide at the funeral of her husband. Of course this probably did not happen with the great majority of widows.

Kipling gives us the dramatic tale of an official who had a clandestine affair with an attractive young girl living in seclusion. On her invitation, he had entered her quarters through a rear doorway. After many days of love he approached the house and was about to enter, when he was suddenly wounded by a sharp weapon. After recovering he returned to find the doorway walled up, and the girl standing at a window, holding up to his view the stumps of her recently amputated hands. She was a widow and she had also violated a caste taboo. This tale, whether specifically true or not, illustrates the cultural role to which many a widow preferred an honorable death on her husband's funeral pyre.⁸⁵

Child marriage of girls is the custom in India. According to a very recent report nearly half the girls of India are married before 15.

For the Moslems the percentage is about 37, for the Hindus 48. The Sarda bill prohibiting child marriages was passed in 1929 but according to this report had not been enforced. In 1925 the age of consent, outside of marriage, was raised to 14. Before 1860 it had been 10!³⁶

The mother-complex is prevalent among the men of India. As we have noted before, love is regarded not only as unnecessary to marriage, but as a moral obstacle. There is little sex repression in India despite its ascetic cults. The idea is rather that sexual desire is something to be escaped by using it up.

Whereas in China the important rule of marriage choice is to marry outside one's own sib, in India it is to marry inside one's own caste. China stresses a specific exogamy; India, a specific endogamy. Theoretically the Chinese has a much wider range of possible mates. Practically the range is great enough in both cultures to permit the families to make a suitable choice.

The Family in Japan.—Japan is not polygynous. However, it adopts many of the patterns of the polygynous culture area which it adjoins. The esthetic function of woman is stressed more than elsewhere in Asia.

Japan is one of the few countries where the divorce rate has actually decreased in recent years. During the period of 1897-1929, it fell from about 3 per 1000 population to less than 1 per 1000, while the American rate during the same period was rising from about 0.7 to 1.7 per 1000, and most European rates were rising.³⁷ One is naturally curious as to the reason.

In earlier Japanese culture, marriage was at an early age, was arranged by parents, and was exceedingly patriarchal although not polygynous. Divorce rather than concubinage was the resort of the dissatisfied husband. Iwasaki attributes the fall of the divorce rate to Western cultural influences, despite the fact that in the West these influences have increased divorce. He mentions the education of women, the increased literature for women as a class, the moving pictures, Christianity, and industrialization.³⁸ The way these forces have had their effect is to raise the age of marriage, to give woman a chance for an independent living, and to increase marriages of free choice. Western premarital courtship (not necessarily sexual) is taking the place of the geisha girl. Marriage and divorce are now more mutually controlled, less subject to the whim of the male. It may be, of course, that a further development of Western culture may lead to individualism and a new upward trend in divorce.

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PART III

SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE FAMILY

CHAPTER VII

THE FAMILY IN MODERN SOCIAL CHANGE

1. THE PROCESS OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Change versus Progress.—Our Euro-American culture has been changing during the past fifty years with unprecedented rapidity. It is common to refer to these changes as "social progress." Progress, however, is not mere change, but *change for the better*. We cannot say whether progress has taken place without having some measure of "betterness" or "worseness." Indeed, buildings are larger and more luxurious, transportation is faster, the material standard of living of the average man is higher, there is a greater variety of amusements and recreations, and arduous physical labor has been largely replaced by machinery. But do these changes make society really "better"?

Evidently, then, the question of whether we have had progress or not depends upon our definition of "better," our concept of "the greatest good." If man's control over inorganic nature is in itself "good," then we have had progress, at least in the sphere of mechanical technology. But along with this have come new kinds of accident and death, new anxieties and economic insecurity, new frustrations because hopes and wishes have grown faster than their means of satisfaction. How shall we assess these debt items; and shall we, in balancing the account, find a net gain or a net loss?

All conceptions of "the greatest good," all ethical philosophies, may be reduced to two classes. The one finds its ultimate "good" on the bio-psychological level, namely in *human happiness*, however designated or qualified. The other finds its *summum bonum* in some non-biological condition or relationship, usually a culture-pattern of some sort. It is often expressed in metaphysical, mystical, or theological terms. Generally speaking, the societies of the past, and also

the Fascist societies of today with their ideals of national greatness and solidarity, are governed by this second type of ethical philosophy. They conceive the *summum bonum* in various cultural or superorganic terms, and regard the happiness of human beings as secondary. On the other hand, liberal, individualistic societies such as ours tend toward the happiness or bio-psychological philosophy, although they may not clearly express it.

Many sociologists have declared that ethical concepts do not belong to sociology. They are *evaluations*; the sociologist should not evaluate, but describe and explain. He should be interested in social patterns and processes without regard to their goodness or badness. If one holds a superorganic philosophy of "good" and "evil," this attitude is logical. If a sociologist reared in a culture where Beauty was the supreme ideal were to meet another sociologist from a culture which held Speed as its *summum bonum*, an ethical debate between the two would indeed be quite pointless. They would do well to discuss how Beauty and Speed are obtained but not which is the better. Their ethical evaluations would be, in a sense, culture passing judgment upon itself, and could come to only one possible result, namely, the dogmatic assertion by each culture of its own ideal, in disagreement with the other culture.

But if there be some criterion of good and evil outside the superorganic realm, some judge available to science who could pass upon various cultures from a single non-cultural point of view, then an *evaluation* of cultures becomes scientifically possible and logical. Such a criterion can be found in the physiological processes within human beings.

Welfare or "Good" as a Biological Concept.—The function of culture is the maximum satisfaction of individual human beings. A "good" culture is one in which there is a minimum rate of defensive behavior, tension, suffering, pain, and death; and a maximum of appetitive behavior, relaxation, pleasure, health, and average longevity. Such a condition may be called welfare. We have not yet developed a general measuring-stick of welfare. But we do know the kinds of items which would make up such a barometer.¹ Hornell Hart expresses an essentially similar idea when he says: "Progress consists in those biological and cultural changes which on the whole and in the long run enable men to do what they really want to do."² Using this definition, he, like the present writer, fails to see why "progress" is not a scientific concept, or why a sociologist should

not make ethical valuations from the standpoint of this definition. Bertrand Russell states with great clarity the contrast between the superorganic and the biological or happiness philosophy:

Among writers of sociology and political theorists generally, a very common way of judging the social structure is by whether it constitutes a pleasant pattern to contemplate. . . . They think of the state as something having a good of its own, quite distinct from the good of the citizens, and what they call the good of the state is usually, unconsciously to themselves, what gives them a certain esthetic or moral satisfaction. . . . It is intolerable to the industrially minded to think of lazy populations sitting under banana trees, eating the fruit as it drops, and being happy in unproductive idleness. Some forms of socialism are not free from this defect: they aim rather at creating the kind of state which is pleasing to theoretical contemplation than the kind that will suit the temperaments of its citizens. . . . Whoever wishes to be a social theorist should daily remind himself . . . that a state is something in which *people have to live*, and not merely something to be . . . contemplated as we contemplate the view from a mountain top.*

In other words, the test of a good culture is not its appearance or form as a structure, but the way it *functions*. Its function is biological, to produce human health and happiness. From the standpoint of evolutionary sequence, culture is "higher" than the organic realm. But from the standpoint of function, it is the servant of the organic realm. Human biological processes are the judge; culture is the thing judged.

Cultural Lag.—This biological concept of progress has another logical advantage which to the author's knowledge has not been called to the attention of sociologists. Namely, it lends significance to the concept of "cultural lag" made so popular by Ogburn.³ Culture is always changing, but the changes do not occur at an equal rate in all parts of the pattern. Certain traits of a culture tend to change before others. Those which change early we may call the **cultural dynamic, or initiating changes**. Those which change late we may call the **cultural readjustments**. The gap between the two is called **cultural lag**. The lag involves **maladjustment**; when the readjustment takes place there is a catching up or reduction of the lag.

Among the important cultural lags of recent years have been the following:

* Bertrand and Dora Russell, *Prospects of Industrial Civilization*, Century, pp. 147-149. The italics are the writer's. By permission of the D. Appleton-Century Company.

<i>Initiating Change</i>	<i>Maladjustment</i>	<i>Readjustment</i>
Increase in automobiles	Traffic accidents	Traffic control Compulsory liability in- surance in Massachu- setts
More women in factories	Fatigue, ill health	Hour laws and other fac- tory legislation
More population in cities	Lack of play space for children	Playgrounds. Organized recreation

How do we know how much and what kind of readjustment should follow a given initiating change? Does *every* change produce maladjustment until some other change takes place? Is there a lag every time *any* part of culture changes sooner or more rapidly than some other part? If so the lags would be too numerous to be counted.

The reply is: no, only those differential rates of change which put the culture *out of adjustment* with itself are really to be considered as lags in any significant sense.

But when is a culture "out of adjustment with itself"? This seems utterly meaningless unless it means that the culture causes trouble (i.e., suffering) to the individual human beings who live in it.

Progress, then, is not any particular kind or direction of social change, nor has it anything to do with the speed of change in general. It cannot be judged by viewing social change grossly, but only by making refined measurements of more or less subtle factors. It consists, partly at least, in keeping lags at a minimum by prompt and vigilant social repair work. It may be that society will never be able to foresee or plan its changes very far ahead, and that the best it can consciously do for its own welfare is to shorten the time required to make readjustments when they are needed.

The Readjustment of a Lag Is Determined by Cultural Resistances.—When a cultural lag exists, there are usually several alternative measures by which readjustment may take place. Which one shall be chosen depends not upon their relative merits in the long run, but upon the differential cultural resistances at the time. Thus a lag is created by the removal of economic functions from the home without a corresponding acquisition of new functions among the women of the business class. This creates a sense of futility and boredom among many underoccupied women and sometimes financial tension as the family struggles with its single breadwinner to climb higher on the economic scale of living. The natural readjustment would be for these women to take jobs outside the home. But as there are

certain cultural resistances against this, the readjustment is more often to elaborate the work of housekeeping and to spend the released time in inconsequential activities.

The Usual Sequence of Cultural Change.—The process of cultural change in general is thought to occur in an order something like this:

1. Material invention or discovery (i.e., scientific ideology).
2. Change in the economic social structure.
3. Change in other parts of the social structure.
4. Change in cultural attitudes and popular ideology.

Both the first and the last step are in the ideology or thought system. Attitudes do seem to come late in the procession of change, because we usually find that they furnish the main resistances which we meet in the effort to make a readjustment. These late-changing attitudes are often called prejudices. Thus the prejudice against birth control, and prejudice against treating women the same as men, are blocking needed readjustments in our culture.

This law of sequences is more applicable to advanced cultures where changes are from within, than to backward cultures which are largely borrowing from others. Thus in modern China non-economic social structure and cultural attitudes seem to be changing, in one class at least, before any economic change has called for them. The dynamic comes from the imitation of the West.⁴

Invention seems to come first, but what causes invention? Is not that itself a result of previous cultural changes? Since cultural change is a continuous process, is it not purely arbitrary to mark off some particular kind of change as initiating?

There is an important practical distinction by which material inventions can be said to be truly initiating changes rather than readjustments. To be sure, they are in a sense readjustments and they are stimulated by certain strains or maladjustments in culture. The invention of the spinning-jenny, for example, was stimulated by the growing overseas trade of England, the growing tendency to buy raw materials and food and to sell manufactured goods abroad, and the opportunity for certain leaders to become rich in this way.

How Initiating Differ from Readjustive Changes.—But an invention requires something more than a cultural need or maladjustment to produce it. It requires something more than breaking down cultural resistances. Necessity may be the mother of invention but it must have also a father. It depends upon *accumulated scientific*

knowledge. No matter how much it may be needed, it cannot occur until the state of knowledge, in other words, the accumulation of previous inventions and discoveries, is ripe for it. It must have a cultural base. Thus Ogburn has shown that the automobile, no matter how much or for how long it may have been needed, could not come until the gas engine, the differential gear, the carbureter, and other preliminary inventions had been made.

The ordinary readjustive changes of culture do not depend upon any such discovery of a new principle of nature. To be sure, we sometimes call them "social inventions." But certainly a trait like workmen's compensation, or traffic control, or children's playgrounds, does not involve some utterly new principle which can be discovered only by years of patient inquiry. It does not have to wait until new methods of observing and measuring nature are worked out. It requires merely the making of a new *combination* of already obvious principles. It is delayed by prejudices, fears, selfish group interests, rather than by a lack of knowledge of *how* the result could be achieved. Economists today know *how* cultural maladjustments of the business cycle and unemployment *could* be remedied. They cannot get it done simply because they cannot overcome the resistance of prejudices and class interests so as to put their measures into effect.

True Invention Possible but Infrequent in Biological and Social Fields.—This is not to deny that there are true inventions or discoveries in other fields than the mechanical or inorganic. Darwin's discovery of evolution and the discovery by Freud and others of the wishful character of mental disorders were such real inventions. Like other inventions, they resulted from the overcoming of nature's resistance to revealing her secrets, rather than of man's resistance to accepting a new plan. Possibly in the future there will be true psychological and social inventions which will enable us to overcome cultural resistance, more easily and directly than we do now. If we could discover, for example, a chemical source of happiness, which would be less harmful and more persistent in effect than alcohol, the whole process of cultural readjustment might be revolutionized. External devices to relieve anxiety might become unnecessary.

Yet so far, the great bulk of true inventions has been in the field of inorganic nature.

Science as a Semi-Autonomous Part of Culture.—There is a constantly accumulating body of scientific knowledge, stored in the form of symbols in books, drawings, and so on. This is one part of our total ideology. This scientific ideology has a certain degree of

independence of the rest of culture. To be sure, it grows faster when cultural attitudes are favorable, and more slowly in periods of resistance to science such as the early Middle Ages in Europe. But it cannot be hurried beyond a certain speed. No amount of favorable attitude toward invention could have caused man in the Stone Age to discover the process of smelting iron. Nor could Julius Caesar, using the entire Roman army to promote scientific research, have brought about the invention of the airplane in Roman times.

Because of this semi-independence of its evolution we may well regard science as one of the sources or starting-points of cultural change. A change which springs directly from science is thus not arbitrarily chosen to be called an initiating change. It is the result of past causes *within science*, and from the standpoint of the rest of culture it is a genuine starting-point.

Besides scientific invention and discovery, there are other sources of initiative in social change. These are largely subcultural changes, such as deforestation, change of climate, plagues, disasters, over-population and depopulation, and possibly changes in the biological quality of peoples due to the selective influence of migrations, wars, and other causes. Again, the borrowing of some new trait from a foreign culture may be the initiating force to a series of changes.

Both the dynamic and the resistant forces of social change can be traced back to wish forces in individual human beings. But they represent wish forces acting upon two different levels, or through two different sets of channels.

A Chart of the Process of Social Change in the Family.—Figure 2 shows in a very sketchy manner the relations between the various forces at work in social change in America today which relate to the family. On the extreme left are the true inventions or initiating changes. These are the original dynamic. In columns 2 and 3 are changes in social structure, cultural attitudes, and some subcultural changes, which have resulted from these inventions. The inventions do not affect the family system directly so much as they do through the medium of these other social changes.

In general it appears that changes in the economic system are prior to those in the family system; as Chapin points out, the family mores tend to lag in social change generally.


The Fallacy of Remedy by "Removing the Cause."—When James Watt invented the steam engine he had no idea that he was contributing heavily to the work of modern divorce courts, sowing seeds for Margaret Sanger's birth-control campaign, or laying the

**1 MATERIAL INVENTIONS
AND DISCOVERIES**

**2 IMMEDIATE EFFECTS
(LARGELY ECONOMIC)**

**3 MORE INDIRECT
EFFECTS**

**4 SIGNIFICANT GENERAL
TRENDS**



Note: The words "increased", "increasingly", etc. should be added to many items to give the precise meaning.
FIG. 2.—Interrelations of Modern Social Changes Affecting the Family.

foundations for the parent education movement. Yet his invention was one of the chief dynamic, initiating causes of all this and much more. Those who think humanity is better off today than ever before may thank James Watt, Newcomen, and his fellow inventors. Those who think society is going to the dogs may also lay the blame upon the same men.

The above reasoning illustrates the futility of trying to solve a social problem by seeking out its "causes." If one means the immediate causes, they are so numerous and require so many qualifications that one cannot lay his finger upon any definite point of attack. If one then, in his perplexity, decides to trace the responsibility farther back, he will eventually come to causes of a more definite character, but they will be these mechanical inventions and scientific discoveries which initiate social change. But he will find that they are not only the causes of his social problem, but also of much that he admires in the modern world. The automobile is one of the prime causes of trouble today, but does anyone expect, or even wish, to abolish the automobile?

If by the "causes" of a social problem we mean the previous social changes which led to it, then we cannot expect to solve the problem by removing its causes. The remedy is always a *new readjustment*, not a going back to any earlier state of affairs. The study of causes helps us to construct the remedy more intelligently, but does not reveal the remedy ready made. Chesterton has said, indeed, that in social matters we must find the remedy before we can know the cause.⁵ When practical men talk of "causes," they are often talking merely about the failure to use known remedies! The "cause" of malaria, in this practical sense, is the failure to take quinine! The real cause, or *antecedent*, may have been a germ received through a mosquito bite, but we cannot help that now. The remedy we apply has nothing to do with the mosquito or germ; it was not discovered through a study of them.

Social Change Never Moves Backward: the Fallacy of History Repeating Itself.—In the long course of social change certain combinations of circumstances do occasionally repeat themselves. The problems of the modern family are, for example, similar in some respects to conditions which existed in late Roman times. Does Roman history, then, teach us any lessons by which we can profit? Some seem to think so. Namely, we must not behave as the Romans did, or we shall suffer their fate. But the condition is that we are behaving somewhat as they did. Our moralists fail to show how we

can stop that behavior. All their exhortations have failed to change the course of events. The only practical remedy we can hope for is *to do something additional which the Romans failed to do*. The remedy is always in *further adjustment*.

The Relation of Cultural Advance to Welfare.—The process of social change is one thing. Increasing or decreasing welfare is another thing. It is true that every invention is prompted by somebody's wish and contributes to somebody's immediate satisfaction. But something else is put out of balance, some other wishes frustrated. Some inventions do seem to add to, more than they subtract from, the net welfare. Doubtless we can say that of the discovery of ether anesthetic by Long in 1842. Could we say it of the invention of gunpowder? But no ethical valuation can be placed upon any single invention. The whole course of invention, the evolution of science as a whole, is man's best insurance policy against unforeseen enemies. Some unknown plague or pest, or the causes of some unpredictable catastrophe, may even now be evolving in a nip-and-tuck race with human science, with the survival of the human race at stake. Therefore we shall do well to let science develop untrammeled, and encourage it to develop faster.

Whether invention shall lead to greater welfare depends in large part upon how quickly we perform the readjustive processes. The ethical responsibility is to keep society constantly in good repair, not to prevent its getting out of order. For get out of order it will.

Disorganization and Transvaluation.—Sociologists today emphasize the disorganization of institutions and mores which accompanies the process of social change. It is becoming customary to speak of social problems and maladjustments as disorganization. At the same time, a continual process of reorganization or readjustment is taking place. These concepts emphasize the structural aspects of society at the expense of the functional. They tend to make us feel that the breakdown of any hoary institution is *ipso facto* evil. We need to be more concerned with the functions which institutions perform. If an institution no longer has a useful function, it is well that it should become disorganized. It is unlikely that any of the major institutions such as the family and the church will disappear. What they do, rather, is to take over new functions in place of their declining functions. This changing of the functions of any culture trait is called cultural *transvaluation*.⁶ When we take a broad cultural view of the modern family, and not a narrow view of particular families in particular neighborhoods, the process which appears to our vision is not

disorganization, but transvaluation. The family is losing its economic and many of its educational functions, it is losing its rigid social control over the individual, but at the same time it is elaborating other functions, most important of which is the more complete satisfaction of the love wish. Both marital and parent-child love play larger roles today than yesterday as functions of the family system. In spite of increased divorce, more persons are probably living in intimate love relationships today than a generation ago. This is partly because the marriage rate has increased and partly because there are smaller families with more attention to the individual child.

2. THE CHANGES CAUSED BY MECHANICAL INVENTION

Industrialization Has Raised the Material Standard of Living.—

The inventions and discoveries which have initiated present social changes include, besides the steam engine, the various kinds of machinery for the transmission of power and the application of tools. These machines, in connection with the new source of power, have made possible a vastly increased production of goods *per worker* and also *per consumer*. The technocrats have been guilty of the great fallacy of measuring this increase in terms of the men actually employed in the particular industry which uses the machine. They have overlooked the number of men required to make the machines, to work in other related industries made necessary by the change, and the increased number of men needed to distribute the product. But with this all considered, the average ultimate consumer in the United States got four times as much in actual consumption goods in 1926 as he did in 1870, and 58 per cent more than in 1900. He was able to exist in 1870, so in 1926 he was obviously far beyond the margin of subsistence. The depression has cut our material income, which largely represents material goods, from 89 billion dollars in 1928 to an estimated 50 billion or less in 1932.⁷ Yet in 1932 our death rate was lower than ever before! It is impossible to say that actual life is threatened when there is no increase in death rate. Few other countries would have been able to reduce their national income by half without serious undernourishment.

In 1928 the American national income was 89.4 billion dollars, which amounted to \$745 per capita or \$3000 per family, since families averaged 4.1 members each. This *average* income, since it counts the very wealthy, is actually reached or exceeded by only a small percentage of the population. For working class families the median income was around \$1500, with one-fourth of them below \$1200. On

the other hand, the median salary of graduates of Massachusetts Institute of Techonology, thirteen years after graduation, was about \$6000.⁸

The "Minimum of Subsistence" Is Itself a Rising Standard.—Social workers' estimates have placed something like 40 per cent of our working class, or 20 per cent of the whole population, below the calculated "minimum of subsistence." The usual estimate of this "minimum," for a family of four to five, has run between \$1000 and \$1500 for the decade 1920-1930. It was demonstrably possible for a family of four to subsist upon an income under \$1200.⁹ It is obvious that the calculated minimum of subsistence is not a physical minimum. Even when people ask for charity, as happens in about one-tenth the population even in normal times, we cannot say that a physical minimum has been reached. Such a real minimum would consist merely in food of sufficient calories, a few sources of vitamins and perhaps medical supplies, and just enough rags and fuel to protect from the winter cold. A family, paying actual market values for everything, could hire the right to use a small piece of ground and to gather fuel, could construct a small primitive hut, and by buying foods of the cheapest per calorie costs and using only discarded clothing could *exist* at a total of \$600 per year. They would be living on the same material standard as primitive men. If there were a sufficient number of families together so that a social and recreational life could be developed, their life could be as satisfactory as that of most primitive groups.

Chinese figures tell us that the typical family in a Chinese city lives on an income which is exchangeable for from \$100 to \$200 American dollars, or roughly one-tenth of the American social "minimum." Because of differences in the internal purchasing power of money, and in the kinds of goods and services which are customarily obtained without money, it is impossible to state any mathematical ratio between the real income of the Chinese and of the American working class family. This difference would be less extreme than the money difference. The author, for example, estimated the pre-war, real standard of living of Czechoslovakia to be something like 70 per cent of the American, whereas the per capita income in money was only 37 per cent of the American. The Chinese real standard might amount to 30 or 50 per cent of the American.¹⁰

In any case it is clear that the "minimum" of subsistence is a relative term and that it includes not only the necessities of physical existence, but also certain other things, such as cheap but conventional textile clothing, leather shoes, a substantial dwelling, which have

become social minima in the given culture. It is estimated that 75 to 80 per cent of the income of the *poorest* classes in backward countries goes for food, while in America this percentage is around 40 or 50. The percentage of income spent for food is an excellent index of how near it comes to an actual physical minimum.

Poverty Has Become Materially Less but Psychologically More Frustrating.—As viewed by a primitive man or a Chinese or Russian peasant, the poorest American laborer lives in physical luxury. This fact has been wrongly used to justify the keeping down of wages where it was possible to raise them, and is therefore an unpopular fact except with hard-fisted or harassed employers. But it is necessary to recognize the fact for it has three important corollaries. First, it means that a much wider fluctuation of real income is possible between prosperity and depression. The richer a country, the greater, relatively, is apt to be the depth of its business depression. Second, the absolute range of difference in living standards within the experience of the average individual is greater. His ups and downs of material prosperity between the cradle and the grave cover a wider range than in poorer countries. More often than in backward countries does the average citizen live socially near to persons enjoying a much higher degree of luxury. The third corollary follows from these other two: the *wish* and the *hope* to improve one's standard of living are greater in America than elsewhere. The industrialization of Euro-America has raised the material scale of living; it has also created greater wishes for luxury. A wish hopeless of fulfilment soon disappears. But a wish grows strong when it has constantly dangled before it the possibility of satisfaction. There is more frustration when we just miss a coveted goal than when the goal is obviously impossible.¹¹

The American business cycle puts a greater strain upon human emotions than would a constant income stabilized on the depression level, provided all persons shared in what employment and income were available. The strain is due both to fluctuations of actual income and to the anxiety over unemployment and possible loss of all income. Again, when there is hope of prosperity, wishes for a higher standard increase. In a society which is democratic as well as wealthy, nearly every person feels some hope of attaining luxury. The moving picture is another invention which adds to this result. It stimulates luxury wishes beyond the possibility of realization. We may make a good case for holding the motion pictures a cause of crime, not so much through their portrayal of the crime itself, as through their portrayal

of high society life, thereby overstimulating wishes for luxury and leading to criminal methods of obtaining it.

American material culture has similar influences upon backward societies. In Hawaii, a prominent dentist said recently to a newspaper reporter :

Among my regular patients are Chinese, Japanese, Hawaiians, part Hawaiians, and whites. The races work together here, although we feel that the native-born Hawaiian is entitled to city posts.

We have an education problem. Children going to the public school grow away from their parents. They are taught to want the very best in clothes and amusements, and they cannot buy them.¹²

Credit Economy Has Increased the Emotional Strain.—Economic wants are further stimulated by the credit economy which has largely replaced the money economy of the early industrial era. Credit economy involves instalment buying. It permits merchants to put on lavish campaigns of advertising and high-powered salesmanship in advance of actual sales. It permits a consumer to consume for considerable periods in advance of his income. Whether or not his actual consumption in the long run is increased, his possibilities, his hopes, and his wishes are increased. Again, when one is consuming in advance of his income, he is apt to be under an anxiety not involved when he delays every purchase until he has saved the cash price. He is more subject to wish conflict. His income may fall and lead to surrender of a half-paid-for car at a considerable loss. His needs may change and the electric refrigerator or sewing machine become a dead horse on his hands. The average man's income is increasingly subject to uncertainty through the fluctuations and changes of business, while his expenditures are increasingly rigid because of the need to meet fixed payments already contracted for.

Rivalry in Consumption Has Increased.—Another effect of industrialization is the "competitive consumption" so forcefully portrayed by Thorstein Veblen as one of the major interaction patterns of our economic life. More accurately it is *rivalrous* consumption. It is consumption whose goal is *superiority*, rather than the satisfactions inherent in the goods themselves. It is "keeping up with the Joneses." Veblen has shown that a large proportion of our consumption is of this kind.¹³ It is of course greater in absolute terms among the wealthy, but the poor in a non-caste society like ours are exposed to its full influence. They are not protected by sumptuary laws or by cultural attitudes which, in other cultures, strictly regulate each

man's standards of taste "according to his station." There is a strain to break through to a higher standard at some conspicuous point although total consumption must be kept down to income. Thus, many underpaid working girls eat below the health minimum on food in order to purchase finery. A miner's family displays a luxurious car, living otherwise in comparative squalor. In order to present a good "front" to their daughters' suitors and their neighbors, families in a Southern mill village spend more in furnishing the "parlor" than all the rest of the house put together. In Middletown, the Lynds note, it is no longer customary as it was in 1890 to poke fun at "dudes," but "dressing up" has become a serious business in all classes.¹⁴

Modern Inventions Have Led to an Unprecedented Urbanization.—Now we come to another, related set of changes set in motion by the same industrial inventions. These are the changes in the nature and location of labor rather than in the products of labor. The Industrial Revolution brought about a great shift of population from country to city. Factories, of course, are usually built in towns and cities, in order to get labor quickly. But sometimes, as in the American South, the factory owner himself builds a new town to house his workers (mill villages). In any case, the factory becomes an urban center. This is not all. There are more goods to be transported and stored, so that commercial cities also grow in size. Large commercial and governmental cities were in existence long before the invention of machinery, such as ancient Rome and medieval Venice. But these pre-industrial cities never contained more than a small minority of the population of a region. Today America lives well with 56.2 per cent of her population urban according to the census definition, with only 24.8 per cent of her population on farms, and yet without any net importation of food. In 1880 only 28.6 per cent of our population was urban.¹⁵

This population shift to the cities has been due not to the application of machinery to manufacturing, but to its application to agriculture and transportation. The mechanizing of manufacturing alone might mean a *lesser* need for city population. Agriculture, made more efficient by machinery and by chemical and biological discoveries (fertilizers and breeding), produced a greater product *per worker*, but continued to produce about the same output *per consumer*. Manufacturing, similarly affected by machinery, yielded a greater product per worker and also a greater product per consumer. The consumer can eat no more food today than he could in 1700,

but he can consume manufactured goods without known limit. His wants for any one kind may be satiated, but new kinds are continually devised. The whole population grew in size, the number in agriculture remaining about the same, while all the increase went to the cities.

Labor Has Been Subdivided to an Unprecedented Degree.—Machine industry has led to a minute subdivision of labor. The commercial and transportation occupations have at the same time become more specialized. There is a far greater variety of occupations than before the Industrial Revolution, when the great majority of the people were either farmers or homemakers.

Social Mobility Has Been Increased.—Urbanization and the subdivision of labor have led to increasing social mobility—vertical mobility from class to class, horizontal mobility to other positions in the same class, and geographic mobility. Mobility is especially high in America. Dr. James Plant finds that 78 per cent of the population of certain New Jersey suburbs are to be found living at a changed address after the elapse of five years.¹⁶ McInerny found that 74 per cent of suburban families had lived in their present neighborhoods less than two years.¹⁷ Mowrer found that Chicago families of the telephone subscriber class (more than half the population) average 2.83 years per address.¹⁸

Increased Mobility and Lowered Birth Rate Have Decreased the Family Unit.—Urbanization and mobility have broken up the large family group of our older rural society. Grandparents, uncles, and aunts less frequently live with the family. Adolescent sons and daughters leave the home community to find work. A new cultural attitude has arisen that it is actually undesirable for a young married couple to live with a parental family. Have we only recently discovered the disadvantages of living with our in-laws, or have we only recently found it possible to get away from them? More probably, we have been *forced* away from them by economic changes, and have hence reevaluated the difficulties of the large household, calling them now a *danger to be avoided* rather than a *duty to be cheerfully performed*. While gaining certain values in the marital relation, we have lost other values of the old-time household where grandfather or aunt oftentimes had a personality which held the group together in a rich and beautiful social life. The reader is urged to read the sketch "Home Life in Grove Manor," in Dawson and Gettys' *Introduction to Sociology*, p. 67, for a vivid picture of these lost values.¹⁹

There are many other means besides physical separation by which conflicts in a large family group can be minimized. But having been

forced by changes outside the family pattern to the use of separation as a method, the other possible adjustments disappear from our culture. So when circumstances do force this and that married couple for a time to live with parents, the crude forces of conflict no longer have social mechanisms to hold them in check.

The size of the average household unit has been decreased by the lowered birth rate as well as by this separation from kinsfolk.

Definition of the Family Unit.—There are several definitions of the family unit. (1) The United States Census defines it as including all persons living together in the same household, and nobody else. Only in 1930 does it distinguish "private" families from "economic" families, which are groups living under the same roof in hotels, lodging-houses, institutions, and so on. Including both kinds, the census family averaged, for the whole United States, 5.6 in 1850, 4.7 in 1900, 4.5 in 1910, 4.3 in 1920, and 4.1 in 1930. Including private families only, it was 4.0 in 1930.²⁰ Before 1900 there are no strictly comparable census records, but some samples of non-slaveholding rural and urban households of 1790 have been recorded. Combining them gives an average household size of 5.9 persons. Somewhat similar samples in 1930, using the same "household" definition, give 4.4 persons.²¹

(2) Miss Monroe defines the "natural social" family as a group of persons who both live together and who are bound together by either a marital or a parent-child relation. The family by this definition averaged 3.8 in Chicago in 1920, whereas by the census definition, in Chicago, it was then 4.3 (same as for the United States).²²

(3) Miss Parten has made a very useful analysis of family units among the entire population of New Haven for 1920. She used a third definition, the "social" family, which "consists of all individuals related to the head of the household and living under a common roof." This averaged 4.1 in New Haven in 1920. She applied her definition to Chicago for 1920 and found the average 4.0, as compared with the 3.8 by Monroe's definition. In 1930, the family by approximately this definition, for the whole United States, had become 3.8.²³

(4) A fourth definition is the "natural" family, which includes the parents and all their own offspring, wherever they live, and excludes stepchildren, adopted children, and other relatives. In fertility studies it is extended to include also stillborn and dead children.

In 1900 each 100 households had 63 servants, lodgers, boarders, and relatives. In 1920 this number had become 49, in 1930, 44.²⁴

The South, which represents earlier conditions, today has the largest average size of household, 4.4, and the Pacific Coast the lowest, 3.4.

Industrialization Has Removed Productive Processes from the Home.—Industrialization has transferred labor not only from country

to city, and from few occupations to many occupations, but also from the home to the factory, store, and office. As late as the decade 1919-1929, the baking of bread was still being transferred from home to factory, the per capita production of extra-domestic bakeries increasing 27 per cent while the per capita consumption of wheat flour decreased 10 per cent. Canning rapidly left the home during that decade. The making of men's clothing had gone several decades ago. Laundering was going, but had not gone so far. About 1929, 88 per cent of farm homes and 33 per cent of city homes, in a sample studied by Hildegarde Kneeland of the U. S. Bureau of Home Economics, were doing all their laundry work at home.²⁵

The contrast with past conditions is illustrated by a study by Faith Williams in isolated mountain areas of Kentucky. There, in 1930, 96 per cent of the homes still did churning, 99 per cent fruit-canning, 86 per cent fruit-drying, 94 per cent pickling of fruits and vegetables, 85 per cent hog-butcherering, 35 per cent sausage-making, 82 per cent lard-making, 57 per cent meat-salting, 17 per cent meat-smoking, 1 per cent shoe-making, 48 per cent shoe-repairing, 8 per cent spinning, 7 per cent dyeing, 1 per cent weaving, 15 per cent knitting, 67 per cent quilting, 22 per cent broom-making, 4 per cent furniture-making, and 76 per cent soap-making.²⁶

This Has Led to More Extra-Domestic Employment of Women.

—This loss of economic processes by the home has led to an increase in female labor outside the home. Census figures show that 5.6 per cent of all married women were gainfully occupied in 1900 and 11.7 per cent in 1930. During the same period the gainfully occupied percentage of single women of 15 years and over rose from 43.5 to 50.5. In 1900 the married constituted 15 per cent of all working women, in 1930, 29 per cent.²⁷ Some married women who work live in apartments or away from their husbands. But figures from 7 states indicate that from 10 to 14 per cent of actual home-makers have regular outside jobs as well.

Under 20 years of age there was a decrease in the gainfully employed percentage of girls from 1920 to 1930. At all ages over 20 until 65 there was an increase, and over 65 no change. The percentage of all women gainfully occupied is now 42.4 at the ages 20-24 and drops gradually to 8.0 for those over 65.²⁸

Monroe's study of some 23,000 Chicago families showed that in only 61 per cent were married men the only wage-earners in the family. In Rochester this was found to be true of 56 per cent of families.²⁹

Class Differences in Employment of Women.—The percentage of employed wives is of course greater in the working class than in the business class. Only one of 40 business class wives interviewed by the Lynds in *Middletown* had worked for money during the years 1920-1924. Fifty-five of 124 working class wives had done so. Only 27 of 102 mothers of these working class women had worked for money during their entire married lives.³⁰ Middletown, however, is a small city with the typical bourgeois attitude that a working wife reflects some discredit upon her husband. In larger cities, and in cities where clerical or other women's work is especially available, the employment of business class wives may be greater.

In the textile mill population of Manchester, N. H., representing the extreme of gainfully occupied conditions, 50 per cent of the whole population worked outside the home, a figure which resembles that of highly industrialized areas of Europe.³¹ Of the whole American population only 40 per cent is gainfully occupied. Only 25 per cent of these Manchester women worked, however, who were either wives or mothers, or both. The employment of adolescent children made up an unusually large proportion. Only one-fifth of the families of over 3 persons had but a single breadwinner. A third of all negro married women in 1930 had employment outside the home.³²

G. H. Berry asked 728 working *mothers* in Philadelphia why they worked. Sixty per cent were forced to do so by the husband's death, illness, desertion, or non-support, 29 per cent by his insufficient income, 11 per cent because they would rather work.³³

The ideology of emancipation from home duties has affected the business class more than the working class. At the same time the old ideology of the sheltered woman is stronger in the former because it is supported by the newer ideology of rivalrous consumption. This newer attitude is less one of chivalry and protection toward the woman, more one of showing superiority through the leisure of one's wife.

Table 3 shows the occupational distribution of women as compared with that of men. Occupied women, relatively to their total number, are more numerous than men in the professions and also in domestic and personal service. The married group is less associated with the professions and with clerical work, more with manufacturing and domestic and personal service, than is the total female group. This is undoubtedly because the married group of gainfully occupied women represents disproportionately the poorer classes of the population.

TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN

City or state	Date	Percentage of all married women who were gainfully employed, census definition	Percentage, exclusive of the foregoing, who were keeping boarders and lodgers	Remarks
Jacksonville.....	1920	27.7	9.3	Many negroes
Passaic.....	1920	18.8	12.8	Textile industry
Wilkes-Barre.....	1920	3.2	9.7	Mining
Butte.....	1920	7.4	6.8	Mining
Washington.....	1930	30		Many negroes. clerical work
Washington.....	1920	25.8		
Washington, native white of native parentage.....	1920	18.6		
New Bedford.....	1930	29		Textile industry
South Carolina (highest state).....	1930	24		Many negroes
North Dakota (lowest state).....	1930	6		Northern United States and Scandinavian farm culture
Cities over 100,000 in New Jersey.....	1920	7.8		
Cities over 100,000 in Oregon.....	1920	14.6		

Sources: HAZEL KYRK, *Economic Problems of the Family*, Harper, 1933, pp. 132-133; JOSEPH A. HILL, *Women in Gainful Occupations*, Census Monograph 9, 1929.

Of the 2,473,000 occupied married women in 1930, 493,000 were servants. The second most frequent occupation was saleswoman, then laundress (not in laundry), then school teacher, then textile operative, then clerk (not in store), then stenographer or typist, then bookkeeper, cashier, or accountant, then operative in clothing industry.

Women Have Found New Tasks in the Home More than They Have Left the Home.—Hildegarde Kneeland in 1929 had several hundred home-makers keep time records for the Bureau of Home Economics. Considering only the 82 city homes which employed less than 7 hours per week of outside help, the average time per week used in all housework was 66 hours and 48 minutes, of which 56 hours and 39 minutes were provided by the home-maker herself. Most of the remainder (because of restricting the sample as above) was provided by members of the family. The average family was 3.9. The total time spent in housework where there was only a married pair

TABLE 3

OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF MALES, FEMALES, AND MARRIED WOMEN, UNITED STATES

Percentage distribution

	1920		1930		1930 Married women only
	Males	Females	Males	Females	
Agriculture.....	29.0	12.7	25.1	8.5	9.2
Forestry and fishing.....	.8		.7		
Extraction of minerals.....	3.3		2.6		
Manufacturing and mechanical industries.....	33.0	22.6	32.1	17.5	19.8
Transportation and communication.....	8.7	2.6	9.4	2.6	2.3
Trade.....	10.8	7.9	13.4	9.0	11.3
Public service (not elsewhere classified).....	2.2	.1	2.2	.2	.2
Professional service.....	3.5	11.9	4.5	14.2	9.6
Domestic and personal service...	3.6	25.6	4.7	29.6	36.1
Clerical occupations.....	5.1	16.6	5.4	18.5	11.8
All occupations.....	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Occupation Statistics.

was 43 or 44 hours, or two-thirds of that spent by the families with children. The first child adds 45 per cent to the work! Apartment living tends to reduce the labor 24 per cent.³⁴

Certainly it cannot be said that the average home-maker's job is a half-time job, even where she has only herself and her husband, and enjoys the modern conveniences.

No comparison with the past is possible because there were then, unfortunately, no questionnaires. A suggestive comparison is possible, however, by considering Miss Kneeland's farm families which are presumably typical of earlier conditions in many respects. In these homes the average weekly household labor was 63 hours and 32 minutes, of which 53 hours and 50 minutes were done by the home-maker, in other words somewhat less than in the city homes. Moreover, the average farm home contained 4.8 persons, more than the city home.

The most interesting difference was in the distribution of time. It appears that the city wife spends much more time in the care of children than the farm wife, but the samples are not comparable, for one-half of these city homes had a child under three, and only one-fifth of the farm homes. But the farm homes had more children. The farm families were considerably larger; their home-makers were

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF ALL HOUSEWORK TIME

	Farm homes	City homes
Meals and dishes.....	43	33
Houscleaning.....	14	13
Washing and ironing.....	10	8
Mending and sewing.....	9	6
Other house care.....	6	3
Essential economic labor.....	82	63
Care of children.....	10	24
Purchasing, management, and other..	8	3
	100	100

not assisted to any greater extent by other members of the family, yet they put in actually less time.³⁵

In a study of 288 farm and 154 town and city families in Oregon, Maud Wilson found that the average working time per week (for home-maker and helpers together) was 61.0 hours in the country and 63.4 hours in the city. Another pair of samples taken by the United States Bureau of Home Economics from a number of states gave the very similar figures of 60.9 and 63.2, respectively. In the farm families in Oregon, 7.3 per cent of the time was spent in personal care of members of the family (mainly children); in the town and city families, 12.5 per cent. The preparation and clearing away of meals took 44.3 per cent of the time in farm families; 37.6 per cent of that in town and city families. Buying and management took 3.0 per cent of the farm time; 5.0 per cent of the city time. The Bureau of Home Economics samples showed the same relations, with only small differences.³⁶

A study by the Committee on Household Management of President Hoover's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership found the average working weeks shown in Table 4.

It may well be that the amount of time spent in housework is fixed more by human energy than by the amount of work which theoretically requires doing. The degree of imperativeness of **any** given work is relative, and varies according to the standards which the home-maker sets for herself and the time at her disposal. The tendency is, therefore, when processes are removed from the home, for the woman either to leave the home entirely for an outside job, or, if she stays home, to create higher standards which require her putting in her full time as before.

Electricity Has Checked the Exodus from the Home.—Certain of the inventions of the industrial era have impinged upon the family from a somewhat different angle from the main push of industrialization. Thus electricity, through the electric motor, the telephone, and

TABLE 4
THE HOME-MAKER'S WORKING WEEK

Activity	Representative rural homes		City homes of the business and professional class	
	559 farm home- makers	249 other rural home- makers	175 home-makers in cities of 50,000 to 250,000 population	222 home-makers in cities of 250,000 popula- tion or more
Purchasing and management.....	2.2	2.7	4.2	5.3
Care of family.....	3.9	4.7	9.8	9.3
Meals.....	22.8	20.7	14.6	11.7
Care of house.....	9.6	9.4	7.4	7.2
Laundering.....	5.3	5.2	3.2	2.5
Mending and sewing.....	5.5	6.2	4.1	4.1
Other home-making.....	2.3	2.6	4.3	4.8
Total home-making.....	51.6	51.5	47.6	44.9
Farm and other work.....	9.6	4.5	2.0	2.4
Help received in home- making.....	9.3	9.6	30.5	36.6
Average size of household	4.3	4.0	4.0	3.9

Committee on Household Management, President's Conference on Home Building and Home Ownership, Household Management and Kitchens, Washington, 1932, pp. 27-28. Arranged by HAZEL KYRK, Economic Problems of the Family, Harper, 1933, p. 93. Reproduced by permission.

the incandescent lamp, has been especially influential. These have reduced household labor and marketing effort. Together with the sewing machine and many specialized types of machinery not sufficiently novel in principle to be called major inventions, they have mechanized much of the work of the home and reduced the proportion of domestic servants. But at the same time they have checked the removal from the home of some functions such as laundry work and the making of women's clothing. Electric refrigeration has restored ice-making to the home. Electric and gas cooking have made home cooking easier but have not prevented a great increase in restaurants, waiters, and delicatessen dealers. The latter before 1920 increased three times as fast as the population.³⁷ Nevertheless, the tendency to discard the home kitchen has been somewhat checked. The rapid growth of electric appliances, which extend now even to home projection of motion pictures, holds the possibility of a change of direction in the evolution of the home. In a sample of homes in large cities the average person ate only two meals per week away from home.

Household Machinery Has Replaced Servants.—In 1890 in the whole United States there was one domestic servant to every 43 persons, or about 9 families; in 1920, about one to 83 persons, or 20

families.³⁸ In Bohemia, Czechoslovak Republic, in 1921 there was one domestic servant to 68 persons, representing an intermediate condition.³⁹ A wealthy country does not mean a greater proportion of servants, be it noted. A special analysis of 1920 census data showed that 50 per cent of servants lived in their own homes whereas only one-third did so in 1900.⁴⁰ Machinery of course compensates for servants. In the decade of 1900-1910 when servants were leaving their jobs to take employment in factories, it was commonly felt that the higher wages and greater prestige of factory work led them to do so. Was increased household machinery the cause or result of the decrease in domestic servants? Both things are true. Both changes were related as parts of one larger process of industrialization. In speaking of that larger process, mechanical invention was the cause and occupational redistribution the effect. But yet it is theoretically possible that any particular type of machinery might lag behind the occupational shift in that particular industry.

Keppel says:

In nearly every American home, rich and poor, elaborate or simple, the most striking changes within the decade [1920-1930], and probably the most significant for the future, have taken place in the appearance of the kitchen and the bathroom. . . . Whatever the reason may be, it is probable that more money and more brains have gone into the appearance of these two rooms than into all the other rooms put together. No article of daily use has been so greatly modified in appearance within the decade as the kitchen stove. The sink is no longer a sink of iniquity. . . .*

The Automobile Has Produced a Great Variety of Results.—The automobile has produced several very specific results. In combination with the telephone, it has greatly reduced the labor of local transportation and marketing. The home-maker's time is particularly saved as compared with the day when she had to go marketing on foot or by street car and limit her purchases at any one time to what could be carried in the arms. Not only this, but more stores now deliver to homes, and more quickly.

The automobile has helped to upset habits of thrift and has encouraged instalment buying. It has led to excited pleasure and is also an added source of financial and bodily insecurity. Its effect upon the customs of love-making and courtship is well known.

Much has been said about the automobile's being not very different

* From *Recent Social Trends in the United States*, Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends; by permission of the publishers, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., p. 981.

from the old-fashioned buggy in its effect upon the relations between the sexes, but certainly this cannot be taken seriously. The effect of course has been upon the city more than the country population. With its speed and closed-in body joined with the inability of the chaperone conventions to keep up with the change, the automobile enables a far greater number of couples per 1000 population per day to escape oversight. Moreover, as the Lynds have shown, the horse-and-carriage in its best days was practically limited to the farming and business classes and absent in the working class.⁴¹

The automobile in limited ways holds the family unit together in recreation. In other ways, however, its influence is to produce separation and conflict. The constant drive of the young people is to get the use of the car for young groups which cut across family lines. Social rivalry compels the parents to yield, and the car becomes in part an agency for segregating youth from age.

The American Automobile Association estimated that 45 million out of America's 122 million people took vacation motor tours during 1929.⁴² In an estimate of the annual cost of recreation in the United States, amounting to 10 billion dollars of the 90 billion dollars of national income, Steiner assigns about half of this recreational cost to the use of the automobile.⁴³

The Telephone Has Helped Reduce the Importance of Distance.—Telephones increased from 17.6 per 1000 population in 1900 to 163.6 per 1000 in 1930, enough to provide a half of all families with instruments⁴⁴ after allowing for the commercial subscribers. The per capita telephone calls per year increased from 64 in 1902 to 246 in 1930, a rate somewhat slower than the increase in the number of instruments. The telephone has assisted the automobile in reducing the disadvantages of geographic distance among friends and relatives.

New Transportation Techniques Have Led to Suburbanization.—A major effect of the automobile, telephone, and other improvements in transportation, is the geographic spread of the city and a new impetus to the development of the suburb. In choosing a residence, the advantage of living near to one's work, kinsfolk, or cherished friends, is no longer important, since the automobile solves the problem of distance. Although theoretically a device to *reduce the time* spent in daily or weekly personal locomotion, the automobile has, instead, *increased the distances* covered.

Nearness to the city is no longer a strong argument in selling real estate. The new "development" miles beyond the city limits becomes popular, and suburban settlements take on a scattering distribution,

with large areas of unbuilt land lying between. The automobile favors the growth of small cities as well as the suburbs of the large. From 1920 to 1930, the growth of population in the 85 metropolitan districts of 100,000 population or more was 19.4 per cent for the central cities and 39.2 per cent for the suburban districts. In the Boston district the population outside the central city is now twice as great as that of the central city, in Pittsburgh almost twice as great.⁴⁵ Of course, small industrial satellite cities as well as true (residential) suburbs account for some of this. If we analyze the growth of a large metropolitan district by concentric rings about the center, we find that between 1920 and 1930 there was an actual decrease of population within the 4-mile radii of the centers of New York and Chicago, and the 2-mile radii of Cleveland and Pittsburgh.⁴⁶ Although all social classes are represented in this outward drift of population, the movement is most extreme on the part of the upper business class, which formerly lived in handsomely built areas not far from the center of the city, and which is now seeking rural scenery in exclusive developments bearing attractive names. The change of place-names from the old rural village or township name to some "Hills," "Heights," "-dale," "-wood," "Park," or "Grove" is culturally significant in several ways.⁴⁷ In the very largest cities only there are movements of the upper classes which are not toward the suburbs, such as the drift of the wealthy in New York from Riverside Drive to Park Avenue. The replacement of working class by "intellectuals" in Greenwich Village is another unusual phenomenon.

Suburbanization Has Produced Further Changes in Family Life.—Suburbanization is having effects upon family life different from those of the earlier urbanization. A comparison of several samples of districts in New York State showed a sex ratio of 117 for the open country, 101 for the city, and 77 for the suburbs.⁴⁸ Nineteen cities in various parts of the United States, of the class of 30,000 to 70,000 population, show sex ratios varying from 63.0 to 127.7.⁴⁹

Young women leave the farms at a greater rate than young men. But they also tend to remain in the suburbs while young men leave to find work in the larger cities. The suburb becomes the home of the married man, who is often a commuter, and around him accumulates an excess of females: unmarried daughters, widows, some domestic servants, school teachers, and workers in other feminine occupations. The unmarried males corresponding to these unmarried females, and some of the husbands of married women in such groups, tend to locate nearer the urban center because of occupational opportunities.

An adult man is comparatively unlikely to live in the suburb unless he has a wife there. But an adult woman is very likely to live there even without a husband.

In the New York sample above mentioned the suburb also has a greater proportion of families with young children than has either the country or the city. The number of children increases as the family income increases—the reverse of what we find when we lump all classes of society together. In a sample of 468 suburban families divided into commuters and non-commuters, McInerny found, that holding income levels constant, the commuters' families had higher mobility but also more family unity¹⁵⁰ On the same economic level, the commuters moved more frequently, had slightly more children (except in the lowest-income group), spent more evenings per week in the family group, entertained more, and went more to private than public recreation places.

Changes in the Housing Pattern.—In the construction of residences the trends are toward more apartment houses in large cities, but also more floor space per individual. From 1921 to 1928 the new residential construction changed from 58 per cent single, 24 per cent multiple, to 35 per cent single, 54 per cent multiple dwellings. The two-family dwellings made up the remaining percentages. They, on the whole, are decreasing. In 1930 the one-family dwelling permits rose again to 46 per cent of the total, but this is regarded as a temporary interruption of the general trend, due to the depression. This trend toward apartment houses is true of metropolitan cities, independent cities of over 50,000, and suburban cities of over 25,000. But it is not true of independent cities from 25,000 to 50,000. Multiple-family dwellings in these small cities remained at the figure of 10 per cent of total construction, as contrasted with 30, increasing to 58 per cent, for the metropolitan cities. That we are becoming *generally* a nation of apartment-house dwellers is by no means certain. A significant trend is the relative decrease in construction of two-family houses in all cities except the independent cities of 100,000 or more. Apparently the trend is toward both the large apartment and the single-family home, and away from the "flat" which was conspicuous in the past. This is related to certain trends in residence attitudes which go with our increasing wealth.

In the period 1913-1919, the new urban residential construction of all sorts provided about 208 square feet of floor space per person added to the urban population. After the war this figure rose until in 1927 it was 286 square feet. There were great regional differences. In New England, New York, and

the Middle Atlantic regions the figure was about 475 square feet, and in each of the remaining statistical regions, among them the Pittsburgh and Central West areas, the figure was 265 or below. Census figures on *farmers' homes* indicate also a much larger number of rooms per person in New England farm houses than in other parts of the country.

In the apartment houses of the larger cities there is a trend toward fewer rooms per family, despite the greater floor space per individual. In the apartment houses built from 1913 to 1919 in Chicago, the average apartment unit was 4.6 rooms, and since 1924, 3.5 rooms. In New York the change was from 4.2 in 1913 to 3.3 in 1928. This change reflects in part the smaller size of family. It may be a change affecting only apartment dwellers.⁵¹

In the smaller cities and more closely built suburbs, at least, there has been a trend away from the spacious backyard and liberal frontage. A garage and driveway occupy space once given to lawn or garden. The porches, rare in Middletown in the eighties, became commoner in 1900, and have since then decreased, with the substitution of sleeping porches and glassed-in dens. It was estimated that recently constructed houses had 50 per cent more glass surface than those of 1890.⁵²

"In the ample Middletown of 1890 it was 'poor-folksy' not to have a house with a yard," say the Lynds.⁵³ While yards and gardens declined in certain specific *areas*, the loss may be compensated, however, by the increase in the less densely built suburbs. Keppel says that though we are far behind Europe in this respect, interest in gardening is increasing. Sales of packets of flower seeds, for example, increased from about 407,000 in 1922 to 623,000 in 1928.⁵⁴

The Single-Family House Is Holding Its Own.—According to census figures the excess of families over dwellings for all United States cities over 100,000 population increased from 34.5 per cent in 1900 to 35.3 per cent in 1910, and to 37.5 per cent in 1920—a very slow increase. From 1920 to 1930 there was no increase at all in the 11 largest cities, on the average. These figures are obtained by considering each residence building as a single dwelling, whether it be a single-family house or an apartment building. For the rural United States this excess was only 2.9 per cent, in 1920.⁵⁵

Regional Differences in Housing.—Great regional differences are noticeable. The highest excess of families over dwellings in 1920 was 71.4 per cent, for New York City. Yet the very large cities of Philadelphia with 12.4 per cent and Baltimore with 18.3 per cent are decidedly cities of single-family

homes. On the other hand, Boston with 51.7 per cent, Hartford with 46.5, Fall River with 47.7, Worcester with 50.7, Newark with 55.5, Paterson with 41.7 indicate that the extreme Northeast tends to build two-family and multi-family dwellings regardless of city size. In this matter of building construction there are distinct culture areas within a territory which in most other culture traits is rather uniform. Architecture retains a certain localism after most features of the material culture have been thoroughly diffused. An expert in housing and city planning says that it is very difficult in the New York metropolitan district to sell a house with a "party wall" to business class people. But in the Philadelphia and Baltimore districts it is quite respectable to live in those long solid blocks of uniform brick houses which account for the single-family house tendency in these cities. New Englanders and New Yorkers place their "flats," "rents," or "apartments" one over the other, and climb stairs. Philadelphians and Baltimoreans place theirs in rows side by side and are therefore allowed to call them "single-family" houses. In such matters the regional differences may be more striking than any general trend.

The apartment-house tendency is not something which occurs universally at a certain stage in the process of urbanization. In continental Europe urban populations have for years lived mostly in apartment houses. At the edges of most Continental cities the American traveler is surprised at the abruptness of the shift from solid blocks of apartment houses to farmlands. The extensive suburban area with its ample lawns and spacious single-family houses is absent. Where such "suburbs" in the American sense exist, they are called "villas," are used by only a small upper-class fraction of the population, and are never extensive. Most of what is called "suburb" in Europe looks like the central city itself. At the same time the downtown area of the central city is less exclusively given to business. There are few high buildings, no real skyscrapers, and the business buildings are occupied by business mainly on the ground floors, while the upper stories are given to residential apartments. The typical continental apartment house reflects cultural inheritance from the old Roman pattern. It has an interior courtyard, upon which face the stairways leading to the various apartments, with often a narrow, inside veranda for each floor. Entrance to any and all of the apartments is controlled by the *concierge* or door keeper, who must be awakened and modestly compensated whenever one enters or leaves the building late at night, even though one may have a key to his own personal apartment. Practically the only single-family house dwellers of the Continent are the peasants and the few wealthy.

In England we see a very different pattern, the one from which the American residential patterns were largely derived. There the single-family house is the standard, although over wide areas it is of the Baltimore solid-block variety. But the result is a much greater area of city for a given population, and much more of the American type of suburb. The following statistics strikingly illustrate the difference.

NUMBER OF OCCUPANTS PER HOUSE

Sheffield, Birmingham, and Manchester	4.8
Inner London	7.9
Paris	38.0
Prague	40.9
Vienna	50.7
Berlin	75.9*

* Eberstadt, *Handbuch der Wohnungswesens und Wohnungsfrage*, Jena.

Trends in Home Ownership.—Home ownership is decreasing in the country, increasing in the city. The trend in the country is due to increasing farm tenancy. In 1890, 28 per cent of all farms in the country were tenant operated; in 1930, 42 per cent. Among non-farm homes, the percentage rented fell from 63.1 in 1890 to 54.0 in 1930. In most of the largest cities, tenancy fell from 1920 to 1930, although the majority of homes were still rented in 1930. Extreme cases are New York, with 79.5 per cent still rented, and Philadelphia, the "city of homes," with only 48.2 per cent rented.⁵⁶

In 1920 the percentage of all homes rented varied from the extremes of 35 in North Dakota and 40 in Maine to 69 in New York and Georgia, with an average of 54. Thus we see low home ownership associated on one hand with high urbanization and on the other hand with an extremely rural but poor population, containing many farm tenants. High ownership goes with small cities and with prosperous or thrifty farming.

In "Middletown," which is typical of many small independent cities, the percentage of rented homes fell from 65 in 1900 to 54 in 1920. But this increasing "ownership" was largely due to increased credit facilities which permit a family to "buy" a home on a contract-for-deed plan, whereby one pays about 50 per cent more per month than the rent would be, looking toward ultimate ownership. It is now, say the Lynds, difficult to rent a house in "Middletown."⁵⁷ By the new system, the dweller in the house assumes the risks of ownership in return for the psychological satisfactions of ownership, but does not have to accumulate much of the capital in advance. On the other hand, an entrepreneur finds it more profitable to buy and sell real estate, or to lend money on real estate, than to assume a permanent landlord's responsibility for particular houses.

Dr. Plant says that in New Jersey suburbs 84 per cent of homes are owned in those areas where 78 per cent of the people are found at a changed address every five years.⁵⁸ Obviously home "ownership" does not indicate the permanence of residence and of social relationships which it is supposed to indicate. Ely estimates that in small

Western cities about nine-tenths of the population which achieves ownership does so through the mortgage plan. Houses in growing communities are readily bought and sold as the people move from residence to residence. To a large extent modern urban home ownership represents a wider diffusion of financial insecurity and anxiety but not greater social stability.⁵⁹

Women Have Gained Power.—Largely through their increased economic independence, women have gained social and political power. According to the common law which we inherited from England, and which was in effect with little modification until 1847, the husband had the right to the wife's person and to her marital and domestic services. If she earned money he had the right to that also. His was the right to fix the standard of living and the place of residence. He could administer reasonable discipline. He took his wife's personal property in outright ownership, and her real estate for use and control. He had the custody of the children and the right to determine their education and care. In return he was obligated to supply his family with the necessities of life and to keep his children off the poor rates.⁶⁰ It has been said that husband and wife were one person, and that one person the husband.

In 1847 began the American feminist movement with the aim of securing greater equality. The earlier situation, under the conditions then prevailing, may not have been actually unjust. Most of the families were on farms living a rather uniform sort of life. The women and children were assistants in farm production, and production requires centered authority. The unwritten mores of the community were adequate to check abuses of authority. With urbanization and the increase of unattached women, the male-centered authority came to be a cultural lag. The feminists represented the dynamic pressure for readjustment to new conditions, and they have largely made that readjustment. Their efforts culminated in the Federal Woman Suffrage Amendment in 1920 and the formation of the National Woman's Party in 1913. From 1847 until the present time many new state laws have been enacted, superseding the common law. These laws have tended to give mothers equal guardianship rights over their children and greater rights in the holding and management of property, and have established juvenile courts and other new agencies by which the paternal power over children could be limited when necessary in individual cases, and by which fathers could be compelled to fulfill their responsibilities in more specific ways.

The main battle of feminism is now over, but much still remains to

be done. There are still many discriminations against women in our state laws, in matters of guardianship, property, divorce grounds, rights to damages, and so on. The National Woman's Party seeks a further federal amendment to the effect that "men and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States and every place subject to its jurisdiction." Most persons interested in social work and social legislation oppose this blanket amendment because it would have the effect of destroying a great deal of welfare legislation enacted for the special protection of women. For example, laws limiting the working hours of women have been upheld where similar laws for men would be declared unconstitutional. Under the proposed Equal Rights Amendment such special protective laws could be held unconstitutional in that they limited women's right to employment, even though this was done in order to protect them. The Woman's Party group prefers to take its chances on protection and to gain greater welfare for women through the medium of power.

A. J. Nock estimates that women now own 40 per cent of the wealth of the United States.⁶¹

Power Has Shifted within the Family.—Mowrer says:

The husband is no longer the head of the household in many families, in spite of the fact that he still provides the family name, as well as the Christian name which his wife uses upon more formal occasions. Within the family circle, however, he is no longer the autocrat whose word is law. In fact, he is lucky if his children look upon him other than as a meddlesome outsider, or as an ally to be catered to when support is needed in breaking down his wife's opposition to some program of the children.

The wife, on the other hand, finds herself quite the equal of her husband in the family circle, if not the superior. She rules the destiny of the family group with a sympathetic, but none the less determined, hand. She is no longer the drudge and slave of other days. So far as the children are concerned, her commands are even more to be taken into account than those of the father.

This does not mean, however, that the children hold the same subordinate position which was once theirs. They, in fact, tend to dominate the scene, their wishes determining the policy of the family. Thus the trend seems to be toward the filiocentric family in which the child plays the dominant role. He is, of course, controlled by the parents on occasion, to be indulged the next moment. He soon learns how to get his way by giving his allegiance first to the father and then to the mother, or by holding aloof and pitting the two parents against each other. He has never heard the dictum that "children should be seen and not heard," and parental commands serve the function of suggesting what not to do.

The result is that parents are more and more experimenting with child-rearing along lines quite alien to their grandparents. The child is not to be disciplined or coerced, but is to be given the privilege of choosing for himself. Application of "psychology" takes the place of the older controls. Persuasion and suggestion supplant the more direct methods dependent upon physical force.*

The Ecology of Urban Family Patterns.—Mowrer maps the city of Chicago in terms of "family areas." These are roughly successive concentric zones although with great geographic irregularities. In the center is a *non-family* area, inhabited mostly by men. Then comes the *emancipated* family area, characterized by rooming-houses, residential hotels, married couples without children, employed wives, birth control, unconventionality, and lack of any but casual contacts with neighbors. Next beyond, in rough geographic order, comes the *paternal* family area of the slum and the ghetto, where dwell the immigrants and the lower levels of the native working class. Here the patriarchal traditions of Europe carry over, although leading to considerable conflict with the younger generation and consequent delinquency. (The traditions of the American farming and working class are also somewhat patriarchal.) Here the husband rules the home, determines the standards of spending, and is the chief medium of contact with the outside. He stands for discipline while the mother stands for affection. The family is large; the mother is confined to the home. This is a declining pattern owing to the stoppage of immigration and the gradual assimilation of the proletariat to business class culture.

Outside of this zone comes the area of the *conventional equalitarian* family, characterized by small families, a minimum of subordination of wife and children, and many activities outside the home for all members. Here are the middle and professional classes. As in the emancipated area, there is an equality of husband and wife, but it is more conventional. The school contacts of the children, the community status and reputation of the family, are important. Mobility is less than in the emancipated area. Finally comes the *maternal* family area of the commuter zones, where dwells the upper business class. Here are almost entirely single-family houses, typically bungalows. Here the father is absent during the greater part of the day, and the mother rules the home. Her tastes and standards determine most of the spending. She and the children are the media of neighborhood

* Ernest R. Mowrer, *The Family*, University of Chicago Press, 1932, pp. 274-275. By permission.

contacts. There is much rivalrous consumption; family prestige depends partly on family connections and largely upon the physical "correctness" and appearance of the home. In outward behavior, at least, there is rigid conformity, extending to "manners" and the rituals of hospitality as well as to "morals."

Generally speaking, the emancipated family area shows the highest rates of family disorganization, which occurs mainly as divorce, secondarily as desertion and non-support. The conventional equalitarian area shows a little less disorganization, mostly in the form of divorce. The paternal family area has an intermediate rate, taking the form of desertion and non-support, with little divorce. The maternal area shows the lowest rate of disorganization, and it is almost entirely divorce.⁶²

The Family Has Become More Child-Centered.—In both the maternal area and the conventional equalitarian area develops a *filiocentric* family pattern in which the children, especially the only child, plays the predominant role. This pattern is less definitely characteristic of any one geographic zone; emergence depends largely upon the personalities and attitudes of the parents. The mother surrenders her predominance to the "cult of the child." Family activities are determined largely by the child, "either in response to his expressed wishes or as projections of family aspirations into his personality and development."⁶³

The trend is obviously away from the paternal pattern. It is difficult to say which pattern the trend is mainly towards. It would seem to be toward a greater diversity of patterns. There is more of the conventional equalitarian, the emancipated, the maternal, and the filiocentric. If we ignore the childless couples, it is clear that the role of the child has been gaining in importance. This is a more recently begun tendency than is the tendency toward maternal power.

The development and elaboration of the school, the extension of higher education to lower classes of population, the reduction of child labor, the play movement, the increased interest in psychology and use of medical service have contributed to this filiocentrism. As noted elsewhere, however, the sheer increase in wealth has played an essential role. That wealth has provided the means by which parents can afford to give so much attention to their children; it has permitted a surplus of time, money, and energy on the part of women and children, which is at the free disposal of whatever specific cultural impulse might come along. The specific impulse which has turned attention toward the child seems to emanate from psychology, education,

and medical science. Ellen Key's influential book, *The Century of the Child*,⁶⁴ expressed years ago a new attitude which has now become effective in everyday life.

Nevertheless, as Lindeman says, the "so-called 'age of the child' has run its course."⁶⁵ A still newer attitude is developing among thinkers, although it has not yet extended itself to the general population of even the upper classes. It is that the best rearing of the child is obtained when the personalities of the parents and their interaction with each other are healthy. If attention and money are spent upon the child in such degree as to cause strain to the parents, the child is not the gainer. If he is spoiled, or if he is allowed to develop an abnormal love attachment to one of the parents, his future is dark regardless of the solicitous care and opportunities which are given him.

Child Labor Has Steadily Decreased.—In 1870, 13.2 per cent of all American children from 10 to 15 were engaged in gainful occupations. This percentage increased to a maximum of 18.4 in 1910, then suddenly dropped, becoming 8.5 in 1920 and 4.7 in 1930.⁶⁶ Although efforts to standardize child labor restrictions into a federal law have failed up to 1933, child labor in fact has been decreasing. In the codes adopted by most industries under the Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, child labor is practically abolished, at least on paper.

Education Has Been Extended to an Unprecedented Range of Persons.—Children from 7 to 14 have been mostly in school, under compulsory education laws, for a good many years. The nature of the more recent change has been the extension of schooling upward and downward on the age scale. According to Judd, "In 1930, one of every seven persons of college age was in college, and one of every two persons of secondary school age was in secondary school."⁶⁷ The total enrolment of American educational institutions of all sorts was in the last few years about 29,500,000; the total teachers about 1,000,000. Thus, about a quarter of the population is in school on a school-day of full attendance.

This condition is unprecedented in America or any other country. Estimating from figures presented in *Middletown*, if one were to meet today at random a person 50 years old, the chances would be 1 out of 12 that he or she was a high school graduate. If one met a person of 25 the chances would be 1 out of 3 that he was a high school graduate. The latest figure is based upon 1924 graduations, and high school enrolment has continued to increase rapidly since then in the country at large. A questionnaire to some 9000 high school pupils in 1930

showed that only from 25 to 30 per cent of their parents had graduated from high school.⁶⁸ The kindergarten likewise has shown a great increase.

The Activities of the Young Have Become More Segregated from Those of Adults.—With the growing cult of the child and the increase in education there has developed a youth *class* in America. This is very different from the youth "movements" of Europe. It has no intellectual culture with independent attitudes upon political, religious, and social questions. American youth is slavishly imitative of its parents in these general social attitudes and in tastes and standards of consumption. It is not a different culture-pattern, but a more or less segregated *class*, with a carbon copy of the culture-pattern of the adult class. There is relatively little functional co-operation and contact between adults and youth, and much activity and social organization within youth as a distinct class. This youth class centers about the extra-curricular activities of the school, some of the activities of the church, the Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., Scouts, and other youth organizations, as well as many small clubs, gangs, cliques, and friendship groups. In these various organizations youth lives and moves and has its spiritual being. Only its material life is carried on in connection with the home and parents. This of course puts the case rather extremely, but expresses the tendency.

There are probably no cultures in which children do not gather in play groups separate from adults. What distinguishes modern America is the lack of participation of youth with adults in the serious work of everyday life. American children "work," but when they do so it is mainly upon artificial tasks in connection with the school or other organizations of their own separate world. This world of childhood imitates the adult world and is supposedly a preparation for the adult world, but it has little functional relation to it. We have an ideology, built partly upon the past abuses of child labor, that a child should be protected from the hardships of life, should be permitted to live in the happy world of childhood during those few precious years until the inevitable day when he must face the problems of adult life.

The writer once visited a Southern mill family. It was evening. As he talked politics with the father and mother in the living room, four children aged two to ten were present, sitting on chairs and their parents' laps. All were quiet, and took in as much of the conversation as they could understand. There was an atmosphere of decorum and of unified family interest such as one seldom sees in business class

families. Business class people are often annoyed by the custom of the working class of bringing their young children to all kinds of adult gatherings. Whether or not this is a wise practice is not the point here. It represents an older folkway which our business class has abandoned, this constant association of children with the adult members of their families in all kinds of activities. Business class mothers may give their children more time in specialized attention than do working class mothers. But the relation is like that of a nurse or a teacher to the child; it is not a relation of participating in a common activity. They do things *to* their children, they do things *for* them, but they do not do things *with* them. They talk *about* them in their presence, they talk *at* them to hear the "cute" reply, but they do not talk *with* them.

This is perhaps an inevitable result of the high specialization and the perfectionist aims of modern adult activities. Housework today involves more machinery, more danger of accident. It involves more expensive furnishings, and the consequences of breaking, spilling, tearing, soiling are more serious than in the farmhouse or the home of the older culture. Again, there is little man's work around a modern home that the average family will trust its boy to perform.

Why cannot children participate with adults in leisure activities? Once they did to a greater extent. Now, if we play bridge we want to do so on an adult level of performance. If we converse, we want to make the conversation interesting and witty from an adult point of view. Children, it seems, spoil everything which adults want to do in modern society. Moreover, the children find adults as dull and uninteresting as the adults find them annoying and distracting.

The Toy Complex Symbolizes the Unreal World of the Modern Child.—One of the most meaningful features of the child world is the toy complex. Developed in Germany as a handicraft, toymaking has become, in the United States especially, an enterprise of mass production. To go to see the toys on display at the department stores, to covet them in heartily flagrant violation of the Tenth Commandment, and to receive a few under the Christmas tree, is the yearly ritual of masses of American children.

The significant thing about the American toy is that it is usually an imitation of something which really functions in the adult world, but the toy itself never functions to any real purpose. Take a toy wagon, for example. It pleases the child through one of two different mechanisms. If the child is very young, he is pleased as he would be by any novel object or new kind of motion. That the toy is a wagon

rather than a broken rolling pin has no significance to him. In either case, if given opportunity, he bites, chews, sucks, drags, pushes, pulls, and manipulates it generally. When the child is older, the wagon's value to the child requires an act of imagination. He must "play" that he is doing something with it.

What would a child do without toys? He might amuse himself as primitive and farm children do, by constructing small bridges or rafts, by learning to handle animals, or to fish, by gathering fruit and berries, by lending a hand in farm or house work, by thoroughly exploring his environment and learning the ways of nature. But in the city? There is a problem. Suburban life may be partly the answer. The modern school and kindergarten, with the project method, are making other suggestive leads. It seems also that with proper training a child could become more interested and useful in the actual processes of even the modern mechanical home.

The Moving Picture Has Increased Vicarious Living.—The moving-picture complex, like the toy complex, is one which furnishes vicarious satisfaction. Dr. James Plant has observed in the modern city a growing tendency toward the more introverted type of mental disorder, as a result, he thinks, of the increasing vicariousness of life.⁶⁹ In our leisure life of today we have fewer contacts with earth, air, and sea; with animals, plants, and even with people who are doing real things. We play in an unreal world of the imagination. We rely increasingly on fiction for our recreation, especially in the form of motion pictures which make fiction more attractive than ever before.

Here we have an invention whose effect upon the social system and attitudes is direct rather than through the medium of economic organization. In 1930 the weekly attendance at motion-picture theatres was estimated as over 100 million, or an average of once a week for every man, woman, and child in the country. This attendance was double that of 1926, and it increased faster from 1926 to 1930 than from 1921 to 1926, owing, it is believed to the introduction of sound pictures.⁷⁰ In "Middletown," the Lynds found an average weekly attendance of about 85 per cent of the total population. They found that among the students in the upper three years of high school, only 21 per cent of the boys and 33 per cent of the girls went to the movies more often with their parents than without them.⁷¹ The movies have contributed much toward the recreational segregation of youth and toward the earlier development of sexual interests and of petting, for

which they provide not only a stimulus but also, to some extent, the time and place.

An analysis made by Hart, Mills, and McGarraghy, has showed that in recent years "moving pictures were more apt than any class of magazines studied to present divorce and sexual irregularities in an approving light." A sample of moving pictures analyzed in 1932 approved violations of monogamy in 34 characters, disapproved it in 42.⁷²

The net influence of the motion picture upon delinquent behavior remains to be determined. Whatever this may be, it seems certain that the effect has been to shift the center of gravity of youthful life toward unreality and vicariousness, and incidentally somewhat away from the family.

The Radio Has Produced Varied Results.—The Census of 1930 reported that 40 per cent of the families in the United States have radio sets.⁷³ On January 1, 1932, the Columbia Broadcasting Company put the number of sets at 16 million, making about 53 per cent of the families.⁷⁴ In New Jersey about 63 per cent and in Mississippi about 5 per cent are thus provided, to state extremes. Suburbs show the highest rates, the extreme being 88.7 per cent for Park Ridge, Ill.; rural areas show lower rates. It is roughly estimated that three-fourths of all the sets are in use sometime every day, and the total daily audience between 30 and 40 million.

The social effects of the radio, like those of the motion picture, are relatively direct. Yet they cannot be readily measured. Ogburn has listed 150 specific effects and, just for illustration, has divided up one of these, "interest in sports increased," into 15 lesser details.⁷⁵ Few of these listed effects, however, involve changes in the family pattern. The major effects seem to be the general diffusion and leveling of culture and the centralizing of the sources of musical entertainment and of information. The rural population is being more rapidly urbanized in cultural attitudes. It is obvious that the radio provides a new reason for spending leisure time in the family group. That it actually leads to the spending of more hours at home, and not merely to the constant auditory stimulation of the hours one would be at home anyway, is not clear. Moreover, to our great discomfort, the radio can be heard at many other places besides our own home.

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CHAPTER VIII

THE SOCIAL EFFECTS OF BIOLOGICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DISCOVERY: MODERN INDIVIDUALISM

The inventions whose effects have so far been described belong to the inorganic realm of physics and chemistry. The biological sciences have contributed also to modern social change, in some ways more significantly than the inorganic. We usually call their findings "discoveries" instead of "inventions," a difference in terms which is not important here. Popularly, "invention" seems to mean some kind of a machine or material structure; logically, it should include the practical application of any new "discovery," whether mechanical, chemical, or biological.

Two fields of biological discovery have been especially influential: first, the field of medicine; second, that of heredity and reproduction.

Medical Discoveries.—"Medicine" is a practical rather than a logical category. It includes a great deal of organic chemistry and of the mechanics of instruments as well as of biology proper. In fact, "physiology," though regarded as the science of functional life processes, deals largely with their relations to chemical processes and balances.

Among the important kinds of medical innovations have been:¹

The discovery of the circulation of the blood, by Harvey (1578-1657).

Theory of infection of micro-organisms (germ theory of disease), Fracastoro and Kircher, 1546.

Digestion as a chemical rather than a mechanical process, Spallanzani and Hunter.

Prevention of putrefaction of wounds by keeping germs from surface of wound, Lister, 1867; Guerin, 1871.

Sulphuric ether as an anesthetic, Long, 1842; Robinson, Liston, Morton, and Jackson, 1846.

Knowledge of transmission of various diseases by insects and other agents.

Tests for various diseases.

The development of vaccines and anti-toxins.

The effects of various drugs.

The perfection of surgical instruments and surgery.

Vitamins.

The X-ray.

The functions of the endocrine glands and the administration of glandular extracts.

Sanitation, or technique for controlling bacteria in the environment.

These discoveries and inventions have revolutionized medical practice and led to the development of hospitals, clinics, health centers, and public health nursing. They have led the government into public health activities including sanitary inspection, laboratory services, quarantine, and the collection of medical reports and vital statistics. An increasing proportion of the medical costs are being paid through government, philanthropy, and other collective rather than individual channels, and now there is a vigorous movement toward the spreading of the medical burden over the whole population rather than concentrating it upon the unfortunate sick.²

Even though the number of physicians per capita has declined somewhat, the rapid increase in dentists, trained nurses, and hospital personnel has led to a considerable increase in the total health personnel per capita of population.³ Also, facilities and medical supplies have increased, so that the work of the average doctor involves now a greater financial outlay for drugs, instruments, and materials.

The Cultural Changes in Medicine Have Caused Important Populational Changes.—Modern medicine has had definite measurable effects. *It has raised the duration of the average human life.* Stated in terms of "expectation of life at birth," this has risen from about 35 years for the group of persons who died in 1789 to about 47 for 1900, and then to about 60 years at present. The period of *rapid* improvement began in 1890. Stating the facts in another way: death rates being as at present, about 60 per cent of babies born alive may expect to live to the age of 60, about 40 per cent to the age of 70, and about 17 per cent to the age of 80. By the time these babies born today reach the age of 60, conditions may have improved further so that their expectation figures would be further raised. Under 1901 death rates, only 30 instead of 40 per cent of newborn babies might expect to live to 70.⁴

This increased length of life is due to the fall of death rates at all ages except the oldest. The rates have fallen the most for infants, considerably for the middle ages, but not at all for the oldsters. If a person actually reaches 60 today, his average expectation of fur-

ther life is then about 14 years, *slightly less* than it was in 1789* In other words, the total *span* of life has not increased.

The Greatest Effect Has Been upon the Death Rates of Children.—The pronounced fall of the death rates of children, and particularly of infants, has given the average parents a much greater hope of raising a given child to maturity. Yet the declining death rate of children under 5 did not begin till 1900. One out of every 10 infants born alive might expect to die within the first year in 1915 (i.e., "infant mortality rate" 100 per 1000); now, one in every 16 (rate 62 per 1000).⁵ This does not tell the whole story. These figures are of course averages for the whole population of the United States. If we compare those classes which enjoy the most advanced facilities of medical science and feeding, with classes which represent the conditions of many years ago, we get much more striking comparisons. Thus, infant mortality among American suburban populations now ranges around 40 per 1000 births, whereas among the poorest laboring families it was recently 170, in Eastern Europe from 100 to 200, in Japan 142, in Chile 224. New Zealand holds the world's low record with 34.⁶

Once the child has safely arrived at the age of one year, his chances of death before he reaches the age of 30, when presumably he will be married and beginning a new family, are about 1 out of 7. Through those 29 years his total risk is only double that of the first year.

Death Rates of Young Women Have Been Decreased More than Those of Young Men.—The death rates of males are higher than those of females and their average expectation of life is about two years less. The difference is greatest at the very beginning and at the later ages of life. In 1929, the Massachusetts death rate of boys under 5 was still 18.5 per 1000 as compared with 14.6 for girls.⁷ The death rates at ages 50-59 were almost exactly the same, 18.9 for men and 14.9 for women. But in the 'teens and twenties the sexes are practically alike, having death rates of only 2 or 3 per 1000. At the ages from 10 to 40, females formerly showed a higher mortality than males, but around 1890 or 1900 the female rates became less than those for the males. The author, examining the stones in a rural Vermont graveyard, was surprised at the number of women who died young during the middle of the last century. To check his observation, he noted the ages at death on some 200 stones comprising the entire graveyard. The tabulated results were in keeping with the trend above indicated. Women then were more prone than men to die between 20 and 40, but when they reached 40 their chances

* This does not mean of course that a person reaching 74 years of age has a zero expectation. If he actually survives to 74, he then falls in a new statistical group which has a further expectation of 7 years.

of attaining old age were considerably better than the men's. Tuberculosis was one of the causes of this situation: young women were more prone to it than young men.

Decreasing and Increasing Causes of Death.—These causes of death have declined: typhoid, tuberculosis, diphtheria and scarlet fever, pneumonia, smallpox, measles, whooping-cough, diarrhea and dysentery, and malaria. These decreases are due to specific medical measures. Even tuberculosis, decrease in which the genetic school of biologists has attributed to the natural dying off of tubercular strains rather than to medicine, has been proved to have been decidedly influenced by sanitary measures. One of the most remarkable achievements of mankind has been the fall of tuberculosis from a death rate of nearly 400 per 100,000 before the Civil War to about 80 per 100,000 at present. These causes have shown increasing death rates: cancer, diabetes, cerebral hemorrhage, heart diseases, nephritis, and accidents. These increases have been due in part to the fact that they represent diseases of old age, and there is an increasing number of old people. But some increase has been true in most of these "degenerative" diseases if we make the comparison at any fixed age level. Thus, the death rate of 60-year-old males from cancer rose from about 200 to 400 per 100,000 between 1900 and 1929.⁸ The most conspicuous upward change was in diabetes, which rose from about 70 per 100,000 to about 230 per 100,000 among 70-year-old women, but only from 80 to 150 among 70-year-old men. The much greater increase of diabetes among women may reflect a greater change in their dietary and labor habits. It is a disease related to overeating and underexercise.

Efforts to discover methods of immunization against venereal diseases have not been pushed as similar efforts with other diseases, partly because the mores demand continence as the only proper preventive; yet these diseases are being confronted more and more with the medical and less with the moral attitude. It is known that there is much suffering among the morally innocent. Experience reveals many cases of individuals who infect their legal mates and of others who avoid disease in illicit sex contacts.

The changed policies with respect to venereal disease are not the result of advancing medicine alone, but also of the changed attitudes toward human behavior which will be discussed below.

Increased Possibility of Health Has Increased the Active Desire for Health.—The results of modern medical science well illustrate the principles of social change. First, we had material dis-

coveries; then we had changes in the organization of medicine (hospitals, public health departments, etc.); lastly, changes in the popular attitudes, such as the breaking down of the resistance to vaccination, the waning of the fear of "night air." Only now is the popular mind getting to fear the companion with a cold in his head more than it fears wet feet or draughts. Moreover, now that we have learned much of the causes of disease and have actually cured it at unprecedented rates, we are beginning to realize that we have medical "problems." Now that health is improving, people are becoming more concerned about their health and willing to make greater sacrifices of other goals for the sake of their health and the health of their children. In other words, here as elsewhere, the discovery of a new means of satisfaction actually creates the wish which is to be satisfied. Health and long life have now become wishes to an unprecedented degree, in the sense that people actually spend proportionately more time and money to achieve them and presumably experience greater mental suffering when the success of their efforts seems in doubt.

Some Biological Discoveries Have Affected Ideology Directly.—Most inventions exert their dynamic influence upon the economic or social organization before they act upon the popular ideology. We come now to discuss some scientific innovations whose only direct effects have been upon man's ideology or patterns of thought. These discoveries have not been applied "practically" to the same extent as mechanical inventions. Nevertheless, they have revolutionized human culture in ways even more fundamental. Steam, machinery, the industrial revolution, the automobile, electricity, and modern medicine have indeed been the main causes of change in the social structure. But the attitude and behavior aspects of modern change, and many changes in the structure of the family system, are not adequately explained by the above discoveries. All the mechanical and economic changes we have discussed, for example, fail to explain the phenomenal rises in divorce and contraception. They alone might have led to greater family conflict, or to an increased murder rate within marriage, to greater prostitution, or to postponement and decrease in marriages. But such causes alone could not break down the firm cultural sentiment of the indissolubility of marriage or of the wickedness of interfering with the divinely ordained processes of reproduction. If the new economic system increased the demand for personal freedom from the burdens of a family, that demand could be met in several other ways, which were

already part of culture, such as non-marriage, prostitution, or desertion. There was no "inexorable necessity" of divorce and contraception.

Increased Divorce and Contraception the Results of General Ideological Changes.—Divorce and contraception became prevalent modes of adjustment because there was a break in a previously impregnable wall of cultural resistance. This break happened to occur within the century after the Industrial Revolution, but it had nothing to do with the Industrial Revolution, except in so far as the general attitude favoring scientific invention spread to other fields than the mechanical. This breakdown of resistance opened the way to adjustments which otherwise would remain even today under powerful taboo.

Throughout the Christian era, despite cycles of asceticism alternating with hypocritical laxity, despite political and economic changes, two ideas remained powerfully intrenched: the idea of marriage as a relation peculiarly under divine supervision, and the idea of the sacredness of the process of reproduction. Both ideas were tied up with the basic concept of the human being as a soul.

The really significant change in this field during the last century has been not the discovery of essential principles of contraception, but the breaking down of the general thought-patterns which prevented the testing and use of such principles.

Three Key Discoveries.—No mechanical or chemical invention yet achieved, nor even medical technique for the prolongation of life, has been able so far and by itself to break the ideology of birth and the soul, constituting as it did a pattern as fundamental as is ancestor worship to the Chinese, or wealth rivalry to the Northwest Coast Indians. Whether it would have changed eventually under technological influences, or made possible the diffusion of other philosophies from Asia, cannot be said. But there did occur certain discoveries in the biological and sociological realms which have brought a complete ideological change in less than a century. These discoveries can be analyzed into three key discoveries. In mentioning the names of certain great pioneers, we must not overlook the fact that many others made important contributions, that each discovery was really a series of unfolding pages for which no one man could be given credit, and that many phases of this knowledge had been already guessed by ancient and medieval philosophers. What the nineteenth century scientists did was to give a definiteness and a

precise, objective verification to theories which had been vaguely "thought out" long ago.

The author would select as the three key discoverers Darwin, Pavlov, and Freud. They were perhaps not equally unique or crucial in their contributions. But all were research scientists in whose laboratories and brains certain vague hypotheses gained an added and revolutionizing dynamic, from systematically collected observations.

It was in 1859 that Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, and the great fight began. In 1925 John T. Scopes was tried and convicted under a new law of Tennessee, for teaching in the public schools the generalizations established by Darwin. On the other hand, in 1919 was written into the *constitution* of the new Czechoslovak Republic this clause:

"Public instruction shall be given so as not to be in conflict with the results of scientific investigation."⁹

The lag of popular attitude behind material discovery was thus different in different regions and classes within our Euro-American culture area. On the whole, the lag has been remarkably brief as compared with similar lags in the past, thus giving tribute to the effectiveness of modern communication.

Ivan P. Pavlov, the Russian physiologist, during the first decade of this century discovered that a dog's saliva could be made to flow by the ringing of a bell, provided that the bell had previously been sounded on several occasions when the dog was given meat. To the principle thus demonstrated he gave the name *conditioned reflex*. At first blush it might appear that this was merely a case of the principle of "association of ideas," which had been known to the ancients. The ancients, however, did not know the relation of an "idea" to physiological stimulus and reaction; they thought of it as something metaphysical. They had no notion of the mechanism or *process* by which their "ideas" became associated. It was Pavlov and his followers who built the bridge between physiology and these ancient introspections. Furthermore, it had not before been realized that stimuli to *different* sense organs, such as sound stimuli and taste stimuli, could become linked by the same process as that by which ideas are linked.¹⁰ Pavlov paved the way to the breaking down of the old metaphysical distinction between body and mind. His work suggested that mind could be interpreted as the *functioning* of certain parts of the body rather than as a substance or structure belonging to a different realm of reality from that of the body. In

America John B. Watson and others performed experiments along the lines of Pavlov's work, and developed the new psychological school known as *behaviorism*. This is a much-abused and much-misunderstood term. Indeed, psychology has already gone beyond crude behaviorism with this school's apparent oversimplification of mental processes. Yet these later refinements do not invalidate the essential discovery. It is difficult to put this discovery into simple language, but it might be stated thus: all mental processes, such as have been called thinking, feeling, and willing, are of essentially the same character as the simpler processes of the nervous system; they can all be analyzed into stimuli, nervous transmission, and reaction (although one may analyze them into other units also); and all learning, whether of manual skill, of sentiment or attitude, or of ideas, is the formation of new stimulus-reaction connections through the medium of old connections.

In 1895 Sigmund Freud, the Austrian psychiatrist, published with Joseph Breuer a work called *Studies of Hysteria*. In this he brought forth a new theory of the nature of mental disorders, showing them to be in many cases the results of repression of sexual impulses or of fearful thinking in regard to sex. Freud and his followers developed the *psychoanalytic* school of psychology, whose main principles we have discussed and criticized in Chapters III and IV. Pavlov revealed the elementary processes of mental life; Freud revealed its larger integrating processes. He showed that all behavior and thinking are controlled by wishes, and that these, though changing their specific goals and directions, develop in an unbroken continuity from childhood. He showed that there are hidden connections between different parts of a person's mental life, and that these connections can be revealed to the person himself even when he has not been aware of them, by giving him opportunity for completely "talking himself out" to the confidential psychoanalytic listener.

These Discoveries Have Driven Pre-Scientific Ideologies from Their Last Strongholds.—The result of these scientific innovations has been to transfer the whole field of human emotions and behavior, including sex and reproduction, from the realm of magic, theology, and metaphysics, to the realm of realistic, scientific thinking. The difference between scientific and pre-scientific thinking is not merely one of definiteness versus vagueness, mechanical process versus spiritual or magical process (which on analysis turns out to be *no process at all* but a refusal to admit the necessity of processes). Scientific thinking carries with it a different attitude toward the subject mat-

ter, an attitude of experiment and thorough exploration as contrasted with an attitude of fear and taboo. Scientific thinking is both a cause and a result of curiosity; it indulges curiosity even in spite of fear. Magical and theological and, to some extent, metaphysical thinking stifle curiosity in order to avoid fear. They aim at security.

In brief, modern science has made behavior, including emotions, an object of curiosity and experiment. "Right" and "wrong" are no longer thought of by large numbers of people as inherent qualities of behavior; they are merely practical judgments concerning the results of behavior under specified circumstances. Behavior is no longer "sensual" or "spiritual," but it is "normal" or "pathological"; it is not "brutish" or "noble," but "anti-social" or "social."

Scientific Ideology Leads to Individuation.—These changes in ideology, these transfers of control from magic and religion to science, have contributed to certain general changes in cultural attitude and sentiment. Let it be recalled once more that an ideology or thought-pattern is the way we think about something; a sentiment is the way we feel about something. In most individuals, feeling commonly determines thinking by the process of rationalization. But this does not mean that new ideas or new discoveries of knowledge may not cause changes in sentiments. In the long run it is the new thinking of a few individuals which leads all other social change. The majority of individuals may need to change their sentiments somewhat before they can change their ideas, but in those select few who are leaders and inventors, changes of idea precede changes of sentiment. Thus Darwin confessed in a letter in 1844:

I have now been, ever since my return, engaged in a very presumptuous work, and I know no individual who would not say a very foolish one. I was so struck with the distribution of the Galapagos organisms etc. . . . that I determined to collect, blindly, every sort of fact, which could bear in any way on what are species. . . . At last, gleams of light have come, and I am almost convinced (quite contrary to the opinion that I started with) that species are not (it is like confessing a murder) immutable.¹¹

The changes in cultural sentiment which have followed the extension of science into the human sphere may be summarized under a single concept: **individuation of goals**. This change would perhaps be described by Ruth Benedict as a change in the "dominant drive" of our culture.¹² Most cultures have some supreme value or goal which requires more or less conformity among individual personalities. Examples are the Roman drive toward empire building, the

Greek love of symmetry and balance, Egyptian and Christian preparation for the hereafter, the traditional English ideal of "character" and self-control, the Chinese honoring of one's ancestors, the French emphasis upon form and method, the Northwest Indian goal of personal prestige through wealth-rivalry, the German ideal of "Aryan" race dominance. In contrast, an individualistic culture finds its supreme value in the freedom of individual personalities to develop *uniquely*. Its chief ethical commandment is expressed by Spranger: "Be whatever you can, but be it wholly."¹⁸ Such a dominant drive appears to be characteristic of one other known culture: that of the Winnebago Indians.

It is not claimed that the new discoveries in the organic and superorganic sciences have been the only causes of greater individuation. Higher standards of living, greater social mobility, and greater division of labor have played important roles. But the new scientific ideology has provided supports for the ideal of individual liberty which this ideal never had before.

What Is Modern Individualism?—What, then, is individualism, and how has it developed out of the various changes we have studied? Some call it the pleasure philosophy of life. In the past, they say, people lived for duty. But doing their duty was what gave them the greatest net happiness or the least unhappiness, in the long run. Duty and happiness were identified, but the name given to the combination was "duty." It sounded better. Then a man's duty was his happiness; now his happiness is his duty. Whether one stresses the goal aspect or the feeling aspect of his wishes is a matter of verbal philosophy and perhaps of individual temperament. It is not the essential character which distinguishes individualism. We shall try to see what that is as we go along.

The individualistic ideology involves such ideas as these:

1. We live only once, hence why not make the most of it?
2. You *can't* give another person happiness; he has to find it for himself: hence look out for yourself. Those who look out for others too much get little thanks for it. (Individual responsibility for happiness.)
3. You *can't* make others happy unless you are a normal, happy, well-adjusted person yourself. (Mental hygiene ideology.)
4. The world needs many kinds of personalities. Be yourself. (Self-expression ideology.)
5. Morality consists in being true to the code that fits your particular personality. Your responsibility is no less than before. It may be wrong for

you to do what is right for someone else, as well as the reverse. (Individualistic morality.)

Increased Mobility a Cause of Individuation.—Individuation has been increased through the greater social mobility brought about by industrialization and urbanization. Even though occupations and social roles might become highly standardized, still there is little in modern society to bind any particular individual to any particular role, or to keep him in the same role throughout life. Social mobility in America has had another cause, which began operating prior to industrialization. This cause was the frontier conditions. Equally industrialized countries in Europe show a much greater tendency to keep the individual in his original job and place of residence. It has been the constant influx of foreigners, the settlement of the West, and the differential birth rate, which have kept individual Americans moving upwards toward higher roles in the social order without a compensating downward movement of equal extent. Now that immigration is shut off, and the increase of population slowing down, we may expect less of this upward vertical mobility. As the Lynds found it in "Middletown," among the working class there was a chance for about one individual out of 750 to be promoted each year from common workman to foreman.¹⁴ Other kinds of social mobility, however, are not apt to be checked by the checking of population growth. Shifting from one occupation or industry to another, and from one locality to another, are encouraged by the rapid changes in industrial technique and organization, which are likely to continue even with a stationary population. The displaced teamster becomes a truck driver, the domestic servant or seamstress a hairdresser, the factory operative the keeper of a filling station. With automobile transportation and improved standards of housing there is a great residential mobility. People move into new neighborhoods, and in so doing into new social circles with somewhat different cultures.

Mobility and "Selfishness."—With high mobility, individuals learn perforce to get their chief emotional satisfactions out of things they can take with them wherever they go. Homesickness tends to go out of date, and with it all emotional dependence upon a particular geographic or social environment. Sentimentalism for localities, houses, particular groups of friends, is weakened. Most of us know elderly persons whose lives were virtually intertwined with the ups and downs of a particular farm, homestead, business establishment, or group of clients. One could say: "That church is Reverend Jones"; "She lived *for* her home." To say that an individual must now live for *himself*, his *own* career, rather than for a group or an institution, is

misleading. He may live as much for outside persons and things as did the individual of an earlier generation. But these persons and things for which he lives are not the same identical persons and things throughout his life. The objects of his devotion and his emotions are constantly entering and leaving his arena, like students going through a school. Or we may consider the environment as fixed and our individual as moving through it. It is all a matter of relativity. We can no longer label the group of persons and things which our individual has loved during his lifetime, except by using his own name; they are not the "Oak street crowd," or "the old Williams place," or "the Dunning school," but simply "Mr. Baker's interests."

This, then, is the essence of what some persons are pleased to term "modern selfishness," or to deplore as "lack of sentiment." Let them call it what they will; it is our business to understand it. This modern interest pattern is selfish only in the sense that it is detached from any particular environment. Its center moves with the individual, as indeed it must. No evidence has been produced to show that individuals are less interested than before in the objective world, in the welfare of other persons or the success of enterprises, that Freudian "object love" is giving place to "narcism." The "self," in all ages and cultures, is made up largely of one's relationships to the outside world. The pattern of the self has changed, but not the drives or emotions which lie beneath it. It is now a migrating rather than a locally rooted self. Its breadth of scope varies, as it always did, with the personality of individuals. But on the average it is as "big" and "unselfish" a self as before. Since it can no longer be labeled with the name of a particular place or group, it must be named after its owner, and the words "myself," "my interests," "my personality," "my career," "my love life," must be increasingly used. The increased "me," if there be such, in modern conversation indicates a language convenience rather than a change in human motives.

The Novel Symbolizes Individualism.—The essence of modern individualism is that the pattern of the individual life experience, based upon the individual's pattern of wishes, has become the chief center of human striving, in place of patterns of group life, interaction, or culture. One of the most significant illustrations is the modern novel. People have enjoyed telling and listening to fictitious narratives in all ages. The stories of the past centered largely about the achievements of whole peoples, and of heroes who represented group aspirations. They were *epics*. The novel centers about the wishes, frustrations, and the final success or failure of an individual. This individual does not necessarily represent a group or a nation. He may be quite atypical, abnormal in fact, but we are interested in him nevertheless. He may even succeed in his peculiar wish gratifications by violating several important laws and mores of his group and of our group. Nevertheless we are gratified by his success.

One of the most striking illustrations of this modern heroism (if the term can be thus stretched) was a film in which the hero, incarcerated on a prison ship which the heroine also manages to board, organizes a mutiny, breaks through the bars, captures the ship, and after leaving bloodshed and destruction in his wake, escapes in a small boat with his beloved to the shores of a frontier country. Presumably they are to live happily ever afterward in this wilderness, free from society and its restrictions.

What does our hero stand for? The idea that he was unjustly imprisoned, and the merits of the case, are not at all developed as they would be in a more socially centered narrative. There is no suggestion of his going back to be a leader in a struggle for some great principle. What happened to the other prisoners and the ship's crew is not revealed, except that many were killed in the violence started by our hero.

What moral can one see at the close, as the couple rows the small boat alone toward a wild shore and a romantically setting sun? None, because this is art and not morality! Indeed, there is a great moral. It is the moral of modern individualism. It might read something like this: "Nothing is important save that each and every individual should be free to develop his own pattern of life in accordance with his own unique wishes, regardless of the culture of the family, sect, class, or nation which gave him birth; and among these private wishes the greatest is romantic love for a person of opposite sex." Our hero does represent society after all: a society which is a mere sum total of many unique individuals, not an organic group serving a common purpose, unless it be this purpose of individual liberty, for the acceptance of liberty as the common purpose rules out most of the other common purposes which groups of people have served.

Occupational Subdivision and Free Choice as Causes of Individuation.—Industrialization and urbanization have contributed toward modern individualism in several other ways. First, there is a greater subdivision or specialization of labor than ever before. There are more different types of work life. Second, labor has become so mechanized that there is less pleasure in the job itself for most people. The days when people sang and talked and imbibed during working hours are gone. There are fewer interruptions for friendly conversation and joking, fewer unforeseen incidents to add the zest of adventure to the day's work itself. To be sure, sailors, woodsmen, farmers, and professional men may still find plenty of new experience during working hours, but the masses who tend the machine or the office desk cannot do so.

In the second place, industrialization and urbanization have made the choice of occupation a matter of individual choice. In the past a person's occupational role was determined largely by his age, sex, marital condition, and the social class into which he was born. Now it is determined in part by his interests and personal abilities. This does not mean that in the past the individual was commonly forced into an occupation against his personal choice. Under a régime of fixed status there is little opportunity or incentive for one to become interested in any type of life save that which is cut out for him by culture and which he anticipates with the same passiveness as he does the next sunrise. The point is that today he has a chance to acquire interests and ambitions *independently of his original status*, and may choose his occupation according to these individual interests.

The Economic Individuation of Women.—In its effect upon the family system the most important phase of this change is the increased economic individuation of women. In the past a woman's career was predetermined by the mere fact that she was a woman. Today, it is said, women are economically independent. This is misleading. They are more dependent than ever, as are men, upon the complicated network of economic relationships. The situation is that a woman's occupational role can be chosen with some degree of independence from her choice of role in the family system; and also that she is more free to choose that family role. She may quite respectably remain unmarried, or marry without bearing children, or marry and bear children. Some radical enthusiasts are advocating that the fourth possibility also be made respectable; to bear children without marriage; but so far few have voluntarily sought this privilege. Whichever family role the woman chooses, she may, with certain difficulties in the case of bearing children, but otherwise quite freely, choose from many other occupations than the traditional housework. There is no longer any "womankind," but individual women, differing almost as much from one another in interests and experiences as men differ. Men have been increasing their individuation; women have done so to an even greater extent, for they had farther to go.

Increased Leisure and Individuation.—The increased speed and mechanization of work have made possible, and also made hygienically necessary, shorter hours of labor. Whether the modern worker has more minutes per week of actual relaxation is uncertain. He does have more leisure time in solid blocks. Play has become divorced from work as to time as well as to place. Commercial and community-fostered recreation have increased. Probably they have not developed

fast enough to take care of the increase of leisure time. The combined effect of greater monotony of work and longer periods of leisure is to produce greater boredom and restlessness except where recreational opportunities and interests develop apace. The choice of recreation to fill the increased leisure is controlled a great deal by cultural attitudes. Prejudices such as "adult dignity," limit the choice; fads and fashions like miniature golf and jig-saw puzzles lead out in new directions, but result in great overemphasis upon activities of little value in a broader sense. But in spite of these social pressures the individual has a chance to develop his own unique pattern of recreational interests.

Individuation and the Emancipation of Love.—Modern individuation has been particularly significant in the sphere of the wish for response. Just as individuals tend to satisfy their desires for adventure in more varied ways, so they are developing greater uniqueness or idiosyncrasies in their wishes for love experience. This has called for an emancipation of love from the traditional taboos. Individuation and the emancipation of love are changes which are closely related and mutually reinforce each other, but they are not identical. There have been periods in the past of comparative emancipation of the love wish, or certain aspects of it, without the *general* individuation of personality which is characteristic of the modern era. Modern individualism is probably an utterly new phenomenon of human culture; the emancipation of love is an old and oft-repeated story.

Many primitive peoples permit an earlier commencement and a wider variety of sex experience than do we. Yet when sexual behavior oversteps the boundaries which they have set for it, the individual violator cannot claim toleration for his personal idiosyncrasies of attitude in the name of "mental health" or "individual liberty." He cannot bring a psychoanalyst before the high court of his culture as an expert witness for his defense, or excuse himself on the ground that he was abnormally "conditioned" in his childhood.

There have been periods of great freedom and periods of restraint in physical sex relations. Since the evolutionary theory of the family lost its hold, anthropologists have been skeptical of any continuous historical trend in sex freedom, but have regarded it as probably fluctuating endlessly in irregular cycles. Some primitive groups, as we have seen, show great license; others are comparatively puritanical. A period of asceticism followed the libertarian period of the

later Roman empire. Apparently the Renaissance brought with it a reliberalization of sex mores, and was then followed by a period of puritanism, especially in Anglo-Saxon countries. The new burst of freedom today seems to many observers to be nothing new, but only a repetition of Roman and Elizabethan conditions.

But the present "freedom" has new characteristics. There is reason to believe that we now have something more than a mere repetition of a cycle. If one reads the accounts of "sex freedom" of pre-puritan Europe, for example, one notes the absence of certain striking characteristics of today. Those people did indeed show a frankness about sex and an unconcealed joy in its physical pleasures. They adjusted to the consequences of this freedom by a certain tolerance of illegitimacy and of venereal disease. All past epochs have been emotionally more tolerant of physical suffering than is the present. Also, it was possible to "sin" freely and yet secure forgiveness, thus avoiding serious personal conflict. Sex experience was regarded simply as a sensual pleasure, and not, as it is by many today, something of a duty toward one's "mental health" or "whole personality," or as a "right of man" to be defended against oppressors. The attitude toward sex as revealed by literature was positive but never serious. Hence it was easily overcome by the puritan negative attitude, which was serious. But the modern attitude is positive and *also serious*. The modern writer is not "in his cups," so to speak, when he praises sex, but is very sober. The "freedom" of love today is not simply another outburst of frivolity and licentiousness. It is not primarily a freedom of love from marriage, but from the supernatural ideology which held it in chains as an instrument of biological reproduction. No Rabelais or Boccaccio could have effected this emancipation; nor could a Watt or an Edison have done so; but Darwin, Pavlov, and Freud, indirectly, have been among the emancipators, and contraception has been the material technique of emancipation.

We noted, among other things, the increasing monotony of work combined with shorter hours of work. It is natural that a part of the increased leisure should lead in the direction of love behavior. Biologically this drive has an advantage over others. A great deal of our recreational life has become pervaded with at least the milder forms of stimulation by the opposite sex. We recreate more in couples whether married or unmarried; there is less of the one-sexed group with its conscious "sprucing up" of manners for an occasional meeting with a group of opposite sex. Gentlemen "join the ladies"

earlier and more naturally, and stay later. Moreover, the ladies now go almost anywhere that gentlemen go, into taverns and to wilderness camps and across the ocean by airplane.

The evidence is strong for a general increase in the number and intensity of inter-sex contacts within marriage, among the unmarried, and among the married with persons other than their mates. To mention only two indicators, there was twenty years ago a widespread attitude that a girl should not allow a young man to kiss her, except during engagement or under rare circumstances. While that attitude was not always followed in practice, it is difficult today to discover the very attitude itself. Second, "petting parties" at which married people sat in dark corners with other than their wedded mates were rare twenty years ago. Today they are frequent, although, to be sure, mostly in certain social classes.

One feature of the emancipation has been a greatly increased deluge of sexual stimulation by fiction, the movies, tabloid newspapers, the stage, and so on. It may be quite true that modern male audiences can observe complete nudity on the stage with no more immediate sexual excitement than earlier observers obtained from much-clothed dancing girls. We cannot judge the effect of any particular kind of stimulus without serious research; but the total volume of stimulation has evidently much increased.

The Intensification of the Romantic Complex.—A related effect is a further development of the romantic complex. Let us note again its prominent features: free individual choice of love partner, without group guidance, and often in defiance of all other persons, a temporarily complete subordination of all other personal interests to the comradeship with the partner, a temporary exclusiveness of the love relationship but also a tendency to shift partners if and when the excitement abates, so as to remain, if possible, perpetually in love with *someone*. The individual does not now merely fall in love a few times, and marry; he finds that he has a "love life." This life-pattern acquires a value of its own apart from the values of particular relationships, and each relationship is judged as to the role it plays in that life pattern. Literature and drama play upon the theme more than upon any other, describing true and fictitious type experiences which then serve as models for actual behavior. Motion pictures suggest that romance is a possible goal for persons in all stations of life. That illicit romance is condemned or punished does not quench the aroused desire. The desire may be outwardly disapproved, but actually stimulated.

At the Same Time the Wish for Security in Love Is Intensified.—But mobility has another effect upon love which is somewhat contrary to the effects above described. Mobility, although it does not diminish the breadth or objectivity of an individual's interests, tends to unbalance his wish satisfactions in this way. It risks the security satisfactions for the sake of novelty satisfactions. It may therefore lead to a compensating intensification of emotion toward those few elements which *can* be permanent even in a very migratory life. This intensified emotion is likely to fall upon the love-partner. One loves one's mate, because she (or he) is all one has in a permanent sense. While the actual average permanence may be less than formerly, because of the forces working toward conflict and divorce, the anticipation or idealization of permanence in love continues great, and is perhaps greater. The modern lover daydreams not merely of a lifelong companionship, but of a lifelong state of being in love. That he does not realize it is not due to any lesser craving for such a happy consummation, but to unforeseen forces which later enter the picture. The real *need* for the permanent love of a single partner is greater than ever before. We can count less than before on being near our adult children or retaining their intense devotion. We can count less on remaining in a familiar and cherished home. So it becomes more important that we have security and permanence in the love of a mate. We say, "Whatever happens is not important as long as we have each other."

Thus the wish for security of love, also stimulated by these modern changes, compromises with the romantic complex. The drive toward love loyalty is as firmly founded as the drive toward novelty in romance. The modern love problem is not that human beings have come to prefer novelty to constancy in love. They want *both*, as they always have done; modern conditions have in certain ways intensified both the desire for romantic novelty and the desire for lifelong love.

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PART IV

FAMILY PROBLEMS AND MASS READJUSTMENTS

CHAPTER IX

THE PROBLEM OF CONTROLLING REPRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION TO FAMILY PROBLEMS IN GENERAL

What Is a Social Problem?—We have seen in Chapter VII that social change is a continuous process, which, however, has been taking place during the last fifty years with unusual rapidity. We have seen that certain types of changes may be regarded in a sense as *initiating* changes, and that these include: (1) changes outside of culture itself, such as those in population and geographic environment; and (2) scientific inventions and discoveries, which, although a part of culture, have a certain independence of the remainder of culture. We have seen further that initiating changes produce adjustive changes in culture, but that these adjustive changes often take place after considerable delay, leading to cultural lags. The initiating changes and the adjustive changes which follow readily and promptly upon them may be regarded as the *dynamic* forces of the change process. Opposed to these are the *resisting* forces which prevent adjustive changes in certain directions, and which are therefore responsible for the cultural lags.

A cultural lag, the direction of whose readjustment has not yet been determined, is a *social problem*. It appears as a problem because we are aware that something needs change, and yet society as a whole cannot decide what the change should be. Various groups and classes in society conflict about the direction of the readjustment. Even the most conservative groups seldom take the position that *nothing* needs to be done. They may oppose the more direct and "radical" adjustments proposed by the reformers, but they nevertheless would deal with the problem, frequently by reversing or overcoming the dynamic forces themselves or by making some change in the attitudes of individuals. For example, certain conservatives

are aware of the dynamic forces of population pressure and higher standards of living which demand an increase in contraception. They would resist the direct adjustment, which is to provide greater contraceptive information, and would solve the problem by mitigating the intensity of the desire for higher living standards, by further efforts to increase national wealth, and by training the individual to greater sexual abstinence. Father Coughlin, for example, has said that what we need is not more birth control, but more control over the banking system, in order to prevent business depressions and to secure a better distribution of wealth.

Economic and Sentimental Resistances.—We have seen that each adjustive social change is usually one out of several possible alternatives. The alternative which is finally used is the one which meets with the least cultural resistance. We have seen that both the cultural resistances and the dynamic forces can be reduced to individual human motives. There are in general two kinds of cultural resistance, which may be called *economic* and *sentimental*. An economic resistance to a suggested or attempted change may be verbalized by the words: "It is too much trouble," "It would cost too much," "It is too difficult." The resistance to part-time jobs for married women and to the reconstruction of housing to permit more collective housekeeping is in large part an economic resistance. The proposed changes would require extensive rebuilding and also extensive reorganization of the economic system. Usually the property-owning class is the chief seat of an economic resistance. Their own economic security lies in preserving the status quo; the proposed changes would compel them to exchange more or less assured property rights and standards of living for new uncertainties which, though they *might* make life better for them, might also make it worse.

The sentimental type of resistance is that offered by a cultural attitude, sentiment, or taboo. The change may require no trouble. In fact, it may be generally recognized that it would usher in an easier and simpler procedure. But it is emotionally abhorrent, "dangerous," "impossible," "immoral," "unthinkable." The resistances to easier divorce and to sex freedom are sentimental rather than economic. The term "sentimental" must not be understood as implying something petty or unworthy. We shall probably never eliminate all cultural sentiments; new ones will arise as the older decline. When we say that a certain goal-object, such as monogamy, has a sentimental value, we mean that to most persons it has a *direct*

value, apart from its economic, instrumental, or other indirect values. It is valuable because people actually do value it.

No sentimental value deserves to be destroyed or changed for the mere sake of change. Human happiness in general is better obtained by preserving and satisfying the sentiments to which we were conditioned in childhood. Nevertheless we shall have to consider the possibility of changing certain deep cultural sentiments, because we shall find them incompatible with *other* sentiments which we also hold valuable. Most social problems, in the final analysis, boil down to a conflict between cultural sentiments, to which conflict there is no arbiter except the actual balance of wish-forces in the aggregate of individual human beings. All that science can do here is to enable people to see more clearly the possible alternatives and the possible or probable consequences of each. After this is done, the decision must necessarily lie in the emotions of the mass of the people. It is at this point that the old slogan of absolute democracy applies: *vox populi, vox Dei*.

Cultural Lag and Human Wishes.—Sentimental resistances, in the last analysis, are fear. People resist social change in certain directions because these changes threaten to destroy emotional values to which they have been conditioned and on which their happiness depends. These values do not reside merely in the personal life of each individual separately, but in the relations between individuals. Parents, for example, resist changing standards of courtship behavior because their own happiness requires the maintenance of certain values in the lives of their children as well as in their own lives. Thus the wish for security is the basis for sentimental as well as economic resistances. Secondarily, the wish for superiority also functions in cultural resistance, for the acceptance of the new departure often threatens one with a feeling of shame or inferiority. A conservative husband, for example, dislikes to have his wife earn money when this is not economically necessary, because, being conditioned in early life to certain sentiments concerning the roles of husband and wife, he feels inferior and ashamed when his wife enters a new role. He expresses this by saying, "It will look as if I couldn't support her."

The dynamic forces of cultural change, as well as the resistances, can be analyzed into human motives. It is the desire of someone, of some small class of persons, perhaps, to experience something new, or to gain greater power over something or somebody, which leads to invention, to demands for change. Wishes for adventure, response,

and superiority are prominent on the dynamic side of social change, but the wish for security is also present there. One of the greatest forces for economic change, for example, is the economic insecurity of the poorer classes. In general, on the dynamic side are elements of *all* the wishes, while on the side of the resistance is mainly fear or the desire for security.

Wherever there is a cultural lag there are frustration and suffering in individual human beings. In some, a predominant wish, either for or against change, is frustrated by the opposition of other persons, and we have social conflict. In other individuals the wishes leading toward change and the wishes opposing change are about equally balanced, producing a psychological conflict within the individual. In addition to the strain upon the individuals more directly involved in a given situation, there is the conflict in the mind of the leader, statesman, or reformer who wishes to reduce this suffering. He does not know which direction the readjustment will take. He wonders whether the readjustment which seems easiest and most probable at present is the one which will be ultimately the most satisfying. He debates whether to lend his own feeble efforts to this or that mode of adjustment.

Plan for Remainder of Book.—In Chapters VII and VIII we discussed changes in the family system which may be regarded as already accomplished. In Chapters IX to XIII we shall discuss the present problems, or, in other words, the changes which are not yet fully determined. In the solution or adjustment of these problems, there are always several possible alternatives. This is what makes them problems. There are three major problems of the modern family which may be treated as *mass* problems involving general cultural changes. These are: (1) the problem of controlling reproduction (Chapter IX), (2) the economic problems of the family (Chapter X), and (3) the problem of marriage as a love relationship (Chapters XI, XII, and XIII). The problem of the parent-child relation, so far as it is a mass or general problem, is largely economic and will be treated in Chapter X. In Chapters XIV, XV, and XVI, we shall discuss the more individual phases of the marital and the parent-child problem. The point of view in those later chapters will be somewhat different. It will be the viewpoint of the individual case, taking the existing trends of social change for granted. In Chapters IX to XIII, and in Chapter XVIII, we shall be interested in the possible alternatives involved in the *social* changes themselves.

2. THE PROBLEM OF EXCESSIVE REPRODUCTION

How the Problem Has Changed Since Malthus.—The first major problem centers about a populational change, but its causes and its

solutions are cultural. It is the problem of reproduction control. This problem was explicitly formulated by Malthus in 1801 in his *Essay on Population*. He saw it as a simple issue between vice, disease, war, and starvation, on the one hand, and "moral restraint" on the other. Moral restraint, to Malthus, meant either late marriage or sexual abstinence in marriage. Malthus' theory placed upon the poor the responsibility for their own poverty, thus furnishing the upper classes with a pleasant relief from responsibility and with an argument against socialism.

Since Malthus' time the problem *as he saw it* has been practically solved, by events which he did not foresee. The unexpectedly great extension and improvement of agriculture, and of world-wide transportation, have brought a *temporary* solution. Namely, they have postponed the evil day when population will need to choose between birth restriction and increased restriction through war, disease, and starvation. That this solution is but temporary was shown in 1923 by East, who carefully calculated that the maximum exploitation of world food sources which can be reasonably expected will feed only 5,000,000,000 persons. He showed, further, that this population, at the actual rates of increase of 1900-1920, would be reached before A. D. 2100.¹

But at the same time a *permanent* solution of Malthus' problem has arisen, in the perfection and widespread use of contraception. A family need no longer choose between "moral restraint, vice, and misery." Modern birth control represents one of the most important changes which have ever affected human society.

These solutions of the older, simpler problem of overpopulation have not solved the whole human problem of controlling reproduction; they have merely cast it in a new and complex form. The problem now is one of adjusting individual cases, social classes, and cultural lags. The lower classes over-reproduce, the upper classes practice race suicide, the biological quality of the race is threatened, and the more able classes are economically burdened to care for the feeble-minded. The knowledge of contraception is being hindered in its spread to those who need it most for both personal and racial reasons. In all classes, inadequate knowledge gives a false sense of security against unwanted childbirth, and when the trusted method fails, there result greater anxiety and greater impulses to resort to abortion. Illegitimacy, though more humanely treated, becomes socially more frustrating. A social conflict rages between those who would universalize contraceptive knowledge and those who would

prohibit its communication. In brief, the problem is still with us, although in changed form.

Let us now consider the known facts concerning the various phases of the problem.

Abortion.—Carr-Saunders has shown that abortion has been a common method of population control among primitives and also historic peoples. Christian civilization stands as an exception rather than an illustration of a general rule in its attitude toward abortion.²

Abortion in itself is a serious problem, but it must be remembered that from the standpoint of those who use it, it is a solution of a problem. From even a non-sentimental point of view it is an inferior solution, because of its physical risks. The chief cultural resistance to it, however, is a sentimental resistance, in which the idea of physical danger plays a minor role. The individual unmarried woman may debate whether *for her* the risks of abortion are greater than the personality risks of a life-long celibacy; but the judgment of our culture upon which is the more desirable policy is clear and unmistakable. The heart of the difficulty lies in this: that the cultural resistance does not prevent a large amount of actual abortion; it merely prevents its being socially recognized and controlled. Culture rationalizes its taboo by the theory that legal permission would cause the evil to be much more frequent than it already is. Better to prohibit it and to put up with the inevitable violations, than to permit it and to risk a much greater volume.

Because of its secrecy and criminality in Western countries, it is difficult to say how frequent abortion is. According to information secured by Thompson, abortions in Berlin are said to exceed the number of births, in all Germany to be from one-half to two-thirds the births, and to have tripled since the war.³ If these estimates be true, they would account partly for the remarkable fall of the German birth rate, which is now less than the French. In pre-war times the Germans had prided themselves on the fact that their birth rate much exceeded that of the "decadent" French. Thompson suggests that abortion may account for the relatively low birth rate (compared with other Oriental countries) in India. In Great Britain the First Birth-Rate Commission received much evidence that wives of the poorer laboring classes practice abortion, while among the higher-paid working families contraception is practiced.

In America, it has been estimated on the basis of physicians', nurses', and hospital records that over a million abortions occur each year, in other words, about half the number of births.⁴ Outside the

medical profession and social workers, few realize how widespread the practice is. Not all abortions are criminal abortions; where the woman's life is endangered by childbirth, interruption of pregnancy is legal. An inquiry among physicians in Maine indicated that 63 per cent of abortions are criminal.⁵ We do not know what proportion of criminal abortions are means of preventing additions to already excessive working class families. Certainly many are for the purposes of preventing illegitimacy or untimely legitimate births which might interfere with the mother's health or other wishes.

In any case, abortion is attended by great social risk for the physician, and physical and social risks and anxiety for the patient and her family or friends. To aid a woman in securing an illegal abortion is itself a crime in some states. Yet the number of criminal prosecutions for abortion is very small compared with those which take place. Dr. Benjamin Tilton says: "It is no exaggeration to say that thousands of women die annually from the effects of these illegal operations and other thousands become chronic invalids or permanently sterile."⁶

The practice of abortion is carried out largely by a special class of physicians of questionable repute and also by women of nurse's or equivalent training without medical degrees. Sometimes the operation is performed in an ordinary office environment so that the danger of detection is minimized, and various other subterfuges are used. Reputable physicians come to know a great many cases of abortion although they themselves do not practice it illegally, because the patient frequently comes into their hands after the illegal part of the procedure, that is, the mere killing of the fetus, has been performed.

The Roman Catholic position, expressed forcibly by Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical, is that abortion is not permissible even when a physician legally advises it for medical reasons, and when the mother's life is gravely imperiled.⁷

Soviet Russia, unlike all other Euro-American countries, has legalized abortion. It is performed by government physicians in government hospitals. At first it was made available to any woman who demanded it, after efforts were made to dissuade her. Since 1924, the case must go before a local commission for approval. In a small city investigated, the commission received applications from 20 per cent of the pregnant women and granted 90 per cent of the applications.⁸ Alice Field reports that only 0.79 per cent of abortions performed under government auspices have resulted in death.⁹ There

is said to be no increase in abortion and that the rate is about the same as in Germany, where abortion is illegal. The government, however, regards abortion as an inferior remedy. By removing the stigma of illegitimacy, by giving economic security to all mothers alike, by making it easy for the woman to name a father and thus compel his economic assistance, and by encouraging contraception, Russia seeks to minimize abortion. It regards legalized abortion, however, as an evil lesser than clandestine abortion with its great medical risks.

The Ideological Basis of Taboos on Population Control.—Imperial Rome, with all its high degree of civilization, had abortion, infanticide, sex freedom, and divorce, and some, though imperfect, methods of contraception. It is significant to note the ideology by which these culture traits were later suppressed. Two key ideas were prominent in early Christianity: the idea of the immortal *soul*, and the idea of *asceticism* as the remedy for wish-frustration. The soul ideology held forth an anticipated compensation in the hereafter for the frustrations of this life. It also implied that continuous production of new souls was desirable as glorifying the Deity. Asceticism handled the wishes for sex and wealth, so often frustrated, by substituting for them "sublimated" wishes which are certain of satisfaction because they are satisfied through the individual's own meditations and contemplation. There resulted a certain conflict between the aim of producing new souls and the aim of sublimating sex desire. The conflict was solved by justifying marriage *for the single purpose* of reproduction, and by placing marriage and reproduction under the peculiar supervision of the Deity through the medium of the church.

From the medieval point of view, the unborn child was thus equivalent to the newborn child, and the potential child which might result from intercourse was almost equivalent to the unborn. For always, a soul or potential soul was involved. Infanticide, abortion, and later, contraception, all came under the taboo against interference with the divine regulation of the soul. Divorce, polygamy, and sex freedom came under taboo because they implied violations of the ascetic rule of sex for reproduction only.

It is very significant that the taboo on *infanticide* is not behaving under modern influences in the same way that these other taboos are behaving. Infanticide, indeed, would perform the same functions as abortion or contraception. Yet not even the ultra-radical Euro-American can think of such a solution without horror. This re-

sistance to infanticide can hardly be subcultural, for the trait exists in many primitive cultures and was common in the ancient civilizations until in the Middle Ages Christianity finally suppressed it. Even homosexuality or incest is more acceptable than infanticide. How can there be less resistance in these subcultural, universal matters than in the case of infanticide which is a matter of cultural differences?

The modern attitude toward infanticide is a phase of the general attitude toward the individual human life. Medieval Christianity, although it had abolished infanticide, gladiatorial combats, slavery, and other cruelties to the human body for the sake of another human's pleasure, did not hesitate to torture the body for the sake of the soul. Modern ideology, on the other hand, regards the individual bodily life as sacred despite anyone's opinion as to the needs of the soul. It is no longer justifiable to kill a person to save his (or her) soul, or because he (or she) has committed an offense against the soul. Under an older moral ideology, for example, it was possible to admire the father or lover who killed a girl, other means failing, to save her from rape or sexual "dishonor," but this ideology is passing away. At the same time, there are signs of a growing tendency to justify the deliberate facilitation of the death of a hopelessly deformed infant or an incurable invalid. The question has been agitated in Denmark, and the Illinois Homeopathic Medical Association on May 8, 1931, passed a resolution advocating *euthanasia* for incurables and imbeciles.¹⁰

In brief, the ideology arising from modern science makes sacred the healthy, happy individual life. The concept of sacredness or inviolability, once attached to the soul, is now attached to the body. The decline of corporal punishment, of the death penalty, and of the crueler types of sport are further evidences of this change.

In the case of reproduction control, the modern tendency is to place the taboo of inviolability at the point where true individual life begins. Thus, while contraception ceases to be sinful, and abortion becomes somewhat less so, there is no letdown of the infanticide taboo except possibly in the case of incurable defectiveness, and there is an increasing reverence for the bodily life of the individual after he has become an individual. The modern ideology is thus not a reversion from Christianity to Roman paganism, but is something entirely new. Again, Russia's legalization of abortion does not represent a departure from the general drift of Euro-American culture.

Russia has shown no tendency to revert to infanticide, foot-binding, ear-piercing, gladiatorial combats, slavery, or cannibalism.

Illegitimacy.—The church was not at first entirely successful in suppressing infanticide. As the lesser of two evils it established foundling hospitals to care for illegitimate and other unwanted offspring, beginning in the sixth century in Italy. In Rome in the twelfth century, these hospitals began to fix *tours* or turnboxes in their walls so that a mother might place her baby in the box and depart undiscovered, knowing that the child would be received and cared for. Foundling hospitals have been abolished in France and Germany, but linger on in Austria, Italy, and the United States. The turnbox was widely adopted in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, but was not introduced into France and Belgium until 1811. After fifty years' trial it was abolished by these two countries after it became evident that it was causing more infant deaths than it prevented.¹¹

A medieval law commanded that "ye shall not seek out the father of an illegitimate child." The early common law of England recognized no legal relationship of an illegitimate child to either father or mother, but in Queen Elizabeth's time a law was enacted compelling support by the father if he could be identified. American state laws have tended to ease the situation of the illegitimate by legitimizing the offspring of certain void or annulled marriages, by declaring that subsequent marriage of the parents legitimized the offspring (in all but four states), and by creating certain rights of inheritance. In California a father, even if married to another woman, may legitimize his bastard child by publicly acknowledging it and receiving it into his home with the consent of his wife. In other states, practically the same result can be achieved by legal adoption. In all but six states there are bastardy laws similar to the English law, by which the mother can compel support of the child by the father regardless of whether the child is legitimized. The sums of money provided by law or by court action are, however, usually inadequate.

A Connecticut court recently introduced into this country the use of the Landsteiner blood-grouping test which is widely used in Europe as evidence for or against fatherhood. The test was applied to a child, its unmarried mother, and the man alleged to be the father. The test showed that he was not the father, and the woman, confronted by the scientific evidence, dropped her charge. On the other hand, in a recent South Dakota case a man was sentenced to 16 years for rape and was refused permission to take a blood test

as evidence for his innocence.¹² The practice of the courts is still to give superior weight to the woman's testimony where she persists in her allegation, and it is believed by many that this often fixes the responsibility upon the wrong man, and sometimes upon a man who is innocent of all sexual intercourse with the plaintiff.

Illegitimate births in 1931 were 19 per 1000 of all births among the white population, 148 per 1000 among the colored, 35 per 1000 for the whole population.¹³ There seems to have been a small rise in this rate since the War, the estimates for 1915 and 1920 being about 15 per 1000 for the white population. However, in absolute terms illegitimacy has not increased since the total birth rate has decreased greatly since 1915. New York City, both in 1915 and 1930, had the lowest illegitimacy rate of all large cities, 12 and 13 per 1000 births; in 1930 Boston had a rate of 44, Pittsburgh 42, St. Paul 45, Denver 56, Kansas City 95. The low rate reported for New York may be due to false statements by mothers, or to greater use of contraception or abortion. The excessive rate for Kansas City is due to the presence of maternity hospitals and homes which make a commercial business of handling unmarried mothers, many of them having good family backgrounds, from the surrounding country. These hospitals even advertise in the small-town papers. The infants are placed out at adoption and every effort is made to keep the girl's motherhood a secret.¹⁴

The foreign born have generally lower illegitimacy rates than the native whites in the United States.¹⁵ Yet in general, Europe shows higher rates of illegitimacy than does the United States. There is an area of high illegitimacy, with rates of 100 to over 200 per 1000 total births, extending from Hungary and Austria through Germany to Denmark and Sweden. England, Italy, and Switzerland show much lower rates, around 40, but these are higher than the American rates. Latin-American rates are very high, as far as known, ranging from 200 to 700 per 1000 births.¹⁶

In Europe generally, the tendency to separate the mother from the illegitimate child is less than here.

The evil or suffering which results from illegitimacy is not indicated by the rate. It is probable that the consequences are less severe where the rates are high, because a high rate reflects a culture which tolerates the situation and makes easy adjustment possible. In a mountain community which may be more or less typical of the Southern Appalachian region, it is reported that little or no stigma attaches to unmarried motherhood.¹⁷ A similar tolerance exists in

Central Europe. In Russia no distinction is made between legitimate and illegitimate children.

A follow-up study of 501 illegitimate children in Boston in 1924 gave the following results: died, 14 per cent; foster homes, 24 per cent; living with relatives, 32 per cent; adopted, on trial for adoption, or permanent custodial care, 7 per cent; unknown, 23 per cent.

A follow-up study of 82 unmarried mothers found that 2 had died and 9 could not be located. Of the remaining 71, 35 were married. Thirty of these had had no further sex irregularities, although many were promiscuous before marriage. Of the 71, 28 were classified as having better social status than at the time of the illegitimate maternity, 27 as the same, 16 as worse.¹⁸

A study of 161 unmarried mothers gave a median intelligence quotient of 76. Only 20 per cent were of normal intelligence.¹⁹

Changes in law and modern social work are tending to make life more tolerable for the unmarried mother and her illegitimate offspring, without leading to any great increase in illegitimacy. It seems doubtful, however, that the *social acceptability* is increasing. Probably the social disadvantages have not been removed as much as the legal and economic, especially in the middle and higher social classes. The lower classes, moreover, are increasingly imitating upper-class standards of respectability. The most serious mental hygiene or true welfare problem may now lie not in the poorest classes, but in certain higher strata where sex freedom has increased without a perfect contraception and without a corresponding increase in tolerance of illegitimacy. This middle-class intolerance consists not so much in absolute disgrace, such as that visited upon Hester Prynne, but rather in an attitude which makes it difficult for the unfortunate girl to make a desirable marriage. This situation often leads to the concealment of motherhood and the permanent relinquishment of the baby to foster care, a solution which is achieved at the cost of great mental conflict and anguish. A culture which fails to prevent sex relations outside of marriage, and in fact stimulates them, attempts nevertheless to maintain its moral status quo, through an attitude which deprives the child of normal motherhood and burdens the mother with a damaging emotional conflict. Central European culture in this respect is at least in better adjustment *with itself*.

Compulsory marriage to the father of the child is hardly an adequate solution, because in many cases there is no real desire for marriage on either side, but rather a serious risk of incompatibility. The "shot-gun" marriage is going out of style, and the trend of policy

among social agencies is away from compelling marriage, and toward facilitating the mother's rearing of the child with only economic support from the father.

An occasional individual solution lies in the willing acceptance of the illegitimate offspring by some other man in the role of husband and social father. Some educated men of liberal attitudes have expressed a willingness to make such an adjustment for a woman they love. It is probable, however, that this type of conduct is actually more frequent in the lower classes where contraception is less practiced and the competition of men for wives is keener.

The History of Contraception.—As early as 1850 B.C. in Egypt was written a probably effective prescription for contraception, which has come down to us in the Petrie or Kahun papyrus. Greek and Roman medical writers considered contraception a legitimate phase of their work. In medieval times there was a regression toward ineffective contraceptive rules, rules dealing with the time and circumstances of intercourse, and toward other superstitions. The matter-of-fact mechanical methods were barred by religious taboo. Francis Place in 1823 began the modern rational contraceptive movement. Although a layman, he made a statement of "indications" (reasons) for contraception which only lately have come to be accepted by the medical profession. He started the neo-Malthusian movement. Dr. Charles Knowlton, an American, followed in the footsteps of this movement and published *The Fruits of Philosophy* in 1832 in Boston. This was the first American treatise by a physician. In 1878 Charles Bradlaugh and Annie Besant were tried in England for circulating Knowlton's book among the working classes. They were acquitted and vindicated, amid much notoriety, and since then the resistance to contraceptive education has materially lessened in Europe. "The weight of authority," says Himes, "is now agreed that the decline in the birth rate after 1880 was largely, though not exclusively, the consequence of these circumstances."²⁰ In 1878 the first birth control clinic in the world was opened in Amsterdam.

In America, however, the resistance had not yet even reached its peak. In 1873, as a result of agitation by Anthony Comstock of the New York Society for the Suppression of Vice, a federal law was enacted prohibiting the mailing of information as to contraceptive methods, and the interstate transportation of contraceptive devices. Most of the states have laws prohibiting contraceptive literature and even the verbal giving of information. In 1932, in thirty-one states physicians were allowed to give information, in eleven more they

might give it but could not publish it, in two states (New York and Minnesota) they might give it only for the cure or prevention of disease. Only in one (Mississippi) they might not give it at all.²¹ In Connecticut it is illegal to practice contraception! Laymen are much more restricted than physicians. Great legislative battles have been waged in Washington, Albany, and Boston. In Massachusetts, during 1930-1931, a very conservative "doctors only" bill, supported by the best medical talent in the state, was turned down.²² Mrs. Margaret Sanger, the leading American in the birth control movement, was jailed for 30 days in New York in 1917 for opening the first American clinic. The case was appealed, and Judge Crane gave the decision that legally practicing physicians may give contraceptive advice for the "prevention of disease."

The controversy then raged over the right of the clinic to give advice for economic and social "indications" as distinguished from medical or health indications. Of course, it is possible to interpret many economic situations as threatening a woman's health in case of pregnancy.

In 1929 the Birth Control Clinic in New York was raided after it had prescribed and sold a contraceptive device to a policewoman who went there to secure evidence against the clinic. This woman claimed to be the mother of three children of one, three, and five years, desiring to prevent a fourth pregnancy, but did not claim to be threatened with venereal or any other specific disease. The medical profession was greatly aroused by the taking by the police of confidential patient-record cards from the clinic. At the trial of the case several prominent physicians testified that it would have been injurious to the presumed patient to have a fourth child under the circumstances she had indicated. The chances of good health for her baby if born within a year after the youngest child would be less than if she waited. Her own physical and mental health would be endangered. The court decided in favor of the clinic and thus interpreted "disease" to mean something more than venereal or other infectious diseases.

In another recent case in which a manufacturer of contraceptives tried to enjoin a competitor who had stolen his trade-mark, a court decided that it is not illegal to send through the mails to doctors and their agents an article which has the (lawful) purpose of preventing disease in addition to the (unlawful) purpose of preventing birth. In still another case it was decided that the law against importing contraceptives applies only to the articles themselves and not to literature about them such as Dr. Marie C. Stope's *Contraception*.²³

Thus clinical work is growing largely through more liberal interpretations of the laws rather than through actual changes in the laws.

The visits to the New York clinic rose from 2846 in 1926 to 12,086 in 1930. It is said that the clients are about equally divided among Protestants, Catholics, and Jews.²⁴

America in 1933 had about 140 birth control clinics. Clients of the New York clinic averaged \$30.52 as to wage of husband. In Baltimore and Cleveland clients were 10 to 12 per cent of the business class (which comprises roughly 30 per cent of the urban population). The British clinics get about the same proportion, but Himes thinks that their clientele in general is of lower economic status than the American. The British professional classes use the clinics very little, he thinks, while in America, owing to legal restraints and greater ignorance on the part of physicians, the clinics have advised more persons of higher status.²⁵

The clinics hold that instruction to the individual is necessary to get the best results. Contraception is by no means 100 per cent effective, but there are methods known to have a very high degree of safety provided they are applied competently. In Pearl's sample, contraceptive responsibility had been borne in about half the cases by men, in the other half by women. European clinics especially have to rely upon contraceptives for women. The personal resistance of adult men to changing their sexual habits is a factor as well as the culturo-sentimental resistance. This factor may be important in the Russian situation, where the cultural resistance has been destroyed by the government.

In January, 1934, an American Conference on Birth Control and National Recovery was held in Washington. The birth control advocates induced Representative Pierce of Oregon to introduce a bill exempting the medical profession from the federal ban on shipment of contraceptive material and information. Four times previously in the past ten years a House committee had held hearings on similar legislation with no result. This time also the House Judiciary Committee pigeon-holed the bill. Nevertheless, much publicity was obtained.²⁶ *

The Present Resistance to Contraception.—The contraceptive situation in America reveals a most extreme lag between actual practice and the formal ideology of law and official pronouncements. Only 21 out of the 200 educated persons questioned by Dr. Hamilton for his *Research in Marriage* said that they were not using some form of contraception.²⁷ Of 1000 educated women questioned by Dr. Davis,

* A similar bill was *favorably* reported by a Senate committee (New York Times, April 24, 1934, p. 4), but Congress adjourned in June without action.

730 were employing contraception and only 78 disapproved its use.²⁸ Among the business class in "Middletown," say the Lynds, relatively efficacious contraceptive measures appear to be practically universal, while only 34 out of 77 working class wives used it.²⁹ Pearl, studying 2000 maternity cases in hospitals, learned that 36 per cent of the white women and 15 per cent of the negroes used contraception.³⁰ A study in Baltimore by Calverton led to the estimate that 2,250,000 contraceptives were sold per year by the drug stores of Baltimore.³¹ This would make about 14 per year for each white male of 20 to 59 years of age. The 15 leading manufacturers of a common type of contraceptive in the United States produce about 1,500,000 per day, or about 18 per year for each male of 20 to 59 in the country.³² This would make possibly one such article to every four to six acts of intercourse. But these estimates do not cover all sources of supply or all methods of contraception. Calverton found that about half of those who purchased contraceptives were unmarried.³³ A 1932 survey in western Florida showed that one kind of contraceptive was being sold in 376 gasoline stations, garages, restaurants, soda fountains, barber shops, pool rooms, cigar stands, news stands, shoe-shine parlors, and grocery stores. Commercialization of contraceptives is no longer clandestine; they are even advertised, and in some states are dispensed through slot machines. Stella Hanau says that there are 300 manufacturers of contraceptives in the vicinity of New York City. At the 1934 Congressional hearing, opponents of birth control even charged its demonstrably altruistic advocates with having commercial interests.³⁴

Despite these facts there is a striking conservatism among both physicians and legislators. A questionnaire by John B. Watson and K. S. Lashley to physicians representing the American Psychopathological Association, the American Association of Genito-Urinary Surgeons, the American Gynecological Society, and the New York Obstetrical Society, brought these results:

Fifteen out of 57 disapproved the sponsoring of a scientific study of birth control by their society, and 14 more failed to answer.

Thirty-four out of 57 opposed special clinics, manned by physicians and nurses for the purpose of sex instruction.

Only 25 out of 69 gave unqualified approval to the teaching of the physiology and psychology of sexual intercourse before marriage.

Forty-two out of 57 definitely opposed the idea of making information about contraceptives generally accessible to the public.

In no medical school that Calverton could discover was the subject of contraceptives studied.⁸⁵

A physician and sociologist well known for his pioneer work in medical social service and other contributions to human welfare said in 1916:

I think that we get into a perfectly hopeless muddle of conflicting standards if we take any other than the religious point of view here. The only way the matter can be settled is by asking what is best for the human spirit. Anything which is so contrary to nature as an artificial control tends to split soul and body apart, and to make a great and sacred function a very cheap affair. On religious grounds, then, and on the ground of obeying the laws, I personally am wholly opposed to the artificial control of births.*

On the other hand, several physicians and clinics are now conducting research in contraception, to determine the actual reliability of the various methods.

The greatest resistance to contraception comes from the Roman Catholic Church. It has been charged that the Church is motivated by the desire for large families, for only in that way can it hope to maintain or increase its membership in the face of the tide of social change away from authoritative religion. However, it is as unfair to charge the Catholic leaders with any such conscious motivation as to charge the birth control advocates with commercial motives. There is no question of the sincerity of their belief, and it is shared by the more conservative Protestant elements. The belief is a pure cultural sentiment, existing independently of any idea of its material consequences or instrumental values. It will stand or fall with the whole system of ideology of human life of which it is a part. The clear-eyed observer of social change, whatever he may *wish* to see happen, can foresee only one final outcome. Even though he deplore the cultural lags which result from their resistance, he may accord a sportsman-like respect to those who from sincerity of belief have set themselves against the irresistible tide.

The legalization of contraception in this country is hindered by the circumstance that the major political party which is now the more progressive in most social and economic matters is also the party supported by most of the Catholic population. One cannot expect the leaders of this party, whatever their reasoned opinions may be, to alienate a large body of their supporters and thereby risk their larger social program for the sake of a single type of reform. Thus

* Richard C. Cabot, *A Layman's Handbook of Medicine*, Houghton Mifflin, 1916, pp. 215-216.

an irrelevant historical accident may profoundly affect the course of social change in this matter of birth control. The effect will be to continue the disparity between law and practice, to compel birth control to advance by clandestine procedures, behind a hypocritical mask of legal disapproval.

Contraception and the Sex Ratio.—The sex ratio at conception is about 110 males to 100 females, but the greater mortality of male fetuses reduces the ratio at birth to 105. Winston found, in a study of a socially superior group, that the sex ratio at birth was 112. A ratio of 109 could be accounted for by the superior pre-natal conditions in such families, which permit more of the excess male fetuses to survive. A ratio of 112, however, requires an additional explanation, since it exceeds even the conception ratio. The ratio among the *last* children of these families was 117.4, indicating that the greater desire for male offspring tends to lead the family to continue child-bearing after a female birth but to discontinue after a male birth. This tendency, of course, is able to work itself out better under contraception. Universal contraception may therefore lead to a greater excess of males in society than we now have, assuming the continuance of certain attitudes associated with a patrilineal culture.³⁶

Why Contraception Is Needed.—Legalization of contraception is needed not for the purpose of reducing the *general* birth rate. That aim has already been achieved by "bootleg" contraception. Conservatives are quite right if they hold that no further decrease in the birth rate is needed at this time. One may recognize privately that a certain amount of contraception is desirable, and then, since we already have that amount, he may try to prevent further increase by publicly voicing the hypocritical attitude that *all* contraception is undesirable. Such is a common technique of social control.

The difficulty with this method of handling the problem is that while we may be now practicing about the right total amount of birth control, it is not practiced *where* it is most needed for human welfare, and is practiced too much in other cases. Contraception is needed not only for general population control, but also to prevent the sufferings in individual families, due to such situations as the following :

Transmissible diseases and defects.

Undue susceptibility of a woman to puerperal diseases.

Too short intervals between births.

Defective children already born to parents.

Marriage at early ages before there is economic ability to raise a family.

Financial inability to support another child without hardship and resort to charity.

Child-bearing begun so soon after marriage that parents have no time to make a normal adjustment or develop their own personalities—"honeymoon pregnancies."

The application of contraception to these cases which really need it can be obtained only through making it legal and honest. If the result of this is to produce too much contraception *in toto*, causing a decline of the birth rate below the replacement needs of the population, then we have another problem which can be treated by methods more suitable than mere resistance to the further spread of birth control.

3. THE PROBLEM OF DYSGENIC REPRODUCTION

The Differential Birth Rate.—There is, however, a problem of general population control which in the long run is more important than any of the present-day individual sufferings caused by lack of contraception. It is a double-headed problem. The birth rate is too high in the poorer classes and too low in the more prosperous classes. The death rates also of the poor are higher, but with modern medicine and public health they are not enough higher to compensate for the birth differential. How far this greater net reproduction of the inferior has been true in past ages we do not know. It is believed that in less advanced societies the biologically unfit are more likely to be eliminated by the harsh conditions of life, so that their reproductive advantage is less or absent. This present differential reproduction threatens a biological deterioration of the population. This spells an increasing economic burden upon a decreasing intelligent population to care for an increasing feeble-minded and dull population. This belief rests upon two assumptions: first, that the *net* rate of reproduction is actually greater among the lower economic classes; and second, that these classes are *biologically* inferior to the higher classes.

The first assumption is easily proved to be correct *within urban populations* in the United States. Thompson secured figures from the census regarding families which had births in the year 1920. The families were classified into occupational groups, and the number of *living* children per family was found to be as in Table 5. The working class thus exceeds the business class in size of family, and the commercial and managerial elements of the business class have larger families than the intellectual elements. A study in England in 1911

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF LIVING CHILDREN IN 1920, OF MOTHERS WHO HAD BIRTHS IN 1920, ACCORDING TO OCCUPATION OF FATHER, U. S. REGISTRATION AREA	
Mine foremen, overseers, inspectors	3.9
Mine operatives	3.6
Guards, watchmen, and doorkeepers	3.5
Farmers	3.4
Janitors and sextons	3.4
Blacksmiths, forgemen, and hammermen	3.2
Carpenters	3.1
Locomotive engineers	3.1
Laborers, not otherwise specified	3.1
Farm laborers	3.0
Laborers, steam and street railroad	3.0
Clergymen	3.0
Hotel keepers and managers	3.0
Mine operators, officials, and managers	2.9
Foremen and overseers, manufacturing	2.9
Stationary engineers, cranemen, hoistmen	2.8
Retail dealers	2.8
Barbers, hairdressers, manicurists	2.8
Officials and superintendents, steam and street railroad	2.7
Semi-skilled operatives	2.6
Machinists, millwrights, toolmakers, mechanics	2.3
Managers, superintendents, managers, officials	2.3
Servants	2.3
Chauffeurs	2.2
Lawyers, judges, and justices	2.2
Commercial travelers	2.2
Electricians	2.1
Bankers, brokers, money-lenders	2.1
Physicians and surgeons	2.1
School teachers	2.1
Clerks (except in stores)	2.1
Technical engineers	1.9
Book-keepers, cashiers, accountants	1.9
Stenographers and typists	1.8
Soldiers, sailors, and marines	1.6
All occupations	2.9

Rearranged from U. S. Bureau of the Census, *Census Monograph XI. Ratio of Children to Women, 1920*, by Warren S. Thompson, Government Printing Office 1931, p. 13. These families, be it noted, are not completed families, but their relative size is significant.

showed that dock laborers were 2.3 times as fecund as were physicians, Anglican clergymen, or solicitors.³⁷

The Educated Classes Fail to Replace Themselves Biologically. —Many studies have shown that the birth rate is correlated inversely with the amount of education. Although the death rate as well as the birth rate is higher among the lower classes, it is not enough higher to compensate for the difference in birth rate. The *net* rate of increase becomes greater as we go down the educational scale. College

graduates, as shown in many studies, do not produce enough children to maintain their population stock. In 1916, Phillips found that the members of the Harvard classes of 1899, 1900, and 1901 had produced 1.55 children per capita, of which 1.45 could be expected to survive, in order to allow for deaths. There were 1.93 births per *married* graduate, but the married must produce enough to compensate for those who do not marry.³⁸

Lotka found by analyzing 1920 census figures that out of 100,000 females born in the whole population, 78,207 survive and eventually marry. Out of 100,000 males born, 74,100 survive and marry.³⁹ For simplicity let us consider for a moment only the females. In order to maintain a stationary population, it is obvious that 100,000 females born today must produce 100,000 female births in the next generation. Since there are 105 male to 100 female births, this means that these present 100,000 female infants must eventually produce 205,000 infants altogether. Since only 78,207 of our female infants will survive and marry, each one who does marry must produce, on the average $205,000 \div 78,207$ or 2.62 live births. If we figure similarly with the males, we get practically the same result. Two births per couple are not enough to maintain the population. Among classes where the marriage rate is below average, as among college graduates, even more than 2.62 births per married couple is necessary, but this is partially offset by the greater survival rate of upper-class births. Again, since about 17 per cent of marriages are infertile, the necessary average number of births for those who *do* have any children, assuming a normal marriage rate, is $2.62 \div 0.83 = 3.16$. For purposes of comparison, however, let us remember the minimum necessary figure as 2.62 births per marriage (including all marriages).

Baber and Ross, studying 2500 persons in completed families of all social classes, found that the average number of births per married woman of elementary school education was 3.49, of high school education, 2.67, of college education 2.51, of graduate training 2.31.⁴⁰ In this group there was not much difference between the college and high school women, and in the case of the *men* it was found that college graduates were somewhat more fertile than high school graduates (2.88 versus 2.73). The large difference occurs between the elementary and high school graduates, and suggests that it is the upper classes in general rather than college graduates specifically who are characterized by low reproduction. This may be true of the Middle West, but college graduates of such institutions as Harvard and Yale show much lower birth rates than those of Baber and Ross' college graduates, and the graduates of Eastern women's colleges show rates generally under two births per marriage.

Rollins has shown that the birth rate produced by college graduates in New England and the Middle Atlantic States has for a century or more been less than the birth rate produced by the brothers and cousins of these same graduates (most of whom were not college graduates), and that this disparity has increased with time.⁴¹ It appears thus that education tends to reduce the birth rate below that usual even in the family stock from which one springs. Cattell, studying 643 American men of science, found that the families from which they had sprung averaged 4.7 children per family, whereas the scientific men themselves had only 2.3 births per completed family.⁴² Rice, asking University of Pennsylvania undergraduates how many children they *wished* to have, found that they wanted only 1.9 children each, on the average. The women wanted an average of 2.0 children, the men 1.7. Dartmouth men expressed a wish for an average of 2.3. A sample of college and other business class young women, studied by Blanchard and Manasses, had a median wish for 2.7 children. Twenty-seven per cent of the Pennsylvania men, 24 per cent of the women, and 7 per cent of the Blanchard and Manasses women did not want children.⁴³ Willoughby found the mean number of children among *eugenists* sponsoring a eugenic program was only 2.05, as contrasted with 2.8 for all persons represented in *Who's Who in America*.⁴⁴ Robert H. Dann found, among 513 families of Oregon State College students, that the students' own generation had a median of 2.55 children per family, whereas their parents were members of families with a median of 5.04 children. In both generations children dying before the first year were not counted. The families of which the students were members were presumably completed families, since each had at least one child of college age.⁴⁵

Families which can afford to send children to college are presumably, by selection, somewhat smaller than other families of the same biological stock and ability which cannot afford college education for their children. There is still a large reservoir of high-grade stock which has not blossomed through higher education and then withered (*quantitatively*) through race suicide. But as this reservoir is gradually drained off at the social top and replenished at the bottom, one fears that its average biological quality becomes lower in grade.

In 1920 Spengler found that the *whole native-born* population of Providence, R. I., a city in which the working class is largely foreign, was reproducing at a rate 35 per cent below its replacement needs.⁴⁶

Urban-Rural and Regional Differences.—Sydenstricker and Notestein, studying samples of all social classes in the native white

population of 1910, found a standardized cumulative birth rate of 129 for the professional class, 140 for business, 179 for skilled workers, 223 for unskilled workers, 247 for farm owners, 275 for farm renters, 299 for farm laborers. They found that this inverse correlation between social status and fecundity was especially high when only those families were considered where the wife at marriage was from 14 to 19, and that there was little difference among urban classes where the wife was 25 to 29 at marriage.⁴⁷

In general, the farming class is more fertile than either of the urban classes. In rural territory (except in New England) birth rates are higher than in urban. The "true" rate of natural increase in 1928 was negative for the *total* of these population groups: (1) Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York, (2) the Pacific States, (3) nine large cities.⁴⁸ That is, while these populations are still increasing in actual numbers because of increasing longevity, they are bound by present conditions to decrease after the present older generations die off, because the total births are not sufficient to replace the generation which is producing these births. On the other hand, Pennsylvania and two groups of Mid-western states were still showing a positive "true" rate of increase of three or four per 1000 in 1928, and the region including Virginia, the Carolinas, and Kentucky showed the very high true increase rate of 12.8 per 1000. Our non-self-replacing urban and Northeastern populations are being replaced by Mid-western and Southern population increases.

Foreign-born stock, originating largely in European peasantry, makes up much of the rapidly reproducing population of our cities. The total effective fertility of foreign-born women was about 50 per cent greater than that of native white women for the whole birth registration area of the United States in 1920.⁴⁹ This was due partly to their higher marriage rate and partly to their higher birth rate when married. The standardized death rates of the foreign born are, however, only 10 per cent greater than those of native whites, so that the foreign born have a decidedly greater net increase.⁵⁰

Kuchynski has shown that the total populations of most countries in Western Europe are now failing to replace themselves, the number of females of 0 to 15 years of age being less than that of females of 15 to 30. On the other hand, most of Southern and Eastern Europe is still showing a "true" increase of population, which is especially marked in post-War Russia.⁵¹

Thus the differential birth rate between business and working class is only a small part of the picture. Regional differences and general

urban-rural differences are also important. Not merely educated persons, but whole populations in several urbanized states and in all of Western Europe, are failing to replace themselves.

Does Biological Superiority Go with Socio-Educational?—The second assumption of the theory of population deterioration is that the classes which have the lower birth rates are the ones with the greater biological fitness. Biological fitness consists in the absence of inheritable traits which make the individual a poorly functioning animal or a poorly functioning man. *Physical* defects which are inheritable and which cannot be adequately corrected affect a relatively small proportion of the population. Again, persons having such traits in general tend toward earlier death, or non-marriage, or low reproduction. They tend, in other words, to be self-eliminating. By far the most important trait which is not self-eliminating, and which needs deliberate social effort to reduce it, is feeble-mindedness. Of somewhat less importance are certain traits predisposing to insanity, but the degree to which these are really inherited is unknown. When eugenists speak of biological unfitness, race deterioration, and so on, they are talking, for the most part, about *low native intelligence*. Most other mental traits, such as those of personality and character, are not inherited, and hence their increase or decrease in society has no relation to birth rates.

The main question, then, is whether the classes with higher rates of increase are relatively low in inborn intelligence. From this follows the question: how can inborn intelligence be measured?

Psychological tests place children of business class parents significantly higher on the average than those of working class and farming class parentage. They place children of native parents significantly higher than those of foreign-born parents except for certain Northwest Europeans and for Jews. On the army mental tests, educated men and men of the professional occupations scored enormously higher than laborers and farmers. Officers scored much higher than enlisted men; and it is significant that soldiers assigned to "awkward squads" because of their stupidity in obeying oral commands showed test scores substantially below those of enlisted men in general. Their commanders had assigned them to these squads upon purely practical judgment, without knowing their test scores.

Collins' study of 5000 children, which, says Gardner Murphy, appears to be fairly representative of large-scale investigations of school children, showed a median family intelligence quotient (i.e., all the siblings of a family are averaged and treated as a single case) ranging from 116 for the pro-

fessional classes to 95 for unskilled labor. While there was much overlapping among the groups, the professional group yielded practically no defectives, the unskilled group no brilliant children.⁵² Studies made upon children placed in foster homes and nursery schools, and upon negro children who have lived for varying lengths of time in a city environment, indicate that environment does raise I.Q.'s, in some cases 10 or 20 points. Yet although specially planned environments *can* considerably raise the measured I.Q., the great bulk of the statistical evidence indicates that differences among children in heredity are *more* influential upon their test-score than are the differences among ordinary environments.⁵³ Even a general raising of all I.Q.'s by 10 points through environmental improvement would not erase the *relative* differences among human beings.

It is claimed by the pure-environmental theorists that intelligence tests are measures of experience, that is, of the range of environmental stimuli to which a person has been subjected, rather than measures of inborn ability. One of the most telling arguments against this claim is the fact that the absolute test scores increase rapidly with age until about the fourteenth or sixteenth year, and then fail to increase through all the years of adult life while new experience continues to be gained. Indeed, there seems to be a slight downward tendency in test score after the twenties. An individual whose intelligence score through early childhood rises more slowly than average (i.e., who has an I.Q. below 100), achieves a maximum score (at 14 or 16 years) below the average maximum, and all his experience from 14 to 30 does not enable him to catch up with the average. In other words, intelligence test scores behave very much like the biological trait of *stature*.

If one admits that individuals differ at all in *native* intelligence, it seems reasonable to assume that in a mobile society like ours, where individuals are known to rise from lower to higher ranks, those who rise have on the average greater native capacity than those who remain in the poorer classes. It is unreasonable to hold that there is a *perfect* correlation between social status and intelligence, or in other words, that any individual's native ability can be judged accurately from the rank he holds. At the same time it seems unreasonable to hold that there is *no* correlation, in other words, that all social classes have the same *average* ability. The most justifiable doubt of the validity of intelligence tests holds when they are applied to the less literate elements of the farming population, including immigrant peasants. These classes may be somewhat under-rated by the tests, but that their native intelligence equals that of the urban business class is highly doubtful. If there is a significant difference merely in the average native intelligence of the classes, then the differential

birth rate tends to lower the average intelligence of the whole population.

Within a given social class it seems that high birth rates go with greater ability rather than with lesser ability. Thus Phillips has shown among Harvard graduates, and Huntington among Yale graduates, that the more successful men have larger families.⁵⁴ However, these facts do not erase the difference between the average fertility of *all* college graduates and the average fertility of *all* laborers. They do not erase the fact that the families producing retarded children and mental defectives in Massachusetts have an average of twice as many children as the families which produce college graduates and "gifted" children.⁵⁵

Anti-Eugenic Differential Birth Rate May Be Temporary.—There is reason to believe that this biological deterioration, if it exists, is only a temporary phenomenon in the history of our society. The optimism lies not in doubting the validity of psychological tests, but in doubting the continuance of the present differential birth rates. In the cities of Northwestern Europe it would appear from several reports that the differential birth rate is growing less, and the classes approaching an equal and low rate. Carr-Saunders says that in Stockholm, and in Germany and Holland, the fertility of the lower classes is now but little above that of the higher classes.⁵⁶ There are signs of increasing birth rates among Vassar and Bryn Mawr alumnae.⁵⁷

If and when birth control becomes universal and the total population stationary or declining, new forces will be set into operation. The desire for children will have less resistance because there will be less severe competition for existing wealth and opportunities. It seems rash to predict that under that entirely new social situation the less able persons will continue to have higher birth rates because they have done so under the situation of the last 50 years with its intense economic competition and its unequal distribution of contraceptive knowledge.

Treatment of Mental Defectives.—Dr. Fernald has had considerable success by training feeble-minded children in institutions to habits and ideals of good workmanship and sexual abstinence and then liberating them into the community under supervision. Out of 176 girls discharged from his institution at Waverly, Mass., during a period of 25 years, only 27 married. A total of 34 legitimate and 13 illegitimate children came from these 176 women. Of 470 discharged males, only 13 married, and there were only 12 children born. Even allowing for possible later births and for unknown illegitimate off-

spring produced by the males, it would seem that the group as a whole practiced race suicide, as eugenics would wish.⁵⁸ Yet the number of feeble-minded who have ever been in institutions is a small percentage of all. It may be, as claimed by Myerson and others, that the idiots and imbeciles (the lower-grade defectives) do not reproduce even in normal amount, and that the real danger is from the morons or higher-grade defectives, most of whom are not institution cases.

Sterilization.—One solution is sterilization. This, like contraception, "goes against the grain" of our culture and is still vigorously opposed by the Catholic Church.

The biological argument, impossible in the days before Darwin and Mendel, has broken down somewhat our cultural resistance to the interference with nature's processes. By 1930, 25 states had laws permitting sterilization of feeble-minded and certain other classes of persons.⁵⁹ California is the only one which had made any large use of such a law. The success there has been achieved through the practice of getting parental consent to the sterilization of defective children, thus avoiding legal contests. Over 6000 cases have been sterilized. One fears that sterilization "gets by" only because it is limited in its application to a very small percentage of the population. East has said that at least 10 per cent of the population are dullards who should not reproduce their kind.⁶⁰ If it were attempted to sterilize all of these, it is not difficult to imagine the resistance which would arise in the name of personal rights, a cultural sentiment much more firmly grounded with us than is racial betterment.

In Oregon in 1931 a 15-year-old daughter of a Syrian-born laborer came to court as a delinquent. On examination she was found to have an I.Q. of only 63, was classified as a moron, and recommended for sterilization. Her father, however, persuaded a lawyer to help him oppose the measure, the Portland *Oregonian* gave the case wide publicity, and the local Orthodox priest complimented the newspaper on its willingness "to champion the rights of the individual against persecution appearing in the guise of 'psychiatry.'"⁶¹

For many years German culture has been characterized by an unusually high valuation of racial fitness, a belief in the superiority of the Nordic race, and a predisposition among scientific men to emphasize hereditary factors in the explanation of pathological behavior. The new government of the Third Reich has given these values and beliefs renewed emphasis, and in so doing has adopted what promises to be the most far-reaching sterilization policy yet

undertaken by any government. It is reported that about 400,000 Germans, already in the care of institutions and physicians, are subject to immediate sterilization: 200,000 "congenital idiots" (presumably includes many imbeciles), 80,000 schizophrenics, 60,000 epileptics, 20,000 manic-depressives, 20,000 with serious physical deformities, 16,000 hereditary deaf, 10,000 hereditary alcoholics, 4000 hereditary blind, 600 with St. Vitus' dance.⁶² Non-Germans will probably question the hereditary character of many of these types, particularly among the schizophrenics, manic-depressives, alcoholics, and physically deformed. Few will question the hereditary character of idiocy or other low-grade feeble-mindedness. More recently, Dr. Guett, eugenics expert of the Ministry of the Interior, stated that the 280,000 incurable inmates of Germany's public institutions would not be sterilized, but only those "at large."⁶³ Special eugenics courts are being created to examine and pass upon candidates for sterilization, the candidates being supplied with or without their own will by criminal courts, physicians, parents or guardians.

In 1931 an Encyclical from the Pope stated: "Public magistrates have no direct power over the bodies of their subjects. Therefore, where no crime has taken place and there is no cause present for grave punishment, they can never directly harm or tamper with the integrity of the body, either for the reasons of eugenics or for any other reason."⁶⁴ In December, 1933, the Church gained these concessions from the German Government: that Catholic hospitals and physicians are exempt from all duty to apply sterilization, and that any Catholic sentenced to sterilization may instead enter an institution which assumes responsibility for him.⁶⁵

4. THE PROBLEM OF INSUFFICIENT REPRODUCTION

The General Decline in the Birth Rate.—Recorded vital statistics cover a relatively brief period of the total history of mankind. During this period the birth rate in Western Europe and the United States has shown a continuous decline. Three kinds of birth rates are commonly used: (1) the crude birth rate, or births per year per 1000 of total population; (2) the standardized birth rate, or births per 1000 women of 15 to 44 years of age, adjusted to a standard age distribution of these women; and (3) the nuptial birth rate, or births per 1000 *married* women of 15 to 44 years of age. For making accurate comparisons between countries or periods the second and third kinds of rates are used, but the behavior of the crude birth rate gives a rough picture of the situation. Thompson and Whelpton estimate

the crude white birth rate of the United States to have been 55 per 1000 in 1800, and to have declined to 20 in 1930.⁶⁶ The census report for 1932 for the total birth registration area, both races combined, gives a crude birth rate of 17.4. The death rate for the death registration area in 1932 was 10.9, leaving a natural increase of population of about 6.5 per 1000 per year.

France was the first country in which the nineteenth century decline of the birth rate became obvious, and from at least the middle to the end of that century had a lower birth rate than any other country on record. England, Germany, and several smaller West-European countries followed in the footsteps of France and now show birth rates as low as or lower than that of France, ranging from about 16 to 19 in 1928.

Crude birth rates of over 50 or 60 are hardly possible. The most prolific populations for which there were any records in the last decade were Russia, Egypt, Chile, and Guatemala, with rates around 45. Japan and India had rates near 35, Italy and Spain 27 to 30. China, which has no reliable records, is said to have a birth rate of 50 or more.⁶⁷ The declining curve of the birth rate cannot be projected indefinitely into the past or future, but appears to be a phenomenon of the past century, marking a change from a higher to a lower level of birth rates. Thompson and Whelpton estimate a birth rate of 13.5 for 1980.⁶⁸

Until recently, population theory held that high birth rates were practically universal before the nineteenth century, and that population was held in check by high death rates in which war, plagues, and starvation played important roles. More recently Carr-Saunders has shown that infanticide, abortion, and even crude contraception are widely practiced among primitive peoples and were also among historic civilizations.⁶⁹ These practices, only one of which is a factor in the death rate (and that only in infant deaths), could theoretically have kept the growth of population in check without the assumption of any more war, disease, or starvation than we now have. It is very probable from other evidence, however, that the rate of death from disease and starvation is now less than ever before. It is certain that the turnover of each successive generation of population is now accomplished with less wastage than ever in the past; that is, the birth rate is lower, the death rate lower, the average length of life longer: a greater proportion of the infants born now live through the full span of life.

The Causes of the Declining Birth Rate.—The decline of the birth rate was once attributed to a decrease in the physiological power to reproduce, conceived of as some kind of lowered vitality, and vaguely associated with the idea of "race decadence." Investigations, however, have proved that the principal factor is a tendency to limit the family to two or three children, and is not an increase in the proportion of utterly childless marriages, although these have increased somewhat. It is estimated that some 17 per cent of American marriages are childless. Harmsen states that 35 to 40 per cent of German marriages are now childless, but this represents a very recent and probably temporary condition.⁷⁰ Hankins, who has studied the great bulk of the evidence, concludes that contraception and abortion are probably the chief factors in the decline, that there is no change in actual reproductive power.⁷¹ Indeed, the whole indication of modern biological research is that the germ cells and their production are quite independent of any but the most extreme influences from the general bodily life and its environment; and certainly they are out of the reach of any "mental" effects which civilization may have produced. Hankins, nevertheless, points out that a civilized environment may have an indirect influence, apart from contraception, through its greater nervous strain, causing less coitus, and through diseases of pregnancy. He holds that coitus is less frequent in the business class than in the farming and working class. Again, maternal mortality has not decreased in the United States during the last few decades, despite the great advance of medical science and decrease in most other death rates. Some of the increase in contraception and abortion is probably due to increased physical difficulty in childbirth rather than to unwillingness to raise an additional child. As regards frequency of coitus, if Harvey's estimate of eight times per month among the educated classes is correct (see p. 66), it seems doubtful that any higher rate of frequency could produce any more births than would this rate if used without contraception.

An analysis of 100 sterile marriages showed that in 11 per cent the husband was completely sterile and in 30 per cent more the spermatozoa were defective in number, motility, or other qualities necessary to impregnation.⁷² Presumably the other 59 per cent were due entirely to female causes. In another study of 300 couples with sterility problems, surgical or other treatment cured 21 per cent of the cases involving female causes.⁷³

The Problem of Race Suicide.—The problem of controlling reproduction is thus becoming the opposite of what it was. While there

is still a harmful cultural lag in the delayed spread of scientific contraception to those classes which need it most, this lag is being slowly adjusted in Western Europe and, still more tardily, in the United States. On the other hand, the newer problem of race suicide presents itself. It is now an actual problem only in certain classes and regions in the United States, but little by little other population elements are joining the group which fails to replace itself biologically. Estimating the future birth rate and length of life at "medium" points between extreme estimates, and assuming a medium immigration, Thompson and Whelpton expect the population of the United States to reach practically its maximum about 1980, at about 155,000,000 persons.⁷⁴ Dublin thinks that a maximum of 148,000,000 in 1970, with a sharp decline thereafter, is more probable.⁷⁵

Reasoning in subcultural terms, it would seem that when the population actually begins to decrease there will be either a letting down of the bars to immigration, or else a revival of the desire for larger families among the native born. With decreasing population each child born would come into possession of a larger share of the country's wealth than the per capita share of the parent generation, and the economic pressure which now holds down reproduction would disappear. Yet the educated classes are now failing to replace themselves even though the *per capita wealth* is increasing. The factor which restrains reproduction is not a lack of economic opportunity for the child, but rather the competition of other interests and wishes in the parents themselves, that is, wishes whose gratification is limited by assuming the economic duties of child-raising. Still, the usual reaction to this pressure is not to avoid child-raising altogether, but most typically to raise two children instead of the racially necessary three. The effective *desire for children* has diminished little if any, it merely substitutes the goal of two carefully nurtured children for the goal of three or four children.

It has been estimated that the total cost of raising one child to the age of eighteen is approximately three years' family income. This estimate, however, fails to deal with the general *overhead* burden involved in having any children at all. To have only one child means the cessation or considerable limitation of the wife's earning power, and it means a very different policy as regards choice of residence and manner of life, and involves the purchase of equipment which can be used for several children. If all these costs were properly allocated it seems likely that the total direct and indirect cost of two children would be much more than two-thirds of the cost of three. In other words, the differential economic burden between adequate race perpetuation and race suicide as *now practiced* is relatively small. Our superior families are not sacrificing their desire for children to their other personal wishes. They desire children and they have them. The trouble is that with modern contraception, high standards of child care, intense parent-child

emotional bonds, and the relative infrequency of children's deaths after the first year, a strong and "normal" parental desire can satisfy itself through having children fewer than racial duty requires. A desire for *too few* children is an entirely different thing from a *weak desire* for children. If there is a "parental instinct" (most probably it is a universal subcultural desire), sophisticated man has learned to satisfy it without paying nature her full dividends in the form of adequate reproduction. Educated man has learned to cheat nature in satisfying his *parental* as well as his sex desires!

But what does he gain by this cheating? In terms of his own economic advantage, he gains very little. In deciding to have one or two children he has already committed himself to the large overhead sacrifices of family-raising. An extra child would mean relatively little more burden in the long run. He is merely doing a little "chiseling." Indeed it is not certain that the decision to have two children rather than three means more income available for the parents' personal interests. It may mean merely a more expensive standard of luxury and education for those two children.

However, parents are motivated by immediate economic pressures rather than by calculations of cost in the long run. A third child *seems* a large extra burden to a family which is already raising two children according to business class standards. It would seem that eugenic education coupled with some economic adjustment which would distribute costs more equally as between two-, three-, and four-child families, thus reducing this sense of extra burdens, might easily transform the present race-suicidal practice into an adequate rate of reproduction. The most desirable parents are discouraged from adequate reproduction by the fact that their financial rewards are not high enough to support the highly specialized and carefully nurtured intellectual lives which they must lead in order to be successful, and at the same time to permit them to have adequate families.

Thompson questions whether the people who fail to perform their full racial duty are, after all, desirable as progenitors:

It may be true that this failure is due to certain social conditions which these people encounter rather than to any lack of native capacity to make the adaptation, so that it shows unwillingness and perverted education rather than inability. But even if that is the case, it shows that they possess a type of mind rather easily seduced from following the instinctive tendencies calculated to secure survival, and have not yet developed the will to make a conscious adaptation which will secure it. In any event, nature says they are not fit in one fundamental respect and decrees their extinction.*

* Warren S. Thompson, *Eugenics as Viewed by a Sociologist*, Pub. Amer. Sociol. Soc., 18: 60-72, December, 1923.

With this the present writer must vigorously disagree. A "type of mind" such as that described is not inheritable; it is an attitude. The human race can neither increase nor decrease this or any other attitude through biological selection. On the other hand, the high intelligence which in general characterizes the class of people described is inheritable, and can be made more abundant in society by stimulating the reproduction of these people. Moreover, recalling again our discussion in the last few pages, we have reason to disbelieve that the people referred to are really lacking in any "instinctive tendencies calculated [i.e., by nature] to secure survival." If nature "calculated," then man has "fooled" nature and thereby fallen into a biological error. He may correct the error by "fooling" nature still further (i.e., changing his cultural attitudes which are also a part of nature).

Thus, race suicide, the newer phase of the problem of controlling reproduction, is really a phase of the economic problems of the family, which we shall discuss in the following chapter.

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CHAPTER X

THE ECONOMICS OF CHILDREN AND THE HOME

1. THE CARE OF CHILDREN

The Difficulties of Raising a Family Have Increased.—Modern social changes have made the raising of children more difficult. If this were true in all classes of population equally, the eugenic phase of the problem would be less serious. But other important phases of the problem would still be with us. Whether or not the difficulties are so great as to cause race suicide in the population as a whole, or in the more educated classes alone, there are also non-biological considerations which demand a solution of the problem.

Even if there were no difference in hereditary ability between the upper and lower economic classes, it would be socially desirable to raise more children in the upper classes. The homes of the more prosperous are more spacious and suitable for the rearing of children. These homes and their advantages are analogous to partly idle machinery, while the homes of the poorer classes are overworked.

What are the sources of this increased difficulty? They may be summarized as: (1) the physical and ecological conditions of city life which is gaining upon country life, (2) the increased strain toward higher standards of living, (3) the increased anxiety concerning the health and safety of children and the health of mothers, (4) the decreased opportunity for children to contribute toward their own economic support, (5) the increased demands of the children themselves for economic goods and services, (6) the increasing difficulty of parental control over children. These may be reduced to: (a) ecological (1), (b) economic (2-5), and (c) family interactional (6), difficulties. The last will be discussed only incidentally in this chapter, and will be given fuller treatment as individual problems in Chapter XVI.

Ecological Difficulties and the Play Movement.—In rural life, ample space for play is provided by the natural environment. Of course, not only space, but also organization, is necessary for an adequate play life. But wherever a self-sufficing rural culture has prevailed, as in the villages of Europe and in the earlier American

countryside, there has been a spontaneous development of play life which required no outside organizers. Our older rural culture was rich in games and activities which came down from the indefinite past. With the growth of cities in America there seems to have been in many regions, at least, an impoverishment of rural recreational culture. The more ambitious young people went to the cities. The village came to look toward the city rather than to its own native resources for guiding ideas and ideals of the use of leisure. In the city itself, commercial recreation developed. The opportunities for non-commercial use of leisure did not keep pace with the growing density and anonymity of city life. To meet this problem the Play Movement was inaugurated, beginning in the 1870's with the provision of sand gardens for small children. Rainwater has traced the growth of this Play Movement through successive stages, which he names and dates as follows: (1) the sand garden stage, 1885-1895; (2) the model playground stage, 1895-1900; (3) the small park stage, 1900-1905; (4) the recreation center stage, 1905-1912; (5) the civic art and welfare stage, 1912-1914; (6) the neighborhood organization stage, 1916-1918; (7) the community service stage, 1918—.¹

In 1910, only 7.5 per cent of American cities of 2500 population and over had playgrounds; in 1930 22.0 per cent had them.²

The lag of recreational facilities behind city growth has by this time been greatly diminished if not entirely eliminated. The future growth of the city will be more in the direction of suburbanization, which will still further help to solve this problem. However, there are still urban areas greatly lacking in recreational opportunity.

The solution of the foregoing problem has led to a new set of problems. Children in many communities and social circles are so occupied with these deliberately promoted play activities that cohesion within the family is weakened, and difficult financial burdens are thrown upon parents in keeping their children properly outfitted. Thus, we face the interactional and economic aspects of the problem.

The Economic Difficulties.—An unsigned article in Harper's Magazine states in a nutshell the economic problem of child-rearing in all but the more prosperous layers of the American business class. This statement has been digested as follows:

In the intellectual and financial middle classes motherhood is a sentence to years of drudgery, confinement, and responsibility. Loss of sleep incident to child care, money worries, lack of servants, confusion and crowding all make motherhood difficult and disappointing when the family income is limited. This condition reacts on the children. The decrease in skill in pur-

suits followed previous to maternity, the abandonment of activities shared by husband and wife, and the incessant companionship of children substituted for former adult interests make the frustrations of young mothers a problem of equal importance with the much discussed neuroses of thwarted spinsters. If parenthood among these classes is desirable, community effort ought to make it less difficult. Reasonably priced nursery schools, simpler standards of living, and cooperation by mothers in child care are possible means to this end.*

Childlessness as a Solution.—One way out of this dilemma is childlessness. Some 17 or 18 per cent of married couples now remain childless. Seldom can it be said in a true physical sense that a couple *cannot afford* to have children. Nearly always we can point to couples living on lesser incomes and yet raising children successfully. The problem cannot be dismissed, however, with a gesture of this sort. Nothing is gained by railing against the "selfishness" of these ambitious, high-standard people who dread to take the responsibility of offspring. Their selfishness is not psychologically different from any other choice of one goal at the expense of alternative goals. Conditioned in childhood to a certain material standard of living, and to certain personal, individualized goals, they cannot be expected to make the same choices as other persons who have not been trained to such standards and goals. Neither can one take with too much moral seriousness the way in which they verbally rationalize their choice. They may openly regret and apologize for their childlessness or their single child, and complain about the economic burdens of life, the difficulties of finding an apartment which permits children, the expensiveness of nursemaids, and so on. It will be fortunate for them, indeed, if they can agree in their rationalizations. Often they will not. The one may project onto the other the selfish decision against children, resulting in marital conflict and divorce. One may resort to an ambivalent defense reaction, repressing his or her real wish for children by a more or less self-deceptive attitude against children. The wife may profess a dislike for children and a contempt for her "enslaved" friends with their deteriorating minds or softened bodies, who can talk about nothing but their darling babies. What such a person says about the matter may usually be regarded as a rationalization for his or her own emotional adjustment. The important social fact is that these people have been placed by culture in a state of conflict between two very insistent wishes. They are not

*Social Science Abstracts, 1931: 8160, digest by F. W. Binkley of anonymous article, "This Business of Parenthood," Harper's Magazine, 162: 173-181, January, 1931.

a few pathological cases needing individual treatment; they represent a new social category, created by modern social change.

"Self-Sacrifice" to Children as a Solution.—Among large numbers the sacrifice of other parental wishes for the sake of giving children "social advantages" has become extreme. This is especially true in the upper working and the lower business class where there is social climbing. Each generation hopes to put the succeeding generation upon a somewhat higher social level. Such family climbing in American society occurs more abundantly than the reverse movement of social degradation. This net upward social mobility does not mean that the upper social strata are becoming relatively more populous and the lower less populous. It is a process which can take place even though each stratum remains the same in proportionate size. It is made possible by: (1) the influx of immigrants mostly upon the lower social levels, (2) the decreasing rate of reproduction as we go up the social ladder. In the upper social strata the birth rate is less than in the lower, so that vacancies at the top are left to be filled by climbers from below. The lowest stratum, on the other hand, quickly fills its vacancies from its own births and from new immigrants, and produces also an excess population to climb into higher strata. European society has less of this net upward mobility because it has, in general, no immigration. American society is becoming more like European as immigration declines. But both European and American society will retain a measure of this phenomenon as long as there is a differential rate of net reproduction favoring the lower classes.

The Fallacy of the Sacrifice Ideology.—The attitude in the more rapidly climbing, or more hopeful, families implies a serial self-sacrifice of each generation to the next. We live for our children, they cannot repay us, but they in turn will live for their children, and so on *ad infinitum*, and, perhaps it would be uncharitable to add, *ad absurdum*. For the thinker will ask, what is the ultimate purpose of all this self-sacrifice? In a sense the final term of the series would seem to be typified by the single child in the highest social stratum, who will inherit the combined wealth of his two parents and indirectly a large share of the wealth of his four grandparents. Indeed, this individual becomes the center of great advantages, because of the thrift of his ancestors combined with the dwindling size of generations. But, on the average, does he represent a goal worthy of all this sacrifice? It may be guessed from certain statistics that he is more likely than the average to become eminent and to make an important social contribution. It can be inferred

from other evidence that he is *not* more or less happy than the average of mankind. (Happiness, in G. B. Watson's questionnaire, was found to be uncorrelated with wealth.)⁸ But there is no evidence to show that there would be less eminent men on the whole, or less happiness on the whole, if advantages were more evenly distributed and not piled up in this converging fashion.

Self-sacrifice is a term of uncertain meaning. The parents who live for their children are living for the goal which seems to *them* most satisfying among available goals. We shall avoid philosophical ambiguities if we say simply that these parents have conditioned their wishes to be satisfied by vicarious experiences, by experiences realized in the lives of their children rather than of themselves. It seems doubtful that the sum total of human happiness is increased by such a conditioning. One suspects that total happiness would be greater if each generation struck a more natural balance between its own original goals and the later substitute goals found in the lives of its children, that is, if it projected its ambitions somewhat less into the future.

From still another point of view, modern mental hygiene doubts that this ideology of sacrifice is the best for the happiness of either the parent or the child. There is the risk of disappointment in case the child's life turns out not to satisfy the ideal of the parent. There is the expectation of filial gratitude which may also be doomed to disappointment. The parent's efforts to insure the child's success and gratitude cause him to interfere with the child's life in a way not conducive to filial love. The child often rebels against the whole program, and wishes his parents had been happy, uninhibited beings instead of noble martyrs to his welfare.

Kimball Young has described several cases of the *projection* of parents' unsatisfied ambitions onto their children. One father, for example, had missed through youthful misbehavior an opportunity for a musical career. He developed a phantasy that his son had the makings of a musical genius, gave him nine years of costly musical education in spite of the boy's obvious unfitness and lack of interest. Finally the son refused to continue, to the tragic frustration of his father and the injury of their relationship. The father lost all enjoyment of music.⁴

The Need of a New and Beneficial Child Labor.—The abolition of child labor, though in general very desirable, has intensified the economic problem of raising children. The working class counts upon its children paying at least their own extra cost from the age of six-

teen. In earlier days, this was expected at the age of fourteen and even twelve.

We need new devices for making children economically useful. The earlier gross evils of child labor in the factories and on the streets have caused the pendulum to swing to the opposite ideology, which limits children to study and play, reserving all of the work of life for later years. Many are beginning to feel that this ideology has now gone too far and has produced undesirable results. They feel that in the business class, somewhat more numerous children with a little more contribution by these children toward their own economic support would be desirable not only from the eugenic standpoint but also from the standpoint of the mental health of children and their families. But the child-centered ideology vigorously resists this idea. Certainly a return to the factory and a decrease in the amount of schooling are unthinkable. The solution must lie in two directions: (1) part-time jobs for children which cannot injure their health or schooling, (2) a reorganization of household life and discipline which will give children a greater role in the work of the home.

On the farm the problem solves itself through the adaptability of various farm tasks to children. There the problem is rather the reverse: how to prevent the undue exploitation of children in farm work. In certain regions where there is an abundance of simple, mechanical work such as cotton-picking or beet-weeding, children are overworked. Child-labor laws usually do not apply to agricultural work; the compulsory education law is the only check. It is to the urban population that our problem of insufficient juvenile work applies.

Among Chicago families in 1920, 80.3 per cent of all sons and daughters sixteen years of age and over, and living at home, were earning. Among the unskilled and semi-skilled classes 87.7 per cent were earning, among the independent business men's families 71.0 per cent, among professional classes 52.7 per cent.⁵

The Enlargement of the Educational Function and Its Adaptation to Changing Needs.—Our public school system arose in an age when the main need was to teach children the three R's, to bring about universal literacy. There was no particular need to integrate education with life. The subject matter about which school children wrote, read, or figured, was sufficiently related to the everyday problems of life. Their arithmetic problems related to the buying and selling of horses; their reading and spelling, though not guided by modern scientific statistics of word-frequency, did not after all waste much time with words which would not be used in later life.

As society became more urban and more complex, the schools held their children during more hours per year, and added more *content* material as opposed to *tool* courses. Geography, history, and physiology were increasingly taught. The school was beginning to provide basic *information* needed in life, as well as the tools for gaining and manipulating information.

As the public schools advanced, however, they tended to borrow their ideology from the colleges and from the private schools which catered to the select few. They lost sight of the fact that the majority of their pupils would never receive a higher education, but would spend only a few years in school. The objective of training for still further *education* came to be modified. The schools began to think more about what material would be most useful to the mass of children who would never go beyond the elementary grades. Thus arose the modern policy of training for actual life rather than for further academic progress.

A little before 1914, Superintendent Wirt of Gary, Ind., introduced a new system in the elementary schools which has been a landmark and a model in the evolution of American education. This famed "Gary System" put the children into school workshops for part of their time, into assembly rooms at other times. The traditional classroom with its desks and books ceased to be the sole nursery of the mind.

But we have still a long way to go toward making education an ideal preparation for life. The specific needs have considerably changed. The woodwork, printing, sewing, and other manual arts taught in practical schools are less important than they were, less universally useful. The economic system requires less skilled craftsmen. Economic changes are now so rapid that a specific craft learned by a child may become relatively useless in his community after he has graduated. The schools are hard put to discover the basic arts and techniques which can be taught with some assurance of their future utility.

Partly because of these uncertainties, the ideology of the school system has swung away again from vocational objectives toward cultural and social objectives. David Snedden has pointed out that there are four main objectives in education beyond the provision of the basic tools of literacy. They are: the physical objective, including health and bodily efficiency; the vocational objective; the social objective, or training for citizenship; and the cultural objective or preparation for leisure and personal development.⁶

A return to emphasis upon social and cultural objectives might seem to imply a return from the workshop to the traditional classroom, to the old separation of the theoretical from the practical. But it is now realized that social and cultural education, as well as vocational, require for their greatest efficiency a closer contact with the world outside the school. Book study of history and civics is increasingly punctuated with visits to government buildings and places of historic interest. Book geography is increasingly accompanied by map-making projects in which the child makes a field study of his

own local environment. The teaching of music is supplemented by playing of varied musical compositions on the phonograph and the teaching of the pupils to recognize them.

The vocational aim of education is being increasingly served by vocational guidance counselors and broad studies of the vocational field.

To link education with life, the *project method* has come into use. Instead of studying arithmetic, botany, and language as separate studies, the pupils may undertake the project of planning a school garden, making the necessary arithmetic calculation, applying botanical principles, and writing a grammatically correct report.

Future Education May Be an Integral Part of Life Instead of a Mere Preparation.—Some thinkers see beyond these tentative efforts to a possible future state where education is correlated with work and play throughout a lifetime. In such a state, education would carry on through adult years by means of periodic educational vacations from work. At the same time serious work might begin earlier in childhood, in small doses at first, but so arranged as to give the child a practical idea of what the problems of work are. On returning to school after such a brief experience in actual useful work, he would have the intellectual motivation, now sadly lacking, to use his books in the solution of real problems. Under such a régime the child would be less than he is today an economic parasite. Instead of passing abruptly from a life of play and study to a life of work, he would pass gradually into a life of longer work hours and greater responsibility, but this adult life would be interrupted daily, weekly, or yearly, by periods of continued education, and by longer periods of leisure than at present. Education would cease to be merely a preparation for life and a means to an end. It would be a part of life, balanced with work and play throughout.

The New Russian School System.—No country has gone farther to integrate education with life than has Soviet Russia. The Russian schools may be criticized for their doctrinaire, uncritical teaching of Marxian economic theory. This is perhaps inevitable in these transitional years when the Communist system is seeking to intrench itself beyond danger of counter-revolution. But in educational practice the Russian school system as a whole embodies the principles of the "progressive schools" in America. Basically it follows something like the project method. Every project has three aspects—technological, economic, and social. Education reflects the local community life; the village itself becomes a blackboard for the teaching

of geography. Where new hydroelectric plants are being built, the children study about them, and in the Donetz basin they study coal.⁷

Family Subsidies as a Solution.—One solution which naturally suggests itself is the economic subsidizing of child rearing. European countries have attempted this in various ways. In France many industries have organized associations and pooled funds out of which a "family extra wage" is paid to employees who have children. In 1930 some 1,820,000 employees were affected by the system. The average scale of payments was 28 francs per month for one child, 67 for two, 116 for three. Organized labor was at first opposed to the system; later it accepted the principle but demanded that it be made compulsory and universal in all industries.⁸

The National Socialist government in Germany has established a system of loans to finance marriage. The conditions are that the bride shall give up a job which she has held for at least six months, and obligate herself not to get another as long as her husband is earning at least 125 marks per month. The loan is repaid over a period of 8½ years and bears no interest.

One naturally fears that family subsidies would tend to stimulate child-bearing among the mentally dull more than among the mentally brilliant. Subsidies in a democratic country would necessarily be limited to the amounts just necessary to stimulate the birth rate among the masses of the people. Such amounts would fail to have much influence upon those of higher income (and usually higher ability) whose birth rates should be especially stimulated. The result in the long run would be dysgenic. Nevertheless in countries where the general birth rate is low, these subsidies, as measures of justice and security, to socialize somewhat the burden of child-rearing, may be justifiable as temporary expedients.

Socialized Services for Families Better than Financial Subsidy.—Better results might be secured through subsidies in *services* rather than in money. Increased provisions for free higher education, cheaper but adequate living arrangements for students away from home, socialized medicine and universal health insurance, public financing of maternity care and childbirth, public subsidy of nurses, public provision of nursery schools and institutions for the temporary care of children, are among the needed adjustments. Such services, financed wholly or partly by society, would distribute the benefits more nearly according to need than could any system of fixed money payments graded according to size of family. Moreover, the entire fund available for the purpose would be spent under

centralized and expert direction. If the same money were to be paid to individual families, it might be spent in less efficient ways. To be sure, a family would have to produce the child before it could claim the subsidy or increase in subsidy. But in allowing the individual family to spend this increased income according to its own discretion, society would encourage the development of the extra child-caring services on a private, competitive basis, and would miss the opportunity to control the organization of these services for greater social efficiency.

The importance of social insurance, especially of health, is great. The mental resistance to raising an adequate family is largely due to *insecurity*. A family may expect its income, in the long run, to be adequate, and yet be in constant anxiety over the unpredictable times and amounts of expenditure caused by illness. Modern medicine has created higher standards of health and medical practice; business class families tend to have fewer children in preference to running the risk of not living up to these standards in the care of their children. The movement for universal health insurance and other forms of socialized medicine is one of the most important movements looking toward family welfare and adequate families.

The Day Nursery and the Nursery School.—Day nurseries have long been in existence to serve the needs of women who must work while their children are young. They serve only a small fraction of the population. The latter is also true, in the United States, of the nursery school, which serves rather those families where the mother does not work outside the home. Robert Owen had established infant schools in his factory in Scotland in 1800. In 1914 there was a revival of this idea in England and the modern nursery school movement began. At first it was philanthropic. The Fisher Act of 1918 provided for the establishment of nursery schools for children of two to five throughout the country; these are now mostly a part of the national school system. The English nursery school aims at the physical and mental development of the child and also the guidance of parents. It was regarded from the beginning as an adjunct to mother care but not a substitute. In the United States the movement began about 1914, under the influence of the English idea, but has developed along different lines. It is not co-ordinated under any one organization, public or private. Schools have been established by a variety of agencies and with widely differing aims. A distinctive characteristic of American nursery schools is their emphasis upon psychological

research. Many of the important schools are under the auspices of colleges and universities.⁹

Socialized Housing.—One of the most useful measures would be provision of low-cost housing especially adapted to the care of children, in semi-rural locations. Such provision need not fall wholly upon the public purse. Rents would be charged, of course, but these could be fixed so as to get the best social results, and not with an eye to profit-making. As long as the profit motive is the only source of new housing developments, we cannot expect those developments to meet the needs here discussed. All that might be expected from purely private enterprise would be a limited number of houses especially adapted to families with children, charging considerably higher rentals, and available in practice only to the more prosperous classes. With social initiative, however, an element of subsidy could be introduced to help pay the cost, justified by the benefits to the general welfare. Moreover, the development could take place on a much grander scale and could be centrally controlled so as to eliminate the wastes of competition.

The housing shortage following the World War led to governmental housing schemes in several countries, but the movement maintained its strength only in Austria and Russia. In Russia today practically all the large city houses are state owned. These represent largely the confiscation of former private property, but the government is also actively building new houses. The new housing is planned for collective living, including such features as group dining rooms and nurseries, in contrast with the typical American apartment house with every apartment a complete unit. It was planned to eliminate all private kitchens in about half of the new dwellings erected after 1931.¹⁰

In the United States the recent business depression has led to a revival of the demand for socialized housing. A noteworthy step was the enactment of a New York State law in 1934 permitting cities to acquire land and build houses to be rented to private dwellers. In the United States, most of the features which in any sense could be called socialization consist in: (1) house building by special private corporations which through limited-dividend provisions eliminate the profit motive, (2) indirect government aid of various sorts, (3) house provision by industries for their own workers at low cost. In 1933 and 1934 federal funds have been extensively loaned to the limited-dividend corporations for slum clearance and new house construction. Still the great bulk of housing in capitalist countries is still supplied according to the business pattern of private enterprise and profit-seeking, with its characteristic result of making an *adequate* adjustment for only the more prosperous classes.

The Need for Specialized Housing for Children.—It may be suggested that the most up-to-date commercial housing already includes many types of houses admirably suited to the care of children. Still, these might be much better suited. The adaptation of houses to the needs of human inhabitants has never been studied as carefully as the adaptation of factory buildings to the needs of particular industries, or of barns and stables to the needs of various animals. Our cultural sentiment of permanent home ownership, which comes down from our agricultural past, gives us a concept of "home," more or less standardized in its essential features, suitable for a childless couple and also for a couple with two or three children at any age. The tradition of the permanent family home has great values where it can actually be carried out. In practice it is increasingly violated by "moving" as the family income and needs change. A quicker and happier adjustment would occur if the old sentiment could be discarded ideologically where it must be discarded in practice.

The house of the future will place more stress upon function. It will be adapted, like a machine, to the services it is to perform. A special type of nursery house may be expected, giving so much space for children's play, feeding, and care, that such a house would be exceedingly wasteful for the childless.

Gray and Staples secured opinions from 60 child welfare workers on the specialized housing needs of children. Prominent among the needs mentioned were a large fenced yard *within the mother's view*; a shelter or other place to keep yard equipment without bringing it through doors into the house; a large room for noisy, violent play; a room for children to study separate from bedroom and playroom; hooks, hangers, bathroom, and kitchen fixtures placed at an elevation suitable for children; and a safe footway between home and school.¹¹

Rivalrous Consumption an Enemy of Family Adequacy.—Some day a socially minded automobile manufacturer may design a car for the convenient carrying of children and such camping equipment as might be essential on a week's journey. Such a car, which would probably need to be on the lines of a small truck, would not appeal to the prestige-through-appearance motive which now largely governs in the purchase of automobiles. Yet mechanical inventions do lead in social change, and if business men were to apply the same courage and advertising skill to this idea that they do to other less useful ideas, they might succeed in changing the popular attitude. By itself this problem is a mere trifle, but it represents hundreds of other small problems of the same class. These problems reveal a general attitude

pattern which needs to change in order to encourage larger families among those who should have larger families, on biological and social grounds, but who fear to do so on economic grounds. It is not so much material obstacles as it is social rivalry in standards of living which stands in the way of adequate reproduction. The whole pattern of social valuations in our urban culture is simply not conducive to the raising of families. A considerable percentage of the cost of living in the business class is a cost of *appearance*. In a remote but very real sense, appearances in our culture are the enemy of life itself. The satisfaction of truly personal esthetic tastes is in a different category. Such tastes are among the ultimate goals of life, and each individual is the best judge of his own goals. But every dollar of family expenditure which is dictated by the how-does-it-look-to-the-neighbors ideology means a dollar less for positive personal gratification or for children. Yet we complacently deny that we have gods demanding sacrifices and burnt offerings.

Co-operation of Mothers as a Solution.—Co-operation of mothers in the care of their children is theoretically one of the most adequate solutions. It is claimed that a mother can take care of ten children with little more time than is required for one. Instead of every mother of young children being on duty all the time, it is suggested that only one out of three or four mothers needs to be on duty at a time. The reply made to this proposal is that it is not practicable. This is simply another way of saying that the theory does not take account of all the cultural resistances. One resistance is in the ecological arrangement of living quarters. As long as each family has a separate dwelling house, with no collective nurseries for children, it would be very difficult for one woman to supervise several families of children at once. Even under the existing ecological conditions, however, the possible opportunities are not made use of. Certainly there are many situations in which mothers could co-operate by pairs, the off-duty mother taking her children temporarily to the home of her co-operating partner who is on duty. More extensive co-operation would require a collective playground, nursery, kitchen, and feeding equipment for each co-operating group, which might comprise from four to ten families.

But another and more serious resistance lies in our *attitudes* toward co-operation in housework. Women's attitudes are as ill-adjusted to co-operation of this sort as were farmer's attitudes to agricultural co-operatives fifty years ago. This does not mean that women are in general unco-operative. No facile generalization of that sort explains

the problem. The difficulty lies in attitudes toward specific situations. Let us analyze them.

Attitude-Resistances to Mother Co-operation.—There is the attitude of intolerance toward another woman's methods of housekeeping and child management. The average mother in our business class culture will not entrust her child to the neighbor or friend about whose methods she feels any question. If there are individual differences in efficiency of mothers, the normal subcultural result would be a community recognition of those of superior ability and a tendency to entrust much of the child care to them, the less efficient doing other work and contributing financially. Such is the result in most matters where individual differences of ability exist. The more able are selected by the competition process, and become specialists. But apparently our culture pattern prevents this normal interaction process from working itself out in this field. Child care is not regarded as a generalizable technique, but as a responsibility very intimate and personal, which each is reluctant to entrust to any other.

Yet many mothers are willing to entrust their children for considerable periods to servants or nursemaids in their own employ. There is in many the feeling that a servant acting more or less mechanically under one's own orders is safer than the independent judgment of another mother with children of her own. Whether this feeling is objectively valid is another question.

The Fear of Accidents.—One great difficulty would be removed if the physical conditions dangerous to children could be eliminated. Not only should they be eliminated in fact, but all mothers of the co-operating group would need to feel *confident* that they were eliminated. One of the most important steps would be the separation of nursery dwellings from the vicinity of highways and traffic streets. The modern, townless, by-pass highway contributes to this end. Specially planned suburbs like Radburn, N. J., also help to solve this problem.

But there are other physical dangers. No thorough-going study of children's accidents similar to those upon industrial accidents has been made. Just *how much* danger is involved when children are permitted to climb trees, to play in hay lofts, to play in the neighborhood of horses and domestic animals? What are the relative degrees of danger to the younger children in open knives, bathtubs, stairways, pins and broken glass, and so on? Certainly a great deal of maternal emotion centers about these dangers.

A family, noted for its excellent care and supervision of its children, arrived one afternoon at a farm where they were to spend a month's vaca-

tion. They rejoiced in this change from the city neighborhood. The farm children immediately invited the girl of eleven upon a tour of inspection of the farm. The mother felt anxiety over possible unknown dangers which she had not yet time to inspect, but yielded to what seemed common sense, and allowed her daughter to go with the other children. After a few minutes a call for help was heard. The little girl was lying on the concrete floor of the barn with a broken hip, having fallen thirty feet through a concealed opening in the hay.

Episodes such as this furnish grounds for the fears nearly every mother feels. Whether such fears are more justified when the child is away from its mother we do not know. Harm befalling a child during the temporary relaxation of supervision naturally causes the parent a feeling of self-reproach. Yet many such cases can be matched by others in which the accident occurred under the most careful supervision.

The Need for Standards of Child Safety.—We need standard safety codes for the places where children live and play, analogous to the codes now established for factories. A course in safety might be given to all prospective parents. This would teach them the points of danger to be looked for in various environments, and might cultivate habits of methodical inspection in place of vague anxiety. Some industries have reduced accident rates to one-half or one-fourth of the former rate, by *general* measures, without supervising or worrying about each individual workman. The results are obtained by placing mechanical safeguards at danger spots, by mass campaigns of instruction, by standardized rules of conduct. The schools are dealing with the safety problem, and the custom of placing boy traffic officers to guard children crossing streets is presumably of great value.

In this safety problem, the total accidents which do happen may produce a smaller harm than does the total anxiety over the accidents which do not happen. The value of a safety campaign must be judged not only by the reduction in the accident rate, but also, provided that rate is reduced, by the reduction in anxiety. Accidents may never be totally eliminated, because there are always unpredictable circumstances. But anxiety may be greatly reduced by creating a standard code of rules, based not upon sentimental fears but upon the best available knowledge of facts and frequently modified according to new facts. If the parent scrupulously and methodically obeys these rules so far as they apply to his own responsibility, he may rid himself of a considerable burden of anxiety. The rare accident which does occur in spite of these scientific rules may then be regarded with a

certain fatalism, freeing the parent from feelings of self-reproach. Certainly the mental health and adjustment of children suffers a great deal from overanxious parents who constantly warn and forbid without adequate knowledge and without any effort at objective control of the dangers they fret about.

Grandparental Care as a Possible Solution.—In rural Europe grandmothers play a considerable role in the supervision of children, while mothers spend much time in the fields in active work. The raising of children by their grandparents is a solution which harmonizes well with certain apparent trends in industrial countries. The trend of the economic system is to eliminate older persons from many kinds of industrial work. Older persons tend to be thrown into work which is more closely connected with the home: farming and gardening, housework, certain professions. There is a considerable movement in England and other industrial countries of Europe toward subsistence farming on the part of the unemployed. Some economic thinkers recommend this as a more or less general disposition of older workers, who are less desirable than the young in industry. Ideally, they think, the working class individual should be born and reared in a semi-rural environment, and perform his urban industrial labor from twenty to forty-five. Then he should withdraw from the more arduous and regular industrial labor, moving out again toward the country, keeping a garden and domestic animals to supplement what income he may get from an industrial pension and from occasional periods of temporary employment. With the automobile and projected railroad improvements, the mobility between city and country becomes easier even on a daily commuter schedule. A great advantage of the pattern is that child-rearing could be ruralized to a much greater extent than at present.

Another aspect of this trend is the concentration of competitive and rivalrous activities during the early adult years. As a result, many persons are psychologically better fitted to rear children after forty than before that age. Their rivalrous and competitive attitudes become weaker; they are more likely to have reached a level of personal achievement which they may consider as final, and to be less inclined toward further strenuous effort. Under those conditions the emotional satisfactions of a close relationship to children may play a more valuable role in their lives. Of course the parent-child relation would not be abolished, but would be supplemented by this strong grandparent-child relation. Many of the routine operations could be delegated to the grandparents. Such a solution would greatly relieve the tension upon the modern young mothers who, with good cause, feel that domestic duties prevent their realization of other life satisfactions. It would relieve the comparative emotional emptiness of the lives of many persons over fifty. Today urban married couples with young children count themselves fortunate if there is a grandparent who likes children, especially if he or she lives in the country.

Earlier Reproduction as a Solution.—On the other hand, there are classes of persons to whom a very different pattern would be more suitable. Among these are some who have superior mental ability and whose lives are known as "careers." To such couples it may prove more suitable to reproduce very early in life with the help of direct or indirect subsidy, so that their children may be already "out from under foot" by the time they reach the most strenuous period of their careers in the thirties and forties. Such persons tend to find activities outside the home becoming more interesting and satisfying as they grow older, and may not retire from active life until seventy or more. They may find babies more satisfying at twenty than later, and prefer in older life the companionship of their matured children. This pattern is likely to become more popular in so far as medicine prolongs life and physical vigor. If present tendencies in the prolongation of life continue, the most suitable caretakers of the child might eventually be either very young parents, or *great-grandparents*.

The various solutions are not social, but individual alternatives.—As we shall see in Chapter XVIII, we must not think of these various solutions as mutually exclusive. One class of persons will follow one pattern, another a very different pattern.

The problem of caring for children is a phase of the larger problem of women's work in general, which we shall now discuss.

2. THE REORGANIZATION OF WOMEN'S LABOR

The Drift of Women away from the Home Is Very Slow.—The number of women engaged in home-making was not directly ascertained by the census until 1930. Then it was found to be 24,481,778. For earlier years careful estimates were made by Kyrk and Reid, by deducting from the known number of women those known to be employed and in school, and estimated numbers disabled, aged, and in boarding-houses and hotels. This estimate for 1930 was 25,500,000, or a million more than the census figure. Accepting Kyrk and Reid's estimates, however, because they are the only means of comparison with earlier times, the home-makers have formed a continually (except for 1920) decreasing proportion of all women of 15 years of age and over. This proportion was 67.7 per cent in 1890, 65.8 per cent in 1900, 62.4 per cent in 1910, 62.7 per cent in 1920, and 59.5 per cent in 1930 (57.1 per cent if we accept the census figure for 1930). The number of home-makers per private household declined from 1.06 in 1890 to about 0.85 in 1930, but at the same time the average size of private households was decreasing from 4.9 to 4.1. Home-makers constituted an unchanging 21 per cent of the total population at every census period from 1890 to 1930, but since there is now a greater proportion

of the population in the older age groups, home-makers have declined relative to the number of females of *home-making age*.¹²

The constancy of the 21 per cent figure during 40 years, however, suggests that there has not yet been any decline of private home-making personnel except what is accounted for by the relatively smaller number of children to be cared for and the relatively greater number of adults. Despite the ideology of woman's independence fostered by feminism, there appears to be little desire among women to combine an independent vocational career with marriage. Employment outside the home in the great majority of cases represents economic necessity.

Coit and Harper, asking several hundred married women why they worked outside the home, found that economic pressure far outweighed other reasons such as interest in outside work or being "lonesome at home."¹³ College women in general appear to desire a vocation, regardless of economic necessity, as long as they are unmarried; but the majority seem to believe that a continuous vocational life is incompatible with the raising of children, and to be not particularly interested in arrangements which would make these aims compatible. It must be remembered that, simultaneously with the spread of the equal rights ideology, there have been rising standards of child care. The child health and child study movements have been active.

A class in the Family, which had become familiar with the whole philosophy of the question, divided half and half on this question: "Would you, in preference to the ordinary home-making plan, take a 36-hour-a-week job, assuming that your children were four years of age and over, that you had competent service in the home, and that your husband was willing?" Of 252 girls answering Blanchard and Manasses' questionnaire, only 34 preferred a career to marriage. When asked if they wished to combine a career with marriage, 95 said yes, 139 no, 18 were undecided.¹⁴

However, outside employment seems to be growing in ideological favor with married women who have neither young children nor large domestic establishments to care for.

In so far as feminism has exerted influence against the traditional home-making pattern, it has spent its force. The last decade of prosperity achieved greater social and recreational freedom of married women, higher standards of living, less arduous household labor, and less spinsterhood, without any appreciable shifting of the direct economic responsibility from men to women. Indeed, some years ago, when the older feminism was still active, Professor E. A. Ross, a keen interpreter of the broad aspects of social change, pointed out that

women were becoming economically *more* dependent on men rather than less as feminist theory held. They were increasingly seeking and finding marriage as a solution of their economic problems, and there was a very real competition of women for able husbands.¹⁵

The Real Dynamic is Not Desire for Careers, but Discontent with the Confinement of Home-Making.—Prediction of the future involves: (1) projecting the present trend forward; (2) considering any new factors which might change that trend and guessing at their importance. If there is to be any acceleration of the slow and uncertain trend away from traditional home-making, this is more likely to come through the ideology of leisure than through the ideology of female vocational independence. Women do not want to work (neither do men), but they do want to play. They want to play more adventurously, more light-heartedly, and more companionably with their husbands than was regarded possible by the previous generation. They *want* this enrichment of leisure partly because its possibility is now abundantly demonstrated on all sides. People want what they see others having. This enriched leisure may require more material goods, but more particularly it requires solid blocks of free time. These are precisely what the married woman with young children lacks. Again, the period when the married woman's play is limited by her children is a period of youth, vigor, and wishfulness. It is becoming increasingly a period of discontent. The real psychological forces working against the traditional home cannot be gauged by studying the attitudes of young women before marriage. These girls naturally tend to look upon marriage and home-making as preferable to their present status as students or employed workers. It is after a woman has had some experience with raising children on a limited income in modern urban culture that she begins to question the desirability of the present system. By that time, however, it is too late for most women to make readjustments, hence the social dynamic of their discontent loses much of its force.

Modern leisure patterns and opportunities intensify the desire of adults to escape the responsibility of child care for solid blocks of time: whole afternoons or evenings, whole week ends, or whole summers. There is increasing need for agencies and persons to whom responsibility can be safely and completely delegated for these limited periods. This does not imply a tendency to weaken the mother-child relationship, but if anything, to make that relationship better through the occasional absence and the greater freedom of the mother as a person.

This temporary delegation of child care means increased expense to the family. A pressure for greater income is created. Again, as a mother becomes accustomed to delegating her maternal responsibilities for purposes of recreation, she will find it easier to extend that policy for purposes of earning a little extra money to help cover the cost of the service involved. Thus, many mothers may drift into extra-domestic employment in spite of their theoretical opposition to it.

Likewise if mothers' co-operation were adopted, it would tend in many communities toward specialization by particular women. Those mothers who showed more than average success in child care, or enjoyed it relatively more, would tend to make a regular job of it, while other mothers, in order to compensate the specialists, would find other kinds of paid employment. If nursery schools and other communal services were provided for families by the state or other agencies, the cost of these specialized services would have to be paid. While families with many children and low incomes would receive more services than they could pay for, other families, including childless couples, would indirectly pay the difference through higher taxes or other contributions.

This also would tend to put pressure upon many of the less occupied young married women to find paid employment. It would seem that almost any adequate solution of the child-raising problem would involve a greater specialization of tasks among women generally, accompanied by less confining hours of labor. Under an adequate readjustment applying to all classes, possibly many women in the working classes might be withdrawn from industry, balancing some of the business class women who would enter outside employment.

Will Women Eventually Leave the Home?—The question as to women's occupational future is usually stated in very naïve fashion. It makes a simple issue between "the home" and "outside employment." Both "home" and "employment" need to be more carefully defined. In 1930, about 21 per cent of our population were home-makers, and an additional 4 per cent were gainfully occupied in "domestic and personal service," which may be regarded as labor assisting, or substituting for, home-making functions. Thus, a total of 25 per cent of the population was performing functions generally known as "domestic," and this percentage was the same as in 1910. As mechanization and large-scale production increase, the *manufacturing* of commodities requires relatively less personnel, whereas their physical distribution, and the final services in which the commodities are used, become more elaborate and absorb an increasing proportion

of workers. Therefore we might expect an increase rather than a decrease in the proportion of persons engaged in domestic functions, for the same reasons that trade, transportation, and the professions are proportionately increasing. On the other hand, if it be true that the domestic department of our economic system is much more inefficient than the other departments, as the feminists have claimed, then by greater specialization of tasks it may secure the same product with fewer workers. Although this inefficiency is doubtless great, it has been exaggerated. One writer, for example, compared our home-making system to an army in which half of the men are detailed to cook for the other half. But actually the proportion is one "cook" to every five persons, not to two persons, and the cook does much more than cook. Whether the proportion of personnel in domestic functions will increase or decrease depends: (1) upon whether reorganization will eliminate more labor than is added by increased elaboration of services at the consumer's end of the economic process, and (2) upon whether these newer functions will be classified as "domestic," or as "professional," or something else.

In another form, however, the question of woman's future can be answered with more certainty. Namely, we may expect that: (1) women and not men will continue to perform the great majority of the functions now classified as "home-making" and "domestic and personal service," and the newer functions which may grow out of these; (2) women will probably specialize to a greater extent in the performance of these functions; (3) they will consequently perform them less exclusively for the members of their own families; (4) the *net* movement of women from "domestic" or kindred functions into agriculture and manufacturing will probably be small, if any, although there may be considerable further movement toward professional, clerical, trade, and transportation functions.

The Real Choice Is Between Greater Specialization and Increased Range of Tasks.—In any case, whatever be the directions of change in functions performed, the individual woman will increasingly face this decision: will she remain in the exclusive service of *her own family*, or will she serve a larger number of persons? If she does the former, she will need to elaborate or increase the range of her services, because her traditional private home-making functions are being continually taken away by outside agencies or rendered less time-consuming by mechanical devices. If she chooses the latter, she will naturally specialize upon a narrower range of tasks. Thus she

must either specialize further, or further increase the variety of her work.

From the standpoint of mental hygiene, one difficulty with the exclusive service to one's own family under modern conditions is that it involves too great a variety of tasks. Its success depends more upon intelligent administration, upon the shrewd allotment of time among the numerous details, than upon the skilful performance of any one of them. This may require more intelligence or emotional control than most human beings possess, and may account for much of the discontent felt by modern home-makers. Administration, in a sense, is the opposite of specialization, and the home-maker cannot even specialize on pure administration, for she has also to *perform* manually the tasks which she plans and delegates to herself. Such an extreme of non-specialization is uninteresting to the majority of persons, as also is extreme specialization, such as found in factory work. In so far as woman remains her own private home-maker, her work is likely to move farther in this direction of non-specialization, this multiplication of unrelated details.

However, in the immediate future, each alternative will be chosen by a substantial number of women, and readjustments are needed along both lines. Let us consider first the adjustments needed for women who choose the road of specialization, then those needed for women who choose to continue in the exclusive service of their own families.

I. Problems of the Specialized Role: A. Lagging Masculine Attitudes.—In the business class the general ideology of woman's economic independence has advanced much farther than has the actual employment of wives, and faster than the attitude of the average husband toward the actual employment of his wife. The ideology of the man as provider, ashamed if not able to "support" his wife completely, lingers on. When the wife does take an outside position which rivals the husband's in importance, inferiority feelings and jealousy frequently develop in the husband. Usually the residence is determined by the husband's vocation, the wife taking whatever job she can get in the same community. To let the residence depend upon the wife's occupation is a policy which few husbands can accept emotionally even when it is justified financially. Among the "intelligentsia" there is sometimes, however, an over-reaction against this traditional attitude.

B. The Need of Part-Time Jobs and Adaptation of Working Hours.—Lorine Pruette has recommended the deliberate policy of

establishing part-time jobs for married women.¹⁶ A half-day in office, store, or school, with a half-day for domestic duties, would admirably meet the needs of a large number of women. There is no insuperable obstacle to such a system. Many occupations, such as stenography and retail selling, could easily establish a certain number of positions running on a double-shift system. If there were more candidates for the afternoon than for the morning shift, the wages could be lowered in the one and raised in the other, until the demand equalized. But there is a great resistance in industry against complicating the working schedules to take care of workers' special needs. It is the same resistance that prevented the establishment of an outright thirty-hour week as contemplated by the originators of the NRA. The resistance is a complicated one, involving the unwillingness of workers already employed to share work and wages with newcomers, the reluctance of employers to set a precedent of a short working day even though they have to shut down their plants for whole weeks at a time, the extra expense of training a larger personnel per hour of labor performed. The employer does what seems most profitable to do under the existing conditions. His mind is alert to any innovation that may reduce costs obviously and immediately; but not interested in innovations whose benefit to him would be uncertain and indirect. One might convince employers that "in theory" they could lose nothing by making the change here suggested, or that they could adjust wages so as to compensate for any financial loss. But where the prospects of gain and of loss are equal, the employer stoutly favors his existing system as against a change, if only because the change introduces new and unknown risks, or increases the number of factors which he cannot control.

In New York and Philadelphia, bureaus of part-time work for women have been established. The fees from placed individuals cover a little more than half of the expenses of these bureaus. In 1928 the New York bureau had 2000 new registrations, and 2400 available jobs were reported to it by employers. The principal kinds of work were stenography, typing, and other clerical work, the care of children, teaching and tutoring, and selling.¹⁷

C. The Need of an Organized Labor Market.—Another difficulty of the specializing woman is that of finding a suitable position in the community where she must live, whether it be a full-time or part-time position. The chief breadwinner is free to move with his family to another community where a better position offers. The secondary breadwinner is tied to a limited range of opportunities. Still this diffi-

culty would be less if there were a well-organized system of employment exchanges through which the married woman could learn all the suitable vacancies which actually exist in the home community.

These problems are part of the general problem of organizing the labor market and of adjusting industrial employment policies to the needs of workers. That problem will probably not be solved as long as employers control industry to the extent they do today. Its solution must wait for the more complete organization of labor and of the consumer for a greater social control of industry.

D. Employment of Women Not a Cause of Increased Unemployment.—What "can" and what "cannot" be done with the economic system depends upon the prevailing ideology of its leaders. In Russia it is assumed that married women have as much right to jobs as men if they want them, and the system is adjusted accordingly. In Nazi Germany, on the other hand, strenuous efforts are being made to confine married women to domestic duties. In Germany, therefore, and also in other Western countries, public opinion rationalizes that the unemployment of men is due in part to the employment of women. In Russia, if there were great unemployment, an entirely different explanation would be on all tongues. Every economic system adjusts itself to the size of the total labor supply, whether that be large or small, masculine or of both sexes. A *sudden* increase in the labor supply will of course result in increased unemployment. But a gradual increase is absorbed by the growth of industry. This is obvious from the fact that the industrial nations have grown to several times their population of two centuries ago, and have employed practically their full labor supply at each successive period of prosperity.

E. As More Women Leave the Home, Domestic Service and Residence Arrangement Will Need to Be Reorganized.—In so far as the percentage of mothers who are employed increases, there will be an increased need for paid, professionalized domestic service. The nature and organization of these occupations will depend partly upon the ecological* forms which develop, partly upon what functions are centralized. Four major ecological forms are possible: (1) the single-family house as at present, (2) groups of single-family houses with communal playgrounds and nurseries, (3) the same with the additional communalization of the kitchens and perhaps dining rooms, (4) large hotel-like institutions with all of these functions communalized. Each ecological form, again, permits many variations as to the

* The term ecological refers to the arrangement of human beings and their culture in relation to *space* or *land*.

precise extent of communalization of each function. The structure or arrangement of the buildings is one thing; the organization of services is another. The two variables may vary independently within a considerable range. Thus we have "cottage-plan" institutions where the inhabitants sleep in buildings similar to present-day family dwelling houses, and summer camps where the tents or cabins accommodate only two or three persons each, while cooking, eating, recreation, and all services are centralized. On the other hand we have the ordinary apartment house, where many families live under one roof but carry on practically all functions separately. We may expect several of these forms to develop simultaneously. The relative extent of each cannot be predicted.

II. Problems of Traditional Home-Making.—For some time to come the majority of married women will probably remain at their traditional duties inside their own homes. A considerable proportion may always do so. There are problems within this traditional home which need to be solved long before its ultimate fate is decided.

A leading household economist once confessed to the writer a profound sense of discouragement and futility about the work she was so ably performing. She believed the desirable solution was to abolish the single-family home altogether, and yet her own career was based upon the objective of improving the single-family home. In the broad light of social change, such an emotional conflict is quite needless. Certainly the improvement of the single-family home is worth the life efforts of many intelligent persons, even if its role is destined to shrink to one-fourth the present extent.

Is the Home-Maker Underworked?—We have seen (Chapter VII) that the weekly hours of labor of the average city home-maker are not appreciably less than those of the present rural home-maker. There may be some ground for questioning the "necessity" of some of the work performed in the city home. The city home-maker's time is less devoted to basic material necessities and therefore involves a certain flexibility and choice.

It is more useful to consider the various types of feminine economy which depart from the general average. On the one hand we have large numbers of women, particularly in the working classes, who are employed outside, and who in addition perform their own housework. There are other women in this class who do not work outside, but who, because of numerous children and poor equipment, work for more hours per week than do most men in a factory. In both cases there is real overwork. Usually this means more work than the husband does, for in the working classes especially there is a male prejudice against

helping out with "feminine" duties. That prejudice is one of the resistances with which progress must contend.

The home-maker is relatively overworked even in the business class during those years when her children are under ten, unless she has a servant. In these cases, too, the performance of some extra household duties by men is called for by a just distribution of labor. In Maud Wilson's Oregon study, the average weekly home-making time, including that of servants and helpers, was about 50 hours in childless families, 68 hours where the youngest child was between one and six, 94 hours (in towns; 81 on farms) where there was a child under one.¹⁸ In so far as the home-maker is genuinely overworked, the remedy may be: (1) greater help from the husband, (2) more use of children as helpers in household tasks, (3) a more just distribution of income in society, or (4) more birth control in poorer families. These solutions are discussed or sufficiently indicated under other headings. Let us turn therefore to the problem of the underworked or, at least, *under-functioning* home-maker, which situation, regardless of its actual frequency today, tends to be *increased* by modern social change.

Large numbers of home-makers, more largely in the business class, are *underworked* both absolutely and relatively to their men. Some of them develop neuroses, some make needless work to fill their time, and some really enjoy themselves and admit it. If we could get them all to do the latter, even that would be a social gain.

As we have noted, the continual removal of functions from the home, and the increasing mechanization of those which remain there, set time free. Therefore, if women persist in remaining in their own homes, they must undertake new services to replace what has been eliminated or rendered easier.

A. Solutions for Underwork: the Return of Former Functions to the Home.—It might seem that the problem of the underworked home-maker would be solved if she were to cease purchasing machinery, labor-saving devices, hired service, ready-made food and clothes, and go back to the old-fashioned craftswomanship. Indeed, many business class families recently have been caught in the jam between a husband's reduced income on one hand and an inability of the wife to find outside employment on the other. The only way out for them was in the socially backward direction, that is, to reduce expenses to a minimum by doing as much work as possible in the home. This has meant the making of clothes in the home instead of buying them, cultivating gardens, more home cooking and preserving.

Dr. Marie Baum, a German leader in family readjustment, emphasizes the social desirability of having a number of productive tasks in the home upon which the several members of the family may co-operate. German thinkers seem to have come recently into a state of acute disturbance over the disintegrating effect on family life of outside recreational organizations. Dr. Baum mentions even the separation of home from work-place as a disintegrating factor, although we in America have long accepted that change and in a way adjusted to it.¹⁹ Studies in a New York suburb, indeed, have shown some indication of greater family solidarity among commuters' than non-commuters' families.²⁰

Such a return to household production would not only solve the problem of finding suitable employment for the spare time of women and children, but would also absorb part of the working time of men and render male unemployment less disastrous. It is interesting that in Russia the effort is distinctly away from this type of economic development, and toward the liquidation of the small household as an economic unit, with the employment of all women in the production of a specific commodity or service. But this Russian policy probably represents an extreme adjustment to temporary conditions. It is now more important for Russia to build up her basic industries than to cultivate perfection in the standard of living.

Ralph Borsodi has advocated the return-to-the-household type of solution for America. He thinks that factory production has gone farther than real efficiency justifies, and that the next epoch will witness a return to greater household production. This will be facilitated by numerous types of small machinery which can be operated in household establishments by electricity. Thus the factory system, by producing household machinery, comes to limit its own field in other sorts of production. Borsodi thinks that some goods will always be produced in factories, but that there are many commodities now factory produced which could be made with more total satisfaction in a well-equipped household.²¹ Even the household loom might be revived.

It is illuminating to consider the real economic implications of Borsodi's plan. They are not what they appear to be superficially.

In the first place, the plan implies *more machinery*, rather than less, in the home. It is really a plan looking toward decentralization of manufacturing.

In the second place, if this household machine production were to prove efficient it would probably prove *more* efficient with a group of families co-operating and specializing somewhat, than with a com-

plete outfit of the necessary equipment in every single household. What we would really achieve would be small, local, co-operative workshops; the women engaged would be employed much of the time either outside their own immediate domiciles, or else in producing within their own homes goods for sale or exchange. Thus, women would tend toward *greater specialization of labor* as they would under the frankly specializing "radical" proposals and the Russian policy. At least, their work of *any one day or any one week* would involve a greater concentration upon some one task than is allowable under modern conventional home-making when that is well done. It is difficult to define specialization so that all will agree upon its meaning. But there seems to be some important phase or kind of specialization which is at its lowest ebb in modern bourgeois home-making, and which becomes greater as one goes either "backward" or "forward" in domestic evolution. That extreme phase of non-specialization may perhaps be described as a "wearisome attempt to balance every day of work between the greatest possible number of petty requirements."

In consequence of these two implications of Borsodi's plan, a third seems to follow. Namely, his plan seems to imply a movement away from national economy toward not family economy but *community* economy.

Finally, the whole plan would be limited by the impossibility of locating more than a certain proportion of the population in the "rurban" environments which the plan calls for. A large proportion would need to remain in cities, another proportion upon farms.

B. The Predominant Solution Will Be the Development of New Functions in the Home Rather Than Restoration of the Old.—For the great majority of women who choose to remain in the service of their own families, the readjustment will probably not be of the Borsodi type. It will proceed along two complementary lines: (1) reducing still further the manual labor of the home through labor-saving methods, (2) employing the time thus saved to raise the family standard of living in non-material ways. These two lines of effort must go hand in hand: 2 is mechanically impossible without 1; 1 is socially dangerous unless followed by 2. By electing to remain in the home under modern conditions, woman subjects herself to a social responsibility different from that which is upon her husband and from that which was formerly upon her. It is not the responsibility to "perform faithfully the tasks that come to my lot," but rather to discover honestly what tasks are worth doing. The use of the husband's working time is more or less rigidly dictated by the requirements of

his occupation. The wife's working time is free to be used in a variety of ways, except during the period when the children are quite young. She herself must discover what way contributes most to the family happiness. If her judgment in the use of her time is good, she can use to good advantage all the extra time that labor-saving devices can possibly release into her charge. On the other hand, if her judgment on this point is poor, she can do the family more harm by remaining in the home than by subjecting herself to an outside employer.

We have heard a great deal about the nervous housewife.²² The nervous housewife may be the product of overwork, or of underwork, of work done under needless mechanical difficulties, or without deserved appreciation. The specific causes are legion, and a case study of each situation is necessary. The only general statement possible is that in housework more than any other work the various factors are ill adjusted to one another; scientific planning and control are lacking, and indeed they are difficult.

Let us consider separately the two lines of adjustment mentioned above.

1. The Further Saving of Labor in the Home.—There is room for further mechanical invention in the home. The problem of dish-washing, for example, cries out for mechanical solution, although it is doubtful whether this solution can be had by merely introducing a new machine into the traditional setting. Changes in the type of dishes, the construction of the kitchen and plumbing, and so on, may be required. We have probably reached a stage where more is to be gained by new construction and new organization than by new machinery.

(a) The Need for More Scientific Organization in Housework.—In the work of any industrial establishment are involved the following functions: purchasing, processing (changing the form of goods), storage, transportation, repair, sales, finance, and management. The work of the household involves all of these excepting the sales function, which is absent because the household product is consumed entirely by the immediate family of the worker. Management in a sense overlaps all the others; there is a general overhead management, and also certain management operations within each of the other functions. In simpler terms, we may say with Hazel Kyrk that housework consists in management and performance. The home, like the factory, is an agency for economic production. The home-maker, though usually unpaid, is *producing* goods and services as truly as is the farmer, manufacturer, merchant, railroad, or theatre. She performs

the final steps in production. A loaf of bread is not completely produced, that is, ready for the final consumer, when it is sold by the retail grocer. It still must be cut, served upon the table, perhaps toasted, and kept in suitable storage in the home.

Perhaps most home-makers fail to realize just how housework has changed in practice since the days of their mothers who taught them the domestic traditions. As Hazel Kyrk points out, performance is simpler and easier; management, if not more difficult, at least is more complicated.²³ The processing function plays a lesser role; the other functions have acquired greater importance. Housework today is less a matter of skilled manual techniques. Education in "domestic science" has consisted largely in craft training. The girls learned to sew, to mix batter, to cook various dishes, and to decorate the home. The more advanced schools have changed their curricula to meet changed conditions, but in other schools and in the traditional home-making lore which is passed down from mother to daughter there is still much lag.

The new household economy comes to resemble business executive training more and manual training less. It lays increasing emphasis upon pencil and paper analysis of the home-maker's job, budgeting, filing, and time-study.

It is possible that modern housework is inherently less interesting than the older variety. Many women, even of the highest education, get more real joy from cooking a meal or making a dress than from manipulating a card index, an account book, a set of electric switches, making telephonic inquiries about goods, and keeping in order the numerous utensils of modern complicated domestic life. Muscular effort, indeed, is less, but so also is the role of manual skill. Ruth Lindquist, questionnairing about 300 mothers, found fatigue, worry, and friction very common. Replies indicated that modern high standards and desires for perfection in home-making contributed to these sufferings.²⁴ In Maud Wilson's Oregon study, the chief cause of dislike among town home-makers was cleaning and straightening, with laundry work a poor second, and dish-washing third. Among farm home-makers laundry work, presumably more difficult there, rivaled cleaning and straightening for first place. Cooking, sewing, mending, and care of children were disliked by relatively few.²⁵ The emotional effects of household processes need to be studied with more refined analysis of tasks into their mental and physical operations. One home-maker of the writer's acquaintance, for example, conspicuous for the neatness of her home, enjoys dish-washing, cleaning up, and putting away more than she does cooking. Another enjoys the construction of a tangible product such as a dinner or

a garment, but is pained by the processes of constructing that abstraction we call "order."

(b) The Improvement of the Purchasing Function.—In the improvement of home-making one important line of effort is consumer education and information. The problem of the modern consumer consists not so much in the inferiority of modern industry's products to those of the past, as in the vast increase in the number of commodities and the various brands and qualities of each. To judge intelligently the goods on the market requires much more knowledge than formerly. Decisions in purchasing make up a greater proportion of the mental work of the modern home-maker. But the choices between one brand of canned fruit and another, one silk fabric and another, are not the only kind of decision required. Increasingly the chief problem is to decide whether canned fruit or silk cloth is worth purchasing at all. The problem of securing the bare physical necessities is solved for the majority of the population. What most of us worry about is whether we ought to buy this luxury or that. Our per capita income has increased, but the sales pressure of business has increased still more. We find ourselves in a constant state of indecision as to what we can best do without. Too often the decision is precipitated by the untimely visit of some glib salesman, or the seductive display of some article in a shop window.

To meet this need several consumer information bureaus have been established, some in connection with women's magazines. Of outstanding merit is Consumer's Research, Incorporated, of Washington, N. J., an organization founded in complete independence of any business firm or of anyone interested in selling goods. This agency was established by men with a genuinely scientific, consumer's point of view. For a small annual fee the organization provides detailed and critical information concerning the products of specific manufacturers covering the whole range of household and personal goods. It does not hesitate to recommend and "not recommend" these by name. Consumer's Research of necessity draws its entire financial support from consumer-subscribers and gifts from progressively minded persons; business does not support it. It may help the sales of those producers whose goods happen to show superiority upon impartial testing, but no producer can feel any certainty of remaining on the "recommended" list. The general tendency of the movement is to weaken the power of advertising and to take from the producers' hands their psychological control over sales.

(c) The Improvement of the Storage Function.—It is difficult to get the traditionally trained home-maker to look upon storage as an economic function. She tends to regard it rather as an esthetic ritual. As she hangs up her shining pots and pans, places her glassware in the china closet, puts away the children's raincoats and rubbers, she is thinking of appearances more than of labor saving. The economic test of good storage is that the stored article should be safe and should be brought to hand with maximum speed when wanted. Most homes are not equipped for good storage. This feature of household and furniture construction has lagged behind esthetic, sanitary, and other more obvious features.

The usual difficulty is lack of sufficient subdivision and labeling of storage space. Very few homes have adequate closets, shelves, cabinets, filing cases, drawers, desks, hooks, and hanging devices. A book could be written about the money wasted in purchasing household articles which are seldom used because they are not kept in condition or not stored so as to be quickly available when needed. The storage of traditional household equipment such as cooking and eating utensils may be well done, while newer categories of objects which have more recently become important in the household economy, such as writing materials, electric fixtures, parts of machinery, drugs and sanitary articles, and toys, are jumbled in a chaos which is none the less real because it is hidden beneath a superficial neatness.

If we analyze the physical operations of an executive or business office, we note that these consist largely in, first, oral communication, and second, the manipulation and storage of paper. It has been said that we live in an iron and steel civilization. Perhaps it is even more significant to say that we live in a paper civilization, for paper, the medium of our elaborate records, communication, and education, is the *sine qua non* of large-scale management. As housekeeping becomes more complicated, more mental and less manual, more concerned with social relationships, it requires more paper, more writing, more reading, more looking up of recorded facts.

(d) Transportation as a Household Function.—It may sound strange to speak of transportation within a household, aside from the toy transportation with which children frequently litter their mothers' otherwise neat living rooms. Yet the failure to recognize basic principles known to every railroad or delivery man accounts for a great deal of household inefficiency. Many housekeepers complain of being tired from constantly going up and down stairs. This stairway-neurosis needs careful analysis. Few women do excessive muscular work in an average day. The woman who feels fatigued

from climbing stairs could usually do five times as much climbing in the mountains every day and feel the better for it. But the situation in the home is commonly as follows.

The housewife is interrupted by the telephone, or a child's crying, or any one of a hundred other things, in the course of some task which is more pleasant if carried through to some convenient stopping place. The interruption brings a certain mild nervous shock, a momentary wish frustration. Repeated interruptions pile up a great deal of unpleasant emotion during the course of a day. Since the interruption is usually followed by going to some other part of the house, that normally healthful muscular activity becomes conditioned to unpleasant emotions. Or, again, the perambulation or stair climbing may be for the purpose of moving some single article which the housewife feels does not make the trip worth while. Or it may involve the carrying of a whole armful of small articles which constantly threaten to fall from her grasp. Here again unpleasant emotion is connected with walking or climbing.

Now the carrying and moving of objects can be reduced to a technique just as can processing operations like dish-washing and sewing. But these transportation techniques are not well recognized. The development of technique in any operation gives satisfaction and avoids nervous strain. In addition to personal technique, perhaps we need more trays, baskets, speaking tubes, telephone extensions, dumb-waiters, automatic sliding doors, butler's pantry windows, and other practical inventions new and old. It is surprising that mirror devices to ascertain who seeks admittance are not used more commonly.

(e) Needed: a Functional Household.—To make an efficient home the home-maker must think about more than qualities, colors, materials, neatness, and cleanliness, important as these may be. The "correct" home-maker prides herself that her home does not resemble a museum as some homes do, but is rather to be compared to a tastefully arranged display-window. But great practical inefficiency may hide behind "interior decoration." One needs also to think of the home as a functioning machine. Each utensil is like a typewriter key which when touched produces a specific result. There should be no keys which do not function, none which cannot quickly be found; the keys should be so placed that the more frequently used are the nearest to hand, and should in many cases be labeled for the benefit of less skilled helpers who should sometimes replace the chief operator at the keyboard. The physically ideal home is an esthetic and also a mechanical unit, operating so as to economize effort and time, and to produce comfort and happiness so far as these can be produced by

material means. Every member of the family should learn to operate it in its essential functions without disorganizing it.

2. The Use of the Time Saved.—As housework becomes more efficient, while the home-maker remains in the home, how shall the released time be used?

Home-makers are already using such time in five ways: (1) the further esthetic elaboration of the home; (2) "social" activities such as women's societies, bridge, teas, and so on; (3) political activities; (4) philanthropic and church activities; (5) creative artistic and literary activities with occasional financial gain therefrom. All these activities have important values and make very satisfactory adjustments in individual situations. Social work owes a great deal to the comparative leisure of business-class women, and such women are now contributing usefully to our political life. Yet any one of these activities, begun partly as a hobby to employ spare time, may later take on the drive and character of necessary *work*, at the expense of other activities which might be of greater benefit to the family.

While some women concentrate their efforts in one or more of the above channels to such an extent that they neglect the needs of their families, others scatter their time among so many disconnected activities as to produce in themselves and others a sense of profound aimlessness. It is not certain whether the greatest maladjustment occurs among those with intensive hobbies or those who merely drift without purpose. It has been said, indeed, that the way to get a thing done is to get a busy person to do it. Within limits this is true, with women as well as men. It is quite unsound to assume that a woman who spends a great deal of time in political, social, welfare, or esthetic activity is neglecting the essential duties to her family. Possibly as much neglect is found among those who have no "interests" at all. Among the leading time-consumers with this group are inconsequential reading, movie-going, solitaire playing, radio listening, knitting, and the casual conversation with neighbors sometimes called gossip. Each of these activities, not excepting even the last, has its values. If one fundamentally enjoys such a miscellany of activities more than the concentration of effort in fewer and more purposive channels, then that scattering policy is desirable for that individual. We must not forget our premises that play rather than work is the ultimate goal of life, and that by and large each person is the best judge of what to him constitutes play.

But two questions concern us. First, to what extent does this drifting policy really satisfy those who practice it, and to what extent is it a pathological result of the extreme under-specialization of modern housework? Second, can such a policy be followed by one class of human beings (certain married women) to a much greater extent than by another equally intelli-

gent class (their husbands) living in close relationship, without producing social tensions? To what extent is it a factor in modern family discord? Perhaps it seldom leads directly to discord, but it may predispose toward a rather devastating type of extra-marital relation, the busy husband becoming attracted by a more purposefully active woman whom he meets on the outside, or the wife by a leisured man who charms by contrast with the preoccupied husband.

(a) The Possibility of Increased Specific Assistance to the Husband.—There is another possible solution which sounds new and different. Why should not women, as their traditional duties diminish, increasingly become associates in their husbands' work? This solution would avoid the difficulties of finding a separate job, and also those of conflict with the husband's job. Indeed, this plan is not so new as it sounds. It is the role of the typical farm housewife, of the wife of the small shop-keeper, especially in Europe, and of the clergyman's wife. American attitudes of sex equality tend to resist this solution. It carries a suggestion of feminine inferiority which is avoided when the wife takes a job apart from her husband's work, even though that job be an equally subordinate position under another man. The writer found considerable antagonism to the plan when proposing it suddenly to a group of senior college women, but he noted later that he had used the word "assistant" instead of "associate." There is also the difficulty that a business relationship mixes poorly with a marital relationship. An American wife does not take orders from her husband as easily as from another employer. This is probably a cultural difficulty which could be overcome.

In a broad sense, most married women do play the role of "help-mate" to their husbands. Their entertainment of guests, their social activities, their ordinary duties in the home do actually help the husband to advance professionally. They often perform specific clerical services for their husbands, taking care of the general family correspondence and finances, thus relieving the husband of work he would otherwise have to do. Yet what they do willingly in practice they tend to scorn in their ideology. They prefer to describe their work as "taking care of the home," or "playing a woman's part." They will go so far as to admit that, "I'm helping Jack to *get ahead* in his profession"; but they want to feel that this help is something different from the services which could be rendered by an employed secretary or assistant. They tend to rebel against the idea that an important part of their help might consist in *saving the husband's time* through the *performance of specific delegated tasks*. In other

words, a woman's duties to her husband should be assigned to her by the general ideology, but not by the specific judgment of the husband himself.

The wife of the farmer or of the clergyman escapes this American business class ideology. She is less reluctant to take specific instructions from the husband, to let him be the judge of what most needs doing on this particular day. This attitude is necessary if woman would play a more specifically co-operative role than she already plays as a traditional home-maker. How useful would a business executive be to his chief if he said: "I'm here to serve you, and I pledge eight full hours a day to your service; but I shall be the judge of what service you need, and of when you need it"?

In medicine, the law, teaching, social work and business, there are many men who could increase their *family* income by employing their wives, on a part-time or full-time basis, in specific positions, which would otherwise have to be filled by outsiders. Such a solution, of course, requires the appropriate training of the wife as well as some rather unusual attitudes on the part of both husband and wife.

But the wife can be specifically helpful in many ways without formal employment. Here are some tasks which men normally prefer to perform, but which under many circumstances could be delegated to wives with advantage to both:

Care of the automobile.

Complete management of family finances.

Semi-personal correspondence.

Much of the husband's shopping.

Buying theatre, railroad tickets, etc.

Telephoning for various information.

Planning trips and recreations.

Repairs to household, toys, etc.

(b) The Wife as a Manager of Family Leisure Time.—Perhaps a more accurate title for this function toward which the modern non-specializing home-maker must gravitate is "family leisure manager." This does not imply that woman's function is to dictate to men and children how they shall spend their free time. The proposed function is rather to study the leisure needs and interests of the various members of the family and assist each one to do more adequately what he really wants to do. This will probably mean more of family co-operative activities than at present, but also assumes some highly individualized activities. The assistance rendered may consist in assembling information about community recreational facilities and events,

caring for equipment, and arranging schedules. The more constructive and valuable recreational impulses of human beings tend to be blocked by a certain inertia; one tends to fritter time away with less valuable and less interesting activities simply because of the mental effort involved in preparing for the superior kinds. A person who shows a very lazy attitude when some leisure project is suggested will show no lack of energy after he is once started in the performance. The laziness is in the "getting at it." Our traditional attitude throws upon the individual the responsibility for this inertia. It holds that any person who is too lazy to make preparation for some kind of fun does not deserve to have the fun. "Let him stew in his own juice," as the old saying goes. At the same time, human experience shows that some social stimulation is necessary for those types of leisure activity which yield the greatest satisfactions in the long run. This social recreational stimulation was actually present in the communities of bygone days which lived a rich leisure life. Much of it has been removed by the anonymity and psychic isolation of modern city life, especially in the working class. In the business class, on the other hand, there is strong stimulation to leisure activities, but it is largely of the rivalrous kind and applies to a rather limited set of conventionalized activities, such as golf, cards, basketball, social clubs, and dancing. These activities, moreover, are largely separative in their influence upon the family. They afford little opportunity for the recreation of the family as a unit, and only limited incentive for husband and wife to play together.

The inertia of "getting at" the more unusual and varied activities of a superior recreational program is more easily overcome when some one person makes it his or her special business to study the causes of that inertia and to overcome them. The causes will often be found to be of a mechanical sort, such as equipment out of place and in need of repair, and inadequate information.

If woman is to remain in her own home, leaving to man the whole burden of earning money to support our rising standards of living, she must accept this role of *residual legatee* of responsibilities left over, or additionally created, by machinery and by the more specialized activities of her husband and children. Her work will be extensive rather than intensive in the old craft sense. She must become even more than at present an administrator of many small details, not all of which will be interesting. But she has an alternative: she may choose a paid, specialized occupation which increases the family income. If she makes this latter choice, then man may be ex-

pected to share domestic tasks in greater measure than he does at present. In either case, the time-consuming labor of caring for young children must be more fully recognized, and a sharp differentiation made between mothers of young children and other married women. Woman needs a more even spread through her lifetime of genuine work.

Sex-Occupational Taboos Form the Resistance to These Readjustments.—The division of labor between the sexes has been regulated in most cultures by strong taboos. These taboos differ greatly from culture to culture. Bantu women must keep strictly away from the cattle; yet in the neighboring Hottentot culture cattle-tending is a regular task of the women. The writer, arriving in a central European village, had his heavy suitcase seized by his host's tiny maid-servant, who carried it on foot from the railroad station to the house. At another station nearby he saw young girls in uniform serving as baggage porters, and on the tracks a gang of women laborers with pick and shovel. While the particular taboos are always cultural, the use of the taboo method has a subcultural base. It serves at least three purposes. First, it fixes responsibility and thus avoids uncertainty, one of the greatest enemies of practical efficiency and smooth social relations. Second, it insures a certain rough justice in the distribution of labor. It is very difficult to measure labor quantitatively, and to balance the total amount of labor performed by one person against that performed by another. Even a statistician with a stop watch has difficulty in doing that. Perhaps all human beings are lazy, but they differ greatly in the degree to which they possess this ultimately desirable trait. Hence there is always a tendency for the more lazy to exploit the less lazy. The simplest way to check this tendency is to assign *specific tasks*, rather than *generalized quantities or hours of work*. Most human societies are aware of the advantages of piece-work over work by the hour. Third, work can be made more pleasant if it is conditioned to the wish for superiority. At least one sex, and often both sexes, derive a sense of superiority from the fact that certain tasks are uniquely theirs, and that the opposite sex is either incompetent or forbidden to perform these tasks.

In a simple, uniform, slowly changing culture, the division of labor taboos may be fairly well adjusted to the quantities of work involved, so that neither sex is overworked. But when culture changes rapidly, or involves great variation among families or individuals, these taboos may result in greatly overworking one sex, or a certain class of individuals within that sex. Our traditional taboos have resulted generally

in overworking the married women of the working class, and underworking those of the business class.

The traditional sex division of labor, in so far as it is sentimental or taboo-controlled, rather than adaptable to circumstances, represents a serious cultural lag. These taboos or sentiments seem to be surviving more stubbornly in the distribution of unpaid household labor than in the distribution of paid occupations. It is emotionally easier for a woman to become a paid mechanic than for her to repair the family car. It is easier for a man to become a tailor or laundry operative than for him to knit a sweater in the home or to be seen hanging out the family wash.

Under modern conditions, each family needs the freedom to determine for itself how tasks shall be assigned, untrammeled by general community culture. The important questions become: *how much* work is each person doing, and *how well* does his work befit his *individual* capacities and preferences?

The Need for Sexually Unspecialized Education.—A striking cultural lag lies in the hesitancy of the mass of women to acquire ordinary mechanical knowledge. During the Great War women showed great ability in working with machines and electrical apparatus. There is no adequate biological or subcultural reason why the textile and culinary crafts should be feminine and the metal crafts masculine. Men make good cooks and tailors and women make good mechanics. The traditional specialization is a lag for three reasons: (1) judgment concerning mechanical and electrical apparatus, and the adjustment and repair of such apparatus, now play a much larger role in housekeeping than previously; (2) the more complete separation of man's work from the home, together with the lightening of woman's labor in the home, even call for the woman's taking over some of the easier mechanical household jobs in the interest of a fair distribution of labor; (3) the wife might enjoy her work more if she felt competent to handle these details without calling for masculine assistance.

A Denver school offers an industrial arts course to girls in the eighth grade. The girls are taught the principles of painting and finishing, electricity, and the automobile; they learn to use tools, to make simple repairs, and to judge the quality of mechanical construction and workmanship. The same school gives a semester course in problems of everyday living to all boys in the eighth grade. This course includes the principles of nutrition, clothing, food, and a study of the boy as a member of the family group. To overcome the anti-“sissy” prejudice in boys a study of Rear Admiral

Byrd's expedition to the South Pole was suggested as an approach to the problems of food and clothing. The Kansas City school system plans to give exchange lessons between the boys' and girls' classes in the seventh grade. Boys will be given talks on the social amenities and courtesy, girls on household mechanics.²⁶ Wellesley College is reported as offering a course in automobile mechanics.

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CHAPTER XI

MARRIAGE AND MATE-FINDING

1. THE MATING PROBLEM: ITS POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The Central Problem Is in the Marital Relationship.—Notwithstanding the importance of the reproductive and the economic problems, the very heart of modern family problems lies in the marriage relation itself. In former times this relationship was rather rigidly defined by law and custom; it was relatively uniform for all; the great majority entered it, and adjusted themselves at least in such measure as to prevent marriage from becoming an outstanding social problem. This is not to say that marriage was a generally happy state in the past and became unhappy only in the last fifty years.

But, relatively, judging from all available evidence, the marital relation has become, through modern social changes, a problem of unprecedented importance. The essence of this problem, as of others, is a cultural lag: individuation of desire and the increasing *potential* satisfactions of human life have advanced rapidly, while social structure and attitudes have not changed sufficiently to permit these desires and potential satisfactions to be realized.

Five Theoretical Solutions of the Problem of the Marital Relation.—Theoretically there are five possible solutions of the problem of marital conflict and unhappiness:

- (1) Scientific selection at the outset.
 - (a) Better sifting of those who should marry from those who should not.
 - (b) Better matching of those who do marry.
- (2) Selection by trial and error; that is, public recognition of the principle of trial marriage through easier divorce.
- (3) Supplementary love relationships to provide what marriage lacks.
- (4) Training in marital adjustment, which, ideally, would enable *any* two persons to make a successful marriage.
 - (a) Mass education.
 - (b) Case work and special treatment for the individual case.
- (5) Devaluation of mate love among the goals of life.

- (1) The need for great precision in the matching of personalities

would not exist in a culture where less was demanded of the marriage relationship. (2) If marriage could be broken easily and without pain, the importance of guessing right the first time would be less. (3) Again, if marriage implied less exclusiveness in the intenser forms of love, whatever element was felt lacking in a person's love life could be supplied by some outside relationship. (4) Or, still again, if social psychiatry could train any two persons to make a good marriage adjustment, then it would not make much difference who the persons were. They could be selected almost by drawing lots. Incidentally, a young man recently announced in the newspapers his intention to choose a wife by lot among strangers, saying that he believed his chances of happiness to be as great in that way as in any other. (5) If there were no romantic ideology of the perfect "love life," but love were regarded as a series of fortuitous minor satisfactions incidental to the performance of duty, and if at the same time life provided a richer feast of superiority and adventure satisfactions apart from the opposite sex, then also "perfect mating" might be superfluous.

Among these five solutions, the fifth, devaluation of mate love, implies, more or less a return to the past. It was, in some degree, the solution used by our medieval, puritan, and Victorian ancestors, by the Greeks, the Chinese, and others. Many peoples have had less marital problems than we, partly because they have demanded less, not only of marriage, but of adult heterosexual love in general. They have been trained to satisfy their love desires to a greater extent through their parents, their children, members of their own sex, their ancestors, or the Deity. But our whole analysis of recent cultural change in Chapters VII and VIII argues against the probability of returning to this older solution. Certainly we are not moving in that direction at present. It is a possibility, however, and we shall consider it in the last chapter.

Supplementary heterosexual love relationships, the third solution, were in some measure the solution of late Roman and of Renaissance times, and today characterize certain sections of European (and, less openly, of American) society. This solution is urged by many radicals as highly promising. But it is still sternly opposed by American mores, and this culturo-sentimental resistance, forcing it into concealment, deprives it of even the limited value it might have if it could be carried on openly and without fear. If, however, the mores did change to permit free love, this would be, like scientific mate selection, only an incomplete solution. It might relieve the strain in marriages where partners have very unequal needs for sex or affection. But it would fail to solve the problems of a large proportion of marriages.

The second solution is being strongly urged by the divorce liberals. In

American culture it faces less sentimental resistance than does the third solution. For example, Fannie Hurst in a popular feature article approves the tendency of modern civilization to make divorce easier. But no spokesman for the popular mores could advocate greater ease of free love. However, it is doubtful that divorce can ever become painless even if legally free, and there is still great prejudice against making it easier.

It might seem, therefore, that the greatest immediate hope lies in the first solution, scientific mating, and the fourth, marital training. To these, there seems to be on the surface no sentimental resistance; they are both highly moral according to our present culture. But while better mate selection is universally approved as a general objective, its practical application also meets with cultural resistances which may prove as intransigent as those which prevent easier divorce or even free love, for its thoroughgoing application requires organization of the marriage "market," the relinquishment of the tradition of male initiative in courtship, and also considerable economic change in order to correct unbalanced sex ratios.

The fourth solution also, in general terms, meets universal approval. The most conservative persons will agree that young people should be better trained for marriage, so well trained, in fact, that they could, if necessary, live happily with *any* mate. Yet when we get down to the details of applying this solution, questions loom which may arouse powerful resistances. Is it possible, for example, to train young people *adequately* for marriage, without either trial marriage or sexual experimentation outside of marriage, at least in a certain minority of problem cases? Is it possible to give really adequate instruction in sex matters, either to groups or to individuals, without destroying that fundamental personal feeling of taboo upon which the traditional mores depend for their enforcement? The final answer to these questions may be yes or no, but it is not possible even to be open-minded about them without running against strong prejudices. Even a course of instruction given to all high school students, limited to the *non-sexual* problems of marriage, to be really helpful would require a scientific approach which would undermine traditional modes of thinking about "human nature" and thus invite the attacks of several conservative groups.* The most serious limitation of the fourth solution does not lie, however, in the possible prejudices which may retard its application. They eventually can be overcome. The ultimate question is how far it will be physically and humanly possible to apply this training. Training requires that varying situations be arranged to suit the needs of varying individuals. Can we ever control sufficiently the circumstances surrounding human beings to insure that all or most of them are trained toward a given end? We can do much better, however, than we do now.

*See *New York Times*, Sept. 27, 1932, p. 24. "Warn of mind clinics marring child faith," an account of the discussions at the National Conference of Catholic Charities.

We may conclude that *any* adequate solution of the problem of modern marriage will meet serious culturo-sentimental resistance from some quarter, and that in fact there is no solution completely within the framework of our traditional mores. These mores, in other words, must and will change; the question is *at what point* they will give way first; in what directions can we make the greatest immediate headway?

We may conclude, further, that any one of these solutions by itself will be incomplete. It will fail to meet the needs of all cases. But again, any one of them could probably be dispensed with altogether if the other four were applied with great thoroughness.

We must recognize that all five solutions are actually being applied in some degree at the present time; one solution in certain individual cases, another in certain other cases, and so on. When we speculate as to the possible future of a given solution, we must think of that future as an enlarged or a diminished role, but never as a complete monopoly or a complete exclusion.

Each "solution," when studied in detail, becomes in itself a problem. There is the technical problem of how to apply it; and there are additional problems which are produced by its application. Thus divorce may appear at first as a solution of unhappy marriages, but, as we shall see, this "solution" becomes a cause of other problems. Again, we should distinguish between "solution" as something applied by individuals to their own case, and "solution" as a mass treatment applied by society through its leaders. Further, each kind of "solution" brings to light new facts about the basic problem which it attempts to solve.

Indeed, the whole concept of "problem and solution" is merely a tool which is useful in the earlier stages of our thinking. As we think more deeply into the tangled mass of facts, we shall view both "problem" and "solution" as merely steps in a continuous process of social maladjustment and readjustment.

First Solution: Scientific Marital Selection.—There are two broad phases of marital selection. One is the sifting of those individuals who should marry from those who should not marry at all. The other is the choice of the particular partner. Although better selection of partners would contribute to human happiness even if its whole purpose were to be found in temporary love affairs, yet its primary purpose must be the happiness of the marriage relation which normally follows. The remainder of this chapter will throw factual light upon marital selection.

2. MARRIAGE AND NON-MARRIAGE IN THE LIGHT OF STATISTICS

Among most primitive groups practically every individual marries; those who do not are disapproved or regarded as abnormal. The same tends to be true in general of civilized agricultural peoples, such as the Chinese and European peasantry, and was true of colonial America.

Several European countries and New Zealand record death statistics according to marital status. These figures in general lead to the conclusion that bachelors and widowers, at all important ages, have mortality rates 50 per cent greater than married men. Among women, excluding deaths due to child-bearing, which substantially increase married women's death rates, spinsters have death rates 10 to 15 per cent greater than married women, and widows about 20 per cent greater. If these greater death rates were true only of the single, we might attribute them to a selective tendency of unhealthy and defective individuals to remain unmarried. But when widows and widowers also show substantially higher death rates at any given age, we are led to believe that marriage itself, especially for men, is a status with which is correlated a lesser risk of illness and accident.¹

The Marriage Rate and Statistics of Marital Status.—Vital statistics such as those of marriage are commonly expressed in three kinds of rates. There is the *incidence* rate, or the number of happenings of the given kind of event during one year per 1000 (or sometimes 100,000) of population. Second, there is the *prevalence* rate, or the number of individuals of which the given condition is true at any one instant of time (the typical or average instant if the rate fluctuates rapidly) per 1000 (or 100,000) population. Third, there is the *expectation* rate, or the chances per 100 that an average individual of given age, class, etc., will experience a given event within a specified time, or within his lifetime. The expectation rate may be expressed also in another way, as the most probable period of time before the given event will happen to the said individual.

The 1930 marriage rate, as given, for example, in the United States Bureau of the Census Annual Report on Marriage and Divorce, is an incidence rate.² It stood around 9 per 1000 during the years 1887-1900, rose irregularly to a level between 10 and 11 per 1000 in the recent prosperous decade, dropped to 9.2 in 1930, then to 8.5 in 1931, and to 7.9 in 1932. Since we are a monogamous people, the *number of persons who get married* per 1000 population per year is of course just double the marriage rate.*

*Both the marriage and divorce incidence rates fluctuate with the business cycle, being high in prosperity and low in depression. See Dorothy Thomas, *Social Aspects of the Business Cycle*, Routledge (London), 1925. We are discussing here the secular or long-time trends, which may be observed by "smoothing out" these cyclical fluctuations on the graphs.

As to the prevalence rate of marriage, about 60 per cent of the total population of 15 years and over in 1930 was married. The remainder consists approximately of: single (in census reports this means never married) 30 per cent, widowed 8 per cent, divorced 2 per cent.³ It is believed by statisticians that the reported percentage of 1.2 for divorced persons represents an undercount, caused by the reluctance of many persons to report themselves as divorced. The incidence rate of divorce, since it is obtained each year from court records which cannot be concealed from the census enumerator, is obviously more trustworthy than the prevalence rate of divorced persons, which is obtained from the say-so of the persons themselves visited every 10 years in house-to-house canvass. Ogburn shows, it would be necessary to have each divorced person, on the average, either remarry or die 22 months after his divorce in order to keep the prevalence rate (persons living in a state of divorce at any given time) as low as it is stated to be.⁴ But there is good evidence to indicate that the average divorced person who does remarry does so after three or four years rather than two, and that at least 20 per cent never remarry. Hence the number of persons living in the divorced state must actually be considerably greater than reported in the decennial census. A very rough estimate would be that there are twice as many persons in the divorced state as actually report themselves as such.

Table 6 shows that the prevalence rate as well as the incidence rate of marriage has been increasing since 1890.

TABLE 6*

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
IN THE UNITED STATES, WHICH WAS SINGLE (NEVER MARRIED)
1890-1930

	Males	Females	Both sexes
1890.....	41.7	31.8	36.9
1900.....	40.2	31.2	35.8
1910.....	38.7	29.7	34.3
1920.....	35.1	27.3	31.3
1930.....	34.1	26.4	30.3

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

TABLE 7*

PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL POPULATION 15 YEARS OF AGE AND OVER
IN THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE WIDOWED AND DIVORCED, AC-
CORDING TO DECENTNIAL CENSUS REPORTS

	Widowed		Divorced	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
1890.....	3.9	11.0	0.2	0.4
1900.....	4.6	11.2	0.3	0.5
1910.....	4.5	10.6	0.5	0.6
1920.....	4.8	11.1	0.6	0.8
1930.....	4.6	11.1	1.1	1.3

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

TABLE 8*

PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS OF EACH AGE AND SEX GROUP, IN 1930, WHO:

	Were in married state at time of enumera- tion		Had been married at some time (i.e., mar- ried + widowed + di- vorced)	
	Males	Females	Males	Females
15 and over.....	60.0	61.1	65.7	73.5
15-19.....	1.7	12.6	1.7	13.0
20-24.....	28.1	51.6	28.8	53.7
25-29.....	61.3	74.3	63.1	78.2
30-34.....	76.0	81.5	78.7	86.7
35-44.....	81.5	81.5	85.6	89.9
45-54.....	81.6	75.2	88.4	90.8
55-64.....	78.0	62.0	89.7	90.9
65 and over.....	63.7	34.7	91.4	91.7

* Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population Vol. II, chapter on marital condition.

Table 7 shows that the percentage volume of widowhood has remained constant among females, and increased from 1890 to 1900 among males but not since then. It shows that the divorced state has become continually more frequent among both sexes.

If it is true that there are twice as many divorced persons as appear in the census figures, then the decrease in the single state might be a little greater than appears in Table 6.

But neither the crude marriage rate (incidence), nor the percentage married of the entire population of 15 years of age and over (prevalence), tells us exactly what is happening. Both of these rates are strongly influenced by the *age distribution* of the population, and this has been changing. In order to determine the precise nature of the change we must keep the age factor constant in making our comparisons.

The age at which a woman is most likely to be in the married state is from 30 to 44; a man, from 45 to 55. Women tend to enter the married state earlier and to leave it earlier. This results from several factors: the usual age discrepancy between husband and wife (in the median case the husband is 2.4 years older),⁵ the greater longevity of women (amounting on the average to about two years), and the greater tendency of widowers than widows to remarry, and to remarry a younger person. As age advances, the differences between men and women, in respect to whether they were ever married or not, gradually disappear, until, among the oldsters of 65 and beyond, about 93 per cent of each sex has at some time married. But at that period of life only 65 per cent of the men and only 34 per cent of the women remain in the married state, chiefly because of the deaths of their spouses. The equalizing of the two sexes in their marital record is partly due to the fact that married men have a lower death rate than others, and for this reason, in addition to others, those who survive beyond 65 are more likely to be married than are a group of men at an earlier age.

The Prevalence of the Married State Has Been Increasing.— From a study of the census figures from 1890 to 1920 only, Ogburn concluded that, lumping all ages together, there had been a steady increase in marriage. This general increase, he found, was the net result of three factors. First, lowered birth rates and lowered death rates had caused a shift in the age distribution of the population, increasing the groups over 25 years of age, in which a majority is always married (except females over 65 years who are largely widowed), relatively to the group of 15-24 in which marriage is usually a minority condition. This shift in age distribution would cause the married percentage of the whole population over 15 to be higher, even though there were no changes in the practice of marriage. Second, there was an actual increase in the percentage married *at any given age* within the younger age groups. But third, there was at the same time a decrease in the percentage married among the older age groups. The influence of this third factor was, of course, opposite to the influence of the first two, but it was not great enough to overcome them.⁶

This decrease in marriage among the older groups, coupled with an increase among the younger groups, is a matter of some interest.

Ogburn found this pattern less noticeable among women than among men, and more characteristic of urban than of rural communities. It was not possible, he found, to explain it adequately by changes in the sex ratio, nor in racial groups, nor in urban-rural distributions, nor by increase in widowhood (which has remained practically stationary). He concluded that it was probably due to changes in social or economic conditions. Among these he merely suggested: increased income, increased manufacturing, birth control, the World War, the employment of women, the movement of the business cycle, and attitude changes.⁷

Thompson and Whelpton, in their report to President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, had the additional advantage of the 1930 census.⁸ They also show that the increase in marriage has been true mainly at the lower age levels, while in the groups over 35 the trend has been stationary or downward. The percentage of males in the married state at ages 20-24 rose from 18.9 in 1890 to 28.3 in 1920, then dropped slightly to 28.1 in 1930. The corresponding figure for males at ages 25-29 rose from 52.7 in 1890 to 61.3 in 1930. For all male groups over 45, the percentage in the married state fell; in the group over 65 this drop was from 70.5 to 63.7 per cent. Among females the changes were smaller, though in an upward direction for all groups except those over 65, where there was a very slight

decrease. The largest upward change was for the group 20-24, from 46.7 to 51.6 per cent.


Especially noteworthy in the 1930 figures were several evidences of a reversal of trend. This reversal could not be explained by the depression, which could have had little effect by April, 1930. In both males and females of 20 to 24, the percentages in the married state, which had increased markedly from 1890 to 1920, fell somewhat between 1920 and 1930. On the other hand, marriage at 35-54, with both sexes, made noticeable upward changes.

Thompson and Whelpton present their findings for the separate sex-age groups and census periods in graphs. If, instead of studying the percentages reported as married at time of enumeration, we study those reported as single, thereby lumping the married, widowed, and divorced on the other side, we arrive at somewhat more clear-cut figures. It appears that the percentage which has remained single throughout life has consistently increased from 1890 to 1930 in all groups over 55. Among the 45-54 groups of both sexes, there was an increase of singleness from 1890 to 1920, but the 1930 figures very slightly reversed the trend.

Let us draw curves, using the same census data as Thompson and Whelpton have used for theirs, but graphing the percentages single instead of married. Let us, furthermore, rearrange these curves so that each vertical line contains all the data available on a given generation of individuals instead of all the data of a given census year. Our data on the earlier generations are incomplete because the censuses previous to 1890 did not present comparable figures. Our data on the later generations are incomplete because these were not old enough in 1930. But it is possible to observe several of the middle generations through a considerable portion of their lives. Thus we get Figures 3 and 4. In these graphs each curve represents the changing prevalence of singleness in a given age-group as we observe successive generations. The scale of percentage single is inverted so that upward direction means more marriage.

From these graphs the nature of the change becomes clearer. The generations born in the neighborhood of 1870 show, at all periods of their history, a relatively high rate of singleness. The generations born in the neighborhood of 1900 show a relatively low rate of singleness, or in other words, a high tendency to be or to have been married. In the generations born since 1900 there are several evidences of a reversed trend toward lower marriage. But all these evidences come from the 1930 census, and it is too early yet to say whether this reversed trend is more than a minor fluctuation. If we consider now the generations before 1870, we see good reason to think that their marriage rates were considerably higher than those of the 1870 generations. As Ogburn says:

It may be that the decrease since 1890 in the percentage of older persons



FIGS. 3 AND 4.—Trends in Marital Condition.

*Data from U. S. Census, assembled by W. S. Thompson and P. K. Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States*, McGraw-Hill, 1933, p. 204.

who are married is due to causes operating a generation or so ago, rather than now. For instance, if large percentages of young persons married in the '60's, then presumably in the '90's there would be a large percentage of older persons married. . . . Now if the amount of early marriage declined from about 1860 to 1890, then there would be fewer older persons married in 1920, because there would have been fewer young persons married in 1890. We do not know whether there was such a decline in early marriage, but if there were its influence would probably be as indicated.*

Thompson and Whelpton also suspect from their data that a reversal of an earlier trend took place about 1890 (i.e., with generations born about 1870).

The period of 1870 to 1890 was one of rapid industrialization, increase of wealth, but much economic insecurity and falling prices, of immigration of excess males and migration of native-born males to the West, of an intense new devotion to business success; it was also a period when the Victorian forces of sex repression, typified by Anthony Comstock, reached their peak. The relative influence of these various factors would make an interesting discussion.

Baber and Ross, studying a large sample of mid-Western native American families which were the immediate or collateral relatives of college students, ascertained *average ages at marriage* to be as follows†:

	Persons of the generation born about 1834	Persons of the generation born about 1866
All men.....	25.58	27.32
Professional men.....	26.65	28.01
Farmers.....	25.32	26.89
Skilled labor.....	24.68	26.74
All women.....	21.34	24.08
Women of college education.....	22.08	26.10
Women of elementary school educa- tion.....	21.05	22.98

The Victorian generation showed later marriage in all classes than the generation which preceded it. The class differences also are interesting.

Loomis found the average age at marriage of a sample of 482 college men who had attained recognition in agriculture and who were presumably born in the period 1865-1885, to be 27.7 years.*

Thompson and Whelpton, while admitting that the post-1890 trend toward earlier marriage arises from a complex of many social con-

*E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, Holt, 1928, p. 152. By permission of Henry Holt and Company.

†Changes in the Size of American Families in One Generation, University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, No. 10, 1934.

ditions, "wish to call attention to the fact that earlier marriage has been taking place concomitantly with the rapid spread of contraceptive information."¹⁰ They think it reasonable that young people, no longer forced to choose between continence, parenthood, and abortion, would be more ready to marry at an earlier age; and that this presumption is strengthened by the fact that an increasing proportion of people live in cities where the raising of children is more expensive and difficult than in the country. They admit that easier divorce might also have some influence, but the present author agrees with them fully when they say that "it seems unlikely that many young people are influenced by such knowledge [of easier divorce] at the time they marry."¹¹

Is it possible that the new reversal of the trend, toward less marriage among the young, is due to the further spread of contraception together with newer mores which regard unmarried cohabitation as less disgraceful than formerly? Such an answer has been suggested, but it is too early yet to judge.¹²

National, Regional, and Class Differences in Marriage Tendency.—There are some interesting differences in marriage among the various classes of the population.

The native white of foreign and mixed parentage show lower percentages married at all ages than do either those of native parentage, or the foreign-born white. Thompson and Whelpton suggest as reasons their difficulty of adjusting to American life, and the unusually large gap between their desired and actual standards of living.¹³ Ogburn adds the suggestion that foreign parents are more apt to take a large part of their children's earnings and thus delay their marriage.¹⁴ Negroes show unusually high percentages of married in the very young age groups and unusually low percentages in the older groups, largely because of high widowhood and high divorce.¹⁵

In the South, in 1930, the percentage of women of 20 to 24 who were married was 59.3 as compared with 55.2 for the West, 50.8 for the North Center, and 42.0 for the Northeast. Moreover, the *white* women of the South marry earlier than those of other regions. In general, early marriage increases as we go West and South, among both sexes. The comparatively low marriage tendency of the women of the Northeast is due both to a low sex ratio and to the greater opportunity for independent work for women in the Northeast.

The rural population has a higher percentage married than the urban, for both sexes and at all ages. The difference is particularly

great in the case of women. Among rural men, the percentage of married at all ages lumped together became in 1930 lower than that for urban men.¹⁶ That this could be true despite the continued higher married rate at each specific age is due to a difference in age distribution. The country has a relatively small percentage of men at the ages of high marriage, and relatively more at the ages of 15 to 25. The high rates of youthful marriage among rural people, however, reflect village more than they do farm conditions. This was discovered through the 1930 census, which for the first time separated farm from non-farm rural population with respect to marriage statistics. Only at the later ages is farm marriage higher than non-farm rural marriage.

F. W. Notestein has studied the difference between social classes as to the age of marriage. His samples consist of women of native white parentage, living at the time of the 1910 census with their husbands, who were also of native white parentage. Neither the women nor their husbands had been married more than once. Two samples having these qualifications were taken. One was urban, representing 33 northern cities of populations from 1000 to 500,000. The other sample was rural, representing the unincorporated parts of 74 counties adjoining these same cities. To eliminate certain errors Notestein confined his samples used in the final comparisons to those

TABLE 9*
MEAN AND MODAL AGE AT MARRIAGE OF WOMEN ACCORDING TO
SOCIAL CLASS OF HUSBAND

Social class of husband	Average age of women at marriage	
	Mean	Mode
Total urban	22.4	20.5
Professional	24.8	23.5
Proprietary	23.3	21.7
Clerks	22.9	21.3
Skilled workers	21.8	19.6
Semi-skilled workers	21.2	19.5
Unskilled laborers	21.4	18.5
Total rural	21.4	19.2
Farm owners	22.3	20.0
Farm renters	20.9	19.0
Farm laborers	20.1	18.1
Urban and rural combined	21.9	

* F. W. Notestein, *Age at Marriage and Social Class*, Amer. Jour. Sociol., 37, p. 40, 1931. Reproduced by permission. The sample consists of women of native white parentage who were under 40 years of age at the time of their marriage, were married between April 16, 1900, and April 15, 1905, and were living with their husbands at the census of 1910.

women who had been married before the age of 40, and who had entered marriage not less than 5 nor more than 10 years previous to the census.

His results are shown in Table 9. Notestein found that these American women married considerably earlier than Englishwomen, in each social class respectively. The proportion of persons married under 20 years of age is from 2.7 to 4.9 times as large as that for similar English classes. If we wish to adjust Notestein's percentage data to compare exactly with Table 10, we can do so by multiplying them each by 0.96, thus getting a percentage based upon all marriages under 50 instead of under 40.

TABLE 10*

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN MARRIED BEFORE AGE 50, ABOUT 1920, WHO ENTERED MARRIAGE AT GIVEN AGES

	Under 20	Under 25
Australia.....	12.4	54.6
New Zealand.....	9.9	51.8
England and Wales.....	8.3	53.7
Sweden.....	7.3	47.9
Germany (1925).....	7.3	53.5
France.....	12.2	53.7
Italy.....	21.3	60.6
Spain.....	8.5	66.5
Hungary.....	27.5	67.3
Bulgaria.....	26.5	74.4
United States—Notestein samples, 1900–1905, adjusted to base of all marriages under 50		
Urban.....	26.2	69.5
Rural.....	36.0	75.3
United States—Philadelphia marriages 1931—, Bossard, adjusted to all marriages under 50 as base		
Women.....	18.4	66.9
Men.....	1.4	42.0

* Sources: Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, McGraw-Hill, 1930, p. 93; Notestein, *op. cit.* p. 30; Bossard, *Amer. Jour. Sociol.* 38, p. 538.

From Tables 10 to 13, we note that marriage tends to be late in Europe, but that even in countries like France and Italy it seems to be later than in the United States. We note also that there has been comparatively little change in this respect in Europe during the past fifty years. When we compare the countries which fought in the World War with those which did not, and compare 1911-1920 with the periods preceding and following, we gather the impression that neither the war nor the peace had much effect on these variables. We note, furthermore, that high percentages of marriage in early age seem to go with high percentages at later ages, and with a low average age of marriage. It would seem that the differences among regions and coun-

TABLE 11*

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN, 1920, WHO WERE IN A MARRIED STATE,
AT SPECIFIED AGES

	15-19	20-24	40-44
United States.....	11.5	50.8	80.0
Massachusetts.....	4.8	36.2	72.3
Kansas.....	11.7	53.8	85.1
North Carolina.....	15.8	56.7	82.5
Australia.....	3.6	33.1	75.9
New Zealand.....	2.1	30.4	78.0
England and Wales.....	1.8	27.0	75.1
Sweden.....	1.1	20.1	69.5
Germany.....	1.2	24.4	77.6
France.....	5.5		74.1
Spain†.....	4.0	40.0	78.2
Italy.....	3.7	31.6	76.9
Bulgaria.....	10.2	63.3	83.9

* Adapted from Warren S. Thompson, *Population Problems*, McGraw Hill, 1930, p. 89.

† Age groups in Spain are 16-20, 21-25, 41-45.

TABLE 12*

AVERAGE AGE OF BACHELORS AND SPINSTERS AT MARRIAGE

England and Spinsters	Wales	France	Italy	Sweden	United States
1881-1890.....	24.59	23.26		26.77	
1891-1900.....	25.06	23.55	23.80†	26.84	
1901-1910.....	25.50	23.72†	23.80	26.39	23.4†
1911-1920.....	25.78	23.67†	24.64	26.45	
1921-.....	25.52		24.33	26.59	
<i>Bachelors</i>					
1920.....	27.51	28.00	27.91	29.22	

* Sources: Thompson, *op. cit.*, pp. 64 and 93.

† For France, data are for 1906-1910 and 1911-1913, respectively; for Italy the data are for 1896-1900; for the United States the figure is taken from the unweighted average of Notestein's urban and rural sample married in 1900-1905, which excludes those who married at over 40 years of age, this figure being 21.9. This is then adjusted to 23.4 to allow for marriages at all ages.

tries are differences in the *whole tendency to marry* and not merely in the *age at which the average marriage takes place*.

Sociological writers are wont to ascribe these differences in the tendency to marry to "social and economic conditions." "Conditions" is perhaps a misleading word, because it suggests that the main causes are a complex of indirect, interactional influences from the material culture, the physical environment, the economic system, and so on. Perhaps the main causes lie in the family system itself, or in other words consist of definite family customs supported by cultural sentiments (attitudes). For example, cultural sentiment throughout most of Europe decrees that marriages shall be made with the consent and often at the initiative of parents, and that a child cannot through marriage escape obligations to his parents. In the United States, on

the other hand, cultural sentiment favors the romantic marriage of free choice. Just as, among the Todas (see Chapter VI), decided changes in "conditions" which would subculturally tend to promote monogamy, nevertheless failed to upset the ingrained family pattern of polyandry, so economic changes in Euro-American culture may be very slow to change our more fundamental family patterns.

When we add to the American married in these tables the divorced, who are more numerous than anywhere in Europe, we strengthen still further our impression that *the United States is a much and an early married country*. At the same time, we cannot jump from this to the conclusion that it is a too much married country. We may find reason in the following pages that its social maladjustments call for still more, and, of course, better, marriage.

J. H. S. Bossard, studying all of the 13,449 marriage licenses granted in Philadelphia and neighboring counties during 1931, in which one or both parties were residents of Philadelphia, found the following results:¹⁷

Percentage of All Marriage Licenses	Men	Women
Under 20.....	1.4	18.0
Under 25.....	41.2	65.6
(adjusted by interpolation)		

These figures, adjusted to a base of "marriages under 50" instead of "all marriages," are shown in Table 10 for comparison with foreign countries. Bossard was particularly interested in finding the age difference between partners. In 10.1 per cent of all the marriages, the woman was the older; in 10.5 per cent, both parties were of the same age (i.e., in whole years at last birthday); in 79.4 per cent the man was the older. In two-thirds of these cases in which the man was older, the age difference was 5 years or less, their median difference being a little over 3 years.

The United States census computes the *median* age at first marriage for the whole United States in 1930 as shown in Table 13.

TABLE 13*
MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST MARRIAGE, UNITED STATES, 1930

	Male	Female
All classes.....	25.6	22.4
Native white of native parentage.....	25.0	22.0
Native white of foreign or mixed parentage	27.3	23.9
Foreign born white.....	27.6	23.4
Negro.....	23.3	20.5

* From 15th Census of the United States, 1930, Population vol. II, p. 838.

The Sex Ratio Varies Greatly among Regions and Classes.—The sex ratio is the number of males in a population per 100 females.

The sex ratio at birth for the white population of the United States birth registration area (most of the country) in 1929 was 105.7. It had not differed materially from this since 1915. Massachusetts figures going back to 1851 show a sex ratio at birth varying, for five-year periods, between the rather narrow limits of 104.8 and 106.7. The negro ratio has always been a little lower, standing at 103.8 in 1929. The various white nativity classes vary but little from the mean. The death rate of males is higher than that of females in infancy and at most later ages. As a result, the sex ratio becomes less with age, except that it increases temporarily in the twenties owing to male immigration. For persons of 80 and over it was 83.9 in 1930. For the population 15 years of age and over it was 105.0, and for the entire population, 102.5.¹⁸

In the United States the sex ratio does not decline with higher ages as much as it normally would, because we are a country of immigration, and immigrants contain a large surplus of males. The sex ratio of immigrants into the United States stood around 150 from 1840 to 1895, then it rose to about 230 during the heavy, industry-attracted immigration of the 1900's, and since then has gradually fallen. During the last few years, when immigration has consisted more largely of wives and other relatives of men already here, the sex ratio has fallen below 100. Our population still shows the effects of the large surpluses of males admitted during the past. But it is now showing the effects of reduced immigration, having fallen from an all-time high sex ratio of 106.0 in 1910 to 102.5 in 1930. However, the sex ratio of the native whites has also declined, because of upward changes in age distribution and because female mortality has been reduced faster than male during the past fifty years.

Western Europe, being a region of emigration, shows, in general, low sex ratios. Some of these were made unusually low by the World War losses, but Table 14 will show that this is not the only cause.

TABLE 14*
SEX RATIOS IN SELECTED COUNTRIES

	Sex ratios of whole population	
	1880	1920
England and Wales.....	94.8	91.2
Sweden.....	94.2	96.4
Germany.....	96.2	93.7
France.....	99.5	90.7
Italy.....	100.5	97.3
Bulgaria.....		99.8

* Adapted from Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

The American sex ratio is highest in the West (107.7 in 1930) and lowest in the Northeast (99.9 in 1930), partly because these regions have been, respectively, regions of immigration and emigration. The Western sex ratio has fallen from 278.9 where it stood in the pioneer days of 1850. The sex ratio varies with the type of community as shown in Table 15.

TABLE 15
SEX RATIOS IN URBAN-RURAL CLASSES, UNITED STATES

Population class	1930 Sex ratio
Farm.....	111.0
Non-farm rural.....	105.0
Cities 2,500-25,000.....	97.2
Cities 25,000-100,000.....	96.3
Cities 100,000-250,000.....	97.1
Cities 250,000-500,000.....	95.6
Cities 500,000 and over.....	100.5

* Adapted from Thompson and Whelpton, *Population Trends in the United States*, McGraw-Hill, 1933, p. 187.

The Relation of Marriage Rate to Sex Ratio.—The generally higher percentages of now-married and once-married found among women is a necessary corollary of the fact that there is an excess of males in our total population, the sex ratio being 105 to 100 among the population of 15 and over (1930). Whichever sex has the larger numbers in a given community generally and quite naturally has the lower percentage living in a married state. Slight variations from this rule occur because some persons have their spouses outside of the community under study. It would seem, further, that the highest percentage of *all persons* who are married would be greatest where the sex ratio is 100 (that is, no excess of either sex). This assumption, however, does not follow necessarily from the earlier one, and is, moreover, shown by the facts to be false. On the contrary, the largest percentage of married persons is found where the sex ratio is about 125 men to 100 women. How can this be true?

It could not be true, of course, if all the members of the less numerous sex were to marry. But always there is a certain residue of unmarried among both sexes, no matter how much one preponderates. The facts indicate that where men are the less numerous sex, they do not take marital advantage of the situation as readily as do women where they are the less numerous. Ogburn has assembled the data regarding sex ratios and percentages of each sex married in 281 American cities of over 25,000 population in 1920. The sex ratios of these cities range from 62.5 to 167.5. If we arrange these cities in order from the most

highly female (62.5) to the most highly male, and proceed in order from one city to the next, we find, as might be expected, that the percentage of males who are unmarried (males not now in married state divided by all males over 15) becomes greater, and that the percentage of females who are unmarried becomes less, as shown in Figure 5. The two curves cross each other at a sex ratio of about 104. But the curve for the males rises only half as fast as the female curve falls. Never, in any single case, are the males less than 35 per




FIG. 5.*—Relation between Sex Ratio of City Populations and Percentages Unmarried of Males, Females, and Both Sexes.

cent or more than 47 per cent unmarried. But the females range from an extreme case of 24 per cent to one of 63 per cent unmarried. Because of this differing behavior of the male and female curve, the curve representing both sexes together continues to fall after passing the point of equality, and reaches its lowest level at sex ratios from 125 to 150. Only after males become so excessive as to outnumber the females three to two, does the percentage of total unmarried persons begin to rise again.

* E. R. Groves and W. F. Ogburn, *American Marriage and Family Relationships*, Holt, 1928, pp. 195, 202. Reproduced by permission of Henry Holt and Company. The cases are 281 cities of over 25,000 population. The two small circles and two small crosses represent the most extreme single cases (cities) as regards unmarried men and unmarried women, respectively.

Various interpretations of this phenomenon are possible. One is that women are economically more dependent and therefore seek marriage more than do men, because in their case it satisfies economic as well as emotional needs. To test this theory Ogburn studied the effect of changing sex ratios upon the marriage percentages of negro women, who are economically much less dependent upon husbands than are white women. He found the sex ratio slightly less effective upon their marriage behavior but only slightly so. This may mean merely that the differences between whites and negroes are not sufficient to overcome the general difference between the sexes in attitude toward marriage. Few women of a masculine community have anything to gain by holding out against the pressure to marry. But to the men of a feminine community the alternatives to marriage are relatively more tempting, more permissible. They need marry only at the behest of their own personal emotions; there is neither social nor economic pressure upon them to do so. Moreover, men in an excessively male community are more directly aggressive in seeking and competing for mates than are women in an excessively female community. In short, the main explanation may lie in the culturally prescribed roles of the sexes rather than in their biological characteristics or economic needs. Before any conclusion is accepted, however, there should be a more thoroughgoing analysis of sex ratios by nativity classes and social classes. The *effective* sex ratios of our Eastern cities may be much lower than the apparent ratios, because many of the males are immigrants who are to a large extent culturally barred from marriage with native women. The high proportions of men remaining single in feminine communities may be due to an actual shortage of women in *their* social class.

In Table 16 we give special attention to the 35-44 age group, because this group marks the end of the rapidly falling part of the curve of singleness. Most of those who have not married by this time never marry. Among these 19 small cities we note, of course, the tendency for a high sex ratio to be associated with a preponderance of unmarried men over unmarried women, and *vice versa*. But we note that the percentage of men who remain bachelors near the age of 40 does not vary greatly from the countrywide figure of 14.3. The extremes are 10.3 and 20.4 for individual cities; the four types of cities vary only from 12.7 to 14.7. But in the case of the women of this same age, all cities but two show greater spinsterhood than the country as a whole, and there is a much larger variation. Individual cities vary from 7.4 to 33.0, and the suburban cities average 22.7 per cent spinsterhood as against about 13.0 for the other types of cities and 10.0 for the national figure. It is striking that Brookline, which has the highest percentage of single women and the lowest sex ratio, at

TABLE 16*

MARRIAGE AND SEX RATIOS IN 19 SELECTED CITIES OF 30,000 TO 70,000 POPULATION IN 1930*

	Sex ratio		Per cent single	
	15-44	35-44	Males 35-44	Females 35-44
<i>Northern and Western Cities</i>				
<i>Industrial</i>				
Haverhill, Mass.	90.7	95.3	15.6	16.2
Passaic, N. J.	95.8	105.5	10.7	10.6
Joliet, Ill.	101.9	108.0	20.4	15.7
Alameda, Cal.	96.3	99.7	12.2	8.6
Average.....	96.2	102.1	14.7	12.8
<i>Suburban</i>				
Brookline, Mass.	63.0	66.8	18.5	
Montclair, N. J.	78.1	81.3	10.3	
Oak Park, Ill.	72.0	84.6	10.4	
Pasadena, Cal.	85.8	77.9	14.6	
Average.....	74.7	77.6	13.4	22.7
<i>"Independent"</i>				
Pittsfield, Mass.	95.0	96.7	13.5	15.8
Poughkeepsie, N. Y.	94.1	98.0	13.6	15.6
Atlantic City, N. J.	88.3	91.0	19.6	15.8
Quincy, Ill.	92.4	93.7	13.7	15.6
Pueblo, Colo.	127.7	108.4	17.3	9.5
Colorado Springs, Colo.	81.5	81.2	11.8	15.6
Fresno, Cal.	96.1	102.9	13.7	7.4
Average.....	96.4	96.0	14.7	13.6
<i>Southern Cities</i>				
Lynchburg, Va.	78.4	80.7	11.5	16.1
Roanoke, Va.	87.7	98.7	10.4	9.6
Charleston, S. C.	78.2	87.0	13.3	12.5
Columbia, S. C.	81.4	91.2	15.6	13.7
Average.....	81.4	89.4	12.7	13.0
Entire United States, 1930.....	100.4	105.1	14.3	10.0

* From an unpublished study of census data by Eleanor Downing, Vassar College. The Independent cities were chosen for these qualifications: considerable distance from any larger city, considerable devotion to commercial functions with no unusual specialization on manufacturing. The Southern cities are also of this character. All the cities were selected without preliminary knowledge of their sex ratios. The average sex ratio of the independent cities without Pueblo is 91.2.

the same time almost makes the high record for bachelors. A greater percentage of men remain bachelors in Brookline where they have a large surplus of women available, than in Pueblo where they are handicapped by a shortage of women in their own age class and a still greater shortage in younger age classes.

Unbalanced Sex Ratios Cause Frustration among Women.—It would seem that women, whose marriage rate varies so much with

the demographic conditions, must suffer more frustrations than men because of the difficulty of securing a mate. Or shall we say that women adapt themselves more readily, both to the married and the single state? We do not know how far the large surpluses of single women in our suburban and some other communities represent a selective migration to these places on the part of women who are relatively indifferent to marriage. It seems reasonable that the bulk of female residents of such communities must desire marriage as much as do women elsewhere.

What is a person to do when he finds himself to be on the excess side of the marriage market? If marriage alone be the goal, the thing to do is of course to migrate, geographically or socially. Many of the spinsters in their thirties in Eastern cities could easily achieve marriage were they to migrate to certain Western and industrial communities where men are in excess. Pure black negro girls in Northern cities might return to the South. The surplus men of mining communities might migrate to suburbs where there are great surpluses of females. The reason why these simple adjustments are not made is not ignorance, but economic difficulty. Here, as at many other points in modern society, the wish for love has been placed in opposition to the economic need, which represents almost all the other wishes of the person. In our earlier society it was not thus.

The probability of marriage for a given person who desires marriage may depend more upon the sex ratio *in the class or group to which he belongs* than upon the sex ratio in his entire community. Within each community are many social strata which do not mix socially, and between which marriage is rare. It is impossible to define such a social stratum exactly and hence to determine its sex ratio. There are always marginal persons who do not quite "belong," but who nevertheless may be brought into one's circle if there is sufficient motive. The desire to marry would seem to be a sufficiently strong motive to lead a person desiring it to extend his acquaintance into the border strata or into neighboring communities. One *can* marry outside his own class or community, but yet the statistics show that relatively few do so.

Marriage Rates of College Graduates.—One of the best sidelights on this class phase of the mate-finding problem comes from the study of marriage among college graduates. Here we have a definable class of persons who can be followed up through their alumni secretaries, to the great joy of the statistician. While there is no perfect correlation of education with wealth or prestige, yet college graduates do




FIG. 6.—Marital Condition of College Alumnae.

Sources: Fifteenth Census of the United States, 1930, Population Vol. II, Chapter on Marital Condition. Unpublished data on alumnae of Sweet Briar College. B. Kenyon, Girl graduates ten years out, *Scribners*, 89: 640-643, June 1931. Roswell H. Johnson, Marriage and birth rates at Bryn Mawr, *Eugenics*, 2: 30, Sept., 1929. Mabel Newcomer and Evelyn S. Gibson, Vital statistics from Vassar College, *Amer. Jour. Sociol.*, 29: pp. 430-442, 1924. Mabel Newcomer, *Marriages and children of Vassar College alumnae*, *Vassar Quarterly*, 16: pp. 98-101, May, 1931. Willystine Goodsell, *Problems of the Family*, *Century*, 1928, pp. 301-306 (referring to several original sources).

Note: The small circles represent known data. The full-line curves are used to

roughly comprise the upper social stratum. Of course their numbers include more fully the members of the professions than they do the persons who owe their high status to business profits.

The American college girl is in an unfavorable position in the securing of a husband. A great deal of publicity has been given to the fact that the woman college graduate is less likely to marry than is the average woman. Even in 1932, when the condition referred to had become much modified, a popular article charged the women's colleges with being "spinster factories."¹⁹

Statistics bearing on this question are often presented in quite misleading ways. Thus, it is misleading to compare colleges as to the percentage of *all* alumnae married, because this gives no idea of how far the alumnae body consists of younger graduates who have not yet been exposed fully to marital opportunity. Again, Southern college women seem to marry at an earlier age than Northern. Figure 6 shows the increase of married status with age and also shows that there has been a general increase in married status at all ages from the classes graduating about 1890 to the classes graduating about 1920. For comparison a curve is drawn showing the percentage of all native white women of each age in 1930 who were or had been married. This curve is not strictly comparable with the college alumnae curves because it represents several generations of women at one time, whereas those college figures which are shown as curves represent particular generations followed through several years. However, it is clear that college women have not yet attained a marriage rate as high as that of the general population of women, of whom about 89 per cent have married by the age of 40. The difference between the different regions and institutions is not as great as usually thought. A more careful examination of figures for particular colleges and particular decades or half-decades indicates that the change with time has been more important than the variation among institutions.

In making the simpler comparisons, the soundest method is to con-

smooth the data where several points on a curve are known; the broken lines represent estimated interpolations between two known points; the dotted lines are used merely to indicate the probable direction of a curve where only one point is known. This probable direction is assumed to be similar to the direction of the general marriage curve of native white women at the same age. This general curve is not logically comparable with the other curves, since it represents many generations at one time, while the other curves each represent a given generation followed through a period of time. A logically comparable curve for the native white women, would, however, not be substantially different in form or location. The figures after the names of colleges represent dates of graduation.

sider only the women of about 35 years of age and over, or, in other words, those at least 15 years out of college. In 1918, Miss Van Kleeck and others found the combined marriage rate for eight Northeastern women's colleges plus Cornell women to be 51 per cent for graduates of 15 years or more standing.²⁰ In 1916, the women graduates of 11 years standing of Ohio State were 54.0 per cent married; of the University of Wisconsin, 51.8 per cent; of the University of Illinois, 54 per cent; of Oberlin, 65.2 per cent; of Kansas Agricultural College, 67.6 per cent; of Iowa State College, 72.7 per cent.²¹ Thus, while the marriage rate was apparently higher in agricultural colleges and smaller co-educational institutions, in the large state universities it was practically the same as in the Eastern women's colleges. Harper found considerably higher rates for Southern women's colleges. In 1926, about 61 per cent of *all* graduates of Agnes Scott, Georgia State College for Women, and Florida State College for Women, were married.²² If Harper had limited his study to those 15 years out of college, he would have found a still higher rate. On the other hand, his study was made a decade later than those previously mentioned, and conditions throughout the country have changed during that period. Figure 6 shows very little difference between the Vassar and Sweet Briar rates for classes around 1930, but suggests that the Sweet Briar graduates marry earlier, as Harper says is true of the Southern college women in general, and also that before the last decade the Sweet Briar rates were considerably higher than any of the Northern rates.

There is some scant evidence to the effect that marriage rates among college women of classes before 1890 were higher than those of the 90's, in other words, that the same historic cycle which we have noted for marriage in general applied also to college women. Thus, Banker gives the following percentages of graduates of Syracuse University as married in 1917:²³

Classes	Women	Men
1862-1871.....	87	87
1872-1881.....	81	90
1882-1891.....	55	84
1892-1901.....	48	73

The last group of classes was from 16 to 25 years out of college and hence sufficiently aged to show almost its final marriage rate. It would seem that the low marriage tendency of the generation born about 1870-1880 affected even the college men.

College men show higher marriage rates than college women, but

generally less than those of men at large. In addition to the Syracuse figures, the following data on men are illustrative:²⁴

Classes	Time of study	Years out of college	Per cent married
Stanford 1892-1900.....	1917	17-25	73.2
Harvard 1899-1901.....	1927	26-28	81
Harvard -1907.....	1917	10 or more	74
Yale -1907.....	1917	10 or more	78
Harvard about 1905-1918.....	1928	10-20	73.8

Do college women marry less than non-college women of the same social stratum? A study of 1000 women in the 1929 *Who's Who in America* yields the figures shown in Table 17.

TABLE 17*
MARRIAGE AND COLLEGE EDUCATION AMONG 1000 WOMEN in *Who's Who in America*, 1929

Profession	Per cent married	Per cent who are college graduates
Physicians.....	38.0	100.0
Lawyers.....	50.0	100.0
Librarians.....	22.2	85.2
Educators.....	35.8	76.1
Missionaries.....	54.5	72.7
Scientific women.....	48.6	70.3
Miscellaneous.....	60.0	70.0
Journalists.....	55.8	60.5
Social workers.....	75.0	54.7
Politicians.....	68.7	50.0
Authors.....	59.9	46.6
Artists.....	51.0	20.0
Musicians.....	67.1	19.7
Actresses.....	64.2	19.4

* Adapted from Bertha B. Tharp, Relation of education to the success of eminent women, *Scientific Monthly*, August, 1933, pp. 134-138.

It is apparent that type of occupation as well as degree of education influences the marriage chances of an educated woman. Library work and teaching, for example, probably do not involve more years spent in education than do the law and social work, yet the marriage chances of the two former groups are much lower than those of the latter. The women physicians may owe their low marriage rates to the time required for training, or to the type of relation to the opposite sex which is involved. It is interesting that nurses show much higher marriage rates than women physicians.

Do Men Tend to Marry Below their Social Status?—Since college men marry more than do college women, and since there are also more of them, it follows that many more college men marry non-college wives than college wives marry non-college husbands. (In 1931 about 75,000 men and 48,000 women received baccalaureate degrees.)²⁵ This is merely suggestive of the generally believed tendency of men to marry downward in the social and educational scale. This tendency would seem to leave an unmarried residue on the upper rungs of the female social ladder, and on the lower rungs of the male ladder. In other words, bachelors of 40 and over are presumably of a lower average socio-economic-educational status than are spinsters of 40 and over.

Unfortunately there is no very accurate evidence for this generalization, though it seems to be supported by general observation. There is statistical evidence for it in the case of college graduates. It is vaguely indicated by the fact that spinsters tend to be concentrated in suburban communities with their greater wealth and prestige, while the bachelors of the country tend to be concentrated on farms, in mining and lumbering regions, and industrial cities. A very indirect indication (and perhaps a cause) is our greater sentimental objection to a marriage between a woman of high status and a man of low status than to a marriage in which these roles are reversed. There is glamour in the story of a prince's choice of a milkmaid, but much less dramatic capital has been made out of the princess' interest in the common sailor or stable hand. Whenever she does give her love to such a lowly male, he must later turn out to be a nobleman in disguise. Andersen tells a fairy tale, indeed, of a princess who offers her kisses to a swineherd, not knowing that he is really a prince. But it turns out that she is merely selling them for a coveted musical toy which he possesses, much to his contempt and that of the reader. This love-rank pattern is related to the cultural patterns regulating *initiative* in social interaction. The man must take initiative in love. But the lower in rank of any two persons must not take initiative. Hence, not much can be done unless the male is also higher in rank. Related also is the cultural sentiment that values woman for her beauty but man for some kind of power. Beauty, according to popular ideology, is independent of rank, whereas the qualities most desirable in a man are related to rank.

Why Persons Fail to Marry.—Hausheer and Moseley questioned 65 unmarried women and 55 unmarried men. Business and professional women gave the desire for a career as the major reason for

their spinsterhood. Female clerks and domestics gave, as major reasons, social obstacles such as lack of contacts. The main reasons given by the men were economic, but they also mentioned social factors such as lack of time to attend social functions, inability to meet the right kind of girl, shyness, or disapproval of modern conditions and of the women of their acquaintance. Seventy per cent of all judged that it was difficult to meet young people of their own age and opposite sex in their community. The younger persons of both sexes mentioned desire for a good time, belief in free love or trial marriage as reasons for remaining single. Office girls and clerks were inconsistent and idealistic in the qualities they desired in a husband, usually stipulating money and college education. Professional and business women desired, rather, common interests and common cultural background. Male salesmen and clerks desired good looks and style in a wife, while professional and business men stressed personality and native ability.²⁶

Popenoe had 100 educated women rank women's occupations according to their degree of marriageability. The average ranking according to these 100 opinions was: secretarial, drama, book-keeping, stenography, journalism, selling, hostess, buyer, nurse, lawyer, teacher, dietitian, librarian, social worker, physician. In a study of Wisconsin teachers, high school teachers of home economics were found to have the highest marriage rate, general elementary school teachers the next, and general high school teachers the lowest.²⁷

Eleanor Wembridge has dramatized the situation in an article "Why Jennie Gets her Man." Why does the educated girl so often fail to get a husband while the less educated more often succeeds? Because, Mrs. Wembridge suggests, the less educated goes in her work and play to the places where there is a surplus of men, while the educated girl places herself in a social environment where there is a plethora of women.²⁸ However, the educated girl has a greater number of desires other than marriage, and she often voluntarily chooses these other advantages in spite of their association with poor marital chances.

The Difficulties of Making Contacts.—A woman's chances of marriage are affected, of course, by the amount of contact with men she has in her daily life. The type of contacts may, however, be more important than their number.

Miss Frances Mitchell ascertained by questionnaire how married Vassar alumnae had met their husbands. She selected three groups, graduated during the periods 1869-1881, 1904-1909, and 1925-1931.

She secured from these groups 50, 48, and 46 replies respectively. Table 18 shows her more important results.

TABLE 18*

PERCENTAGES OF MARRIED VASSAR ALUMNAE WHO MET THEIR HUSBANDS UNDER GIVEN CIRCUMSTANCES

	Average of 3 groups	Classes 1869-81	Classes 1904-09	Classes 1925-31
Church work.....	7	14	4	2
Work or study.....	11	10	10	13
Met in childhood with continuing friend- ship.....	26	28	27	24
Introduced through mutual friends or social events.....	55	46	58	60
	—	—	—	—
	99	98	99	99
Percentage having same address for the girl and her family at the time she met her future husband.....	73	80	77	61

* Unpublished study by Frances Mitchell, Vassar College.

The remarkable fact here is that very few of these women met their husbands in professional or occupational situations, and that this percentage has not materially increased since the 1870's, despite the changes which have taken place since then in women's role and their occupational contacts with men. It is significant also that whereas 28 per cent of the older group "grew up" in the acquaintance of their future husbands, this tendency has not materially decreased, despite the fact that the tendency of the girl to live away from her parents has increased. As a popular feature article puts the case, women's jobs are not the road to the altar, even today. However, similar studies at other kinds of institutions might show different results.

Doubtless, in most women's occupations, the actual number of contacts with the opposite sex is large. Certain of our cultural attitudes, however, inhibit the development of sex attraction and love in situations centered about work. These attitudes do not function equally in all work situations. We expect more love affairs to develop, for example, between business men and their stenographers, than between men school principals and their women teachers, because of differences in the mores in these situations. However, we lack statistics on this point, and it is not at all certain that the weaker social censorship of the contacts of young men and women in the business office actually leads to a greater frequency of marriage following such contacts. Custom may, even, favor certain recreational contacts, as in the case

of business men and their women co-workers, without favoring the type of attitude which leads to marriage. The old tradition that a man should marry a woman of a different class from the woman who would work in his office, store, or laboratory, is not entirely dead, although it is doubtless passing.

On the other hand, social gatherings apart from occupational life, surrounded by a certain atmosphere of esthetic gaiety, and free from "shop" talk, are traditionally match-making situations. The unattached young person at such a gathering is set by culture in an attitude of mate-seeking, and is unusually receptive to the charms of the opposite sex, while he goes to extra trouble to make himself unusually attractive.

Obstacles to Contact in Co-Educational Colleges.—There is a certain inhibiting factor even in many co-educational colleges.

This factor is especially prominent in state universities with a vigorous fraternity culture and social stratification. Such institutions are attended by students from an unusually wide range on the social scale; there is a tendency to protect one's social ranking in college through a certain snobbishness, and there is also a great drive toward social climbing. Fraternities are important agencies in this struggle for prestige. The fraternities and sororities apply considerable social pressure to the "dating" of their members. One gets merits, whether formally recorded or not, for dating with a co-ed of a high-ranking fraternity, demerits for associating with a non-fraternity person. The net result of this competition might seem to be to match each person with one of fairly equal rank, as happens in society in general. But there is another result. It is to discourage matching altogether among the lower ranks. The fire of competitive dating burns hot at the top, smoulders at the bottom. The low-ranking student often has more to gain by abstaining from dating than from dating with a person of his own rank. He may possibly climb higher in the social scale through individual achievements, but his chances of so doing would be hindered if he were to identify himself with the plebeians by openly appearing with a plebeian of opposite sex.

Thus the satisfaction of the wish for response, an important value of co-education, is defeated by the wish for superiority, to which all other objectives are prostituted.

Higher Education and Marriage of Women Are Becoming More Compatible.—Much has been written about the unfitting of girls for marriage by higher education. There is both truth and error in this simple explanation. One important factor which cannot be measured is the tendency of college to *select* those girls who are less likely to attract men. It is possible that the women's colleges during the last century, when it was unusual for women to attend college,

did exert such a selective influence. Many women doubtless developed intellectual interests partly as a compensation for a lesser degree of personal attractiveness. Others developed intellectual interests from other causes and as a consequence lost, or failed to develop, certain traits attractive to the men of those days. Among other things they lost a certain docile stupidity which made many of their less educated sisters attractive to men. No doubt many cultivated needless poses and manners which suggested intellectuality and which repelled many men.

But in any case the modern college girls constitute a more numerous class and also a class which is nearer to the average female in those external traits upon which "attractiveness" seems to depend. At the same time, men are probably less afraid than they were of "intellectual superiority" in their wives. The unmarriageable girl graduate is coming to be a problem of the past.

3. THE PROBLEM OF SELECTING PARTNERS

The generally important fact is that our society contains many groups and classes in which there is a poor balance of the sexes, in consequence of which many persons greatly desiring marriage, and well fitted for marriage, are deprived of it. On the other hand are many persons ill fitted for marriage or relatively indifferent to it, who have nevertheless entered it because of its ease of attainment in the social situation in which they happened to be placed.

Individuation Has Increased the Difficulty.—But this maladjustment is accentuated by another difficulty, namely, the greater differentiation of personality as among individuals, quite regardless of the social classes to which they belong.

Superficially it might seem that, with the greater freedom and mobility of the individual, it might be easier for the young man or woman to find a suitable marriage partner. Actually, it is probably more difficult. In the older rural societies of America and Europe, there was a certain degree of uniformity of attitudes and tastes among the marriageable young people of a community. Even if one's mate were selected by one's parents, this person could be counted on to be a more or less standardized product of the community culture, similar to oneself in those matters which were of importance to marital harmony. It really did not make so much difference as now, whom one married. Where there was an incompatibility of attitudes, it was handled more easily than now. Rights and duties were definite and well understood. The man was understood to be the

master of the family in certain major respects, and it was not so difficult for the woman to submit her own will to his when every other woman was doing the same and nobody thought of doing otherwise. Again, selection of mates by parents is not particularly a source of frustration and suffering in a culture where individualism is generally lacking.

With modern individualism, the demands which prospective mates make upon each other may not be greater in total quantity, but they are more specific and unique. More and more the question becomes: will this person help me to develop my own life and personality, according to my ideals, or will he or she prove a stumbling-block?

Personalities are far from completely formed at the age when marriage is most frequent, and most desirable on biological grounds. The young person in his twenties may find a certain partner quite suitable, but ten years later his needs and desires may have so changed that the former compatibility has become a serious incompatibility.

The Machinery of Selection Has Lagged.—Many community leaders are aware of this problem of finding mates and attempt to solve it by increasing the traditional machinery for its solution: social gatherings and personal mediation. Churches recognize these needs and sometimes intensify their program of young people's gatherings, with greater leniency toward dancing and popular modes of recreation. Some persons attempt to perform the old European and Asiatic office of match-maker, without, of course, giving to their purpose that explicit verbalization which in our culture would defeat the purpose. Privately, however, they pride themselves upon their success in bringing together suitable young people and giving them a start toward the altar. In the wealthy classes of American society, as well as in some immigrant groups, this function becomes obvious and even organized. A society leader, for example, is reported to keep a careful index of eligible unmarried men who may be invited to social events. Thus she helps solve a very real problem which faces the upper-class young women and their parents. Such leaders also develop skill in choosing whom they shall introduce to whom.

Yet there has been no improvement in mate-finding devices comparable to the great increase in individualism. There is a serious cultural lag.

Popenoe suggests as further remedies that we (1) awaken society to the need for more contacts, (2) develop more pleasing personality traits in children, (3) place increased emphasis upon leisure and the balanced life. He thinks there could be a greater development of

extra-curricular activities, of church, Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. social gatherings for both sexes, and of bi-sexual professional clubs. Despite the many contacts of popular high school students, the majority of the students complain that there is not enough social life.²⁹

The Direct Solutions Are Resisted by Cultural Taboos.—In order to solve the problem of marriage so well through wise mating that post-marital solutions would be little needed, we need measures of a more radical and thoroughgoing character. Two revolutionary patterns are needed: the organization of the marriage "market," and bi-sexual initiative in courtship.

(1) Organization of the Marriage Market.—The very use of this phrase brings to light a powerful prejudice. We resent the association of the idea of a market with ideas of love and marriage. This is a powerful sentiment whose existence we must recognize, but it is hardly a rational one. A market, while associated mainly with economic processes, represents a broader principle. The principles of demand and supply apply not only to economic goods and services but to all kinds of opportunities and situations wanted by individual men and women. In the case of marriage the total demand and supply are approximately equal within any community or group where the sex ratio is near 100, and the desire for marriage is approximately equal in the two sexes. But in order that demand may meet supply there must be a market, which in essence means a *centralization of information* concerning unsatisfied wants and the opportunities for their satisfaction. The more centralized a market, the more efficient is its operation and the less there is of unsatisfied demand and of left-over supply.

Were there no cultural resistance in that direction, the natural solution would be organized bureaus of information, not concerning marriage, but concerning individuals. Each bureau would cover a population large enough to represent all types of personality as regards intelligence, occupational interests, recreational interests, and love attitudes. Each available person would doubtless be registered in a much-despised card index, because, sad to say, card indexes have been found to be the most effective device for using such information. The several bureaus would be chained together like chain stores or federal employment bureaus so that an unusual type of demand which could not be supplied in the home bureau might be transmitted to some other bureau more likely to possess the appropriate personality.

Such bureaus might perform the broader function of bringing together persons for friendship, irrespective of marriage desires, and of the same as well as of opposite sex. A "Bureau of Personal Acquaintance" might encounter less cultural prejudice than a "Marriage Bureau." It would also promote a new

type of wish-satisfaction which heretofore has played a small role in our culture, namely, the satisfaction of the wish for new experience through new and varied personal acquaintance.

This proposition sounds highly fantastic and impractical. Our ridicule of the idea reveals an ingrained cultural taboo of which we have been less conscious than we have been of the taboos against trial marriage and sex outside of marriage. Yet this proposed institution, or some other performing the same function, should logically be accepted by those who think that the marriage problem can be solved by "proper mating" alone, to the exclusion of other solutions.*

A Wider Range of Intimate Acquaintance Is Needed.—No matter how wide may be the range of speaking acquaintance, satisfactory matching of personalities is not possible without some means of more intimate acquaintance. These means are dependent upon the customs of conversation and social intercourse. The cut-in dance, for example, may permit a greater variety of contacts during an evening, but the brief time spent with each partner and the superficial and stereotyped conversation give little opportunity for a person to decide even whether it is desirable to renew the contact. It takes time to get acquainted. Is there any way of shortening this time?

In general, social informality aids in the process of getting acquainted. Not hindered by a rigid ritual of approach, two young persons may "come to the point" with greater speed, that is, to a discussion of their personal interests, enthusiasms, and dislikes, and to what they like in each other's personality. Recent changes in social convention have doubtless contributed to this more rapid acquaintance. But still more effective measures are needed to bring an adequate adjustment.

(2) Bisexual Initiative in Courtship.—A related requirement for better mate-selecting machinery is that initiative be taken by both sexes. Women, who in finding mates have been much more at the mercy of social circumstances, need to be permitted a more direct initiative in courtship. Yet such a change seems to transgress one of our most fundamental culture patterns. Many well-educated young women, intelligent about marriage and knowing definitely what they want, despair of any improvement in mate selection because they feel

* Since this was written there has appeared an announcement of a "date" booking bureau started by students at Brooklyn College. It is planned to register each applicant in a card index, indicating his or her personal characteristics and subjects of conversational interest. The purpose is to "bring together young men and young women who otherwise might not be able to make each other's acquaintance." *New York Times*, May 3, 1934, p. 21.

helpless in the passive role which they must play, in order to attain any success whatsoever. If and when a girl receives attention from several men she has power and may truly do the choosing. But if she has been unsuccessful in the preliminary stage of attracting attention, she has no opportunity to use her skill and knowledge. When a man desires love or marriage, he can at least begin immediately to do something about it. He may be unsuccessful, but he can always keep on trying, and this constantly active policy spares him the very serious type of frustration to which women are subject. The woman must pursue her goal through the method of setting traps and lying in wait, while the man pursues his by active search and chase. The woman's method, from what we know of psychiatry, would seem to cause a greater volume of suffering and of neurotic maladjustments, even though her probability of eventual success (in the whole population by the age of forty) is 90 per cent as against the man's 86 per cent.

Actually, more initiative seems to be taken by women today than formerly. The old pattern is not directly violated but evaded. Fortunately the older culture provides certain forms through which the woman may take initiative, such as the invitation to dinner at home. Young women join together to rent an apartment which may be called home, or to arrange a social gathering to which they may invite the desired men. Under such circumstances they may escape both the charge of "chasing after men" and also the supervision of the older generation. Many women possess automobiles which they may request men to drive for them, or they may have important duties in which they may request male escort. It is by such indirect approaches that the much-needed equality of initiative in courtship will probably come about.

4. MARRIAGE LEGISLATION

Marriage Legislation Has Been Largely a Negative Solution.—Society has attempted to solve the problem of mate selection in ways less visionary than those we have discussed in the preceding pages. It has, indeed, used legislation toward this end. But these efforts of legislators and other "practical" men have been negative rather than positive. They have been efforts to prevent unwise marriages rather than to facilitate intelligent courtship and wise choice.

It is well recognized that restrictive marriage laws are weak instruments because many people can and will arrange their love life and even prolonged living together without benefit of clergy. Neverthe-

less the social advantages of formal marriage are still so great that certain limited results can be achieved through marriage legislation.

The Legal Nature of Marriage.—Let us look into the underlying legal patterns of marriage as it is today. It is often referred to as a contract between two persons. This is misleading. The parties may make a contract to enter the state of marriage, and financial damages may be secured by the loyal party against the one who refuses to go through with the ceremony. But if the parties actually marry, their relations thereafter are relations of *status* and not of *contract*. That is to say, their rights, duties, are now standardized by law and custom, uniform for all couples. The contract that binds them is like the printed "form contracts" often used in business, but without any amendments typed or written beneath. In drawing up this uniform code the individuals concerned have had no part. They might agree in writing that in *their* marriage the husband need not support the wife, or that *they* would recognize incompatibility but not adultery as a ground for divorce. But such special agreements would be unenforceable; their local judge would treat their marriage as he would all other marriages in his jurisdiction, without regard to special private agreements.

The status known as Christian, Euro-American marriage has come down to us, with some modifications, from the medieval church. In those ages the church gradually took over the control of marriage from the civil authorities, which had held such control in ancient Rome. It embodied the rules of marriage in its "Canon Law." With the Reformation, the church lost its ultimate control in much of Northern Europe, although it retained a large practical control enforceable through local public opinion and the power of dismissal from the church. In some Catholic countries, such as Austria and Poland, the state still, in effect, rubber-stamps the laws of the church as far as the members of that church are concerned, and requires no "license" or ceremony other than what the church itself provides. In France, on the other hand, the state has taken complete control, so that a couple cannot be married at all except by a state officer, the religious ceremony being an optional superfluity. It is interesting that England, which broke from the Catholic Church in earlier days, when *some* church was considered necessary to the individual, still gives the Church of England much of the authority formerly held by the Church of Rome. No government license or permit is required for a Church of England marriage, although civil officers grant licenses and perform ceremonies for persons who wish to marry out-

side of church auspices. Also there existed in England the "common law" marriage, which under certain conditions treated a couple as legally married even if there had been no civil or religious ceremony or permit. The conditions were either: (a) that they had mutually agreed that they *were* married (*per verba de praesenti*), or (b) that they had agreed that they would be married (*verba de futuro*), and then followed this by actual cohabitation. Of course it was easy to prove the existence of such agreements if both parties wanted to do so. The difficulties arose when they came later into disagreement as to the continuance of their relationship. If one party could prove that the prescribed conditions of agreement had existed, then the party wishing to break the relation was held as he would be by legal ceremony, and even a subsequent ceremonial marriage of his could be held bigamous and void and its offspring illegitimate.

In 1932 much publicity was given to a New York case in which a woman, who had been presumed to be the mistress of a deceased man of wealth, proved that she was his common law wife, and thus secured her right to half of his estate. Ex-mayor O'Brien, who was then Surrogate Judge in New York City, wrote the decision. On one occasion, testimony proved, the couple had appeared together in public with the woman wearing a new wedding ring, and met a third party who, remarking upon the ring, was told "we are doubly married now." This statement the judge found to constitute sufficient *verba de praesenti*, and since it was followed by actual cohabitation, the couple were judged to have had full married status. They did not have a ceremonial marriage, and could not have done so without risking bigamy prosecution, because the man had been divorced by a former wife under the New York law which forbids remarriage by the defendant.³⁰

While England herself abolished common law marriage in 1753, requiring then an Anglican Church ceremony for every marriage, except in the case of Quakers and Jews and later admitting a civil ceremony as alternative, most of the American colonies had already inherited common law marriage, and in 1932 twenty-four American states including New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Ohio still retained it. In 1933 New York State abolished it.

New England, on the other hand, has no common law marriage in her history or traditions, and in general gives unusually strict control of marriage to her civil authorities. There the Puritan reaction against the Church of England outlawed at the very outset both the religious authority over marriage and also the common law marriage, and regarded marriage as a status to be granted to individuals exclusively by the civil government. Until 1686 there were no religious

marriage ceremonies in New England. Since then, the custom has become similar to that in the other states. Namely, the state grants the permissive certificate, and the minister may, and in most cases does, perform the ceremony. In so doing he is regarded as an officer of the state; he may not perform marriages without a clergyman's license, which holds good, of course, only in the state granting the license.

The term marriage "license" comes from the days when a bishop could grant special permission to a lower clergyman to perform a given marriage without the previous publication of the *banns*, which was generally required. The license is now a permit-granted by the state rather than by higher church authorities, and it is a standard requirement rather than a permit for a special privilege.

About one-fourth of all marriages in the United States are estimated to be performed by civil officers.³¹ A study at the University of Minnesota showed, however, that clergymen performed at least 95 per cent of the marriages in a rural sample of the past generation.³²

American Marriage Laws Tend toward Increasing Stringency.—Beginning in 1897, except for the much earlier action of Maine in 1858, the states have been enacting new laws requiring a period of waiting between the announcement of intention to marry and the actual performance of the marriage. There are two types of law, one granting the license upon application but forbidding the ceremony until after a specified time, the other withholding the certificate itself until after the time has elapsed. The latter type, which is followed in most of the New England States, is more effective since it prevents evasion by a misdating over the signature of the officer who performs the marriage. The most commonly prescribed waiting period is five days; but many states have less.³³ These laws re-establish through governmental procedure a principle which was formerly embodied in the ecclesiastical *banns*. In New England, until 1850, the town governments were obliged to publish all marriage intentions. Mere publication of intention today proves an ineffective control, since nobody in the public may care to investigate or complain; the new laws in theory place the responsibility of investigation upon the government officials. France still publishes civil *banns*.

"The purpose of these laws," says Groves, "is to prevent illegal marriage, to discourage the marriage of non-residents of the state, and to give those who are marrying hastily and impulsively time to ponder before making the final decision."³⁴

* Ernest R. Groves, *Marriage*, Holt, 1933, p. 175.

The marriage license is commonly obtained from the town or city clerk of the place where the marriage is to take place. The states vary in procedure. To note extremes, Maine has 626 officers who are empowered to issue marriage licenses, New Jersey has 578, while California has 63, Rhode Island 39, and Maryland 25. In some states and Canadian provinces notaries may issue licenses. In Toronto it was found that four-fifths of the notaries empowered to issue licenses were jewelers.

In American states, the most common age requirement for marriage without consent of parents is 21 for men and 18 for women. With consent of parents, the most common requirement is 18 for boys and 16 for girls, but several states place lower limits. In two states, presumably, the old English common law provision holds which permit a boy of 14 and a girl of 12 to marry with parental consent.

There is a trend toward raising the legal minimum age of marriage, but it is very gradual and much resisted. Much of the resistance is due to the attitude that a young girl who has become pregnant should not be forced to bear her child illegitimately.³⁴ Resistance is also due to the fear that higher age requirements would cause a larger volume of premarital sex relations.

The age requirements of marriage are frequently violated because the law allows the license issuer to take the sworn statement of the parties without compulsory investigation, or does not require the presence of both parties at the issuing office. In some cases license issuers have taken the statement of parents over the telephone, or of persons who merely pretended to be parents. The trend is toward the requirement of more adequate proof.

There is also a trend toward raising the age of consent, that is, the age at which a girl may voluntarily give herself to sexual intercourse without causing the man to be guilty of rape.

Most states forbid marriage to insane persons and idiots, but it is impossible to detect and eliminate all such cases without a thorough examination, which the law seldom requires. North Carolina and North Dakota have taken a forward step by requiring of every one a medical certificate of freedom from tuberculosis in the infectious stages (modified in North Carolina in 1933). In 1926 New York State added to its requirements a statement by the applicants that they are free from venereal disease. Several other states have this requirement. Wisconsin, Alabama, Louisiana, North Dakota, Oregon, and Wyoming have adopted a more effective measure, requiring that the man present a *medical certificate of freedom from venereal disease*. But even

this fails to control the situation entirely, for the medical examinations are often superficial, some consisting merely in the doctor's asking the patient a few questions.

Marriage between relatives closer than first cousin are almost everywhere forbidden. Some states forbid marriages of first cousins, some of second cousins, some of certain classes of in-law relatives.

In the South, marriage between a white and a person of any appreciable degree of black blood is forbidden. The tendency is toward the tightening of this provision. Virginia, which had formerly defined the negro as a person with one-sixteenth of negro blood, now defines him as one having any trace whatsoever of negro blood, and has instituted a system of personal certificates for the more careful enforcement of the law.

Not all the bars to securing a marriage license, however, cause a marriage to be null and void if by chance the law is evaded and the ceremony actually occurs. This is true of some age requirements, for example. A person may be forbidden to marry because of his age, yet if he does so, the marriage may be binding. Marriages solemnized by unauthorized persons, or by evading certain other technical requirements, may nevertheless be legally binding. Such are matters of court decision.

Bigamous marriage is everywhere in the United States forbidden, and is legally null and void even if the marriage ceremony is performed. States vary in the measures taken to prevent bigamy, some requiring the divorce certificate to be filed by a person who was previously married and divorced. In many cases the law is evaded and a person lives for years, supposedly legally, with a second mate while the first is still living and undivorced.

Non-resident Marriages Defeat the Legislative Purpose.—The great obstacle to the effectiveness of marriage requirements is the fact that most persons are within reach of some state where the requirements are less strict, or of some locality where the officers are known to be lax in checking up the facts. Richmond and Hall discovered 57 marriage market towns in the United States, so-called Gretna Greens, where officials and often clergymen make a business of marrying out-of-town couples with the least possible investigation and delay. Not one of these towns is in a state having a complete advance-notice law. In one such town a pastor had been unfrocked and another dropped by his church for engaging in the easy marriage business. Such marrying parsons have split fees with taxi drivers who brought couples

to their offices, and often advertise their business with large signs. In one town even the railroad men were in the game, signaling by whistle how many prospective couples were aboard the incoming train.³⁵

A well-known "marrying parson" who recently died estimated that in his fifteen years of function in Elkton, Md., a famous "Gretna Green" within easy reach of the large eastern cities, he had joined 50,000 persons in holy matrimony.

To reduce the number of such marriages, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Vermont, and Wisconsin have adopted marriage evasion acts. These acts declare that the marriage of a resident of the state is null and void in that state, if it violates the requirements of the state and was contracted in another state in order to evade those requirements. If, however, one of the parties is innocent of intent to evade the law of his home state, the marriage is valid. Likewise the marriage of non-residents is void if they intentionally came into the state to evade requirements which would have prevented their marriage in their home state. Such laws are of doubtful effectiveness, but indicate the trend of efforts toward stricter control.

In 1923 Nebraska, seeking to control marriage more strictly, passed a law requiring 10 days' advance notice. The marriage rate of the state had been, in 1922, 9.35 per 1000 population, approximately normal. In 1923 it dropped to 6.82 and in 1924 to 3.12 per 1000, a drop far beyond anything that can be accounted for by economic conditions. Presumably one-half or two-thirds of Nebraska couples marrying that year did so outside the state. In 1924 the law was repealed, and the marriage rate climbed back gradually to 6.98 in 1926 and 7.02 in 1927.

In California, the so-called "gin marriage law" went into effect in August, 1927. This required a three-day notice before a marriage license was issued; previously license was obtainable on application. For the remaining five months there was a decrease of 3177 marriages in the state as compared with 1926. In the three adjoining states of Arizona, Oregon, and Nevada, there was in all an increase of 2329 marriages during the same period.³⁶

In 1933 North Carolina repealed her requirement of a doctor's health certificate, and substituted the much weaker requirement that the male sign an affidavit that he has been free for two years from tuberculosis and venereal diseases. This weakening of the law was brought about largely by pressure from the border counties, which were losing money from the practice of their residents going into border states to marry. It was estimated that North Carolina lost \$75,000 to \$100,000 per year in license fees because of her health-certificate requirements. Women's and welfare organizations for some years had exerted enough counter pressure to prevent the repeal, but they were finally defeated.³⁷

It must not be assumed that all out-of-state marriages are to evade

the personal legal requirements in the home state. Many are to avoid publicity or to avoid delay and red tape, as the Nebraska events seem to indicate. Most of them, however, seem to be for the purpose of evading age restrictions. Thus only 12.4 per cent of Philadelphia marriages involved brides under 20, but 56.5 per cent of Elkton, Md., marriages of Philadelphians did so.³⁸

Legislation of Traditional Types Impotent; But New Forms of Legislation May Arise.—Marriage reformers have therefore despaired of any more effective regulation of marriage without uniform state legislation. To this end several states in 1912 appointed Commissioners on Uniform State Laws to meet with the representatives of other states, with the result that the standard marriage evasion act mentioned above was adopted by several. In New England there is unofficial co-operation between the states in their marriage legislation. But for a long time there are likely to be states which make profits for certain of their citizens by remaining lax and taking advantage of the strictness of other states. Many persons and organizations advocate federal marriage control. This would require a constitutional amendment. Before this occurs, if it ever does, there will probably be much more rapid advance along non-legislative lines in improving the marriage situation.

Whether or not it can be carried out, the policy of preventing very young marriages is probably sound in theory. Hart and Schields have found statistically that marriages under the age of 22 are much more likely to breed difficulties than those between 22 and 29. They determined this by comparing the age-at-marriage distribution of 500 cases before Philadelphia Domestic Relations Courts with the age distribution of 500 marriage license applications selected at random in Philadelphia. Where both parties are under 22, the risk of becoming a Domestic Relations Court case is 3.7 times the average risk for all cases. If the bride is under 22, she runs only an average risk if the groom is from 22 to 24, a risk of 1.5 times average if the groom is 25 to 34, and of 3.7 times average if the groom is under 22. If the woman is married between 22 and 29 to a man a few years older than herself, her risk is about half the average risk.³⁹ A study by Hart in Cincinnati showed that where a woman under 20 marries a man more than five years her senior, the risk of divorce is several times as great as when a woman over 20 marries a man near her own age.⁴⁰ There seem, then, to be two types of dangerous situations: extreme youth in both parties, and extreme youth in the bride coupled with a large age difference.

The provisions barring venereal disease and insanity help to reduce

the number of marital failures. The provisions barring tuberculosis and feeble-mindedness serve hygienic or eugenic purposes, but no one has shown that marriages of such persons are less successful *as marriages* than are others.

In a sample of 134 *forced* marriages, 57 per cent were unstable, but these are marriages which even the strictest laws facilitate by giving power to judges to make exceptions in their favor, in order to avoid illegitimacy.⁴¹

In general, there is hope for little improvement of American marriage through the kinds of legislative measures with which states have been experimenting. What we need are measures making sound marriages easier to arrive at, not measures forbidding unions which are known or guessed to be dangerous. To say that legislation is impotent to affect the realities of marriage is perhaps too sweeping a statement. It is true of legislation which merely restricts the rights of individuals who want to marry. But legislation creating new agencies and imposing new responsibilities upon agencies and officials might be positively helpful. Thus, if expert investigation and guidance for marriage candidates, and pre-marriage courses of instruction for adolescents, were made universal and compulsory, something might be gained through legal compulsion.

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CHAPTER XII

DIVORCE

1. HUMANE DIVORCE AS A PROPOSED SOLUTION

Personalities Change after Marriage.—Let us assume that the machinery of mate-finding is already perfected; that each person who desires marriage can easily find a person of opposite sex to whom his personality can make an adjustment as satisfactory as the happier 50 per cent of couples now achieve. Are the emotional problems of marriage thereby solved? Can we now expect the great majority of couples to live happily "ever after"?

To assume that scientific pairing would thus eliminate the major difficulties is to ignore the ceaseless tendency of personalities to change. Psychologists have said so much about the early childhood foundations of personality and the difficulties of changing habits after maturity, that we have overlooked the important types of changes which do occur in adult life.

Marriage Is Essentially a Trial.—Easier divorce really implies the principle of trial marriage. This phrase carries a shocking sound to conservative ears. However, it is one thing to advocate this principle; another to point out that it already exists. One out of every six marriages in the United States is a trial marriage ending in such failure that its termination is officially pronounced by a judge. We cannot say how many more fail in reality without being juridically liquidated.

Even with seemingly well-adjusted couples who marry with due forethought there are many failures. Whether the law or the church declares it indissoluble or not, marriage is essentially a trial. The science of human relations has not yet arrived at the point where the trial and error process can be fully dispensed with through correct judgment at the outset.

There are many who think that the solution of the marriage problem lies in a frank recognition of the necessity of this trial and error more than it does in efforts to sift the unwise from the wise marriages in advance. They claim that, barring a negligible minority of obviously misguided matings, the only test of the adaptability of a couple

is actual experience in living together. This principle is recognized in limited forms which do not break with our traditional mores. The conventional period of courtship, with its intensive co-activity and intimacy, stopping short of sexual intercourse, is supposed to perform this trial function. The trend toward greater freedom, and toward a greater variety in the shared activities in courtship, and toward co-education, is approved for its tryout value by many who would balk at any change in marriage or sex customs. Those of more radical views claim that lovers will never reveal their whole personalities in such courtship nor develop all the important interaction patterns which result from full cohabitation. A couple cannot truly *know* each other, or discover the possible germs of failure in their relationship, until it is too late.

While ordinary marriage under modern conditions may be regarded as "trial marriage" in this broad sense, the term trial marriage is used with two more specific meanings. It may mean: (a) cohabitation without the legal ceremony, or (b) certain proposed changes in law which would create a new kind of legal marriage status differentiated from the present standard marriage.

Unmarried Cohabitation.—According to Groves, in his summary of changes in the family during the year 1928, observers reported the belief that in large cities there was a considerable increase in the number of young couples living together without legal marriage.¹

In form this tendency looks like a reversion to the principle of common law marriage. In its social role and significance it is, however, something quite different. Common law marriage was related to ignorance, to unexpected pregnancies, to a policy of drifting on the part of the less-educated classes. This modern tendency is a more deliberate policy, backed more or less by a definite philosophy, and practiced by young people of high education and "good" social background. It thrives in the Greenwich villages, and the rooming-house and downtown apartment areas of large cities where anonymity can be had and landladies ask no questions. It is encouraged by social mobility.

The first woman judge of New York City came to grief partly as a result of her method of handling a case which was apparently of this sort. A deaconess of a Methodist Church informed a policewoman that an unmarried girl was living with a certain man in the neighborhood. The girl, an artist's model, about twenty years of age, was arrested, without warrant, brought before the judge, convicted of vagrancy within two hours, and committed to the Florence Crittenton Home pending investigation. She was not informed by the judge of her

legal rights nor allowed to communicate with relatives before conviction. Subsequently, the investigation reported her character as "excellent," and she was finally released. The judge was shown to have an unusually high record of conviction in vice cases. At the same time certain police officials were under fire for "framing up" vice charges against women for blackmail. Among the results of the whole campaign of investigation was the removal of this woman judge from the bench as unfit for judicial service. One of the five charges upon which she was convicted was her illegal handling of the case described, including arrest without warrant, failure to inform defendant of legal rights, and conviction upon hearsay testimony.²

Here we see illustrated certain characteristics of American law. The text of the law, in sex and family spheres, tends to correspond to the most conservative mores and not to the newer mores which actually govern large communities and groups. On the other hand, the enforcement of the law is difficult because the technicalities of procedure give the defendant a great advantage over the prosecution. Even when the methods of enforcement are wholly legal, there is a tendency to regard "excessive" enforcement as "persecution." The defendant may say, in effect, "Yes, common sense would judge me guilty, as it would thousands of others, but just try to prove my guilt *legally!*!" The result is much liberty of behavior coupled with a hypocritical ideology.

It is a great mistake to think that the policy of unmarried cohabitation can be followed in any great part of present-day American society. It seriously limits the couple's social contacts outside of a certain class, particularly with their parental families, and involves risks to the happiness and permanence of the relationship in addition to the ordinary personality risks. For if one of the partners happens to become drawn toward more contacts within conventional circles, he or she may be tempted to withdraw from the relationship. Only with a change in the *general* mores of the country can such a pattern become widespread, or safe for the individuals who practice it. It is not likely that the areas of high mobility, anonymity, and apartment dwelling will increase as rapidly as they have in the past few decades. The residential trend is now toward decentralization and suburbanization.

Lindsey's Companionate Marriage.—The other meaning of trial marriage implies a proposed change in legal marriage. The best-known proposal is that of Judge Ben Lindsey called companionate marriage.³ He points out that this is not "trial marriage," but his emphasis on this point merely means that he does not wish it confused with the

other possible meanings which have been attached to the latter term. Companionate marriage according to Lindsey would involve three principles: divorce by mutual consent in the absence of children, complete legalization of birth control information, and the regulation of alimony according to the actual needs of the divorced partners instead of by the traditional principle that alimony is a normally presumed right of the woman against the man. The companionate marriage automatically becomes an ordinary marriage upon the birth (or perhaps conception) of the first child. Clearly the only legal difference between the proposed companionate and the ordinary married state is in the *divorce provisions*. If the couple have no children they would be able to get divorce through the mere request of *both* parties, after some lapse of time to prevent a hasty decision. If they have children, they could get divorce only through the present laws, that is, through the one proving the other guilty of one of the recognized offenses which are grounds for divorce in their state. This proof would have to be established, as at present, without the collusion of the guilty party.

Lindsey's proposal, therefore, boils down to a proposed change in the divorce laws rather than in the marriage laws. The only principle in it which is completely new to American law is divorce by mutual consent, and that only in case of childless couples. This principle is already in force in several European, Christian countries, and does not involve any break with our broader Euro-American mores. Lindsey has skilfully placed his proposal in a realm just a little beyond the existing American mores, not far enough beyond to cause its wholesale condemnation as "immoral" or "abhorrent," but yet far enough advanced to gain the approval of a large body of moderate progressives. By giving it the well-sounding title, "companionate marriage," he has excited a certain curiosity which would be lacking if he gave it the more accurately descriptive title, "limited divorce by mutual consent." Thus the idea attracts people who crave something sensational but would balk at any really radical change. These comments imply no attack upon the proposal but are meant to illustrate the tactics necessary in any deliberate social change.

Lindsey's proposal was attacked in a public debate by a reputable speaker who took a much more radical stand. This speaker contended, in effect, that Lindsey's plan merely gave love a little more rope and then tied it up securely to a new and firmer legal hitching post, whereas the ideal was to set love completely free from law. Lindsey answered that law was still needed to protect

the girl from the risk of bearing a child without a father who could be held legally responsible for support and care.

The avowed object of Lindsey's companionate proposal is not to increase the actual amount of divorce, but to make more honest and direct the procedure of trial and error which is now carried on through evasion of the law. Lindsey would abolish "bootleg" divorce. Or, as one Nevada official justifies his liberal state policy (which does not, however, technically accept the mutual consent principle), "You cannot change human nature by law; so what we are doing is to make human nature legal."⁴

Many persons think that a liberalization of marriage and divorce laws would tend to keep love more closely within marital bounds. In Lindsey's solution they see a desirable alternative to free love.

Many persons who oppose easier divorce on the ground that it would encourage divorce seem to overlook the fact that the separation of two former lovers is painful and tragic in itself regardless of how the law treats it. It is only after prolonged conflict and suffering that a man and woman break such a bond as marriage. Frequently the legal difficulties merely divert the mind from the essential problem of whether the divorce is desirable, to the extraneous technical problem of how it can be obtained. Partners who might become reconciled if nothing more than the mutual wish were necessary for divorce, instead become absorbed in "getting something on" each other, and in so doing develop additional and needless hatreds which bar any reconciliation.

Lindsey's companionate ideology, with its differentiation of treatment of childless marriages, is, however, open to a serious criticism which does not apply to the general proposal for more humane and honest divorce. We shall discuss this in the next chapter.

2. TRENDS IN DIVORCE LAW

The History of Divorce.—Among the Romans of the Empire period and among the ancient Teutons marriage and divorce were matters of civil contract. During the Middle Ages the church gradually arrogated to itself the control over marriage and divorce. These came under the canon (church) law rather than the civil law. Ecclesiastical control reached its climax in the declaration of the Council of Trent in 1563, which redeclared marriage indissoluble for any reason. This has remained the official doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church to this day. Catholics cannot be prevented, of course, from making

use of the civil divorce legislation, but if they do so they risk expulsion from the church.

However, loopholes have always been necessary. The church, during the Middle Ages and later centuries, while refusing to *dissolve* a marriage, would *annul* a marriage for at least fourteen different causes. That is, it would declare that the marriage was invalid and never really existed, thus giving the parties freedom to remarry. Among these causes for annulment were impotence, disparity of worship, and consanguinity. Again, the church would grant separation from bed and board where it regarded the continued cohabitation of the parties as dangerous, but this divorce *a mensa et thoro* did not allow the remarriage of either party. During the more corrupt centuries of church history, the granting of annulments to wealthy or powerful individuals became a profitable business.

The Protestant Reformation demanded that marriage be restored to the control of the civil authorities, and that it be regarded again as a private contract which could be dissolved for just cause. This demand succeeded temporarily in England, in Cromwell's Civil Marriage Act of 1653. But this act soon became inoperative under the counter-revolutionary Restoration, and the Church of England came to control marriage by rules similar to the canon law of the Roman Church. Until 1857, divorce was possible only by act of Parliament, which cost a minimum of £500. Since 1857 the high court at London and since 1912 certain provincial courts have been allowed to grant divorce. Adultery still remains the only ground for divorce. Desertion and incurable insanity are not grounds. In 1912 the Royal Commission on Divorce reported, after a five-year study of the problem. They recommended that five other causes for divorce be added, but so far the cultural resistance, supported by both the Roman Catholic and Anglican Churches, has prevented any change.⁵

In Italy, Spain, and the Irish Free State the canon law of the church has prevailed and absolute divorce has been practically nonexistent. In Austria the Catholic law of no absolute divorce applies to persons who were Catholics at the time of marriage, but not to members of other churches. Jews could secure divorce by mutual consent after three attempts at reconciliation.

The Orthodox Church in Eastern Europe has never been so ascetic as the Roman Church in its family ideology. Orthodox priests may marry, and the retention of this privilege was specially permitted to the Uniate Church of the Ukrainian people when it joined the Roman Catholic body. Absolute divorce on several specified grounds, includ-

ing physical cruelty, has long been legal in Orthodox countries, and remarriage was permitted. The Orthodox Church does not permit judicial separations, but only absolute divorces. In Greece a man could get a divorce on the ground of the wife's attending a theatre without his consent. In Bulgaria, although marriage and divorce continue today to be under the exclusive control of the church, the ecclesiastical authorities are preparing new and more liberal legislation. This will allow as grounds for divorce: "infidelity, lunacy, epilepsy, the disappearance of either party for three years, deliberate separation for one year, imprisonment for three years or more, gambling, drunkenness, physical or moral cruelty, immoral living, attempt to murder, cruelty to children, excommunication, apostasy, or the abandonment of one for another Christian church by one party without the consent of the other."

The Bulgarian church allows a person only two divorces and three marriages.⁶ In Poland recently five Orthodox bishops and an archbishop have been indicted for abusing their powers by granting divorces to persons who became members of the Orthodox Church for the purpose of obtaining divorce. A few years ago the Polish "Reno" was a Calvinist church in Wilna.⁷

National and Regional Variations in Divorce Law.—The variations in the American state laws in part reflect the early cultural differences of the several colonies. Certain regional uniformities of attitude are discernible. In general the civil contract concept of marriage, with its divorce for just "causes," the ideal which found expression in Milton's writings and Cromwell's legislation, prevailed. But this was most characteristically true of Puritan-settled New England. New York follows more closely the canon law and the Church of England traditions. Traces of the patriarchal double standard of aristocratic England still survive in some Southern states. Thus a North Carolina decision held that a single act of adultery by a husband was not sufficient to constitute ground for divorce, even though that single act was the cause of venereal disease which he transmitted to his wife. In Texas the husband's adultery must be accompanied by desertion; in Kentucky a single adultery of the husband is not sufficient ground unless through it he contracts venereal disease. In South Carolina no divorce at all is permitted, and adultery appears to be regarded as more excusable than elsewhere.

Nowhere in the United States is there divorce by mutual consent. Mutual consent, according to the law, is "collusion," and this prevents either party from getting the decree. "Incompatibility" is so

frequently said to be the ground of many divorces that it is well to note that legally there is no such thing as divorce for incompatibility in this country. The word implies an interactional concept which is utterly foreign to American divorce law. Incompatibility may sneak into court in the more liberal states under the legal phrases of "cruelty," "mental cruelty," "personal indignities rendering life burdensome," "gross neglect of duty." But always, even in Nevada, the case must come before the judge as an offense by *one* party wronging the other, innocent party.

In France, divorce by mutual consent was established by the Revolution but subsequently repealed. French divorce, however, is comparatively liberal in that it can be granted for *injure grave*, which covers almost any serious offense to the plaintiff; that publicity is forbidden; and that the court listens receptively to the parties' "own stories," including hearsay evidence, which would be unrecognized in an American court. But recently French courts have become less inclined to accept jurisdiction over aliens.

Norway, Sweden, and Denmark introduced divorce by mutual consent in the period of 1918-1922. Before that their laws were more liberal than those of England, wilful desertion having been the common ground used. Now, however, 75 per cent of the divorces are by mutual consent, alleging "incompatibility." A year's waiting period is required except in divorces for adultery, criminality, venereal disease, or incurable insanity, and, in Sweden, three years' wilful absence. The parties are regarded as having equal rights in money, property, and children; the wife has no inherent right to alimony. The parties usually make their own contract regarding the children. Damages for breach of promise are also abolished except where illegitimate children have been born.⁸ The mutual consent law, as might be expected, caused the divorce rate to rise in all three countries, but their rates are all much less than half the American rate despite greater legal freedom.

Mexico overthrew the Roman Catholic doctrines with the revolution of 1917, and several of its states established some very radical divorce laws, some making an apparent bid for American business. In 1923 Yucatan went as far as Russia, granting divorce on request of either party without specified grounds, but this law was declared unconstitutional in 1926. Campeche permits its Bureaus of Vital Statistics to grant divorces, but such a non-judicial decree is not apt to be recognized, even in other states of Mexico.⁹

In Cuba, as well as Mexico, divorce by mutual consent is obtainable,

but not legally by aliens. However, there is said to be an inadequate check-up of the nationality of the plaintiff so that many aliens do secure decrees.

Russia is the arch-radical in divorce legislation. There, the defendant may not even know that his mate is requesting divorce until he receives notice by mail that the decree has been granted. The Russian court nevertheless safeguards the interests of children in divorce, and is careful to prevent the evasion of economic responsibility. It does not hesitate to compel the wife rather than the husband to pay alimony if economic circumstances render that course just. In old Russia the Orthodox Church controlled all marriage and divorce. Absolute divorce was permitted on some grounds, but was infrequent.

The divorce laws of today may be roughly graded as follows. Each grade after 2 recognizes all the grounds in the previous grades and adds new ones.

GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

1. The will of the husband, subject to certain limitations, such as return of dowry. No divorce to wife.
2. No complete divorce, i.e., no privilege of remarriage.
3. Adultery only; remarriage of guilty party forbidden or subject to special conditions.
4. Other wrongs and grave personal defects: cruelty, desertion, habitual drunkenness, insanity, impotence, felony, etc.
5. Same with more liberal interpretation, taking the sufferings of plaintiff more as criterion rather than specific immorality or defect of defendant: mental cruelty, indignities, neglect, invincible aversion, etc.
6. Mutual consent; unnecessary to prove either party guilty of an offense or defect.

COUNTRIES, STATES, CODES

Mohammedan law, China until recently, patriarchal cultures in general.	
South Carolina, canon law of Roman Church, Ireland, Italy.	
New York, District of Columbia, England. Several Protestant Church codes.	
Middle Atlantic and Southeastern states generally; Orthodox Church countries.	
Most Western and New England states, France, Czechoslovakia.	
Ancient Greeks, Scandinavia, Federal district of Mexico, Yucatan, Lower California, Morenos, Cuba, Jewish law, special procedure in Japan, Roumania.	

7. Upon request of either party, without grounds, regardless of will of other. Soviet Russia, Yucatan (1923-1926).

Changes in American Divorce Law Mostly toward Greater Stringency.—Most of the actual changes which have been made recently in divorce legislation in the United States have not been in the direction suggested by Lindsey. They have been rather efforts to make divorce more difficult, on the theory that the present ease of divorce is one cause of marital maladjustment. If we could make divorce more difficult, it is claimed, people would be more careful in the selection of mates. If they had less hope of getting out of a marriage once made, they would strive with more determination to make that marriage a success. The policy, then, should be to make divorce laws more stringent rather than more liberal. While this policy is, objectively, a step backward toward the policies of the medieval church, it is based upon social rather than religious grounds.

Lichtenberger has made a thorough study of divorce legislation and has tabulated the changes which have occurred in the past fifty years. His carefully assembled facts indicate clearly that the trend of American divorce legislation in the last fifty years has actually been toward greater stringency, except as regards the grounds of divorce. Divorce is granted upon more grounds, but the process of getting it is attended by more legal regulations. In particular those regulations have increased which would discourage the getting of divorce for the purpose of remarriage. States have tended to prolong the time of waiting between divorce and remarriage, to forbid remarriage to the guilty person for a longer period than the innocent, to require longer residence periods before beginning divorce action, to require more adequate notice to the defendant or more adequate defense of the suit. The relaxations in these matters have been much less numerous than the changes toward greater stringency. In the matter of grounds, however, Lichtenberger says: "On the whole there seems to be, as a total result, a wider possibility for the selection of grounds upon which divorces may be secured although, it should be observed, many of the revisions in the direction of leniency are of minor importance."* In a few states such as Nevada, Arkansas, and Idaho, provisions as to grounds, residence, and other technicalities have been greatly relaxed, with the obvious result of giving such states a large

*J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, Whittlesey House of McGraw-Hill, 1931, pp. 167-168.

divorce business among couples balked by the stricter regulations of their own states. In the spring of 1934, Assemblyman Ross failed to get the very conservative New York law modified so as to permit divorce for three years' desertion.¹⁰

The Impotence of Divorce Law.—One cannot read the history of all these efforts without being overwhelmed by a sense of the impotence of the law in controlling the divorce situation. Even though the theory back of increasing regulation may be sound as to the immediate effects of the particular measure in the particular state, yet other, mightier forces are set into operation which defeat the purpose.

Lichtenberger shows that there is little relation between the number of grounds for divorce in the several states and their respective divorce rates. He also tabulates the new grounds for divorce legislated in twelve of the eighteen states in which significant changes were made. He then shows the divorce rates in the five years following each of these twelve new pieces of legislation. "In not a single instance is there the slightest suggestion that the divorce rate in any state has been influenced materially by the introduction of new causes."¹¹ Furthermore, the new cause of divorce was itself made use of in such a small percentage of all divorce cases that its influence was obviously negligible. Both the relaxations and changes toward stringency have served mainly to register changes of public attitude without affecting materially the conditions they were supposed to control.

Prevalence of Collusion.—The chief reason for the impotence of divorce law is the fact that couples in practice agree to the divorce. It is possible, through outright perjury or stretching the meaning of statements, to prove almost anything to an Anglo-Saxon court of justice if the opposing party tacitly agrees to let one prove it. All American divorce law, not excepting even that of Nevada, treats a divorce suit as the action of an injured party against an offending party. It is legally assumed that if the charges made are untrue, the alleged offender, who must always be given notice and must acknowledge receipt of such notice, will defend himself. If he does not, he is assumed to admit the charges. Under the Anglo-Saxon theory of law, in general the court takes no initiative to ascertain the facts independently for itself. It assumes that the plaintiff will bring in all facts that support his claim, and the defendant all facts in opposition. These two classes of facts together, it is held, comprise all the relevant

¹⁰*Op. cit.*, p. 185.

facts of the case, and from these the judge makes his decision. Collusion, that is, the agreement of the defendant with the plaintiff to permit the action to succeed, is forbidden, and if discovered results in the petition being thrown out of court. But the judge ordinarily makes no effort on his own initiative to find out whether such collusion has taken place. If there is no overt sign of it in the evidence brought before him, he assumes its absence. Lawyers know how to frame statements and sift evidence in such a way as to show no external evidence of collusion. How often does such collusion actually take place?

Judge Harry A. Lewis of Chicago tells us that 50 to 60 per cent of the decrees there are obtained on fraudulent grounds of cruelty, "while as a matter of fact there was nothing but incompatibility which had become so unbearable that the wife would perjure herself in order to get relief."¹¹ Judge C. W. Hoffman of the Domestic Relations Court of Cincinnati investigated cases in his court and found that 75 per cent of the defendants had grounds for defense which they could have used but did not. An observer, while listening to undefended divorce cases in a Chicago court, heard the judge recess the court for five minutes, instructing a lawyer to have his witness "get his dates straightened out." But even in the East, where judges are probably less lax, one hears from Judge Callaghan of the New York Supreme Court that "it is almost impossible for a judge to prove collusion even though he strongly suspects its existence, for the attorneys are always careful to satisfy every technical requirement of the statute."¹²

In 1925, 84 per cent of the divorce decrees in the United States were undefended. The law everywhere insists that the defendant be notified of the time and place of the proceedings against him and acknowledge that notification. Therefore it must be assumed that the great majority of defendants are either so definitely guilty of the offense charged against them that they regard any attempt at defense as hopeless, or else that they are willing to be divorced. In no other class of litigation do defendants show so little effort to defend themselves. Geoffrey May reported a study of 3306 divorce petitions in Maryland and Ohio, out of which only 55 were denied by judges. In only 8 to 12 per cent of Ohio divorces were cross petitions filed.¹³

The great increase in the percentage of divorces for "cruelty" reflects the increase in collusion and perjury. Cruelty is a broad term and is a less disgraceful offense than adultery, with which to charge

*Dorothy D. Bromley, *Civilized Divorce*, *Nation*, 128: pp. 608-609, May 22, 1929.

one's mate. In New York State, where adultery is the only ground for divorce, it is common to "frame up" cases of apparent adultery for the purpose of divorce.

There is a widespread attitude that the chivalrous thing is to let the wife get the divorce, regardless of who is guilty. This attitude is obvious in American popular literature, drama, and conversation; yet it is amazing how little we realize the ridiculous hypocrisy it reveals in our legal divorce patterns. Indeed, a false court record of guilt against a person, even guilt of adultery in the case of a man, is considered in many circles a lesser evil than is frustration of wishes in regard to personal relationships. Could there be any better illustration of the nature of modern individualism? The moralist, however, might draw a certain consolation from the fact that persons are willing to sacrifice these traditional values, not only for themselves but also for the sake of their mates who have theoretically "done them wrong." Out of the dying respect for certain laws and certain cultural values there is perhaps being born a newer ethics, which consists in a greater tenderness toward the aberrant personality of another human being.

The strength of this chivalric attitude is testified to by a New York judge in the following case:

It is virtually impossible for a man to get a fair trial in a matrimonial case in this State, Justice — said yesterday from the bench in Brooklyn in criticizing a jury which had just exonerated Mrs. — of a charge of misconduct brought by her husband. . . .

"This woman was as guilty as hell," Justice — said. "There was another case tried after this one in which the woman, to my mind, was also guilty, but the jury in that case sidestepped the question by disagreeing. It seems difficult to get juries to adopt common-sense views in these matters."

When counsel for the — entered into an argument over the possibility of a new trial, the court interrupted to say:

"Of what use would a new trial be? The chances are the result would be the same or maybe there would be a disagreement."

He reserved decision, however, on an application for an order permitting the case to be tried a second time. Some time ago Justice — went on record as opposing the payment of alimony to "young, strong and healthy wives."*

The following episode shows that collusion is in some circles so much taken for granted that even a lawyer becomes careless of exposing it to the judge:

*New York Times, April 2, 1933. By permission.

DIVORCE COLLUSION ADMITTED IN COURT**Lawyer Naïvely Submits Compact Whereby Wife Foregoes Alimony for Evidence**

Supreme Court Justice — got a new and rare exhibit for what he calls his "curiosity file" in Brooklyn yesterday.

The justice was hearing the undefended divorce suit of Mrs. — of —, Brooklyn, against her husband, —. Justice — called attention to the omission of alimony provisions in the decree submitted by Mrs. —'s lawyer.

The lawyer hastened to reassure the judge. He said that had been taken care of outside of court; that there was an agreement on alimony.

"In writing?" inquired the court.

The lawyer answered affirmatively.

"Let's see it," said the court.

The lawyer handed him a paper. Justice — read it and looked at the lawyer in evident amazement for a moment.

"Of course, we never suspect collusion in these cases," he said at length.

The agreement read:

"In consideration of the fact that you are willing to furnish me and my witnesses with evidence that will give me grounds to secure a divorce from you, I, —, do hereby agree not to request any alimony."

It concluded with the sentence:

"I further agree to pay all expenses for divorce proceedings."

"They now put collusion in writing," Justice — observed, speaking more to the ceiling than to the lawyer. "I shall have a copy made of this and shall put it in my curiosity file. Case dismissed."*

The Resistance Lies in the Ideology Represented by the Letter of the Law.—Thus the forces of social change leading toward higher divorce rates in America, though they have met with unusually stiff resistance in the letter of the law, have found another outlet where the resistance is weaker. The weak sector on our cultural resistance front is the enforcement of law. A basic principle of social change seems to be involved: the total of adjustive changes must in some wise be proportional to the force of the primary changes which are impinging upon them. If the resistance be made unusually strong at the point of direct attack, there will be unusual breaks at some other less-fortified points to the side. Or, conversely, if the resistance be unusually weak at these side points, the point of direct attack may hold unusually long. We cannot say how much our tradition of weak law enforcement is the cause of our delay in adjusting the law, and

*New York Times, July 27, 1933. By permission.

how much our delay in adjusting the law is the cause of poor enforcement. Probably each is a cause of the other.

In 1931, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in America met the demand for liberalized divorce in a manner which well illustrates the principles of cultural resistance.¹³ No church in America, of course, can take away from any one rights which the civil law gives him. It can, however, refuse to give a church remarriage ceremony, or can take away church membership, from a person not complying with the marriage and divorce canons of the church. To many people it is important to be in good standing with the church. Since 1808 the church had permitted the remarriage of the innocent party in a case of adultery, but had refused to sanction the remarriage of most divorced persons. In the 1931 action, the Bishops struck out the adultery exception and thus made even more stringent the church's verbal stand against divorce and remarriage. But at the same time, they provided for church courts to which people could apply for "annulment" of their former marriages. Several grounds for such annulment were included, but each case was to be decided on its merits by the court. To annul is simply to declare judicially that the former marriage, having involved certain "impediments," was not a valid one in the eyes of the church and hence did not really exist. The party who obtained such an annulment could then be remarried by the church under the verbal formula that he had never before been really married. Thus a mere phrase, "no remarriage," becomes the last resisting element of the old culture pattern after everything else has changed. It stands, like a lone turret amid the ruins of a demolished city wall, hindering few from actually passing, yet proclaiming through its sturdy tenacity that the wall is not yet gone.

The Confusion of Varying State Laws.—There is seemingly great confusion because of the differences among state laws.

In the famous Haddock case of 1906 the husband abandoned his wife in New York State and went to live in Connecticut, where he secured a divorce from her. Later Mrs. Haddock sued him for divorce and alimony under the New York laws. Mr. Haddock's attorney replied that he was already divorced under Connecticut law, and that under the Federal Constitution each state must "grant full faith and credit" to the decrees of courts in every other state. Nevertheless the Supreme Court of the United States upheld Mrs. Haddock, holding that if the full faith and credit clause were to apply to such a case, it would deny the State of New York power over the marriage relations of its own citizen (Mrs. Haddock).¹⁴

On the other hand, in the Atherton case in 1901, the Supreme Court decided

that a state must recognize the divorce decree granted by another. In this case the parties were married in New York and went immediately to Kentucky, the home of the husband, to live. Later the wife returned to New York, where she sued for separation on the ground of cruelty. But her husband had anticipated her by obtaining a divorce decree in Kentucky. The New York court held that the Kentucky decree was not valid against his wife, but the Supreme Court reversed this and upheld the husband. The essential difference of this case from the Haddock case was that the husband had obtained his divorce in the state of "matrimonial domicile" against an absent non-resident.

Thus a person may be legally married in one state and divorced in another. He may commit bigamy in one state through an act which would be perfectly legal in another. But these uncertainties of legal marital status affect comparatively few individuals, and have been advertised far beyond their actual importance.

Divorces obtained by migrating to other states, and especially to foreign countries, are subject to legal attack on the ground that the plaintiff did not have a *bona fide* residence in the state or country which granted his divorce, but went there in order to evade the laws of his domicile. But whether this view will be supported by the court to which the protest is made depends upon a host of legal technicalities and judicial opinions which we cannot examine here. One prominent lawyer has declared that not one in ten Nevada divorces would stand up if tested in a court elsewhere. Yet New York courts have been somewhat favorable to recognizing Mexican divorces. An out-of-state divorce may satisfy social requirements and conventions and permit remarriage in practice, even though it is legally questionable. Though questionable, it will not actually be questioned in court except on the initiative of the one of the parties who has something, usually financial, to gain, or at the initiative of a state officer prosecuting for bigamy. Where the divorce is by mutual desire and neither party is greedy or vindictive, final and mutually satisfactory property arrangements are likely to be made at the time of the divorce. A state does not go out of its way to prosecute for bigamy. It does so only in flagrant cases. Again, only the state in which the alleged bigamous marriage took place can prosecute. So in practice this risk is small.

The ease of divorce in a given state depends upon customs of judicial interpretation as well as upon the letter of the law. Thus, many Western states recognize "mental cruelty" or "indignities" as grounds for divorce, while Eastern states usually specify only "cruelty." Nevada says "extreme cruelty," which would seem to be still less liberal, yet, through easy residence requirements, holds

the record in the divorce rate since the judges construe "extreme cruelty" to include any kind of injury.

The Movement for Uniform Divorce Law.—The rapid increase in divorce and the confusion of state laws led to a movement for uniform divorce legislation. In 1905 the Governor of Pennsylvania, upon the resolution of his General Assembly, called together a Congress of Delegates from the various states in Washington. This Congress drew up a divorce code and recommended that it be uniformly adopted by all state legislatures. This code was adopted with slight revision by three states. In the others it failed of passage or was not even presented. Interest waned, and little more has been heard of the matter.

The uniform divorce movement revived in a new form. In 1923, through Senator Capper, it presented a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution: "The Congress shall have power to make laws which shall be uniform throughout the United States on marriage and divorce, the legitimation of children, and the care and custody of children affected by annulment of marriage and by divorce." Under the proposed amendment was a proposed Uniform Law which among many other things would limit divorce to five causes: adultery, cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment or failure to provide for a period of one year or more, incurable insanity, conviction of an infamous crime. These measures were reintroduced several times up to 1920, but never passed.

From a legal or a political point of view much can be said on both sides of this question. What chiefly interests the sociologist is the role such uniformity would play in the larger process of social change. Lichtenberger, a leading authority on divorce says:

It appears that the bill was originated and is sponsored in the main by conservatives who regard divorce as an evil *per se*. Throughout the arguments of the advocates, therefore, is the assumption, tacit or expressed, that divorcees, as such, should be controlled and if possible reduced, in the interest of greater marriage and family stability, and that this is the best means of accomplishing the purpose. Such persons are more inclined to put their trust in measures of legal repression than in constructive efforts to remove the causes and conditions which give rise to divorces. In this, if our generalizations in the preceding chapter in regard to the effects of law are well founded, they are likely to be disappointed.*

In the early days of this agitation, Mrs. Elizabeth Cody Stanton, one of the leading champions of feminism, warned that the movement

*J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, McGraw-Hill, 1931, pp. 201-202. By permission.

was inspired by persons who regarded our divorce laws as too liberal and who sought, under the guise of making them uniform, to make them narrow. Again, a federal law would discourage experimentation in legislation and curb the progressive states, while also forcing upon the more conservative divorce laws which they consider too advanced.

The extent of migratory divorces has been exaggerated. A careful estimate is that only 3 per cent of all are secured by going to other states.¹⁵

The National Divorce Reform League, however, proposes a *uniform* law which would make divorce easier, without going as far as the much-opposed principle of mutual consent. Alimony would be according to circumstances. The League also advocates Domestic Relations Courts and more stringent marriage prohibitions.¹⁶

Other Facts about Divorce Law.—Marshall and May find that in Ohio, alimony or property is granted to the woman in 75 per cent of the cases where there are minor children, but in only 19 per cent of the cases where there are no children. In only 2 per cent of the childless cases does this award involve periodic payments over a long period of time; in 9 per cent there is a lump sum. When a wife is defendant she gets custody of the children in about half the cases; when plaintiff, she gets them nearly always.¹⁷

In about half of the cases dismissed, there is a new petition for divorce at a later time.

The principle that there must be an innocent party and a guilty party does not prevent each party bringing suit against the other. The second suit is then called a "cross-suit." The judge may find that both parties are guilty and in that case neither is entitled to divorce. "The plaintiff must come to court with clean hands." But again, the guilt of one party may be judged as less, or insufficient, and the decree granted to him.

3. TRENDS IN DIVORCE FACT

Whether or not we regard increased divorce as a desirable solution of the marriage problem, it is certain that it is a very incomplete solution. Waller, in *The Old Love and the New*,¹⁸ and Groves, in *Marriage*,¹⁹ have given us several pathetic case studies of what happens after divorce. It is clear that divorce does not "end it all." The difficulties of readjusting to life afterward may be as great as those which were encountered in the marriage. From many cases one gets the impression that the legal obstacles are not the chief deterrents to divorce. The emotional conflict over breaking a relationship in which so much love was invested involves suffering comparable only with that produced by the death of a beloved person. Indeed, that suffering is apt to be more prolonged in the case of divorce than of death. To

say that one is seeking divorce because "love is dead" is often a false and pitiful rationalization.

While divorce may be a solution in that it relieves certain phases of the suffering which led to it, it is also a cause of peculiar sufferings of its own. Let us now study divorce as an *indicator* of marital sufferings rather than as a solution.

Extent and Increase of Family Disorganization.—The all-time record for divorces in the United States was in 1929, when 201,468 were granted.²⁰ This makes a rate of 1.66 per 1000 of total population, or of 1 divorce to every 6.1 marriages performed. Since 1929 both the marriage and divorce rates per population have declined, largely because of the business depression. The ratio of divorces to marriages in 1931 became 1 to 5.9. Annulments of marriage in 1929 were 4408, making a rate of 1 to 280 marriages. Desertion is estimated as 50,000 cases per year, or about one-fourth the number of divorces. Some of it leads to divorce and thus duplicates the divorce figures. Most of the remainder is a repetitive phenomenon which leads to intermittently rather than permanently broken families. Desertion is prominent in the poorer classes, and has been estimated as causing about 20 per cent of the dependency.

From a large sample of families in the Mid-West in 1930, including both rural and urban population, 14.6 per cent of the families were found to be broken by death, divorce, annulment, or separation. In 1900 a corresponding sample of population showed 14.3 per cent of broken homes. While the total figure remained about the same, the homes broken by divorce, annulment, or separation increased from 6.7 to 9.8 per cent, while those broken by death, because of the falling death rate, fell from 7.6 to 4.9 per cent. The percentage of broken homes varies with the size of the community: in 1930 it was 19.0 for the metropolitan area of Chicago, 16.7 for cities of 100,000 population, 14.7 for villages, and 8.1 for the rural area.²¹ In interpreting these figures, we should note that one family breaking up by separation yields two broken families, but that some of those broken by divorce lead to remarriage and when so doing do not permanently increase the number of families. This sample omitted all families in which the wife was over 45 years of age, and thus eliminated many older families broken by death.

Can we tell from these figures how frequent separation is as compared with divorce? In 1920 the ratio of the widowed to the divorced and separated in the Chicago part of this sample was 135 to 100.²² If the same ratio held for the whole city, the total number of divorced and separated in the city would have been 48,000. But the census reported 10,567 divorced for Chicago. As we have noted before, the decennial census probably under-reports the divorced, possibly to the extent of half their true number. The actual number of divorced was

probably 15,000 to 20,000. Thus, separated, non-divorced persons are at least as numerous as divorced persons at any given time in the city, and may be twice as numerous. Legal "separation," or divorce *a mensa et thoro*, is counted in the annual census figures as divorce, no distinction being made. This limited divorce does not give the right to remarry. According to Maryland 1929 figures, only 5 per cent of all the divorces were of this type.²³

Separation is an ambiguous term. The census enumerators were instructed to report temporary absentees as living at their normal place of abode and not as separated. The enumerators who talked to Professor Ogburn seemed to think that wherever one married person was recorded, and his or her mate was not recorded as divorced or dead, a genuine separation was the case. Separation may not originate in marital discord, but in occupational causes, and may later lead to desertion or to a permanent separation based on discord.

The crude divorce rate in the United States has increased from 0.29 per 1000 population in the period 1868-1872 to 1.66 per 1000 population in 1929. Each year showed a higher rate than the previous year, with a few exceptions which were all years following business depressions. As Cahen points out, the most ideal statistical unit for comparing divorce rates is divorces per 1000 *married* population, which refined rate in 1929 was 4.05.²⁴ The crude rate per total population neglects changes in the number of marriages and in the age distribution. Again, the familiar unit of one divorce to x marriages gives a ratio between the divorces of any one year and the marriages of that same year, between which there is no logical connection. Nevertheless, we are frequently compelled to use these cruder rates in order to make comparisons with data from other countries, and so on. From 1867 to 1929, Cahen's rate advanced about five-fold, not seriously different from the crude rate in the long run. Its advance was about equivalent to that of a sum of money compounded annually at 3 per cent interest. It is remarkable that Dr. Walter F. Willcox in 1891, working with the limited figures then available, predicted almost exactly the divorce rate as it actually was for 1930.²⁵ If the present rate of increase continues, one-half of all marriages will end in divorce by about 1963. The behavior of the crude rate during 1920-1930 gave some hope that there was a slackening, but Cahen's refined rate from 1922 to 1929 continued to increase 3 per cent annually.²⁶

The Probability of Divorce for the Individual.—Cahen has shown that the probability that the average marriage will result in divorce is a little greater than is indicated by the familiar ratio of one divorce to six marriages, or 16.7 per cent. He calculates the probability by

more refined processes, following the course of marriages contracted, and ascertaining what proportion of the total ends in divorce for each year of married life. He finally arrives at 17.92 per cent as the probability of an American marriage ending in divorce according to the divorce rate of 1928. If the rate goes higher (it did in 1929 but not thereafter) the probability will correspondingly increase.²⁷

An American marriage at the time it is contracted has an average expectation of continuing 20.4 years before either death or divorce breaks it. If it could be predicted at the outset whether it were to be broken by death or divorce, the average duration to be expected by the marriage destined to divorce would be 7 years, by the marriage destined to death of one partner, 23 years.²⁸ Of course, these are only averages. The probabilities for any given marriage could be more specifically stated if we knew the age of the partners.

All the above calculations are based upon the assumption that the annual census reports on divorces granted are substantially correct. Their correctness has been called into question by some investigators. Thus, Sanderson compared actual court records in four counties in central New York with the census reports for those counties for ten years, and found that one-third of the actual divorces had not been reported to the Federal Census Bureau.²⁹ On the other hand, some careful students of the problem think that under-reporting is not a general phenomenon and that the error in some areas may be in the opposite direction. Marshall and May's exhaustive study of Maryland court records for 1929 ascertained the total number of divorces to be in substantial agreement with the census figures.³⁰

The Causes of Increasing Divorce.—The causes of increasing divorce are to be found in the general social changes we have discussed at some length, especially urbanization, economic emancipation of women, decline of religious ideology, individuation, and the intensified romantic complex. But these are broad generalities. We need to get a closer picture of the more specific ways in which the causes operate.

One social change which is generally accepted by sociologists as a cause of increased divorce is urbanization. In the early days there was little difference between urban and rural rates of divorce; today divorce is increasingly a city phenomenon. Urban divorce rates are now about double the rural rates.³¹

Ogburn tested the correlation between the number of divorced persons and the employment of women for 170 cities. He found a slight negative correlation, —.20, which may possibly be explained by

the fact that the cities where women are most largely employed contain more Catholic population and are in the East.³² But only about 9 per cent of wives request alimony and only 6 per cent are given it. This is some decrease since 1867-1886, when 16 per cent of wives asked alimony and 12 per cent received it. Thus there is some evidence that the employment of women makes women more willing to request divorce even though no alimony is in sight, but in general the relation between women's freedom and divorce is uncertain.³³

In regard to religious decline, there has been no substantial decline of church membership, and the legislation of the churches has changed toward stringency rather than toward leniency. But, on the other hand, it seems certain that the average church member has less fear of ecclesiastical authority and is less governed by theological beliefs.

The Changes in the Use of the Various Grounds for Divorce.—One sidelight comes through a study of the changing frequencies of the various grounds for divorce. Three legal grounds account for the great bulk of divorces, and have always done so since the beginning of the statistical record. They were, in 1929: cruelty, 40.8 per cent; desertion, 29.6 per cent; and adultery, 8.3 per cent. In the period 1887-1906, these percentages were: cruelty 21.8, desertion 38.9, adultery 16.3. Adultery and desertion have proportionately decreased, cruelty increased. This change does not mean that people are more cruel and less adulterous today than they were thirty-five years ago. It is not at all explained by the addition of the cause of cruelty to state laws which formerly did not include it. It means that the mores and the interpretation of law have changed. In the District of Columbia and the states of New York, North Carolina, and Louisiana, the large majority of divorces are granted upon adultery, other causes being lacking or difficult. The adultery divorces of these states, divided by their combined population, gives an adultery divorce rate of about one-fifth the national divorce rate for all causes. From this Cahen argues that it is fair to assume that adultery is a real cause in 20 per cent of all divorces, but is disguised under the charge of cruelty in the more liberal states, thus reducing the recorded adultery percentage to 8. While the present national figures underestimate adultery, they overestimate cruelty. They also overestimate desertion. In Louisiana, where seven years' desertion is necessary, 16 per cent of all divorces are granted for desertion. Since her total divorce rate is about half that of the country at large, Cahen estimates that about 8 per cent of all divorces involve bona fide, long-time desertion. Allowing 20 per cent of all divorces to adultery, 8 per cent to long-time desertion, 2

per cent to drunkenness, and 3 per cent to minor grounds, he concludes that 33 per cent of all divorces are on grounds which would be valid in the stricter states. The remaining two-thirds, listed under cruelty, desertion, and neglect to provide, are really divorces for incompatibility by mutual consent, in which the alleged "cause" is chosen according to convenience rather than according to facts. It is these divorces which account for the great increase in rate. Attitudes have changed so as to render divorce for mere incompatibility justifiable where before it was regarded as unethical; and the interpretation of courts has changed so as to allow this incompatibility to fit itself into the broad formulas of cruelty and desertion.³⁴

In Ohio in 1868 only 8 per cent of divorces were granted for "gross neglect of duty" although it was then, as now, a valid ground. In 1929, 60 per cent or more were secured on this ground.³⁵

In the period of 1867 to 1886 about 65 per cent of divorces were granted at request of the wife; in 1929 the figure was 71.3 per cent. Does this mean that husbands have become worse and wives better? It may mean that wives are more dissatisfied with marriage in general, and the recent liberalization has given them a better chance to show it. It may mean that in these modern divorces for dissatisfaction or incompatibility, where cruelty is usually the technical charge, the chivalrous attitude has a better chance to show itself, the man taking the blame. Will a man be so chivalrous in court as to allow his wife to prove him unchivalrous in his private life? In many cases probably so, because he may feel that what is said about him in divorce court will not be taken too seriously on the outside. But probably the greater truth is that it is simply easier to prove cruelty against a man than against a woman. Cruelty is the ground in 44 per cent of divorces granted to wives and in only 32 per cent of those granted to husbands.

Migration to Lenient States a Mere Trifle.—It has been alleged that a large part of modern divorce is due to the leniency of states like Nevada. In 1889, Dr. Dike, Executive Secretary of the National Divorce League, came to the conclusion that migration to more lenient states accounted for only 3 per cent of the divorces in the United States. Cahen, analyzing the statistics up to 1929, comes to the same conclusion for the present time.³⁶ According to the United States Marriage and Divorce Report for 1922, 26 per cent of all divorces of persons known to be married in the United States were obtained in a state other than the state where they were married. But (in 1920) 22 per cent of *all* the native-born persons in the United States, those

who did not get divorces as well as those who did, were living outside the state of their birth.

To get a more accurate estimate, Cahen analyzed the figures relating to New York, known for its stringency of divorce laws. Almost half of all the American divorces granted to people married in New York in 1922 were granted in other states (3100 out of 6400). Of these 3100, 200 were granted in Nevada, and 900 in the states contiguous to New York. A few hundred additional, non-American divorces were granted in Paris, Mexico, etc., to New Yorkers. But after allowing for the normal migration, Cahen concluded that only 20 per cent of the divorces of New Yorkers were obtained by migration for the purpose of divorce.³⁷

New York is probably the second worst offender in this way, because of her large cosmopolitan population having attitudes quite different from those which inspired her strict divorce laws. The District of Columbia is probably the worst offender, 40 per cent of divorces of its residents being estimated as having been obtained by deliberate migration for the purpose. The District contains a cosmopolitan population which, however, has no voice in the making of its own laws. These are made by Congress. Divorce was formerly more liberal there, but in 1899 Congress limited it to adultery, under the influence of a conservative lobby. But the District of Columbia, after all, cuts a small figure in the total national population.

South Carolina, which allows no divorce at all, would be expected above all other states to resort to migratory divorce. During 1922, only 221 South Carolinian couples were divorced in the United States, and, of course, all of these outside the state. This amounts to a total divorce rate of 0.30 per 1000 married population, a rate one-twelfth of the average American divorce rate. Only one of these divorces took place in Nevada. It is hardly reasonable, therefore, to expect that any considerable number happened abroad. More of them took place in the strict state of North Carolina than in the liberal state of Georgia. That was because the ordinary flow of migration was northward rather than southward. The conclusion is simply that South Carolinians are not given to divorce, wherever they may be. If there were any great demand for divorce in South Carolina, as Cahen points out, the legislature would probably be forced to enact a divorce law in order to get the business which would go to lawyers and associated agencies in neighbor states.³⁸

The one obvious divorce market, Nevada, granted in 1929 only 2553

out of the 201,468 divorces in the United States, or 1.3 per cent. The number granted abroad is estimated as a few hundred.

Weighing all these figures, Cahen finds that 3 per cent is still a liberal estimate of all migratory divorces.

Divorce and Remarriage.—It has been alleged that at most divorces there is a new mate waiting around the corner.

In 1928 Dr. I. M. Rubinow created a popular sensation by seeming to prove statistically that most divorce leads to remarriage. He estimated that 6 per cent of divorcees died, 17 per cent remained divorced, and 77 per cent remarried. He did this by comparing (1) the annual number of *divorces*, published each year by the Bureau of the Census, with (2) the number of *divorced persons* reported at the decennial census enumeration under the heading of "marital status."³⁹ The first figures are quite accurate, being reported by court officers throughout the country, but the second figures, obtained from the say-so of unsworn interviewees at the decennial census visit, are known to be grossly inaccurate with respect to divorce.

At the 1920 census, 0.6 per cent of all males over 15 years of age reported themselves as being in the divorced state. The United States Census of prisoners in 1923 found 2.7 per cent of prisoners divorced.⁴⁰ Making allowance for the men who were divorced by their wives after and because they went to prison, Cahen estimates that 2.4 per cent of the prisoners were already divorced before going to prison. He sees no reason to believe why these 18,000 prisoners, after making this correction, are not a fair sample of the male adult population as a whole with respect to marital status. Prisoners are used in this study simply because this is the largest and most representative group of men upon which the necessary statistics exist, and in which there would be no reluctance to report divorce if it were true. Cahen then concludes that the reports of the divorced state by males to the census-taker in 1920 constitute only one-fourth the actual number of divorced. The other three-fourths reported themselves as single, married, or widowed.

The present writer thinks Cahen is wrong in dismissing the theory that there is "any proclivity of divorced men toward penitentiaries."⁴¹ There is evidence to show that divorced are more likely than married persons to enter insane hospitals. Much indirect evidence suggests that personality traits which lead toward divorce lead toward insanity and also crime.

In 1930 the census reported 1.1 per cent of males 15 and over as divorced. The increase of admittedly divorced persons between the 1920 and 1930 censuses was at a greater rate than the increase in the number of divorces granted. Cahen is probably right in concluding that this points to decreasing shame of divorce. The actual proportion of males living in a state of divorce probably lies somewhere between

the 1.1 per cent admitted to the census enumerator and the 2.4 per cent estimated by Cahen on the questionable theory that the prison population is typical of the whole population.

The divorced females reported at the 1930 census were 1.3 per cent of the female population of 15 and over, as against 0.8 per cent in 1920. They increased at the same rate as the divorced males. They seem to be somewhat more numerous than divorced males; we do not know whether this is due to a greater tendency of divorced men to remarry or to die, or to a greater willingness on the part of women to admit divorce.

Divorced women seem to remarry more than divorced men, the ratio being about five to four, according to figures for marriages of divorced persons in New York State outside of New York City, 1916-1924. These figures are obtained from the facts given by prospective brides and grooms in applying for marriage licenses. The ratio would be erroneous if a larger percentage of men than women swore falsely to their license applications. This seems unlikely. However, New York may be unrepresentative in respect to remarriage because the law there restricts the remarriage of the defendant, and defendants are usually men. But also in Oregon, which represents the western high-divorce area, Robert Dann finds reason to believe that the women are more prone to remarriage, for the very different reason of the surplus of males in that area. If divorced women do remarry more than divorced men, while there are also more women than men reported in the divorced state by the census, it would appear that men are much more prone to conceal divorce when replying to the census enumerator.

An investigation some years ago in Switzerland showed that divorcees do not remarry sooner than widowed persons.⁴²

How many divorced persons do remarry? Rubinow estimated 77 per cent. Cahen estimates 31 per cent of all, or 35 per cent of those who do not die within a few years afterward. More than half, he thinks, remain permanently divorced.⁴³ Ogburn, using the state statistics for New York State outside of New York City for 1916, found that the number of divorced persons who remarried was about half the number of persons who were divorced during the same year. This would suggest that the truth lies between Rubinow's and Cahen's estimates and that about half of divorced persons eventually remarry and half never do. But many uncertain allowances need to be made for migration in and out of New York State, and for changes in rates, so this figure is a very rough estimate.⁴⁴

Of those divorced persons who do remarry, about half do so (figures for New York State outside New York City) within 1½ years

after the decree, and over three-fourths within 5 years after the decree. The average interval between divorce and remarriage was 3.4 years (New York State outside New York City, 1919).

Many states require an interval of time between the final divorce decree and remarriage. The idea back of this is that such a compulsory delay places an additional check upon persons who seek divorce for the purpose of remarriage. But an opposite idea is coming forward, that such a delay may simply encourage cohabitation without marriage. Moreover, the delay often encourages premature divorce and prevents many possible reconciliations. That is, couples who have not fully made up their minds to divorce, nevertheless rush the procedure in order to avoid the period of waiting between the decree and the right to remarry.⁴⁵

Several state laws provide that the guilty party in a divorce for adultery may not remarry, except after a period of years or at the permission of the court. Thus in New York the defendant may not remarry at all, unless, after three years have elapsed, he can prove to a court that his conduct has been uniformly "good." Some states compel the defendant on any charge to wait longer than the plaintiff for remarriage.

These laws reflect the traditional cultural attitude toward extra-marital love, singling it out for special punishment over all the other behavior which may have led to a broken marriage. Such an attitude is of course a natural corollary of the attitude which produces a law singling out adultery as the only valid cause for divorce. On the other hand is the conservative but more realistic attitude that obstacles to desired marriage simply encourage illicit sex relations. There is also the newer liberal attitude that if it is justifiable to break a marriage at all, it is most humane and mentally hygienic to facilitate the earliest possible remarriage of both parties, inasmuch as the legal judgment tells nothing as to real fitness or unfitness of either party for marriage.

How Often Are Children Involved in Divorce?—Children were involved in 37.2 per cent of the divorces in 1929. This figure had been a little higher in the period of 1887 to 1906, fell to 34.0 in 1927, then rose again.⁴⁶ The true figure may be 2 or 3 per cent higher since there are 5 per cent of "unknowns." However, the great majority of married couples have children. What we need to know is the relative probability of divorce as between childless families and families with children. Cahen's refined estimate of the probability of eventual divorce is 18 chances out of 100 for all marriages, 8 out of 100 for marriages

with children, and 71 out of 100 for families without children. Thus, if we could predict at marriage whether a couple would have children or not, we could also say to those destined to childlessness, that they will *probably* (71 per cent) be divorced. On the other hand, the likelihood of divorce for those who have children is much less than the generally high divorce rate would seem to suggest. But this statement is less significant than it seems, for after all, a large share of the divorces are in early years of marriage and these marriages *would* have borne children had they lasted longer. However, it is significant that roughly 60 per cent of all divorce is accounted for by childless couples, and about 20 per cent more by couples with only one child. The majority of American divorces actually represent Lindsey's companionate marriage pattern: trial and error without children, then a marriage with much higher probability of permanence after there are children.

How Long after Marriage Does Divorce Occur?—As usual, when statistics are involved, a simple question requires a complicated answer. If "usually" means the mode, that is, the point of greatest frequency, then we can say that the modal year is now in the fourth year of marriage, whereas in 1867-1886 it was in the seventh year. If you are still alive at your silver wedding, your chances of being divorced in any one year then will be about one-fourth what they will be during the dangerous third, fourth, and fifth years. But still, during a four-year period at that older age you will be exposed to the same total amount of danger as during one year in the early period. There is no deadline: divorces occur in substantial numbers into old age.⁴⁷

A study of Wisconsin divorces of 1887 to 1906, compared with those of 1929, showed that it was the *interval between separation and divorce* which had shortened. The average duration of marriage before divorce decreased from 10.37 years to 9.83 years, but its duration before separation increased.⁴⁸

Variations of the Social Classes in Divorce Rate.—Let us now examine some differences between social classes in divorce. These are not furnished by annual or decennial census data, and are fragmentary. But they may prove more important than the regional and nativity data given by the census.

We note elsewhere (Chapter VII) Mowrer's studies of the ecology of family disorganization in Chicago. He found a crude divorce rate for the whole city in 1919 of 1.6 per 1000 population, about the same as the United States divorce rate at its highest level (1925-1930).

The 70 local areas into which he divided the city varied, however, from 0 to 6.4, with very low rates in the suburban commuters' neighborhoods and also the immigrant communities, and high rates in the areas characterized by rooming-houses, kitchenette-apartments, childless couples, and also in the "equalitarian" family areas of the "middle" classes.⁴⁹

The Census Bureau studied divorce in relation to occupation of husband for the period of 1887 to 1906. Farmers supplied much less than their proportionate quota of the divorces; males in manufacturing, trade and transportation, about their quota; professional workers, more than their quota; workers in domestic and personal service, about twice their quota. Examination of the specific occupations suggests that the most important factor may be the amount of contact which an occupation provides with the opposite sex. Clergymen, for obvious reasons, are exceptional: they show a much lower divorce rate than this factor would tend to produce.

The statistics from the State of New Jersey were the most complete, giving returns from 81 per cent of the inquiries. The number of married males in 1900 to each husband divorced between 1887 and 1906, inclusive, is used as the index. A small index number thus represents a high rate of divorce. The indices for the various occupations were, for New Jersey, as shown in Table 19. The indices from several other states, though less reliable because of poorer returns, placed the highest and lowest occupations, and the broader categories, in about the same relative positions, although there were striking interstate differences in specific occupations.⁵⁰

European divorce statistics collected by Sorokin, Zimmerman, and Galpin, show strikingly low rates in every country for agricultural pursuits. The highest rates are among the official class in Italy, England, and Norway; among various commercial and industrial classes in France, Switzerland, Sweden, Bavaria, and Prussia.⁵¹

Divorce seems to be particularly high among negroes. In 1930, 1.4 per cent of negro males of 15 and over reported themselves divorced, as against 1.1 per cent of native whites. The corresponding female percentages were 2.2 and 1.3.⁵² Lichtenberger and Willcox doubt the significance of these figures, because the divorce rate tends to be unusually low in the states and counties having highest proportions of negroes.⁵³ They suggest that perhaps the negroes are merely more frank in reporting divorce. But this difference in frankness would be less in 1930, and a large difference in figures still exists. Moreover, the "black belt" is a region of low divorce in general. Negroes in homogeneous negro communities may be little given to divorce, even though negroes in general divorce more than whites.

Southern court officers and lawyers estimate that from 50 to 90 per cent of

TABLE 19*

INDEX OF RELATIVE DIVORCE FREQUENCY, NEW JERSEY, 1887-1906

(Low numbers = high divorce rates.)

Actors and professional showmen.....	6
Commercial travelers.....	9
Musicians and teachers of music.....	22
Bartenders.....	22
Physicians.....	23
Telephone and telegraph operators.....	24
Bookkeepers, clerks, and stenographers.....	32
Barbers and hairdressers.....	33
Agents.....	34
Tobacco and cigar factory operatives.....	34
Hotel keepers.....	37
Printers, lithographers, and pressmen.....	37
Restaurant and saloon keepers.....	40
Servants and waiters.....	44
Merchants and dealers.....	46
Bakers.....	48
Butchers.....	49
Lawyers.....	49
Teachers, professors in colleges, etc.	50
Bankers, brokers, and bank officials.....	52
Salesmen.....	53
Painters, glaziers, and varnishers.....	53
Steam railroad employees.....	53
Boot and shoe makers and repairers.....	57
Plumbers, gas and steam fitters.....	61
Tailors.....	66
Machinists.....	78
Miners and quarrymen.....	79
Masons.....	82
Manufacturers and officials, etc.	82
Draymen, hackmen, and teamsters, etc.	82
Watchmen, policemen, firemen, etc.	83
Clergymen.....	87
Farmers, planters, and overseers.....	92
Laborers.....	94
Carpenters and joiners.....	95
Blacksmiths.....	99
Agricultural laborers.....	113
Engineers and firemen (not locomotive).....	140

* From U. S. Bureau of the Census, Special report on Marriage and Divorce, 1867-1906, Part I, publ. 1909.

all divorces are granted to negroes, while it is in comparatively few districts that the negro constitutes as much as 50 per cent of the population.

Divorce Low among College Graduates.—There is some fragmentary evidence concerning the divorce rate among college graduates. Rita Halle gives statistics taken from a number of college alumni offices.⁵⁴ These show divorce-marriage ratios among college graduates

to be from one-eighth to one-twentieth of the present general ratios for the states in which the colleges are located. In dealing with a whole body of college alumni, it would seem more suitable to compare their total rates with the rates which existed ten years ago in the general population, but this cuts down the rate for the general population only about 25 per cent, and thus still leaves a tremendous difference between college and general rates. In 1929 Mabel Newcomer found that all the recorded divorces of Vassar alumnae of the classes of 1902-1916 amounted to 54, bearing a ratio to all their marriages of 1 to 31. In the general population about 1923, which would have been approximately the average date of divorce for members of these Vassar classes who did divorce, the divorce-marriage ratio was about 1 to 8; in the Eastern states from which most Vassar women come about 1 to 15. In addition to those reported as divorced, 30 of the women of this Vassar sample had married "more than once," and if we gratuitously assume that half of these cases involved an unreported divorce (rather than a death), we get a divorce-marriage of 1 to 25. Thus at the most liberal estimate the Vassar graduates are much less given to divorce than the average population of their geographic region.⁵⁵ At Wellesley, a crude ratio of 1 divorce to every 49 marriages is cited.⁵⁶

Combining Mowrer's ecological evidence, the census occupational data, and these data on college graduates, we conclude that divorce is not a characteristic of the highest social and educational stratum. It is not prominent among the class which initiates social change in general. It does not behave like traits which start at the top and gradually filter downward through the social scale. Neither is it a characteristic of the farming class, nor of the immigrant, largely Catholic, laboring class. It seems to characterize rather that vague area we call the "middle classes." It characterizes persons engaged in domestic and personal service and occupations involving exhibition of the person, frequent absence from home, or close contact with the opposite sex.

Divorce Correlated with Social Mobility.—Mowrer has shown that divorce in Chicago is correlated with high mobility of population. By tracing the past addresses of the persons in 1000 Chicago divorces, by means of telephone directories, he found that these persons showed an average residence of 1.81 years at each address. For a control group he used names immediately following these names in the directory (an alphabetical and hence purely random selection). The members of the control group showed an average residence of

2.83 years per address. The difference between the groups was 1.02 years, with a probable error of only 0.07 year. The divorced group also showed a shorter period of residence per community in which they had resided, the difference being 1.49 years. The divorced group showed a tendency to move toward areas of higher family disorganization, while the control group tended to move toward areas of lower disorganization. The disorganization of an area was measured by its combined rate of desertion and divorce.⁵⁷

Desertion has been called the poor man's divorce. As we have seen, much of it leads neither to divorce nor to permanent cure, but becomes a chronic and indefinitely repeated phenomenon. Real desertion, as distinguished from the often framed-up type of desertion which is used as a convenient ground for divorce, is a phenomenon coming primarily under the purview of Family Welfare Societies and similar social agencies. Through their case investigations many facts are known about deserted families which are not known about families which go merely to the divorce courts.

Most desertions are by men. Only 14 per cent of the cases studied by O'Neill and Glover in 1929 involved deserting women. About half of the deserters had had previous court or penal records. Also about half had deserted previously.⁵⁸ Seasonal occupations and occupations involving mobility seem to provide the greatest proportional quotas of deserters. The very poor seem not so much addicted as the "lower middle" classes with some degree of skill. The results of the various studies differ greatly in the importance they attach to size of income, nationality, health, interference of relatives, defective intelligence, hasty marriage, size of family, and broken parental homes. The general tendency of the evidence is to show desertion as a psychological phenomenon, related to certain types of personality in the deserter and the deserted mate, and to cultural background. Lilian Brandt found in 1905 that 28 per cent of the desertion cases were of mixed nationality, as against 13 per cent for a comparable non-deserting group.⁵⁹ The significance of this difference, however, has been questioned. Mowrer found Negroes, Poles, Russians, Italians, Austrians, and Greeks to contribute disproportionately large numbers of deserters, while native-born whites and Swedes contributed less than their share. Mowrer finds that among like marriages, desertion is likely to be *earlier* in married life among Protestants than among Catholics, and still earlier among mixed marriages.⁶⁰

In 1928 social agencies in 93 cities estimated desertion rates from 28 to 203 per 100,000 population. Assuming an average rate of 100

for the urban population of the United States (50,000,000), the National Desertion Bureau made an estimate of 50,000 total annual desertions, or about one-fourth the number of divorcees. But most studies report that over half of the deserters had deserted previously; in one study 87 per cent were repeaters. Hence much desertion means only a series of temporary breaks in the family. Other cases of desertion lead to divorce and thus duplicate the divorce figures.⁶¹

The National Desertion Bureau finds that desertion, like divorce, is greater in times of prosperity than in depression.⁶²

Regional Differences in Divorce.—Divorce rates vary enormously among the several regions. The refined divorce rate for 1929 is shown in Table 20. These rates fall into three well-defined orders of magnitude as shown. Figure 7 shows the variations of rate among the several states.

TABLE 20*
DIVORCE RATES IN GEOGRAPHIC DIVISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES;
1929*

Geographic divisions	Divorces per 1000 married population
Middle Atlantic.....	1.49
New England.....	2.39
South Atlantic.....	2.57
East South Central.....	4.32
West North Central.....	4.46
East North Central.....	5.00
Pacific.....	6.51
West South Central.....	7.15
Mountain.....	7.50
United States.....	4.05

* Adapted from U. S. Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1929.

If we exclude those few states whose laws are extremely liberal or extremely illiberal, we find that there is little relation between the strictness of the letter of the law and the actual amount of divorce which takes place. Nevada, Idaho, and Arkansas are the outstanding liberal states, because of their low residence requirements rather than of other liberal characteristics of their laws. Nevada is also the leader in divorce rate. Idaho and Arkansas have not yet had time to show the effects of their recent liberalization of law. New York, the District of Columbia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Louisiana are the unusually stringent states, and they show low rates, at least in comparison with the rates in their respective regions. Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Mexico consist of populations more than one-third Roman Catholic, and therefore show lower rates than would be expected from their laws and the general tendencies in their respective regions. The remaining 39 states may be con-

sidered as a standard divorce area where law is fairly uniform and religion predominantly Protestant. But within this legally standard area tremendous variations of rate occur.⁶³

It is interesting that New York and the District of Columbia, with stringent divorce laws and low divorce rates, have unusually high annulment rates. In New York, annulments are about one-fifth of divorces. But certain Western states with high divorce have still higher annulment rates than New York or the District of Columbia.




FIG. 7.—Divorces Per 1000 Married Population, 1929.

Source: United States Bureau of the Census, Marriage and Divorce, 1929.

One of the most significant facts is that these regional differences are not lessening, as is true in the case of many social changes affecting the country as a whole. As Ogburn says, there seems to be less uniformity in rate than there was before the World War when there was agitation for uniform divorce laws. From the very beginning (1870) the Mountain, Pacific, and some Mid-Western states were the leaders in divorce, although at that time New England stood relatively higher and the Southwest relatively lower than now.⁶⁴ In general the leading states have increased their lead, each continuing its own steady rate of increase. Again, the only ten states which have shown any tendency toward lessening divorce, with two exceptions, are among the group in which divorce has always been relatively low.⁶⁵

The divorce rate therefore seems to be composed partly of some factor which does not geographically diffuse as do many culture traits, but which is closely linked to certain regions. In respect to divorce, and possibly other traits of the family system, several geographic regions of the United States may be regarded as distinct culture areas as much as may European countries.

We have seen that these regional differences are not adequately explained by differences in industrialization or other economic conditions. They are partly explained by religion, but any formal classification of religions fails to get at the real difference. The Protestants of the South Atlantic region behave in respect to divorce much as do the Catholics of New England, while the Western Protestant areas are given to high divorce. Probably divorce attitudes constitute a distinct part of culture, more or less independent of the economic, political, religious, or other great divisions of culture. A next step in research should be to study more thoroughly the attitudes toward divorce among different social classes and different regions, and to find out how different attitudes toward divorce are related to other attitudes and practices in the family system.

Robert Dann, who has studied divorce in Oregon, one of the highest-rate states, suggests that the high sex ratios may be an important cause of the higher divorce rates in the West. His figures also suggest a greater rate of remarriage of divorced women in Oregon than is true of the country at large.⁶⁶ Women's petitions account for 71.3 per cent of all divorces (varying from 66.4 per cent in the South Atlantic to 75.9 per cent in the Pacific division), and it would be natural if the women were more ready to seek divorce in regions of excess male population. Yet the variations in these factors seem too small to be the major explanation of the divorce differences, and, moreover, the Western sex ratios have been falling while divorce has continued to increase at a more rapid rate than in the East.

Divorce Rates Abroad.—Table 21 presents some very loosely comparable data regarding divorce rates in foreign countries. These figures are derived from many sources. Some refer to single years and others to averages of several years. Divorce has been increasing everywhere where records are available except in Japan. There the rate exceeded the American rate until 1915, and has been progressively falling while Euro-American rates have been rising. The reasons for this peculiar phenomenon were given in Chapter VI. The excessive Russian figures refer to two large cities only, and do not tell us the rate for the country as a whole. These figures may appear less startling when we recall that for six years after the French Revolu-

tion there were more divorces than marriages in Paris. The rates for Catholic countries such as Ireland, Spain, Italy, and Poland are practically zero, except for the small non-Catholic groups which are sometimes allowed divorce. Many European governments have followed the practice of allowing divorce to be regulated according to the laws of the church of which the applicant was a member. Thus, in Poland from 1877 to 1886, while there was one divorce to 1470 marriages among Roman Catholics, there was one to 405 among the Russian Orthodox, one to 217 among the Reformed Evangelical, one to 181 among the Augsburg Evangelical, and *one to four* among the Jews, the last rate exceeding even that of the United States in recent years.⁶⁷

TABLE 21*
DIVORCES PER 100,000 POPULATION

	Years	Rate	Rate in or about 1900
United States.....	1921-1929	153	73
England and Wales.....	about 1920	17	2
Scotland.....	1921	11	4
Canada.....	estimated from 1931 census of marital status	12	
Australia.....	1921-1922	24	10
New Zealand.....	about 1920	38	12
France.....	1921-1923 1932	71 52	25
Germany.....	1921-1922	60	15
Switzerland.....	1921-1922	52	32
Czechoslovakia.....	1923-1932 (fairly constant)	38	
Belgium.....	1921-1922	49	11
Netherlands.....	1921-1922	29	10
Denmark.....	1921-1922	40	17
Sweden.....	1921-1922	22	8
Norway.....	1921-1922	22	6
Uruguay.....	1921	17	0
Japan.....	1921-1923 1931	92 79	143
Leningrad.....	1923 and 1926	347	
	1927 (after new law)	983	
Moscow.....	1926	212	
	1927 (after new law)	959	
Irish Free State.....	39 divorces in a period of 65 years		

* Sources: E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganisation*, University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 33. J. P. Lichtenberger, *Divorce*, McGraw-Hill, 1931, p. 110. Paul Lublinsky, *Marriage and divorce in Soviet Russia*, Family 10: pp. 28-31, 1920. *Zprávy Státního Úřadu Statistického Republiky Československé*, 14: no. 171, 1933. Also this chapter, refs. 5, 50.

The Future of the Divorce Rate.—We noted that the divorce rate has increased its interregional differences in the United States. Many cultural phenomena start from zero and then increase rapidly to a

certain saturation point, after which they increase slowly or not at all. After the course of general increase has been half run, we notice a slowing down in those areas where the increase was earliest, while the tardier areas catch up. The spread between areas decreases as we get nearer to the saturation point. It would seem that the *increase* of divorce in the United States had not yet run half its course, that we are still far from the saturation point if any exists. Ogburn expresses the view that there is no limit yet in sight.⁶⁸ Cahen points out that divorce tends to increase by a momentum of its own: the more divorces there are, the less a disgrace it is, hence the easier a further increase becomes.⁶⁹ We may have reached a point where the *changing attitude* toward divorce, rather than economic and other conditions, has become the most dynamic factor. The rising divorce rate in each area would seem to be more a process of internal cultural change than of diffusion from other areas. It is significant that while in any given region city leads country (except in New England and a few other states), yet the leading region is the West with its relatively low industrialization. It is even thinkable that the West and the East will become regions of permanently differentiated cultures in respect to divorce, the West using easy divorce as the favorite solution of marital dissatisfaction, the East relying more upon the other remedies mentioned in Chapter XI, section 1. The East, we do know, is retarded in its divorce increase by the Roman Catholic culture. It would be interesting to know whether it is also influenced to a greater degree by the European attitude that tolerated adultery is preferable to divorce. Is the East, perhaps, more psychiatrically sophisticated, more understanding and tolerant of individual differences in personality?

Despite Professor Willecox's accurate estimation in 1891 of the 1930 divorce rate, it is questionable that the further projection of the statistical curve into the future will give us a reliable prediction for 1971. Any secular trend has its limits.

Guessing is the best we can do as to the future of divorce, but the guessing will be more intelligent if we use cultural and subcultural (socio-psychological) analysis as well as statistical analysis. Statistical analysis might suggest that the ultimate limit of the divorce rate is something short of one divorce to one marriage. If in the future it became the custom for *everyone* to marry, divorce, and then remarry, there would then be about one divorce to every two marriages. The State of Oregon from 1925 to 1929 had one divorce to two and one-half marriages (we ignore Nevada because of its catering to non-

residents). But we cannot tell just what this means for the Oregon family system without more refined analysis. If it should become the custom for each to marry, divorce, and remarry several times during his lifetime, the divorces would then become more than half of, but never quite as many as, the marriages.

Analyzing the situation in terms of social psychology, it would seem that the divorce rate would reach its limit whenever it became high enough to relieve all serious marital dissatisfaction. It is unlikely that the majority of persons are sufficiently dissatisfied with marriage (see Chapter XIV) to request divorce even if it could be had for the asking. The most uncertain factor is the behavior of that minority who are apt to be dissatisfied with *any* marriage. How many times on the average would they make the marital experiment? One of our greatest research needs at present is a study of persons who have been divorced and remarried. How many have been divorced more than once? No federal or state statistics give us any aid on this point. We need an original investigation. If 80 per cent of people were to marry once and for all, 10 per cent to marry, divorce, and remain divorced, 10 per cent to marry three times (divorcing twice), then the ratio of divorcees to marriages would be 30 to 110, or 1 to 3.7, approximately that for the Pacific states today.

Seventeen families in a sample of 101 Domestic Relations Court cases studied by Hixenbaugh had been through the divorce court, and a total of 27 divorces were found in the history of these 17 cases, indicating that divorce is *to some extent* a repetitive phenomenon.⁷⁰

In most of the other countries for which divorce statistics are available, the rate of increase in divorce from 1890 to 1920 was greater than in the United States. However, none of them, except Japan and Russia, have yet attained a rate more than about half that of the United States.

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CHAPTER XIII

THE LOVE MORES

1. INCREASING IMMORALITY OR CHANGING MORES?

“Free Love” as a Theoretical Solution.—The third theoretical type of solution of the marriage problem consists in removing some or all of the cultural taboos which limit love relationships. Its advocates hold that this would reduce marital unhappiness in three ways. First, it would permit sounder choice of mates, for it would give young persons the opportunity to test their compatibility in the most intimate phases of love before agreeing to a life-long partnership. Second, it would encourage those whose personalities are ill fitted for marriage to make the wise decision to remain unmarried, for this decision would no longer carry the penalty of sex deprivation. Third, it would encourage those who find inadequate response satisfactions in marriage to find compensation in supplementary love affairs, rather than to break their otherwise desirable marriages or injure them by excessive demands.

To these claims the conservatives reply, in effect, that the cure is worse than the disease. If marriage is difficult now, it would be made still more difficult by these kinds of freedom. What the radicals view as a more ideal love life, the conservatives view as mere “sexual promiscuity.”

The radicals do not contemplate sexual promiscuity, nor do they regard all love between the sexes as necessarily involving sex relations. They believe in self-control, decency, ideals, and ethical standards, but since these standards and ideals are so definitely opposed to our present mores, conservatives tend to dismiss them indiscriminately as so much licentiousness.

Bertrand Russell states an idealistic but extreme view, as follows:

Sexual morality, freed from superstition, is a simple matter. Fraud and deceit, assault, seduction of persons under age, are proper matters for the criminal law. Relations between adults who are free agents are a private matter, and should not be interfered with either by the law or by public opinion, because no outsider can know whether they are good or bad. . . .

The ideal to be aimed at is not life-long monogamy enforced by legal or

social penalties. The ideal to be aimed at is that all sexual intercourse should spring from the free impulse of both parties, based upon mutual inclination and nothing else. At present a woman who sells herself successively to different men is branded as a prostitute, whereas a woman who sells herself for life to one rich man whom she does not love becomes a respected society leader. The one is exactly as bad as the other. The individual should not be condemned in either case; but the institutions producing the individual's action should be condemned equally in both cases. The cramping of love by institutions is one of the major evils of the world. Every person who allows himself to think that an adulterer must be wicked adds his stone to the prison in which the source of poetry and beauty and life is incarcerated by "priests in black gowns."*

Is Sex Freedom Conducive to Happiness?—The meager statistical evidence which is available does not augur well for sex freedom as a remedy for marital unhappiness.

Dr. Hamilton, in his *Research in Marriage*, classified his subjects into two fairly equal groups, the more happy and the less happy.¹ Again, he classified them into those who had committed adultery (28 per cent of the men and 24 per cent of the women), and those who had not. Though the number of cases was small, the difference in happiness between adulterers and non-adulterers was sufficiently great to far surpass the probable error. Sixty per cent of non-adulterous men and 54 per cent of non-adulterous women belonged to the happy half, while only 29 per cent of adulterous men and 17 per cent of adulterous women were among the "happy." When premarital intercourse was considered, however, those men and women who were virgin at marriage showed only a moderate superiority in happiness over those who were non-virgin (57 versus 46 per cent in men, 49 per cent versus 37 per cent in women). From personal knowledge of the cases, Dr. Hamilton is said to have expressed the opinion that the adultery was more the cause than it was the result of the unhappiness.²

Among a group of 116 unhappy married women studied by Dr. Katherine Davis, 15.2 per cent had had premarital intercourse, while of 116 happy married women of the same age and education, only 2.5 per cent had had such experience.³

The above results, together with general observation, may indicate either that unhappy and maladjusted persons are more likely to violate the sex mores, or that violation of the existing mores leads to unhappiness. Both are probably true. But all these facts leave us in the dark as to whether *changed mores* permissive of greater sex freedom would produce greater or less happiness. If it were shown that communists and monarchists in the United States are unhappy peo-

* Bertrand Russell, *Styles in ethics*, Nation, 118: 497-499, 1924. By permission.

ple, this would furnish no evidence as to the desirability of communism or monarchy, nor as to the happiness of communists in Russia or of monarchists in Japan.

2. THE FACTS OF THE CHANGE

Statistics of Sex Behavior.—Regardless of what is desirable or of what conduces to happiness, we need to know what is actually happening. The evidence is meager, but furnishes some indication. Table 22 gives results from several studies. Hamilton's study was made through personal interviews by himself, a physician, with 200 persons who had shown willingness to act as subjects for research. The other investigations were by questionnaire.

TABLE 22*

PERCENTAGES OF PERSONS WHO REPORTED HAVING HAD PREMARITAL SEXUAL INTERCOURSE

	Women	Per cent
Katherine B. Davis: 1000 normal, married women of respectable standing and super-average education, average age 39, about 1920.....	7.1	
Davis: 1064 unmarried women, all college graduates of five years or more standing, average age 37, about 1920.....	12.7	
Hamilton: 100 married, urban, educated women, 1927.....	35	
Men		
Hamilton: 100 married, urban, educated men, 1927.....	54	
Hughes, 26 representative college undergraduates.....	27	
Peck and Wells: 100 college graduate men, median age 23 (first study)...	35	
Peck and Wells, similar group (second study).....	37	

* Sources: see refs. 1, 3, 5, 9, this chapter. For Hughes study see V. F. Calverton, *The Bankruptcy of Marriage*, Macaulay, 1928, p. 110.

Among Hamilton's group, 15 of the 35 women reporting premarital intercourse had had their first intercourse with the men who later became their husbands. Among men, however, only 10 of the 44 premaritally unchaste had had first intercourse with the women who later became their wives. In Davis' study, about half of the women reporting premarital intercourse had confined it to their fiancés. It is clear that premarital intercourse, at least within generations born before 1900, was limited to a smaller group of women than of men, and was also in the case of women more exclusive as to partner, more closely confined to situations practically equivalent to marriage. First intercourse was with a person other than spouse in 44 per cent of the men and only 20 per cent of the women.

In Hamilton's group, 28 per cent of the men and 24 per cent of the women had committed adultery. Altogether 59 per cent of the men and 47 per cent of the women had at some time or other experienced illicit intercourse.*

It is generally believed that Hamilton's group included a disproportionate number of maladjusted persons. It probably over-represents unconventional

sex behavior, especially in women, not so much because of the maladjusted individuals as because of its cultural composition. The ratio of all divorces to all marriages represented by the group is 1 to 17.

Harvey, summarizing questionnaire studies up to 1923, upon persons of *superior intellectual and social status*, found the approximate median percentages of premarital intercourse to be about 35 per cent for men and 15 per cent for women.⁵

Dr. Reitman, whose practice gives him access to many intimate sources of information, estimates that in the city of Chicago there are fully 100,000 women (prostitutes and others) who give illicit sex satisfaction to 500,000 men. This makes about 12 per cent of women aged 15-44, and 45 per cent of all men aged 20-65.⁶

It might be more important to know the number of illicit *acts* rather than of persons who at some time had committed such an act. If statistics were gathered from this angle, it is quite probable that all illicit sex behavior would prove to be a very small quantity compared with sex behavior within marriage. If we assume that 30 per cent of adult men are violators with an *average* violation rate of once per month and that 50 per cent are leading a conventional married life, with an intercourse rate of eight times per month (estimated to be the median by Harvey⁷), and the remaining 20 per cent are practically celibate, we get the ratio of one illicit to 13 married sex acts.

Changes in Illicit Sex Behavior.—What we need is comparison with the past, and this is difficult to get. Hamilton classified his subjects according to age, and found the results given in Table 23. Al-

TABLE 23*
SEX BEHAVIOR OF MEN AND WOMEN ACCORDING TO DATE OF BIRTH

Date of birth	Total number of men	Percent of those of each age group who never had illicit sex intercourse		Total number of women	Percent of those of each age group who never had illicit sex intercourse	
		group	intercourse		group	intercourse
1880 or earlier.....	10		20	11		55
1881-1885.....	13		31	14		57
1886-1890.....	36		42	25		76
1891 or later.....	41		49	50		40
	100			100		

* Adapted from G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage*, Boni, 1929, p. 384.

though the total number of cases here is too small for safe generalization, the figures suggest an increase of illicit relations among women and a decrease among men. Another interesting finding of Hamilton's was that in men illicit behavior before marriage was strongly correlated with illicit behavior after marriage, while in the case of women there was no correlation between premarital and post-marital

chastity. In his group a woman virgin at marriage was as likely to become an adulteress as was a woman with premarital experience.

Most significant is the changing character of prostitution. It is impossible to say whether it has increased or decreased, not only because of its concealment but also because of the difficulty of defining it. The striking fact is that we have passed from a situation where prostitutes were more or less a single distinct type, limited to a very small percentage of the female sex, to a situation where there is no clear dividing line between the prostitute and the socially acceptable woman. Reitman in 1931 distinguished eleven categories of unconventional women:

(1) "Juvenile" prostitutes, girls from ten to fifteen who often appear in Juvenile Court on sex charges; (2) "potential" prostitutes, who are willing to accept money for sex relations which, however, may also be on a voluntarily free basis; (3) "amateur" prostitutes, who sell themselves occasionally but who continue to live at home; (4) "young professional" prostitutes, who have recently entered the regular life of a wanton; (5) "old professional" prostitutes, established residents of houses of prostitution; (6) "field workers," streetwalkers, who take men to their cheap rooms or to hotels; (7) "bats," superannuated prostitutes, rendered unattractive by drink and drugs to all but the least particular among the bums and homeless men; (8) "gold-diggers," called "boulevard" women, living in residential hotels and fine apartments; (9) "kept women," who may supplement their income from their regular patron by mercenary relations with other men; (10) "loose" married women, who deceive their husbands and receive pay; (11) "call girls," who receive remuneration from relations with men arranged by telephone calls from disorderly hotel keepers and the like.*

These types are all technically prostitutes because they receive economic benefits, directly or indirectly, in exchange for illicit intercourse. In addition to them are the modern women who engage in premarital and extra-marital relations purely for love, for physical satisfaction, or to express their "freedom," indignantly rejecting any economic compensation other than incidental social entertainment. Presumably most of Hamilton's women sex violators were governed by these motives. Non-commercial sex unconventionality is not confined, however, to the educated classes. In some working-class communities there is much premarital intercourse of couples who later marry. As to the "middle" class, Judge Lindsey estimated that among high school girls in a large western city, eliminating those

* Ben Reitman, M.D., *The Second Oldest Profession*, Vanguard Press, 1931. Statement arranged by Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, *Social Disorganization*, Harper, 1934, pp. 182-183. By permission.

who have no social contacts with boys at all, 90 per cent engage in hugging and kissing, 50 per cent in more extreme sexual stimulation, and 15 to 25 per cent in intercourse; and that at least 50 per cent of high school boys experience intercourse before leaving school. He says further: We found from our records that of 495 girls we dealt with who confessed to illicit sex relations, only one in twenty encountered pregnancy.* The condition, of course, may vary greatly among regions. In a disorganized New England community, suburban to a large city, it is reported that illicit sex relations became so common among the young people connected with a large church, that half of a class of girls in their 'teens had a record of illegitimacy as a result of relaxed vigilance during the summer of a single year. These girls had for years enjoyed the advantage of trained and devoted teachers and church leadership.⁸

In Peck and Wells' study, two-thirds of the college graduate men who confessed to illicit intercourse said that none had been had with prostitutes, while only about a fifth had their relations confined to prostitutes.⁹

In the decade 1920-1930, it is common knowledge that there was much free sexual experimentation among both high school and college youth. Reports of episodes suggest that even there the illicit behavior was concentrated in a smaller number of girls than of boys. The significant departure from the past lay in the high social status and non-commercial motive of the girls who participated. This behavior seems to have declined since 1929. Again, the latest generation of college youth, whatever its behavior, at least shows evidences of a more conservative and responsible attitude.

No longer does the stigma of social degradation fall upon all women who indulge sex outside of marriage. Even those who receive economic compensation for such behavior are not uniformly degraded. The extreme stigma is now reserved for those who give themselves for an obvious cash payment, and "promiscuously" to strangers.

Prostitution and the Newer Freedom.—The trend in both Europe and America is toward the elimination of institutionalized prostitution. In the nineteenth century, prostitution was accepted as a necessary evil and even as a safeguard for virtuous women against the excess passions of men. In France, Italy, Belgium, Austria-Hungary, and Russia it was licensed and regulated; in Anglo-Saxon and Scandinavian countries it was silently tolerated. Around 1911 it was esti-

* Benjamin B. Lindsey and W. Evans, *The Revolt of Modern Youth*, Brentano, 1925, p. 105. See also pp. 56-66.

mated that there was about one professional prostitute per 330 population in New York, 440 in Chicago, 500 in Philadelphia.¹⁰ In the period of 1909 to 1919 prostitution in America became the subject of many investigations, and many new state laws were enacted to prevent it. The campaign to prevent venereal disease in the army lent further impetus to the reform movement. By 1921 all but three states had enacted laws punishing those who forced women into prostitution, who pandered, or lived off the earnings of prostitution. A federal law called the Mann White Slave Act had been enacted forbidding the interstate transportation of females for immoral purposes. These laws have weakened *organized* prostitution and the recruiting initiative of men. But in less obvious forms and by purely voluntary choice of women prostitution continues to flourish. Again, the absolute economic need of the women has decreased and their desire for luxury has become the heart of the problem. The higher rewards of prostitution in comparison with normal labor now furnish the incentive. Apparently the depression has led to a temporary increase through economic necessity. Reitman claims that for every opening in a house of prostitution, around 1930, there were four or five applicants.¹¹

Studies of prostitutes show that they are disproportionately of lower-class origin, disorganized home backgrounds, and inferior intelligence. It must be remembered, however, that the subjects who are studied are the ones who have gotten themselves into court. In most social phenomena, court cases represent the less intelligent, skilful, and prosperous individuals—those who are less able to conceal their behavior or purchase immunity.

In Germany, regulated prostitution, formerly tolerated in certain districts at the discretion of the police, was definitely forbidden in 1927. The number of publicly recognized prostitutes has decreased since 1870, and the men who promoted the business sank lower and lower in social repute (in 1860-1870 they were "solid business men"). On the other hand, it was estimated (before the Nazi régime) that the "free prostitute," as distinguished from the organized and regulated variety, was five times as numerous as fifty years ago.¹²

In Soviet Russia, sex freedom has gone far beyond anything we know in the United States. Of 1450 Moscow working men questioned, only 22.6 per cent had had their first sex experience with wife, fiancée, or mistress; 50.1 per cent had had the first experience with an acquaintance, 7.3 per cent with a stranger, 20.0 per cent with prostitutes.¹³ Among Moscow students more than half had had intercourse before the age of sixteen. During the revolution, intercourse

between acquaintances became prevalent and largely displaced prostitution.¹⁴ Only 1.7 per cent of the women and 2.4 per cent of the men in a large Moscow school admitted that they expected to find the ideal sexual life in marriage.¹⁵ But in a study of 550 women students about 1925 by Dr. Weissenberg, 55 per cent of the unmarried anticipated their future happiness through marriage, 42 per cent through a permanent love relationship, and only 3 per cent through casual affairs. Of the married, 53 per cent favored extra-marital intercourse. Russia more than any other country has definitely reduced prostitution, but at the same time has experienced a great increase in free sexual relationships by mutual desire.¹⁶ Thirty-seven per cent of 20-24 year old peasant women in Russia reported premarital sex experience, as against 23 per cent of women of all ages.¹⁷

In the Orient, prostitution is a more approved institution than in Europe or America. Forty-eight thousand girls are in licensed quarters in Japan, and the patrons are estimated as 22,000,000 per year. But the practice is decreasing, with what effect upon free sex relations we do not know.¹⁸ That there is an ideological difference between "prostitution" and "free love" is very well illustrated by a Japanese incident narrated by Bertrand Russell:

Müller-Lyer suggests a general law to the effect that where the state is strong the family is weak and the position of women is good, whereas where the state is weak the family is strong and the position of women is bad. . . . It is true that in modern Japan the state is very strong, yet the family also is strong and the position of women is bad; but this is a transitional condition. The whole tendency in Japan is for the family to grow weaker and the position of women to grow better. This tendency encounters grave difficulties. I met in Japan only one woman who appeared to be what we should consider emancipated in the West—she was charming, beautiful, high-minded, and prepared to make any sacrifice for her principles. After the earthquake in Tokio the officer in charge of the forces concerned in keeping order in the district where she lived seized her and the man with whom she lived in a free union and her twelve-year-old nephew, whom he believed to be her son; he took them to the police station and there murdered them by slow strangulation, taking about ten minutes over each except the boy. In his account of the matter he stated that he had not had much difficulty with the boy, because he had succeeded in making friends with him on the way to the police station. The boy was an American citizen. At the funeral, the remains of all three were seized by armed reactionaries and destroyed, with the passive acquiescence of the police. The question whether the murderer deserved well of his country is now set in schools, half the children answering affirmatively. We have here a dramatic confrontation of middle-family ethics with personal ethics. The officer's views

were those of feudalism, which is a middle-family system; his victims' views were those of the nascent personal period. The Japanese state, which belongs to the late-family period, disapproved of both.*

Venereal Disease.—It is a mistake to overlook the medical risk which is involved in sex freedom, including even the "modern" variety. Public health surveys, made during the years 1926-1929, indicate for the United States, covering communities with a total population of 18,000,000, a prevalence rate of 3.41 per 1000 population for gonorrhea and 4.05 for syphilis, making the combined rate 7.46. The combined rate for males is 10.01, for females 4.86. The largest share of venereal infection is premarital for men and post-marital for women, indicating that most women are infected "innocently."¹⁹ Some investigators, however, believe that the actual rate among women is greater than appears, owing to the fact that gonorrhea is less easily detected among them. There is also a mild but prevalent form of gonorrhea which infects pre-pubertal girls through innocent contacts with persons and objects. The incidence (new cases or attacks) rates for the United States, estimated on the basis of information from communities totaling 2,000,000 population, are estimated as 5.71 per 1000 per year for gonorrhea and 3.45 for syphilis. Gonorrhea, thus, is the more frequently contracted, but because of its more rapid cure is the less prevalent at any one time. As to expectation rates, it is estimated that before the age of 25, 95 per 1000 males and 62 per 1000 females have at some time contracted syphilis.²⁰ Estimates for gonorrhea are greater but very uncertain. German figures indicate that 88 per cent of all men in the age group 15-50 have at some time had gonorrhea.²¹ The percentage is probably less in the United States.

The United States army has succeeded in reducing its prevalence rate of venereal disease from 103 per 1000 in 1914 to 79 per 1000 in 1920 and 48 per 1000 in 1930. The Metropolitan Life Insurance Company reports a decrease of 35 per cent in deaths caused by syphilis, and a reduction of over 50 per cent in gonorrhreal blindness in infants, during a period of twenty years. Public health educational campaigns and the increasing use of personal prophylactic methods appear to be reducing the extent of venereal disease without corresponding reduction in illicit sex relations.

Venereal diseases, as well known, are due to specific germs transmitted through physical contact. No amount of excess or of illegality in sex behavior will produce them unless the germs are there to be

* Bertrand Russell, Styles in Ethics, Nation, 118: 497-499. By permission.

transmitted. However, it must be obvious that the spread of such germs through a population is promoted by promiscuity and restricted by monogamous sex relations. Many infections are acquired innocently, especially by women who have married infected men, and, in the case of syphilis, by children who acquire the disease through the mother's blood. Forty per cent of syphilis infections are said to be innocent.²² Eight states require freedom from venereal disease as a condition to obtaining a marriage license, but the methods by which this freedom is to be proved are usually unsatisfactory. A small percentage of syphilis incidence is due to non-genital contacts, as in kissing.

Both venereal diseases are more serious in their ultimate consequences than appears from their immediate effects. Gonorrhea is one of the common causes of rheumatism, heart disease, female abdominal infections which often require removal of the ovaries, and of the blinding of infants at birth. It is said to cause half the cases of sterility. Syphilis, in its later stages, after the danger of communicating the disease to others is gone, often produces general paresis, or "softening of the brain," locomotor ataxia, arteriosclerosis, and other diseases. It is the original cause of a large number of deaths which are reported as due to other causes. Both diseases can be cured if taken in time, but complete cure takes longer than is commonly believed; and one cannot be certain that he is cured without careful and repeated testing, which is commonly neglected. The modern theory is that syphilis was of American (Indian) origin, was unknown in Europe before Columbus' expedition to North America, and that it then spread rapidly in Europe. In any case, it appears that a degree of racial immunity is acquired by a population long exposed to the disease. It is a blood disease and passes through the blood from mother to offspring more frequently than it is inherited in the strict sense through the germ cells. Medicine has made progress in reducing the ill effects of these diseases, and the spread of knowledge has led the more intelligent classes, at least, to use greater care, whether that care be in abstention, choice of partner, or prophylactic measures.

Even though the rate of venereal disease may be decreasing, the mental anxiety associated with it is not necessarily decreasing. The persons who contracted it in earlier days tended to take it for granted and were misled by false opinions as to its non-seriousness. Today, through changing sex mores, some persons of considerable education expose themselves to a risk of serious mental suffering and personality derangement even though the serious physical consequences are under

better control. The occasional mistake or accident, to the person who believes himself to be "playing safe," is more devastating than a similar experience to another type of person. Certainly, for a long time to come, the risk of venereal disease will continue to act as a check upon promiscuous tendencies. At the same time, there are signs of the development of a new code of personal ethics in regard to medical examination and the protection of one's partner against infection.

Changes in Attitudes Concerning Sex.—Statistics of illicit sex behavior tend to mix together a very old phenomenon which is on the wane with a new phenomenon which has a very different meaning. Better insight into the nature of the cultural change comes through the study of attitudes. Hornell Hart has attempted to measure the changing attitude toward free love by counting approving and disapproving magazine articles, motion-picture films, and so on. It is clear from all indicators that public toleration is much greater than it was in 1900. There are indicators, however, that the tolerant attitude reached its peak in the period of 1924 to 1927 and that there is now a recession. It is too early yet to tell whether this recession is more than a temporary reaction following the unusual amount of publicity in the last decade. In 1931-1932 the movies were the most radical of all the mediums studied. The "intellectual" magazines were next, the women's magazines next; the sensational magazines were the most conservative in expressed attitude, although at the same time devoting the most attention to *narratives* of sex irregularities. Hart, while admitting the causal influence of the automobile, birth control, industrialization, urbanization, and the breakdown of patriarchal ideology, believes that "a major factor in recent shifts of attitudes toward sex behavior has been the breakdown of traditional religious control and partially worked out attempts to substitute scientific criteria."²²

The new attitude toward sex is serious and zealous, not bold, gay, and extravagant. It is illustrated by D. H. Lawrence in contrast with Rabelais and Boccaccio.

One indicator in fiction is the change in the nature of the obstacle used to create suspense. In the older novel the hero struggled, before marriage, to win his heroine against the obstacles of her unwillingness, parental opposition, or the interference of the villain. In recent literature the obstacle is often a triangle situation developing after marriage, and the hero is not always the husband.²³

Peters, Dysinger, and Ruckmick attempted to find out whether the

* Recent Social Trends in the United States, McGraw-Hill, 1933, p. 421.

moral code of the moving pictures is "higher" or "lower" than that of their audiences. By questioning 18 social groups as to what they approved in actual life they learned that the movies prevailingly represent girls as more aggressive in love-making than the audiences approve, and that in respect to kissing scenes they represent the audience code rather accurately. In the treatment of children by parents, the movies were found to represent a code higher than that of the audience!²⁴

Katherine Davis secured opinions from 1000 unmarried college women: 20.9 per cent said that premarital intercourse is sometimes justified in men under certain conditions, 19.4 per cent that it is sometimes justified in women. The other 80 per cent held premarital intercourse to be always unjustified. There was clear evidence of the "single standard" in this group. The justifications given for men were of the same sort as those given for women: temptation, stress of unusual conditions, health, love, obstacles to marriage. Of those (unmarried) women who had actually experienced intercourse, 64 per cent justified it; of those who had not, only 14 per cent justified it. Of all the women, 24.1 per cent justified extra-marital relations by a husband under specified conditions, 20.7 per cent in a wife. Here again there was a strong correlation with personal sex behavior.²⁵

Hamilton's subjects divided themselves, in their attitudes toward adultery (in general) into the groups shown below.*

	Men	Women
Conservatives—adultery impossible or difficult to justify...	15	32
Liberals—adultery justified under certain circumstances...	69	55
Radicals—adultery needs little or no justification.....	16	13
	—	—
	100	100

Blanchard and Manasses made a study of attitudes among 252 girls, of whom about half were college students and the rest mainly employed in higher-grade occupations. Forty-seven per cent regarded extra-marital (evidently understood as premarital) sex relations as immoral, 45 per cent as not immoral but unwise, 7 per cent as permissible. Fifty-five per cent would not disapprove such relations in their girl friends, and 71 per cent would continue the friendship after such a fact were discovered. Seventy-one per cent would definitely not break an engagement with a man who had had premarital sex relations. But when it comes to behavior after marriage, only 16 per cent say that a married woman should go out (i.e., on purely social "dates") with men friends, 20 per cent are undecided, and the remaining 64 per cent answer no. Their attitudes toward a married man taking out women friends have almost exactly the same distribution.²⁶

* G. V. Hamilton and K. MacGowan, *What Is Wrong with Marriage?* Boni, 1930, p. 241.

On the whole, the evidence points toward a "liberal" rather than a "radical" attitude as the prevalent one among college students and other educated young people today. It is approximately that of the "new code" presented below, but not the code suggested by such writers as Havelock Ellis and Bertrand Russell.

The Tentative "New Code" of Love Mores.—This "new code" seems to be somewhat as follows:

1. The essence of moral "rightness" for a sex relationship is mutual love and monogamous exclusiveness, rather than formal marriage. The sex relation before or outside of marriage is, however, unwise, if not always morally wrong. In any case it is excusable only if the result of (romantic?) love.

2. Sex experience may legitimately be used not only for reproduction but also to intensify, beautify, and consecrate love. It should never be used, however, for pure physical satisfaction apart from higher values, or without mutuality of desire. Commercialization of sex is especially to be condemned.

3. Sexual feeling or passion is not wrong. It should be subject to self-control rather than external social control. A certain admiration is won by a person, especially female, who under extreme sexual stimulation nevertheless refrains from the final act. A sharp moral distinction is drawn between complete intercourse and all preliminary acts; "technical virginity" is considerably valued.

4. A single standard of morality governs men and women as to their overt acts; but a double standard still holds as to attitudes and *motives*. Namely, only romantic love or marital duty excuses or justifies sexual intercourse by a woman, while in a man sex may be more excused or tolerated as an act of physical passion alone. Again, sexual aggressiveness is despicable in a woman although pardonable or even admired in a man; and plurality of sex relationships at any one time is much more condemned in a woman than in a man.

5. Lifelong monogamy is an ideal but is not a moral obligation when love fails; divorce or termination of a relationship is preferable to conflict and suffering.

6. The status of one's sex relations, whether in formal marriage or not, should be clean-cut. Partners should either maintain sexual exclusiveness, or break their sex relation completely.

7. The taboos upon sex as an impersonal subject of conversation, art, drama, and literature are largely removed. Strong taboos still regulate, however, the communication of personal sex experience; an "honorable secrecy" concerning illicit sex relations should be maintained even at the expense of verbal truthfulness.

8. Romantic and sexual love continue to be regarded as predominantly

belonging to youth. Violations of the love mores are less excusable among older persons than among the young. Older persons, even if unmarried, should not compete with younger for the love of younger persons.

9. The male continues to take the initiative in all love relations. Feminine "boldness" is despicable.

10. Love should be mutual. A relation, whether in marriage or otherwise, in which intense love on one side is reciprocated by satisfactions of another sort than love, is to be condemned. It follows, therefore, that no individual has any *right* to love satisfaction save as he finds a partner to whom he can give reciprocal satisfaction *in kind*.

Will the change continue until this new code is firmly established and accepted by the majority in ideology as well as in practice? If so, will we stop there, or are much more fundamental changes to be expected within the next hundred years? Or will there be a return toward the traditional code?

Only time can answer these questions. It is worth while, however, even in our present ignorance, to illuminate the problem as best we may by studying how well this new code is adjusted to the sub-cultural needs of human beings.

3. THE FORCES INVOLVED IN THE CHANGE

Culture changes, or it resists change, under the pressure of human needs. We have already noted in Chapters VII and VIII the dynamic forces which have led toward this present individuation of human wishes and general emancipation of the love wish. If we would make an intelligent guess as to the future course of change, we must avoid two errors. One is to assume that conditions will continue indefinitely to change in the same direction they have been changing. The other and opposite error is to assume that every change will inevitably reverse its direction, like a pendulum. The sounder mode of reasoning is to weigh the dynamic and resistant forces in the human, sub-cultural, scale-pan; in other words to estimate the wishes and frustrations involved.

The Needs and Problems of Youth.—Much of the literature upon modern love and sex problems seems to imply that these are chiefly problems of youth, and that it is mainly youth which is straining at the traces of our traditional mores and demanding a change. In some senses this is true, in others not. Contrary to prevalent assumptions, there is reason to hold that the needs of unmarried youth can be satisfied with less drastic changes of our traditional mores than can the needs of the other classes of persons.

Floyd Dell, in *Love and the Machine Age*,²⁷ seems to feel that the real desire of the adolescent is not to hurry into a full sexual life. Healthy sexual life requires a much more gradual process of initiation than the traditional mores give it. Dell holds that modern premarital, non-exclusive "petting" is desirable; that a long period of high sexual stimulation by the opposite sex, without proceeding to intercourse, conditions the emotions in such a way that after marriage the physical sex desires will be in entire harmony with the desire for affection and romance. Petting with a number of persons gives wide experience with personalities, makes the final choice of partner safer because that choice has been based partly upon intimate sexual stimulation as well as upon other factors. When the choice is finally made, marriage occurs, and the last dam to the sex drive released, then that drive is safely anchored to its individual goal, with less chance of later conflict.

On the other hand, if intercourse were to be practiced at an earlier stage, there would be a tendency to short circuit the behavior around the rich and more prolonged feelings of preliminary love-making, and to develop physical sex cravings toward one kind of person, and affectionate cravings toward another, resulting in difficulty of choice of the mate, with emotional conflict, and polygamous desires after marriage.

This is precisely the trouble, thinks Dell, with our traditional love culture. We have been living under a patriarchal régime which is only now breaking down under the pressure of modern industrialism. The patriarchal family as an economic unit required obedience and emotional subservience to elders. Therefore it could not afford to permit children to grow up to complete emotional (heterosexual) maturity, but encouraged parent-child fixations and dependence attitudes.

Patriarchal education segregated the child from the opposite sex during adolescence and hindered the full development of love toward a person of opposite sex and similar age. Not until a young man had achieved enough economic power to support two persons should he be permitted any real sexual expression. But by this time his long-since matured sexual passion had often found substitute objects. Some young men clung unduly long to their childish mother-love, and under the influence of this developed sexual attachments to older women. Others developed homosexual attachments. A few found refuge in sacred celibacy. Still others learned through prostitution to prefer sexual experience which was apart from tenderness and from any sense of responsibility. These conditionings did not prevent marriage, but interfered with the finding of the greatest sexual satisfaction

in marriage. Sex had been partly divorced from tenderness and even from romance.

Especially interesting is Dell's interpretation of the extra-marital sexual liaisons practiced by social equals in certain sophisticated classes, which he calls "polite adultery." These relationships, he holds, are not so much a new adjustment required by the changes following modern industrialization, as they are a compromise with the older patriarchal pattern of which we have not fully rid ourselves. While indulged in the name of freedom, they are really symptoms of our enslavement to patriarchy. Dell's idea is that the highest possible sexual satisfaction would be obtained with a single mate of one's own age, provided emotional education were directed toward that end. Polite adultery is in large measure a confession of the failure to attain this complete emotional maturity of sexual love.

Under Dell's plan marriage would take place when the partners were *emotionally* ready for it, regardless of economic circumstances. This would be made possible through the employment of the wife, birth control, and in some cases financial subsidy by parents.

Conservative and also radical thinkers criticize Dell's petting theory on the ground that it may tend to cause fixation of the sex desires at the petting level, particularly in the case of the girl, and make it more difficult for her to adjust to sexual intercourse later. She may, in other words, find perfect satisfaction in petting, and further degree of contact may seem an anti-climax.²⁸

Dell does not favor the companionate marriage. It also is a concession to patriarchal prejudices, an expression of skepticism as to romantic love and of the wisdom of youthful choice. Marriage, he says, should be the public ratification of a choice regarded by the parties themselves as final. Divorce should be offered by society as a way out of mistake, but not incorporated in the marriage pledge as a loophole of escape. A somewhat similar view of the easy divorce solution is taken by Professor Groves in *The Marriage Crisis*.²⁹ These objections are not against divorce by mutual consent or any other liberalization of divorce which would make it more humane. They are directed rather against *differentiating* the treatment of childless couples in such a way as to build up an ideology of trial marriage as the *normal* procedure.

Will this "new code" satisfy the subcultural needs of youth better than did the traditional code? We are not considering merely their desires for immediate pleasure, but all of their needs in the long run. If the code is not satisfactory, where are its weaknesses, wherein does it still embody cultural lags and maladjustments?

The Lag of the Concealment Attitude.—In the present author's view, there is one primary weakness or lag in our present love mores which prevents our knowing just how satisfactory or unsatisfactory they are in all other respects. This is a lag of the process of de-concealment behind the process of liberalization and individuation. Our newer mores permit us to *experiment* widely with human emotions, yet they do not permit us to observe freely the results of these experiments. How, for example, can we ever know whether Floyd Dell or his opponents are sounder on the theory of adolescent petting, without thorough study of many individual case histories?

To be sure we are having more questionnaires, and there have been some important pioneer researches into human love life, such as those of Hamilton, Davis, and Dickinson. At the same time several persons have gotten into serious trouble with educational authorities by attempting such research. Yet the larger difficulty is not that of making special investigations, but of making useful through informal communication the everyday experience of human beings. In most spheres of life, individuals profit by the experience of others (apart from formal research). In the sphere of the love life and of emotions in general, such mutual profit is very limited because of the concealment taboos. These concealment attitudes appear in numerous forms: reluctance to "air" one's private life, fear of being thought disgusting, indelicate, perverted, or "abnormal," fear of being too "subjective" or "introspective," fear of "letting someone get something on me," fear that the persons involved in a significant narrative might be identified by the hearers, the obligation to observe confidences, and the plain fear of being caught and punished for something which might seem "right" to oneself, but would not seem right to others (see item 7 of the "new code," above).

The tremendous popularity of certain kinds of fiction suggests that there is a real need for the discussion of the finer details of human emotion *in relation to specific persons and settings*, and that this need is not adequately satisfied through the sharing of real experiences, because of the mores of reticence. Fiction, although increasingly "realistic," cannot be trusted to represent reality faithfully in all ways, and there is no doubt that it seriously misleads many persons in their personal love lives.

To use an analogy, our present mores of communication in the sphere of love are like a course of study in military science which would present general principles of strategy, and fictional descriptions of more or less imaginary battles, but which would never be

permitted to describe an actual engagement without labeling it "case study no. 26" and its heroes "General A——" and "General B——."

The attitude of reticence about love seems desirable from an esthetic point of view. It seems to be based, fundamentally, upon the concealment of the sexual act, which is quite general, although not without exceptions, among human cultures. This concealment had the subcultural function of shielding love-making from attacks by enemies or jealous rivals. In its broader aspects, reticence about love may have been in good adjustment with our earlier culture with its lesser individuation of love and of love problems. It may never be necessary or desirable to eliminate the attitude altogether. Yet certain phases of this attitude of concealment are very much out of adjustment with our present cultural changes. Increasing complexity of a problem demands increasingly elaborate, accurate, and faithful *verbalization*. Words, discussion, talk, are the handles by which we must grasp and control all but the simplest phases of life. The trouble with verbal reticence is that it diminishes the total volume of communication, the useful along with the useless. If there is any one single effort upon which it would seem worth while for youth to concentrate at present in the readjustment of the love mores, it would seem to be to work for greater frankness, intellectual honesty, and immunity from resentment or criticism in the verbal discussion of love experiences and problems.

The Love Problems of the More Mature.—There are more specifically definable weaknesses in the "new code" from the standpoint of persons who have already married, or have already entered upon a full sexual life, or who have come to the age when they no longer anticipate with confidence a conventional and happy marriage.

What, for example, will be the effect of the increasing requirement of mutuality in love and the increasing disapproval of commercialization, upon the irreducible minority of unattractive, unfortunate, and yet highly sexed persons? How does the idealistic substitution of the spirit of monogamy for its letter (formal marriage) help the persons stranded by economic needs in a community where they are on the excess side of the marriage market? The general attitude of the love mores has been that it is better that unfortunate individuals be deprived of satisfactions altogether than that the more fortunate should have too much. It is not certain that the "new code" represents any change in this attitude. The "new code" indeed, if it does not create, at least reveals more problems than it solves. Let us consider a few of them.

Easier Divorce Versus Greater Freedom in Marriage.—The adjustment to unsatisfactory married love is taking two practical forms in Euro-American civilization today. On the one hand is the tendency toward easier divorce, best typified in Scandinavia. The same tendency, working through evasion of law rather than change of the law, is prominent in the United States, especially in the western states. On the other hand is the tendency to hold legal marriage relatively indissoluble, while at the same time tolerating in greater degree extra-marital relationships. This tendency is prominent in England through very strict divorce laws, and in France through custom rather than law, and in South Europe generally. In South Europe, however, the tolerated freedom is chiefly masculine, while in England there is more sex equality in the pattern. In South Carolina, which allows no divorce at all, this extra-marital form of adjustment (for man) appears to be tacitly understood, for South Carolina has a unique law limiting the property which can be left to a "concubine." The state laws are also unusual in that adultery is not an indictable offense. (In most states adultery is actually a *crime* as well as a ground for divorce under civil law, although in practice seldom prosecuted.)

Count Keyserling, who represents certain upper class European attitudes, has idealized marriage as a state of "tragic tension." The essential difficulties of life, he says, do not end, but rather begin, with marriage.³⁰ But the highest ideal consists in a social and spiritual loyalty to the marriage, physical fidelity being desirable but not equally essential.

Dora Russell, in an article entitled "Is Divorce Worth the Price?" says:

Roughly speaking, the English have thought it more indecent to break a marriage than to have affairs *sub rosa*, while Americans on the whole have thought that it was more indecent to be unfaithful without accepting the consequences of a fairly prompt divorce.

Lately the idea that it is right to set one's partner free when he or she really wishes it has gained ground in England. In order to give freedom to each other, men and women possessed of a higher standard of morality than is allowed for in our law have been increasingly willing to go through real hardships and disgrace to comply with the law's absurdities when cheating it by subterfuge no longer avails. At the same time, Americans seem perhaps to have been discovering that there may be greater disadvantages in insisting on the break-up of a pretty good home at the bidding of an uncertain romance than in mutual tolerance of infidelity.

If this is so, then the American and English views have come nearer to-

gether, and there may be ground for hope that a new family morality built upon practical experience rather than on taboos is being evolved.*

The Neglected Problem of the Older Woman.—In Denmark, it is reported by Dorothy Bromley, the law of divorce by mutual consent has resulted in the frequent discarding of middle-aged wives for the sake of younger women. In European culture there is more than with us a respect for the love wishes of older men. We are told that it is common for the wife to consent to the divorce, which she herself does not wish, for the sake of the husband. The Danish divorce rate on the whole is only half as great as the American, but the above-mentioned pattern seems to play a more conspicuous role.

Miss Bromley cites several cases which outrage our sense of justice:

A prominent member of the government divorces his wife to marry an actress, and his wife allows him to keep their 12-year-old boy, perhaps because she feels that the father can do more for him than she can. Friends express the greatest sympathy for the first wife, who is left quite alone, and yet no one criticizes the husband's action.

Even highly educated men who might be expected to have a sense of values break up their marriage late in life. Two professors at the university, both of them married for more than twenty-five years—quite happily, everyone thought—divorce their wives to marry younger women. A lawyer, whose wife had waited for seven years to marry him and had helped him in his office all of that time, asks her for a divorce after ten years of married life, when he meets a woman whose beauty appeals to him. . . .

The lot of the divorced older woman is especially difficult in Denmark because she receives comparatively little alimony, even if unable to earn her own living. The amount is usually agreed upon in advance by the husband and wife, and the authorities have nothing to say about it. When the civil official or the judge fixes the alimony it is likely to be quite a small sum.

This practice, in some cases, works an injustice on women who have small children to look after, or on others who are too old to find a gainful occupation. A milliner, for instance, was awarded but \$10 a month for the support of her two children. An expectant mother, whose working-class husband had won a separation, was allowed \$7.50 a month for four months, and after that \$3 a month for the child.†

If there is a need for wider love opportunities than our present culture gives, certainly the older woman has as much need as do other

* Dora Russell, *Is Divorce Worth the Price?* Nation, 136: 84-85, 1933. By permission.

† Dorothy Bromley, *Divorce in Denmark*, New York Times Magazine, Oct. 2, 1932, p. 6. By permission.

classes. Many present indications suggest that we shall develop a new cult of middle-aged feminine personal attractiveness.

The Generally Increased Need for Intense Affection and Romance.—Under former cultural conditions we got along with romance limited to the earlier years and to the unmarried. It is probable that in those days there was more of intimate friendship, that the average person had emotionally richer contacts with a larger number of persons in the community. He probably called more people per day by their first names, and felt sympathy and tenderness more often. He was more often residing near his parents or his grown children. Indeed, there was often a certain affectionate attitude toward a group of persons as a generalized concept. These feelings were reciprocated; the wish for response was diffusely but more securely satisfied.

In modern urban life the wish for response is less well satisfied by the average human contact. There is a tendency to overload with emotion one's principal object of love, be it spouse, sweetheart, parent, or child. If no one of these relations is ideally perfect one is likely to "fall in love" with some new person.

L. K. Frank points out that in modern society the individual needs more affection and also fuller sex realization to compensate for the loss of other satisfactions, and to sustain him in the anxiety of modern life. Men especially, he thinks, require newer patterns of mating.³¹

Homosexual Affection as a Reaction to Increased Needs for Response.—One result of the cultural lag between the increasing need for love and the practical arrangements to promote it is an increase in homosexual love relationships. There is indeed much evidence for an increase in the homosexual conditioning of the physical sex reactions.³² To some observers the increase is alarming. Just why this should occur when the opportunities for heterosexuality are becoming more free, is an interesting question. Homosexuality spreads; devotees in the effort to find partners educate younger persons whose attitudes are near the borderline and thus bring them into the homosexual class. Furthermore, many persons still live in one-sexed institutions where they unconsciously develop homosexual attachments of a non-physical type. They may feel the impact of individualism and general emotional freedom before they gain practical opportunity to become reconditioned toward heterosexuality; their emancipation then takes the form of intensifying the personal contacts they have already learned to enjoy. Male homosexuality has been reported to be on the increase in Germany. Some observers find a great deal of more or less

sublimated homosexual feeling in the psychology of the Nazi movement. It is expressed in the intense emotionality of a purely male group in its devotion to its leader. There seems something more in this attitude than devotion to an impersonal social principle.³³

The great bulk of homosexual love is not, however, physical sexual expression. Most of it lies in the domain of affection, and on occasions it flares up into cardiac reactions essentially the same as those in heterosexual romance. Strong homosexual affection may exist even though the sexual reactions themselves are normally conditioned toward the opposite sex. As Esther Harding points out, it is unfortunate that the term "homosexual" has become associated with perverted sexual practises.³⁴ The student should become accustomed to the use of the word in its broader sense; in this sense it does not necessarily imply any immorality even from the most traditional standpoint, but on the contrary may refer to a very beautiful and ethical relationship.

This, less physical, homosexuality, in America at least, is much more common among women than among men. Dr. Esther Harding sees this tendency among women as playing a new and distinctive role in our culture. It is somewhat analogous to the idealized phases of male homosexuality of Greece, as described in Plato's symposium, and to the fraternal relationships of Knights in the Age of Chivalry.

In the last fifty years friendships between women have come in a similar way to hold a place of unprecedented importance in the community. This change in the emotional life of women is significant not only for the individual but also for our whole civilization, for we are passing today through a distinct phase of culture like those which affected men so profoundly in the past.*

Many women today, especially in the more educated classes, are making a major relationship with another woman instead of marrying and raising families. The earlier unmarried feminists affected masculinity of dress, manner, and interests. Their present successors have reverted toward distinctly feminine symbolisms. In many cases women who formerly lived at a club or residential hotel are joining forces and setting up housekeeping together. They are setting up true homes with the same interaction patterns as in the normal family home.

The Romantic Complex Intensifies the Sex Problem.—Romance will normally lead to permanent love and marriage. But supposing it

* Esther Harding, *The Way of All Women*, Longmans, Green, 1933, p. 107. By permission.

cannot ethically and wisely lead to marriage, what is to be done? Suppose that one of the partners is married to another whom he cannot justifiably divorce, or does not wish to, or again, that the partners could legally marry but are so unsuited on other counts that a marriage is unwise. How can the value and beauty of the romance be preserved under these conditions? Our traditional culture has only one solution. It is essentially the solution which Robert Cameron Rogers has beautifully sentimentalized:

The hours I spent with thee, dear heart,
Are as a string of pearls to me;
I count them over, every one apart,
My rosary.

Each hour a pearl, each pearl a prayer,
To still a heart in absence wrung;
I tell each bead unto the end and there
A cross is hung.

Oh memories that bless and burn!
Oh barren gain—and bitter loss!
I kiss each bead, and strive at last to learn
To kiss the cross,
Sweetheart,
To kiss the cross.

Indeed, much of the rich sentiment of poetry and song in our Euro-American civilization is based upon the sublimation of frustrated romance into tender grief. Perhaps this accumulated tender sentiment is worth more than anything which could be gained by a change of our love mores. But future generations will not accept this conclusion without experiment and proof. People are beginning to ask whether the deliberate breaking of a romance helps or injures the individual's other or subsequent love relationships.

Again it seems to be increasingly felt that a romance is not "complete" without full sex relations. This attitude represents not so much an increase in the positive valuations of sex, but rather a decrease in its negative valuations or dangers. There is no greater *absolute* necessity for sex to beautify romantic love than there was in Victorian days when sex was thought to degrade love. But most human needs are not absolute; they are relative to the cultural situations. *People come to need everything which they can see no good reason for not having.*

The "new code" attempts to meet this new problem by assuming a certain exceptional tolerance toward illicit sex relations when the parties are "really in love," while at the same time professing to regard sex for its own sake, without either romantic or marital love, as degrading. This attitude is illustrated in a case reported by Smith and Cabot.

The woman in this case found a lack of romance in her relation to her very conventional and dutiful husband. She fell into a romantic affair with another man, which continued for some time without the husband's knowing the extent of the feeling involved. He accepted the other man as a friend and frequent visitor. The wife determined that her husband should not be hurt by the affair, so she concealed her feelings from him.³⁵

In Victorian times such an affair, even though seriously wounding the feelings of the husband, could have preserved an honorable character by avoiding sex or any "compromising" situation from which sex relations by the unwritten law could be inferred. It would have satisfied the canons of chivalric romance without violating the fundamental laws of marriage. In this modern case, however, we are told, the lovers decided that "they were to have each other only once." Certainly no one can say that they entered the sex relation from lack of self-control, nor yet from any valuation of sex for its own sake. Nor was their act one of individualistic rebellion against tradition. It was rather an act of compromise between two standards for which they felt a strong loyalty. On the one hand were the older marriage mores. On the other hand was the modern romantic complex which in its extreme form values sex as a ritual of consecration but nothing more.

This new attitude helps to create a much greater problem than the problem it attempts to solve. If we are to be more tolerant toward sex outside of marriage when it is tied up with romantic love, we shall be faced by increasing demand for sex experience for its own sake independently of romance. Many more persons, especially women, will discover the possibilities of sex as a physical satisfaction. Having made this discovery, they will be less inclined to regard sex desirable only as an esthetic ritualization of romantic love. Many will find themselves stranded, after a temporary romance, with a definite sex hunger calling for a more regular even if less idealistic satisfaction. This will be more difficult to control and more provocative of personal maladjustments than the vaguer sex desire of the virgin.

In this and in other ways the "new code" appears to create more

problems than it solves. One suspects that the "new code" is not a "solution," not a new and fairly stable equilibrium of human relationships, but rather a nebulous, transitional pattern, on the way to something more permanent. We cannot long stay where we are; we must go farther, whether radically "forward," or conservatively "backward," or in some unknown "sideways" direction.

We do not know the final solution; but we can at least understand what the problem is. The great majority of persons on both the conservative and the radical side misunderstand its true nature.

The Modern Sex Problem Is Not Biological but Cultural.—What is the disturbing force in the new ideology of sex? Biologically, sex is no more or less necessary today than it was fifty years ago. If human beings kept sex life within certain limitations then, they can, *physically*, observe the same limitations today. The doctors used to tell young men: "Continence is not injurious, the sexual function is not weakened by lack of practice." There is no real contradiction between this doctrine and the new doctrine that sex repression is injurious. The older doctrine assumed that the young man would intellectually accept it, that he would and could avoid undue sexual stimulation, and would find plenty of satisfying interests of a non-sexual character. Under these assumptions, the doctrine was substantially true. Physiologically the sexual mechanism enjoys a remarkable independence of the remainder of the body. It probably makes very little difference to physical health and general bodily efficiency whether sex be indulged to so-called excess (barring disease), or in moderation, or whether it be denied altogether.* Organic nature made the role of sex function exceedingly flexible. Only by great adaptability to outside circumstances can it fulfil its function of reproducing the race, without wrecking the individual within whom it must for long periods be kept in storage. The role of sex is entirely different from that of hunger, which must be satisfied with a certain regularity in order to maintain life and health.

Sex, being, as it were, an accessory function subject to the vicissitudes of the animal environment, likewise became a plaything in the hands of culture. Culture could arbitrarily choose to stimulate it widely, or to hedge it within narrow limits with rather indifferent results upon the physical health of individuals. Modern culture is stimulating sex desire and also desires from romantic love in very

* This point needs to be investigated by a careful research, whose great difficulty would be to eliminate the suggestive influence of the preconceived opinions of the subjects.

great degree. Henry Neumann gives the following incident. Twenty years ago a respectable magazine returned a manuscript to a writer because it deemed one scene in his story improper. Twenty years later he sent the story unchanged to the same magazine, and was told that if he would amplify this particular scene his story would be accepted.* The movies provide a large part of this stimulation. Formerly the person who would live vicariously through a fictitious romance had to read print for several hours. Now one to two hours of screen pictures present such an experience through stimuli carrying a much more intense feeling of reality. Maturity and happy marriage may lessen the effects of such romantic stimuli but do not eliminate them.

With greater need for romance as a substitute for former response satisfactions, and with vicarious romance constantly exhibited to view, the ideology of romance which limits it to a few youthful experiences begins to totter. The movies have done a great deal to idealize the manners and appearance of youth, and they probably stimulate older people toward efforts to maintain youthful appearance or behavior.

Apart from fiction, sexual behavior of the preliminary phases is more widely indulged and frequently exhibited. Lives apparently characterized by variety and freedom of sexual experience are indirectly exhibited to the view of those of limited or unsatisfactory sex life. Such contemplation awakens envious desires, even though these be covered up by outspoken condemnation. Even the campaign of sex education, intended though it be to enhance happiness within marriage, as its by-product stimulates the desires of the unmarried. Again, the knowledge that sex experience can be more perfect than it usually is, has awakened impulses toward extra-marital experiments among the married. Indeed Frank J. Bruno utters a caution against undue frankness in sex education. Sex-enlightened persons, he notes, are not in general shining examples of conventional sex conduct. He thinks the old taboo upon sexual frankness may have a real value in social control, even though we cannot see it.³⁶

The connection between sex behavior and physical health is largely mental; that is, it exists, through the cortex, and not through chemical, circulatory, or the lower reflex nervous channels. It is a matter of attitudes, of wish frustration, not of the specific physiological deprivation. Mental suffering to the point of mental or nervous disorder may be produced by the repeated stimulation of *any* powerful wish, with hope for its satisfaction, but ending in repeated frustra-

* *Modern Youth and Marriage*, Appleton, 1928.

tion. The emotional maladjustment may disturb the basic physiological functions and thus lead to physical ill health. We are suffering more than previously from so-called sex repression; but this is not any psychologically peculiar kind of repression. It is just plain "repression," or more accurately, *frustration*; and the maladjustments in our love mores are one of its major causes.

Can We Return to the Traditional Code?—The conservative's answer to this situation is simple. Let us retrace our steps; let us cut down the stimulation of sex, "purify" the stage, screen, and book, confine sex education to the parent-child relation and to very private conferences of physicians with couples who are actually married or about to be, and deal more severely with the sex offender. Let us revive the old values.

However we may wish, as parents, citizens, educators, or government officials, to bring about this reversal of the tide of change, let us mentally step into the role of individual, unofficial human beings, and ask ourselves: is it possible? There are indeed cycles in culture, and changes do reverse their direction, as witness our business prosperity, and the skirts which alternately shorten and lengthen. It was pointed out in Chapter VIII that the present era of sex liberalism is attended by three utterly *new* conditions: (1) a tremendously greater scientific knowledge of man, sex, reproduction, and medicine; (2) the destruction of supernatural and metaphysical sanctions for conduct by this scientific knowledge; (3) contraceptive and prophylactic techniques which will be comparatively safe, when existing knowledge is fully applied. These changes are of cumulative and not cyclical character. Our culture has burned some rather important bridges behind it!

Role of the Desire for New Experience.—Most thinkers about the modern sex problem overlook the importance of the wish for new experience. They imagine that the whole problem is one of adequately satisfying the wish for response in all persons. They view sex unconventionality as due to lack of sexual skill in marriage or to one partner's being more highly sexed than the other. The problem may now be chiefly of this character, but as that problem becomes solved, the problem of sex adventure for its own sake threatens to become more conspicuous. It is quite true that there are plenty of other adventure satisfactions in life, and that there is hence no absolute necessity for novelty in the sexual sphere. It is also true that much more novelty can be obtained within monogamous marriage than is dreamed of by most persons, by varying the circumstances of love-

making and the joint recreational life. But the nature of human personality is to expand its experience into all reasonably possible channels. If a satisfaction once dangerous or impossible becomes safer or more possible, a new wish is created; this wish, once established, becomes as imperious as older wishes. The fact that people lived happily without automobiles fifty years ago does not make it any easier to prohibit automobiles today.

Thus the question "how necessary is sex freedom?" is utterly indeterminate and meaningless. The decisive question is: how far is it socially possible?

New Sanctions for Sex Control: (1) the Social Sanction.—The scientific and contraceptive changes we have mentioned, however, have not removed all the disadvantages of sex freedom. Even though the religious, metaphysical, biological, and medical objections be removed completely, there remains the *social* or *interactional* resistance. This resistance is *potential conflict*. It is possible that plural sex relations in a democratic society with a sex ratio of 100 or more would lead to such competition, conflict, and rivalry over sexual opportunities that the energies and emotions of men would be seriously withdrawn from other activities. It is possible, indeed, that sex freedom would not plunge man into an orgy of sexual excess, as conservatives fear, but into a chaos of intrigue and personal combat without any increase in actual sex experience. It may be that a vague realization of this possibility has been the unconscious basis of the traditional sex taboos, although they were verbalized in religious and esthetic terms. In other words, social restraint of sex is not entirely the arbitrary sentiments of this or that culture; to a certain degree it is a subcultural necessity (see Chapter IV), whatever be the ideology in which it is expressed. What this degree is we do not know; we can best illuminate the question by studying other cultures, especially those comparable with our own in material advancement, such as those of Japan, Germany, and Russia.

(2) The Psychological Sanction.—Another *scientific* objection to sex freedom is that it might lead to a net impoverishment of love experience within individual lives, quite apart from any interactional results.

Sapir's experience in cultural anthropology gives him a better insight into the essential problem than is possessed by most thinkers on either the conservative or radical side. He says that the modern urge for greater sex freedom overlooks the ideological problem of sex. The danger lies not merely in the obvious physical risks but in de-

stroying the cultural values which give sex its supreme satisfying power. He notes by way of analogy that eating owes much of its pleasure value to its social setting, to the vast pattern of ritual and symbolism which surrounds it. We could, indeed, dispense with the esthetics and hospitality of dining, and keep ourselves alive by gulping food from the kitchen shelf whenever hungry; but this would greatly impoverish our culture in its power to yield satisfactions. By the same token Sapir observes that most persons who seek to "enrich" their lives by sexual "freedom" succeed rather in impoverishing them.³⁷

Sapir's observations are apt to be interpreted as an argument for the traditional sex culture. Thoughtful reflection, however, will show that the argument is really for idealism in sex, for the integration of sex with life, as against making it a casual, detached physical function. Yet when society tries to obtain that result through any rigidly uniform requirement, it lends surreptitious values to the very types of behavior which it forbids, because of the ever-present human wish for adventure. If polygamy were made compulsory the result might be a large crop of individuals secretly enjoying the stolen sweets of monogamy. There is a fascinating tale of a wealthy polygamist, who set free one of his wives from his harem, to love her with an entrancing secrecy and exclusiveness!³⁸

Realization of the maximum values of love is hindered above all by our traditional code with its gutter concept of sex. It is also hindered by the "glass-of-water" concept of sex which was popular in the early days of Soviet Russia. This concept was that intercourse should be as direct and unhesitating as the taking of a glass of water.³⁹ Thus within Victorianism and within Communism there have been attitudes working by different means toward the same nefarious end: to detach sex from other values and reduce it to the simplest possible role. Both have thought thereby to release energy and motivation for the "higher" values, such as business profits or the Five Year Plan. However uncertain we may be of the specific code of love which will obtain in the future, we are not freed from moral responsibility. *Morality* is bigger and more permanent than *morals*. The essence of morality is social responsibility, care for the welfare of other human beings according to the needs of the situation. To teach that basic attitude is the unchanging function of parents in every generation.

At the same time, in a period of rapid social change it is inhumane to inculcate in children's minds such *specific* values that they will

suffer conflict with the changed culture in which they will live as adults. This error in the past generation is responsible for much of the maladjustment in present-day women. There is no need of eliminating from our own lives the values we have personally found worth while, but it is dangerous to prescribe them dogmatically to the next generation, leaving no intellectual transfer-ticket by which the young may adjust their emotions to social changes.

Society is not changing all the time *in all matters*. There are positions of relative permanence and stability which can be held for long periods with relative contentment. Once such a position is broken, society must move on to the next position of stability. It cannot stop between points. The conservative asks: "If we concede *A*, they will demand *B*, if then we give them *B*, they will be stronger to demand *C*; there is no limit to how far they will go." The answer of historical experience is: "There is a limit; they will keep on going until some new equilibrium is reached; there they will stop. That stopping place is probably much farther than you would like, but not as far as your extreme fears."

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PART V

FAMILY PROBLEMS AND INDIVIDUAL ADJUSTMENTS

CHAPTER XIV

FAMILY DISORGANIZATION AND PERSONALITY

1. THE EXTENT AND THE INDIVIDUAL CAUSES OF MARRIAGE FAILURE

Social Psychiatry, the Practical Application.—The remaining portions of this book in a sense constitute the applied or practical phases of the subject. What is applied sociology? Some people seem to think it is the science of how to bring about the sort of society we want. In other words, it would enable us to direct social change. How far the individual scientist, or any number of them, can alter the course of social change, is a philosophical question which need not concern us here. As to the family part of culture, we cannot even predict its future with any sense of assurance. Our ability to guide it is even less than our ability to predict it.

There is no certain correlation between individual happiness and any particular kind of family pattern. Happiness does not lie in this or in that culture system. It results rather from the dynamic pattern or sequence of events in the life of the individual. When he passes from a worse to a better situation, he is happy. If his situation changes for the worse, he is more unhappy than if he had always been in the worse situation. Something analogous to the theory of relativity seems to apply in the field of human happiness.

Our scientific knowledge of the family, even though it should be powerless to deflect the more general course of change, has nevertheless a real, practical value. If it cannot guide society, it can at least guide the individual. It can thereby reduce the individual suffering which attends social change. Perhaps that is all that is important.

The chief practical application of sociology at the present day is social psychiatry. This is the treatment of the sufferings, or emotional ill health, of individuals, through the medium of social readjust-

ments not in the whole culture, but in the primary group situations of those individuals we are treating.

Social Change and Unhappiness.—When culture is changing rapidly we get a great deal of unhappiness among individuals. It may be argued with good reason that there is more of it then than during comparatively static times. It is suggestive that suicide rates are higher in the mobile and changing portions of society.

There are other conditions besides cultural changes in our society which are related in some way to individual happiness and unhappiness. One of these is the high degree of social mobility, or social circulation of individuals. This has been increased by recent social change, but it may exist continuously even when there is no cultural change. Most studies of crime, delinquency, insanity, and suicide show much higher rates of these misfortunes in the urban areas of high mobility than in rural areas or urban areas of low mobility.

Beardsley Ruml is quoted as saying at the 1933 meeting of the American Psychological Association:

The term "nostalgia," refers to a pathological condition involving acute physiological disturbance. Common "homesickness" in extreme forms is a familiar example. The term "nostalgic sentiment" is used to designate milder states of which nostalgia is the extreme variant.

Nostalgic sentiments are associated not only with place but also with persons, time and even abstract symbols.

Nostalgia is psychogenic in the ordinary sense. Its onset is frequently abrupt. It is commonly noted in primitive peoples and therefore is not associated with a particular culture. Behavior of typically nostalgic character is observed in animals, as in the dog; this suggests that the phenomenon is primitive and general.

Nostalgic sentiments are not to be confused with a desire for security, which is characteristically "egoic."

These nostalgic sentiments have a varied and important rôle in social institutions. They affect the distribution of population. They are the foundation of patriotism and of nationality.

They operate to increase vocation and class stability and tend to promote conservatism in all forms. The cohesive influence in the maintenance of the family is certainly more nostalgic than sexual, and probably more nostalgic than "egoic."*

In previous chapters we have studied cultural changes as *processes*, without pronouncing them good or evil. Where some approval or dis-

* New York Times, Sept. 8, 1933. By permission. Nostalgia as described by Ruml seems to be frustration of the wish for response in its broad sense, as used by Thomas.

approval was suggested, it was an evaluation *relative* to some other change. That is, we could sometimes say that if A happens, then B *ought* to happen also, but we could not say whether A and B together were more desirable than no A and B. It was impossible to say whether the whole group of changes made human life better or worse. But now, in dealing with individual cases separately, it will be appropriate and possible to discuss what produces happiness or unhappiness in a given case, for the individual's welfare depends not so much upon general cultural conditions but upon the particular role or situation in which he is placed, which situation he or his advisers *might be able to change*.

Family Disorganization, Conflict, Unhappiness, Personal Disorganization.—These four terms are often used interchangeably, but it is essential to distinguish them.

(1) **Marital or family disorganization or disintegration** usually implies conflict, but it includes *any long-time change* in the interaction process, by which this becomes less subject to mutual control, less integrated toward common purposes. The parties come to be dominated more by their individual purposes. Disorganization may proceed toward three different end results:

(a) Complete and permanent separation, through divorce, or through one-sided or mutual desertion.

(b) Formal or occasional living together, with a certain aloofness or social distance. Conflict is avoided by sacrificing intimacy. If intimacy does occur it is brief and sporadic. This pattern is common in upper-class families who wish to avoid divorce.

(c) Continued intimate cohabitation, but on a lower level of integration, with chronic, recurring conflict. This pattern is common among lower and middle-class families.

(2) **Marital conflict or discord** is an interaction process from the short-time point of view, rather than a long-time change in interaction. We have seen that it is usually but not always present in disorganization; and that it may lead to a complete or to only a small degree of disintegration of the family.

(3) **Marital unhappiness or emotional ("mental") suffering** results from conflict or disorganization. It may also act as a cause of conflict or disorganization. We do not include here all suffering which occurs during marriage, but only that which is related in some way to the interaction of the partners. Suffering may occur in peaceful disorganization as well as in that attended by conflict. Unlike disorganization and conflict, suffering is a physiological process within the individual. It must be diagnosed separately for the two partners; it is usually greater in one than in the other, and in any case takes different forms in the two persons.

The violence or frequency of conflict episodes is a poor indication of the degree of unhappiness. Some kinds of conflict to some persons are even pleasant. If the "making-up" after the fight continues to occur regularly and joyously, there may be little reason save esthetic taste to deplore such behavior. Finally, the most serious marital unhappiness may be accompanied by such absence of conflict that one mate never knows of its existence, until he comes home some day to find his partner gone, a deserter or a suicide.

The reality of the sufferings of marital discord is made very pointed by such episodes as the following:

HURLS TWO CHILDREN AND SELF 18 FLOORS

Milwaukee Divorcee Casts Brother's Girl and Boy From a Hotel Window

Two small children, their hands and feet bound, were hurled to their death from the eighteenth floor of the Schroeder Hotel in the downtown district soon after 5 p. m. today by Mrs. —, divorced wife of a Milwaukee contractor. She jumped to her death a few seconds later.

Mrs. — recently had been divorced, and it was thought that her marital troubles had caused her to become demented. The prostrated mother of the children could think of no reason why she should have made them her victims.

The woman left a note in the room which declared that she was disgusted with life.

"My brother will know all about it," she wrote.*

(4) With suffering commonly goes **personal disorganization** or disorganization of the individual personality. In extreme forms this becomes mental disorder, psychoneuroses, insanity, etc.

Where it is unnecessary or impossible to say whether we are concerned primarily with family disorganization, conflict, personal disorganization or suffering, we may use the general terms **marital success and failure**.

Shall We Be Concerned with Individuals, or Relationships?— These four theoretical points of view seem to boil down to one essential issue: should we aim primarily at the adjustment of the individual personality or of the family unit? To be sure, personal disorganization and family disorganization go together, each acting as a cause upon the other. But which philosophy we hold makes a difference in our policy toward many concrete cases. If, for example.

* New York Times, Oct. 14, 1932, p. 42. By permission.

we aim at individual readjustment, we may counsel divorce in some cases where otherwise we would urge further endurance and effort. The author's own view is that the happiness of individuals is the ultimate aim. But he is not sure whether this will be best achieved in the long run by looking at individuals as the unit problems, or looking rather at *relationships* between individuals. Psychiatrists tend to stress the individual; social workers the family group. But the recent psychiatric movement in social work has led toward a new approach. Social workers now tend to see their clients more as problem personalities, less as impersonal bundles of social problems. According to Harriet Mowrer, the idea is now gaining ground that domestic discord is the result rather than the cause of personality disorganization.¹ But when we inquire as to the cause of the personality disorganization, we find it in the past history of the personality, especially in childhood. The important things in that history are the person's interactions with other persons, especially his parents. Thus we come back again to a family view of the problem, differing from the older view in that it studies families in the previous generation.

It has often seemed to the writer that the individual is too small and the family group of four or five is too large a unit for the best viewing of our problem. It seems promising to consider each *pair-relationship* between individuals as a unit of study. An individual commonly finds it difficult to say whether he is happy or unhappy. But if we ask him whether he is happy in relation to his father, or his wife, or his employer, he can usually answer quite easily and also describe the nature of the relationship.

We may come nearer to measuring human happiness if we count happy and unhappy relationships instead of happy and unhappy individuals. From this point of view, a happy individual is simply a nucleus in which happy personal relationships center. If any important relationship of his be unhappy, he is apt to rate himself as an unhappy individual, even though the majority of his relationships are good. This consideration gives additional reason for regarding the relationship as the unit, and viewing social psychiatry as the science and art of healing unhappy personal relationships.

In practicing this art, we are permitted one mode of treatment which is forbidden the physician or individual psychiatrist. Namely, we may kill the incurable, for our patients are not individuals but relationships.

Why So Much Emphasis on the Pathological Family?—Some writers have said that we need to know more about normal, happy

family life. Sanderson, Mildred Thurow, and others at Cornell University are attempting to fill this need through case studies by college students of their own families. Sanderson and Foster discovered two types of rural families. In one, the parents were jointly in control; attachment of the children to parents was joint; there were many activities in common inside the home, some active participation in outside organized activities, and much ritual in the home. In the other type, the father was dominant, attachment of children divided, individual and few activities in the home, little ritual, and little outside participation.²

Mrs. Chase G. Woodhouse investigated 250 successful families by an elaborate questionnaire.³ She found the factors producing *happiness* to occur in the order of importance represented by the numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. (The order of the items after each number is not significant.)

MENTIONED BY HUSBANDS

1. Companionship with wife.
2. Mutual understanding and accommodation.
3. Love, sexual adjustment, children, and specific traits of wife's character. (No mention of freedom and relatively little of money.)

MENTIONED BY WIVES

1. Companionship with husband.
2. Interesting work, freedom of personality, and outside interests.
3. Children, specific traits of husband's character, and good management of money.
4. Love and sex adjustment.

Problems were found in the following order of importance:

MENTIONED BY HUSBANDS

1. Financial problems, mentioned by half the men, far more frequently than any other problem.
2. Absorption in work, sexual adjustment, adjustment of wife to home life after having outside occupation, each mentioned by a tenth or less.

MENTIONED BY WIVES

1. Temperament of husband, and financial problems.
2. Fatigue, absorption in work, management, jealousy (wife's own), husband's family.
3. Wife's family, futility of housework, and sexual adjustment.

Two-thirds of husbands worried over money; one-fourth of women over money, and one-fourth over illness.

From wide experience with cases, Groves has said that successful and unsuccessful families present substantially the same problems.⁴ If this be true, then a study of successful families will not tell us much more about the nature and frequency of problems than we can get from a study of the unsuccessful families alone. It is easier to get the information about the unsuccessful, because they are the ones which come to various agencies for some kind of aid. Moreover, it is more illuminating to study a problem when it appears in extreme form. The ultimate purpose is to help the unsuccessful out of their difficulties and to help the successful to remain successful. In the accomplishment of this purpose we must naturally rely, in larger degree, upon information furnished by the unsuccessful. Moreover, the "pathological" emphasis, if such it must be called, has more *practical* value, because it concentrates our study upon the factors which are important in guidance. Using the "normal" emphasis, which some people seem to advocate, the medical student should spend less time in studying disease and more time in studying the healthy body. If he did so, however, he might easily get lost in details concerning the hair, bones, finger nails, and other items which are of small practical importance because they seldom give trouble.

The Measurement of Marital Success.—Success and failure, of course, are matters of degree. The study of failure throws light upon success and helps to preserve and increase success.

Three studies have given us some idea of the extent of marital unhappiness. In Katherine Davis' study of 1000 married women, of whom 691 were college graduates, 87 per cent reported themselves as happy.⁵ But the simple question which was asked: "Is your marriage a happy one?" would tend to elicit answers giving the benefit of any doubt to happiness. The subjects were not interviewed personally. Dr. Hamilton had lengthy interviews with his subjects. His method was to present 334 questions on printed cards while he sat at a constant distance from the subject and wrote down the answers without comment. He estimated the degree of happiness in two ways. First, he scored the answers to 13 different questions diagnostic of happiness; expressing them on a scale ranging from 0 to 14 points.⁶ Second, using his general impression of each case as a whole, he classified the marriages into five descriptive grades: obviously successful, fairly successful, doubtful success, intolerably bad, separated or divorced. He then found that the dividing line between the second and third grades corresponded to about 6½ points on the scale obtained from rating the detailed answers, and also split the group into about

two equal parts. He could say then, that about half his cases were obviously or fairly successful marriages. These are henceforth called the "happy," or the "more happy," the others the "unhappy" or "less happy." The happy group contained 51 men and 45 women. The average happiness point score for the men was 6.6; for the women 5.9. The men felt both the economic and sex tensions less, but felt personality dissatisfactions with their mates in about the same degree as the women.

One question gave some absolute indication of happiness. The subjects were asked: "If by some miracle you could press a button and find that you had never been married to your husband (or wife) would you press that button?" To this only 66 men and 64 women answered with an unqualified "no"; 8 each gave a qualified "no"; 17 men and 16 women said "yes," with or without qualifications.⁷

Dr. Dickinson found, that out of 770 women living with their husbands, 47.4 per cent made no complaint of any kind, while 48.7 per cent had complaints which they were willing to discuss with the doctor.⁸ However, Dickinson's data emphasize sexual maladjustment, and 275 of his women were diagnosed as sexually pathological. Mrs. Jessie Bernard⁹ estimates that if all Dickinson's cases whose unhappiness *might* have been based upon their sexual difficulties were eliminated, the figure for unhappiness (i.e., on non-sexual grounds) would be 13 per cent, the same as Davis' figure. Hamilton's group yielded 36 per cent of women who failed to give an unqualified "no" to the question of pressing the button. Mrs. Bernard says that Hamilton's group is overloaded with clinical cases, since 23 of the 200 persons (11 per cent) are divorced or separated. But in view of Ogburn's finding¹⁰ that 6 per cent of married couples in one large city in 1920 were living apart, and of the additional fact that the number of divorced persons is about 3 per cent of the number of married persons, Hamilton's group does not seem to include a great excess of divorced and separated. If we eliminate Hamilton's 15 separated and divorced women, we find $(36 - 15) \div (100 - 15) = 25$ per cent unhappy of the women who are living with their husbands.

All the studies rating marital happiness have been made upon fairly educated groups. Within such groups we can say that 13 per cent of couples who are living together are unquestionably unhappy and 50 per cent unquestionably happy. The total unhappiness will amount to something between 13 and 50 per cent according to the standards and definitions used.

Mrs. Jessie Bernard measures the degree of success by a questionnaire. The subject checks a list of 100 favorable and unfavorable traits such as "abusive," "affectionate," and so on. He checks first those which describe his spouse, on another sheet those he thinks necessary in marriage, on a third sheet those he thinks harmful to marriage. The relation between his responses on the first sheet and those on the other two gives his happiness score. These scores, when distributed for 252 individuals, gave a curve with a strong negative skew. That is, while the scores range from 26 to 100, with an average of 78.8, the mode is at about 88, near the upper limit. That the method really measures marital success is indicated by the fact, among others, that a sub-group of clinical cases averaged 52.6 points and the normal cases 81.0. Mrs. Bernard finds men to average 2 points higher than women on the satisfaction scale, but doubts the validity of this result. She suggests that they may be simply more generous in rating their spouses' personalities.

Mrs. Bernard¹¹ finds that her marital satisfaction score shows practically no correlation with the presence or absence of children, with income, nor with degree of education. She does find a correlation with age of $-.24$ in the case of women and $-.29$ in the case of men, the probable errors being about 0.08. In both sexes, the average degree of satisfaction falls about 8 points during the period from the third to the tenth or twelfth year after marriage. After the tenth year the curves behave in a very striking fashion which will have great significance if it is corroborated by a larger number of cases. These curves show a slight rise after the "depression" of the tenth or twelfth year, then a drop to a very low point (some 20 or more points below the third year level) near the twenty-third year, then a rise in later years. Near the thirty-third year the male curve stands a little below, the female a little above, the average for the whole course of years. The first low point on the curves occurs near the time when the bulk of divorce occurs. The still lower point near the twenty-third year, if it be valid, may represent a period of marital dissatisfaction commonly observed near the age of fifty, when there is greater reluctance toward divorce, and when the frustrations of life have not yet come under the softening and pacifying influence of old age. Another interesting result is that satisfaction score is highest when the husband is three to five years older than the wife, and falls lower as the age-difference departs from this norm in either direction, toward greater seniority of husband, or toward seniority of wife. Where the husband is over fifteen years the wife's senior, however, the happiness is greater than when he is from ten to fifteen years senior, although this result comes from too small a number of cases to have unquestionable validity.

In another sample of cases, Mrs. Bernard tentatively reports a correlation of about +.40 between marital satisfaction by a revised test, and the Bernreuter questionnaire index of neuroticism. The indications are that the relation is non-linear and actually much closer than the simple correlation coefficient indicates.

The satisfaction score itself has a pronounced negative skew, that is, the bulk of the cases are in the upper part of the scale, while the distribution trails off toward the lower end (dissatisfaction). Examining the possible causes for this skewed curve, Mrs. Bernard concludes that it is partly genuine; that is, that *actual* marital satisfaction varies farther from its norm in a downward than in an upward direction. But the nature of the scale used, and the sampling errors, she finds, probably exaggerate the skew.

The divorce rate is the only index of marital failure which permits comparison with the past. It is not an adequate measure of the extent of marital unhappiness but only of disorganization, in fact only one form of disorganization. The rising divorce rate may indicate nothing more than a change in the cultural mode of adjustment to unhappiness. Couples who formerly remained legally together in unhappiness or in personal relationships of great aloofness, now meet the problem by a legal break. That all was not entirely well in the past in America is suggested by the appearance of a book in 1891, entitled "How To Be Happy Though Married."¹²

Counting the "Causes" of Marital Failure.—What are the causes of marital failure? This is typical of the questions which the layman or the beginning student puts to the sociologist. The question seems simple enough. Its trouble is that it is too simple. As a result it is ambiguous. It needs to be broken up into two questions. First, what causes marital failure to *increase*? Second, with what conditions, types of individuals, and so on, is marital failure associated at *any one time*, regardless of whether it is increasing or decreasing? The first question refers to the sequence of general social changes, the second to the distribution of a phenomenon among individuals. From a naïve point of view, it might seem that an answer to the first question is also an answer to the second. Thus, marriage failure is always associated with disordered personalities, and since the proportion of disordered personalities in society seems to have increased, this might also seem to be one cause of the increase in failure. But not every answer to the one question may serve as an answer to the second. For example, it has been shown that couples in which there are certain age disparities are more likely to fail than are others. Yet there is no evidence that there has been any increase in the pro-

portion of couples having this age disparity, and hence no evidence that it has been a factor in the *increase* of the failure rate.

We have already answered the first question, as to the social changes, in Chapters VII to XIII. We now turn to the second question: what conditions and types of individuals are associated with marriage failure at any one time? Or, if one dislikes the "pathological emphasis," he may ask, what is associated with marital success? The same methods apply, for success and failure are simply the two extremes of a continuous scale.

As indices of success-failure are used divorce, desertion, and marital satisfaction questionnaires. No one of these indices may provide a perfect measure or an accurately representative sample of marital failure, but they are better than no data at all.

It might seem that something could be learned by interviewing practical men such as judges, psychiatrists, and directors of marriage clinics, who come in personal touch with thousands of cases. Cahen tried this.¹³

Dr. W. J. Hickson, psychiatrist of the Chicago Court of Domestic Relations, believed the principal causes of *divorce* to be: (1) feeble-mindedness plus dementia praecox, (2) dementia praecox, (3) feeble-mindedness. Another prominent psychiatrist says: adultery is the chief cause. Judge Bradley Hull, once Director of the Bureau of Domestic Relations in Cleveland, rejected the psychopathic theories and listed the main causes as: (1) economic pinch, primarily, (2) nerves, (3) faulty education. Judge William L. Morgan of Chicago said: (1) poverty, (2) neglect of woman by husband, (3) low mentality, (4) drink, (5) nagging, (6) improper sex mating. Judge C. W. Hoffman of the Cincinnati Court of Domestic Relations believed nine out of ten divorces to be due to the sexual degeneracy of the husband. Rev. John G. Benson, head of a Methodist Church clinic in New York, listed: (1) adultery, (2) relatives, (3) physical incompatibility, (4) female independence. Rev. Ralph H. Ferris, Director of the Bureau of Domestic Relations in Detroit, listed: (1) hasty marriages on physical attraction, followed by quarrels when economic pinch occurs, (2) lack of religion, (3) drink, (4) uncontrolled temper.

Perhaps by this time the great value of collecting opinions, even from those in daily contact with the problem, will be evident. So we turn in desperation to those who, regardless of whether they were in direct or only in documentary contact with the live cases, have had time to analyze and quantify their findings.

Lilian Brandt in 1905 studied 574 cases of *desertion*.¹⁴ She concluded that 245 of these situations were the fault of the man, 46 of the woman, 52 of

both equally, 43 of circumstances. Fortunately the act of desertion itself was not counted as a "fault," for in that case the men would have been still more overwhelmingly at fault. Such a classification is typical of the nineteenth century approach which was so interested in fixing blame, and which usually fixed it upon the party whose overt behavior most violated the moral code. The picture of marital discord in the working classes was that of the patient, overworked, over-fecund wife and the dissolute, drunken, lazy husband. This picture was further supported by the fact that about two-thirds of divorcees were granted on the complaint of women, and that desertion was committed mostly by men. But *why* did the men loaf, drink, desert, beat their wives, commit adultery, infect their wives with venereal disease? Modern sociology permits us to put those acts on record as the *immediate causes*, if we will; yet insists that we do not let the matter rest there, but go back a step or two further in the chain of cause and effect.

Joanna Colcord reported on 1500 cases of *desertion* which came before a court of domestic relations. She gives the causes as:¹⁵

	Per cent
Distinctly sex factors.....	39
Alcohol and narcotics.....	37
Temperamental traits.....	15
Economic issues.....	6
Mental and physical troubles.....	2
	<hr/>
	99

Different investigators take cross sections of the causal factors at different levels, so to speak. One observer sees mainly factors which can be attributed to persons, another sees more the factors which can be attributed to situations. Both kinds of factors are always present. A cause which in one investigation is labeled "cruelty" might, if looked at from another point of view, be called "alcoholism." Still another investigator might record it as "economic tension," finding that to be the cause of the alcoholism.

A Classification of the Causes of Failure.—Apparently we need to straighten out the logic of the matter before going farther with statistics. Figure 8 may help in our thinking. Reasoning backward from result to cause, which in the diagram is from right to left, the immediate fact before us in every case of failure is the interactional process of conflict (or occasionally peaceful aloofness). This conflict is never caused by personality defects, personality differences or similarities, or circumstances *as such*, but only if and when such conditions have produced *specific interferences and frustrations* of the wishes of the partners. These wish interferences with their implied frustrations are attributed to three types of causes: (1) *circumstan-*

tial or *non-personality* factors which are not directly related to the personalities of the mates, such as physical health, economic circumstances, children, interference of relatives, and so on; (2) *personality defects* in one or both mates, that is, traits which would presumably cause failure in *any* marriage; (3) *differentials* or disparities in general personality, ability, education, culture, etc., between the two spouses, without any implication or defectiveness or *general unfitness* for marriage in either party. But there are still other personality traits which cause conflict, not because they are similar or different, or because they are related to any defect or abnormality, but simply because they *interfere*. They are specific tastes, attitudes, and habits




FIG. 8.—Interrelations of the Causes of Marital Failure.

concerning which no generalization can be made. It is often practically impossible to distinguish them from the conflict process itself. Some of these traits are social interactional roles which the partners were trained to play in childhood, and which do not fit in the present marriage.

We often speak loosely of a "difference" or "disparity" between two persons as if it meant the same thing as "conflict." "Temperamental differences" especially are often assumed to be *ipso facto* sources of discord even though they may tend to attract each other in the beginning. Many kinds of differences produce *harmony*. It is never the mere fact of difference which causes the trouble, but the *interference* of some specific wish, attitude, or habit of one partner with some specific wish, attitude, or habit of the other. To say that mere difference, or similarity, of personality causes conflict is like saying that an automobile collision was caused by the fact that the vehicles were going in different, or similar, directions.

The "difference" on which the conflict is blamed is often created by the conflict. Personality is changed by prolonged conflict. Those traits which enter into the conflict tend often to become more extremely opposite. A wife who starts out in marriage liking the radio only a little less than does her husband, may come to dislike it always and intensely by repeated conditioning, because her husband insists on playing it at certain times when it annoys her. He, on the other hand, may become emotionally attached to radio music as a symbol of independence from his otherwise dominating wife.

TABLE 24*
CAUSES OF DISSATISFACTION IN MARRIAGE—*Hamilton*

Classification. Numbers by which items designated (Hamilton p. 60)	Number of times mentioned
<i>Non-personality (circumstantial) factors</i>	64
Occupational 26, 27, 28.....	9
Economic situation (no blame) 31.....	15
Health 23, 24, 25.....	16
Age 48.....	1
Children 13, 22.....	2
Lack of children 15.....	7
Difficulties caused by their respective families 20, 21.....	14
<i>Personality defects</i>	99
Fundamental personality defects of spouse 49, 50.....	33
Defects in self 64, 65.....	16
Alcoholism of spouse 46.....	3
Other objectionable habits of spouse 45.....	12
Conditions of married life found irksome 33, 34, 35, 36.....	29
Inadequacy of spouse as parent, or unwillingness to have children 14, 18, 19.....	6
<i>Personality or culture differentials</i>	39
Spouse's insufficiencies of intellectual, vocational, or social capacity (presumably not a defect if properly mated) 43, 44.....	14
Cultural or educational disparity or defect 47, 54, 63.....	10
Lack of common interests (?) 58.....	15
<i>Specific marital frustrations</i>	249
Unsatisfactory sex life 2-8.....	85
Jealousy, interest of spouse in outsiders of opposite sex 9-12, 18.....	21
Lack of desired kind or amount of affection 37-40.....	16
Attitudes of spouse toward self 41, 42.....	36
Disagreements, lack of sympathy, and other family interaction 17, 51-53, 56, 57, 59-61.....	42
Temperamental differences 62.....	29
Unsatisfactory economic or social life blamed upon other.....	20
<i>Total number of mentions of all items</i>	451

* Adapted from G. V. Hamilton, *A Research in Marriage*, Boni, 1929, p. 60.

Hamilton asked the question: "What is there in your marriage that is especially unsatisfactory to you?" From his 200 persons he secured answers which the writer has classified in Table 24. Seventy-nine persons reported no serious dissatisfaction, or specified none. The remaining 121 persons mentioned 451 specific items of dissatisfaction.

Hixenbaugh, studying 101 cases from the Dayton, Ohio, Court of Domestic Relations, of which 67 had been reconciled or adjusted, 10 divorced, and 24 were still unsettled, found 577 specific items, of which she classified 278 as personal, 126 as economic, 70 as health, and 103 as social, factors.¹⁶ In Table 25 these 577 items have been recast into categories comparable with Table 24.

TABLE 25

COMPARISON OF HAMILTON AND HIXENBAUGH RESULTS, CAUSES OF MARITAL DISSATISFACTION

	Per cent of all mentioned items	
	Hamilton	Hixenbaugh
Non-personality factors	14	28
Personality defects.....	22	27
Personality and cultural differentials.....	9	5
Specific marital frustration.....	55	40
	—	—
	100	100

It would appear that personality defects and non-personality factors are more prominent in lower-class samples. In the upper-class group the spouses of the unsatisfactory mates are more likely to charge them with specific offenses or allege "incompatibilities" rather than to pronounce them as generally abnormal. In both groups, nevertheless, it would appear that specific interferences or frustrations bulk larger than causes which can be generalized under the captions of "personality" defect or "personality differences."

Causes in Terms of Pattern-Situations.—It might be more illuminating to state the *whole causal situation* of each case of failure as a unit, instead of tabulating and classifying all the specific details of all the cases, in other words to take a *Gestalt* point of view. E. R. Mowrer did this with the records of 466 divorce cases in Chicago. He started with 1000 cases from the years 1917 and 1920, taken without selection, in chronological order. From these he eliminated cases based on legal grounds other than desertion, cruelty, and adultery, and cases in which records gave no information beyond what the legal grounds indicated, and, further, cases in which the causal situation used only a single legal ground. The remaining 466 cases showed five main pattern-situations of "natural" causes, each overlapping two or more "legal" causes, as shown in Table 26. Mowrer's sample rep-

TABLE 26*

Apparent Natural Causes	Number	Percentage of all cases	Legal Causes		
			Desertion	Cruelty	Adultery
Total	466	100.0	231	139	96
Financial tension	187	40.1	119	68	—
Infidelity, jealousy, illicit intercourse, venereal in- fection	116	25.0	31	22	63
Desertion for and living with another	72	15.5	39	—	33
Drink and cruelty	72	15.5	29	43	—
Irregular habits	19	4.0	13	6	—

*Quoted by permission, from E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, University of Chicago Press, 1927, p. 68.

resents divorces rather than all marital failures, and it represents only those cases about which he could get the desired background facts. The addition of the remaining 534 cases might cause alcoholism to play a somewhat larger role. However, it seems safe to conclude, for areas of which Chicago may be a representative sample: (1) that financial tension and infidelity in love are about equally frequent as causal patterns, each accounting for 30 to 40 per cent of divorces; (2) that infidelity in love is represented to about one-half its true extent by the divorces for adultery; (3) that at least 20 and possibly 30 per cent of divorces are caused by alcohol, cruelty, and other personal habits more or less independent of infidelity or financial tension.

In the remainder of this chapter we shall consider the influence of non-personality factors, personality defects, and personality and cultural differentials, by applying statistical methods to detailed items and to specific, objectively definable variables. In the next chapter we shall consider the factors which must be observed from a *Gestalt* point of view: marital roles and frustrations in relation to the whole interaction process. We shall see, however, that statistical methods can be applied also in that sphere.

Non-Personality Factors.—There is no general correlation between *income* and marital happiness. Hamilton found a slight tendency for his women to be better satisfied with marriage where the family income was greater, but no correlation at all in the case of his men subjects. Thirty-nine per cent of all his subjects said that there had been family friction on account of money, 21 per cent that there had been *much* friction. The women were more inclined than the men to be dissatisfied with the economic behavior of the spouse. Mrs. Woodhouse, answering from the experiences of 344 persons the question, "Does money make the marriage go?" says that it is the management rather than the amount of the income which correlates with

happiness in her study. Fifty-one per cent of the husbands gave money as their chief source of worry.¹⁷ Financial tension is the major situation in 30 to 40 per cent of divorces, if Mowrer's sample be representative, but this tension may take place on any economic level.

We have already noted that high family disorganization is correlated with high social *mobility* in the neighborhood in which the couple resides (see Chapter XII). We have noted also (Chapter XI) the relation between marital failure and *age* at marriage.

By far the most ambitious attempt to relate marital success or failure to circumstantial factors is a study now in progress by Professors E. W. Burgess and Leonard Cottrell of the University of Chicago. Their study is not yet published, but certain of their results have been tentatively announced at meetings or communicated to the author. Their data include personality factors, but mainly represent the non-personality causes. Most of the causes they study, in other words, are relatively remote rather than immediate causes of marital happiness or unhappiness. Obviously, conditions in the parental families of the spouses do not directly cause the spouse to be satisfied or dissatisfied with their marriage, but do so through the medium of the spouses' personalities. Nevertheless, if a high correlation can be found between a variable (happiness) and another variable (some parental family condition), that correlation is important even though there are several intervening and unmeasured links in the chain of cause and effect.

Among the tentatively announced factors which correlate with successful marriage are:¹⁸

Wife has some interests outside the home, rather than none.

Husband's mother is dead, especially if she would be a widow if living.

Courtship was three to five years in duration rather than more or less.

Father's advice was heeded and mother's ignored in selection of mate.

Couple wants children but did not succeed in having them.

The full report will be awaited with great interest.

Personality Defects and Marital Failure.—It is quite certain that marital discord is correlated with individual mental abnormality. Statistics from hospitals for the insane show that at ages of 50 and over divorced persons are four to six times as likely as married persons to be mental hospital patients, and from 1.8 to 3 times as susceptible as the single and widowed.¹⁹ In other words, some factor is involved in addition to the mere loss of mate or failure to get married. Mental disease may, of course, be either the cause or the result of divorce, and is probably both. In eleven states it is a legal ground

for divorce, but is used in only about 100 cases per year in the whole United States.²⁰ More often it leads to behavior or interaction which leads to divorce on other legal grounds.

Flinn and Jacoby, in 100 Domestic Relations Court cases selected at random, found 48 per cent of the men alcoholic and nearly all of them abnormal in some way. They found 56 per cent of the women to be feeble-minded or mentally inferior.²¹ But apparently domestic relations court cases as a whole tend to represent the lower classes. To them go cases in which some infraction of the law is charged. Flinn and Jacoby's cases, in fact, were limited to that category in which some misdemeanor (or felony) had been committed. They do not fairly represent the whole field of family disorganization or of family unhappiness.

There is no evidence which permits us to declare any *general* personality trait such as intelligence, extroversion, ascendancy, sociality, hyperactivity, emotional excitability, radicalism, or the reverse of these, as more or less dangerous to marriage than any other. The only "personality defects," from the standpoint of marriage in general, are the various pathological personality conditions which unfit people for life in general. *Pathological* personality usually involves *abnormality* (i.e., extreme deviation from the normal in one or more respects), but mere abnormality does not necessarily imply pathology or maladjustment. Maladjustment is a matter of specific forms and combinations of behavior, and cannot be diagnosed merely from measuring or estimating general "traits."

However, there are *specific habits* which are dangerous to practically all marriages. Such, for example, are alcoholism, sadism, homosexuality, uncontrolled temper, and tendencies to various criminal acts. Again, any normal trait may be dangerous when mated with a particular kind of personality, although not dangerous to marriage in general.

2. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MATES

Social Classes Are Largely Endogamous.—A number of studies have shown that in general like tends to chum or mate with like. This tendency appears to be at bottom a tendency to choose from within one's own cultural group or social level. Thus Gladys Jenkins found a correlation of +.82 between the socio-economic status of the families of children and that of the families of their friends. The correlation was not significantly influenced by proximity of homes, since only 25 per cent of the children stated that they had made their friends

in the home neighborhood. Her subjects were 280 boys and girls representing a cross section of the junior high schools of Riverside, California.²²

Bossard recorded the residences of parties in 5000 consecutive marriage licenses in Philadelphia.²³ He found that one-third of all the couples lived within five blocks or less of each other, and the percentage of marriages decreased steadily with increasing distance between residences of bride and groom. It must be remembered, however, that geographic proximity in cities usually means also social similarity. When a random sample of the whole population is taken, such geographic proximity naturally plays a larger role than in a sample such as that of Miss Jenkins, where the subjects were having their more important contacts through high schools, each drawing from several neighborhoods.

Marvin showed from Philadelphia marriage licenses that partners much more frequently have *similar occupations* than they would by random assortment.²⁴

Negroes, whites, Protestants, Catholics, and Jews are to a large extent in-marrying groups. The number of intermarriages is much less than mere chance would produce. Ernst Kahn finds that in Germany of recent years, one Jewish marriage in every four was a marriage with a Gentile, as compared with one in twelve about 1900.²⁵ But, by a pure chance assortment, the great majority of Jewish marriages would be with Gentiles, because the Gentiles are the much more numerous group. (Of course the vast majority of Gentile marriages would also be with Gentiles.) In New York only one per cent of negro women and three per cent of negro men marry white persons.²⁶

Social workers hold that differences in nationality and religion are causative factors in desertion, and there is a prevalent opinion that these lead also to divorce. There is some statistical evidence for the belief that mixed marriages are more likely to fail, but it is inconclusive because of the difficulty of finding appropriate control groups.²⁷ The question is a phase of the larger question of cultural differences in general. Differing cultural backgrounds of the partners, be they Catholic versus Protestant, farm versus urban upper class, or even intolerant Republican versus intolerant Democrat, increase the potential subject matter of conflict. In Switzerland it is said that canton loyalties cause many marital conflicts.²⁸ Differing cultures tend to conflict when thrown together in the family not because such difference *per se* is intolerable to most persons, for, indeed, had it been so, they would not have married. Conflict occurs only when the cul-

tural differences lead to interference on some specific point, such as the question of sending children to church, or of how certain money or time should be spent.

Homogamy in Biological and Other Traits.—The tendency toward similarity between mates in many physical and mental traits may be largely explained by this group endogamous tendency. H. E. Jones, reviewing several research studies, concludes that there is through the population at large a spousal correlation of the order of +.50 in respect to general intelligence.²⁹ We know that measured intelligence does vary roughly with socio-economic status and according to occupation. If persons tend to marry within their own broad occupational class and on their own social level, they will for this reason alone tend to marry persons of similar intelligence level. It is not proved that there is any tendency to choose a mate specifically on the basis of intelligence, although a more refined analysis of the statistics might show that such a specific tendency also exists.

When we confine the investigation to a single cultural group or social level, we find a lesser tendency toward similarity. Thus Garrett found that among Columbia freshmen, who represent a narrower range of social status than does the entire population, the correlation between friend and friend in intelligence was only +.21, and in honesty, where the friends were in different classrooms, only +.16.³⁰

The workers of the Pearson school of biometrics at the University of London have made several studies of mating, based upon such large numbers of cases that the probable error is small. They have rather consistently found that there are low positive correlations, of the order of .10 and .20, between spouses in physical traits, such as stature, span of arms, length of forearm, eye color, and longevity. Jones summarizes these and other studies by saying that there is an average correlation of about +.25 in physical traits and +.50 in intelligence.³¹ The physical homogamy (similarity of mate to mate) can be due in part to social and cultural selection, for it has been shown that certain social groups differ from their neighbor groups in physical traits. Thus in England there is a population which can be more or less geographically and socially defined, which contains a disproportionate number of short, brunette individuals. Roughly this is the population of the London slums and of an area to the immediate north of London.³² The English upper classes, on the other hand, contain a larger proportion of tall, blonde individuals. But there are some facts which suggest that social endogamy is not the sole cause of such homogamies. Pearson and Lee have found physical homogamy among sheep, deer,

and paramecia.³³ It seems theoretically quite plausible that there is a *subcultural* interaction process of selection by which an animal tends to be attracted somewhat more toward a mate of his own size, and having the characteristics of his kin, than toward one radically divergent. There would seem to be psychological resistances to the pairing of two persons of very unequal stature or weight. Again, when we come to a trait like deafness, we find no difficulty in understanding the tremendous homogamy which Schuster found, 72.5 per cent of marriages of deaf persons being with another deaf person.³⁴

Belle Schiller, in a group of 46 couples, married 2.5 years on the average, found spousal correlations mostly of the order of .30 and .40 in height, weight, an intelligence test, and in *association type* as measured by the Kent-Rosanoff test. The correlations were practically zero with vocabulary tests, and with extroversion-introversion and mental hygiene inventory. The average agreement (not a correlation coefficient) between man and wife on an attitude test relating to current topics was 72.4, the average agreement of man with woman chosen at random was 55.8. Thus in intellect, physique, and attitude, like seems to attract like, while in temperament there is no such tendency.³⁵

Do Unlike Temperaments Tend to Mate?—The most interesting findings have to do with temperament. A most astounding assertion is made by Kretschmer, who is famous for his classification of human beings into pyknics (large trunk with relation to limbs) and leptosomes or asthenics (small, slender trunk with long limbs), and for his partly corroborated generalization that pyknics are extrovert and asthenics introvert in temperament. (The proof of this generalization is still regarded as inadequate by many scientists.) Kretschmer says that among 170 married couples of his acquaintance, the great majority were of dissimilar physical-temperamental type.³⁶ His statement means, in effect, that extroverts tend strongly to marry introverts. Crux and Haeger support this contention. They say it is normal for a pyknic to marry a leptosome, and that failure to do so indicates a personality injured by childhood experiences.³⁷

But Kretschmer and his followers, however, have not used rigid statistical procedure in classifying their types, and many of their findings seem to be based upon the practiced clinical observation of the individual physique as a *Gestalt*³⁸ (whole-pattern), rather than upon strict objective measurements. When such measurements have been applied by other workers, Kretschmer's alleged correlations between physique and temperament have fallen to lower figures, although in many studies they have not disappeared altogether, but have left a

modicum of truth in Kretschmer's assertions. The theory that introverts tend to marry extroverts should be tested by rigid statistical methods.

Some indirect light was thrown upon this question by Elizabeth Clark (Sweet Briar College) and Natalie Lampert (Vassar College) in a study of differences between friends and between antagonistic persons among a group of 50 senior college women.³⁹

These 50 subjects were rated or tested in some 100 traits of personality. Among this group were 70 pairs of rather intimate friends and 43 pairs of persons in which there was mutual or one-sided dislike. Some individuals appeared in several of these pair relationships. In each trait of personality, the average differential of the friendly pairs and the average differential of the antagonistic pairs were compared with the *average deviation* of the whole group.

The following tentative conclusions were drawn. How far they would apply to other groups cannot be said.

(1) Friends tend toward oppositeness of personality, or to judge each other as opposite, in most temperamental traits, in attitude toward literature and art, in reliability and promptness, and general happiness. Their interests, as judged by themselves alone, tend toward dissimilarity in matters regarded as "dry" subjects of conversation, but tend toward similarity in the fields which are more popular in spontaneous discussions. They tend to be notably similar in conversational *habits* (not subject matter but form of conversation) as judged by their acquaintances. By their own judgment they are dissimilar in the desire to *save* money, and similar in desires to spend for *possessions*.

(2) Antagonistic persons tend to be similars and opposites *in about the same traits, respectively, as friends*. The main exceptions are that they rate significantly less similar than do friends in hypochondriacal tendencies; attitudes toward moral standards; interests in botanical matters, food and drink, the society page, and philosophy; in social influence, good mixer ability, and the desire for leisure and vacations. Antagonistic persons are significantly more alike than friends in interest in business, and languages; somewhat so in tension and efficiency.

The differentials in certain interest and attitude traits might be explained as follows. If the interest is a popular subject of conversation, and not loaded with deep prejudices, friends tend to discuss it, and persons who both enjoy it tend to be mutually attracted. If, however, it is a "dry" or prejudiced subject, its discussion tends to annoy the less interested or less open-minded person. That person, through annoyance, becomes more antagonistic toward the topic; the other, through being forced to inhibit self-expression, feels his inward interest intensified.

From the preceding study and from Schiller's study it seems that temperamental traits tend *not* to show the mate-mate or friend-friend similarity that is generally true of physical measurements, intelligence, interests, and attitudes. There is the barest suggestion of a tendency for *unlike* temperaments to be mutually attracted; the hyperkinetic to the inactive, the extrovert to the introvert, and so on. On purely theoretical grounds this seems to be expected. It is difficult to find a basis for companionship in a person of unlike attitudes, interests, or intelligence. But while our prospective mate or friend needs to be somewhat similar to us in these respects, we may find his attractiveness enhanced by his being different from ourself in the rhythm or tempo of his behavior or in the manner of expressing his emotion. If therefore there is any truth in the popular doctrine that opposites attract each other, it must lie in the field of temperamental or emotional traits, but not in the field of interests or attitudes. Just how much truth there is in the doctrine still remains to be discovered.

M. J. Ream classified a number of salesmen into "mobile" and "deliberate" types, by the Downey Will-Temperament test.⁴⁰ He asked each man to say whom he would most like to have working at a desk near him. The mobiles were found to be more popular in general than the deliberates, by a difference greater than three times the probable error. But the deliberates chose mobiles and deliberates about equally, while the mobiles chose other mobiles with much greater frequency, the difference being over four times the probable error. In this supposedly temperamental trait, the tendency was toward attraction of similars.

Whatever be the case with temperamental traits, in many phases of personality, especially in attitudes and interests, there is a strong tendency toward attraction of similars.

A Study of Attitudes in Relation to Mate Selection.—A questionnaire study was made at Vassar College by Muriel Davis and the author to try out a possible method of measuring similarities and differences in personality among engaged couples.⁴¹

Fifty questions, each answerable by two alternative answers, were presented to 65 engaged couples in which the girl was a college student. The questions dealt with attitudes toward love, children, recreational pursuits, social situations, and various annoyances. Questions which either theoretically or statistically differentiated the sexes in marked degree had been eliminated. The degree of similarity of any two persons was measured by the number of questions upon which they agreed. Perfect similarity would thus be indicated by a score of 50. The similarity to be expected by chance,

if the 65 college women were paired at random with the 65 fiancés, was 29.2. The actual average similarity of the engaged couples was 33.5, or 4.3 points (probable error 0.4 points) above chance. To get some indication of the validity of this measurement of attitudinal similarity, the questionnaire was given to a group of 6 mature persons known to be intellectually congenial. The average similarity for the 15 possible pairs among this group was 36.8. Twelve other pairs of persons known to be uncongenial gave an average similarity of 26.9.

Especially significant were the results obtained with particular questions. The engaged couples showed agreement of nearly 1.5 times chance on each of the following two questions:

1. You have a week at a mountain resort and you are in good health. Would you prefer to spend the majority of your time: (a) taking part in some socially acceptable group sport such as tennis, or golf? (b) generally roughing it with one or more like-minded friends—hiking, camping or climbing mountains?

6. How do you feel about receiving affection from the person you love? (a) want it only when you want it, believing that there is such a thing as having too much? (b) want it constantly, believing that there can't be too much?

On the other hand, the engaged couples agreed in slightly less than chance proportion (i.e., showed a slight tendency toward oppositeness of attitude) on the following questions:

28. When saddened by the loss of some previous happiness, do you: (a) try to forget it entirely and avoid anything which reminds you of it? (b) find enough beauty and sentiment in the pathos itself to give you some relief and courage?

29. Are you most irritated by the discomfort of: (a) a room ten degrees too warm for you? (b) a room ten degrees too cold for you?

45. Which annoys you most? (a) to be hurried? (b) to be forced to wait?

46. When not invited to some affair to which you feel that you may have some reason to be invited, do you: (a) feel annoyed? (b) tend to think of reasonable grounds for your not being invited?

It is notable that the five questions showing low agreement were questions more or less indicative of *temperament*, whereas the ten showing highest agreement were more clearly *attitudes* independent of temperament. The twelve antagonistic pairs showed a pattern the reverse of that of the engaged couples: *they showed greater similarity in temperament and less in attitudes.*

Students who have used the questionnaire, though warned that it must not be taken seriously as an indication of the probable marital compatibility of any given couple, report that it is nevertheless valuable in that it leads couples to examine and discuss their differences of attitude, thus paving the way for better mutual understanding. It is intended to publish this study elsewhere.

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CHAPTER XV

MARITAL ROLES, FRUSTRATIONS, AND INTERACTION

1. PERSONALITY PATTERNS AND INTERACTIONAL ROLES

Even if we discover with some accuracy what types of personality are spontaneously attracted toward each other, we shall not know what types are best fitted to live together. The person toward whom one has the greatest spontaneous attraction may or may not be the type best calculated to produce a healthy interaction and the best development of the two personalities.

Having examined the influence of non-personality factors, personality defects, and differentials of personality and culture, we approach the study of specific marital frustrations. As we have seen, these are by far the most important factors. It is probable, moreover, that they are involved in all cases, even though the cause be stated in terms of the previous categories.

The Genetic Versus the Cross-Sectional Study of Personality.—Most of the studies of personality above described represent the statistical cross-section method.¹ A personality is pictured as a bundle of traits, each of which can be theoretically if not practically measured upon a scale. One end of the scale is "extremely high," in extroversion, for example. The other end of the scale may be called either extremely low in extroversion, or extremely high in the opposite trait, introversion. In the middle of the scale stands the "average." We may use ten traits, or a hundred, or a thousand, according to the fineness with which we subdivide them. Any inadequacy of data is to be corrected by further subdividing the traits and introducing more trait scales. Thus we may describe a person as being average in neatness of dress, as at the twentieth percentile in neatness of possessions, the forty-first percentile in aggressiveness, the eighty-fifth in extroversion-introversion, and so on. Of course, we may mark off our scales in numerical scores or values of some test or other, instead of percentiles.

This method has important values. It is useful, for example, in selecting or sifting persons for various purposes, as in awarding honors or promotions, for measuring the extent of change in personality, for comparing different groups. There is a growing belief, however, that the method, no matter how refined, will never be very useful for predicting how a personality will function in a particular situation. A more promising method

is the *dynamic* or *genetic* study of personality. This method pictures a personality not in cross-section, but as a moving, changing thing. It takes time into consideration. It views a personality in terms of wishes, with their constant change and substitution of goals. It is the method of the Freudian psychology, but also of other psychologists who reject certain parts of Freudianism.

The genetic method does not exclude statistics. It sadly needs more of them. So far it has been too busy trying to find units that are worth counting or measuring. Especially needed are techniques for measuring changes in personality, and for the quick finding of correlations among the data given by case studies. Hamilton's, Terry's, and Chassell's work illustrate the use of statistical treatment in the genetic method.

Personality is continually changing. A personality, as it stands at any given moment, is the result of several kinds of causes. First, there are the factors of bodily constitution. Individuals differ in health, muscular strength, glandular functioning, sense organs, nervous physiology. These constitutional factors together comprise what we call *temperament*. The most important element is probably the endocrine glandular system. Temperament is partially inherited, but not entirely so. It is influenced much by food and prolonged physical habits, and by the disease history of the individual. The second type of cause is in the learning or conditioning process. These factors are entirely dependent upon the past environment of the individual and do not involve heredity at all. Those phases of the personality which are due to conditioning are *habits*, *attitudes*, and *wishes*. They and temperament mutually influence each other.

The Personality Pattern: Its Childhood Formation.—It seems generally agreed by psychologists that childhood experiences are more important than later experiences in determining these habits, attitudes, and wishes. It is said that the fundamental patterns of personality are laid down in childhood. What is the real meaning of this theory? Is it not a mere solemn repetition of the obvious? Naturally the foundation of anything must be laid down before the superstructure. Are the psychologists merely telling us that childhood comes early in life?

The more important meanings are not obvious from the usual trite statement of the theory. First, it should be noted that not all traits established in childhood become fundamental traits. Some of them disappear in later life. Again, very strong and pronounced traits are often established at a later age. The "fundamental patterns" which are "laid down in childhood" are the traits which, so to speak, become centers of other traits, and determine *what* and *how* the individual shall learn from his later environment. Thus a child who in

early years acquires an artistically creative attitude may find something to sketch or paint in every environment to which he is exposed. His brother may pass through the same series of changing environments without ever appreciating their artistic possibilities, but with a fundamental attitude which causes him to make collections of objects from each environment.

Personality Pattern Not Cultural or Imitative.—A second important meaning of the theory of childhood personality formation is that the fundamental pattern of each personality is *not a cultural pattern*. It is constructed before the child is able to perceive or imitate the cultural patterns surrounding him. To be sure, culture supplies most of the objects of his environment and directs much of the behavior of his parents. To be sure, he imitates these. But this imitation comes mainly at a later stage. Before that, the child has been learning how to secure food, warmth, interesting objects, relief from pain and discomfort. He has learned, within the limits of his intelligence, how to secure pleasures from his environment and how to escape from discomforts. The particular habits and techniques he has learned are determined very much by the behavior of his mother and other family persons and the unique physical characteristics of his particular home. These determining factors are not uniform among the mothers and the homes of any given culture. They are matters largely of individual variation. They are not cultural influences, but as Kimball Young calls them, *personal-social influences*.² They are conditions which vary from home to home, even among the most culturally homogeneous community. They are conditions partly resulting from the accidental combinations of circumstances, which, of course, can never be standardized and imitated.

When it is said that childhood environment determines most of the fundamental traits of personality, we are apt to think of such standardizable factors as the large house versus the small house, the country versus the city environment, the kindly or cruel father, the truth-telling or deceptive mother, the loving or quarreling parents. But any one of these environmental features may produce several different results in the personality of the child. The tyrannous father may produce a timid, weak-willed son, or he may produce a rebellious, revenge-seeking son, or a sneaking, deceiving son. The idyllic country village may condition the young girl to a life-long fondness for lowing herds and whispering forests, or again, may lead her to a passionate fondness for Broadway. The result depends upon the *kind of relation*

into which the child enters with the environmental factor. This is a matter of accidental combinations of circumstances.

An arbitrary and dominating father had two daughters, whom he frequently punished or threatened with punishment. There was also a discordant relation between father and mother, and the girls both took the side of the more even-tempered and reasonable mother. The older daughter reacted defiantly to her father's ill-tempered chastisement. She endured his beatings as long as she could, before asking for mercy or promising to mend her ways. Even after submission she sometimes muttered, like Galileo, a denial of the words of surrender she had previously spoken. She developed a certain stubborn attitude which pervaded many segments of her personality. The younger daughter made apologies and begged mercy as soon as a beating was threatened. She became, by contrast, a conciliatory, forgiving, easily influenced personality. Sheer accident may have determined their original reactions. Their difference in reaction naturally led to a difference in the father's treatment of them. This difference further reinforced their original reactions. It was natural for the father to continue longer the whipping of the defiant child, natural for that child to develop, in consequence, a greater hatred of the father.

It is futile to search for the accidental circumstances which started these differing interactions. For all practical purposes we must regard the interactions themselves as the causes of the later personality developments.

Personality Pattern and Social Type.—Clifford Shaw, in his study of the *Jack Roller*, distinguishes "personality pattern" from "social type."¹³ Stanley, his subject, had a personality pattern including the following traits:

1. Early rise and persistence of a sense of injustice.
2. Self-pity.
3. Hypercritical of others.
4. Always right; never takes blame but readily blames others.
5. Readily makes friends and as easily breaks with them.
6. Excessive interest in attention.
7. Lacks insight into his own motives and those of others.
8. Suspicious toward others without sufficient cause.
9. Ideas of persecution.
10. Substitutes rationalization for insight.
11. Builds up rational system of explanation.
12. Absorbed in his own ideas and plans and relatively immune to suggestions from others.
13. Resentment of correction and resistance to direction.

14. Tendency to escape from unpleasant situations by the method of protest.
15. Tendency to moralize.
16. Speed of decision and strength of reaction.*

Classifications of personality patterns are still in the experimental stage, but Stanley would be classed as "egocentric" or "self-centered." His is the type of personality which becomes *paranoia* when it breaks utterly with reality and becomes a case for the mental hospital. Stanley was distinctly not a "disorganized" personality. As Shaw says, his type may better be described as "overorganized."

If we look into Stanley's childhood, we find that he was reared from the age of five by a stepmother who discriminated against him in favor of her own children. He and his seven brothers and sisters, for example, were forced to wait at the none too copious meals while the stepmother's seven children were served first and best. He states that beatings were the usual thing at meal times. His father took the side of the stepmother. The result was a deep sense of injustice. He ran away from home, lived in several institutions where he learned the ways of crime. Older inmates narrated their experiences in crime to the wonder and admiration of the newer boys. In these institutions his sense of injustice was further strengthened by the treatment received. This was not so much physical ill treatment or deprivation as it was the support by higher officials of tyrannous subordinates and their refusal to listen to the "under dog's" side of a grievance. He developed a grudge against society and wanted to get even. He learned to escape feelings of guilt by blaming everything upon someone else. Thus he developed ideas of *persecution*. In order to maintain these rationalizations and protect himself from mental suffering over his own mistakes, he had to lose his *insight*, to close his mind to the suggestions of others, to become absorbed in his own ideas.

Such was Stanley's "fundamental pattern of personality." It was developed as a result of the personal-social, not the cultural, features of his early environment. The death of his mother, an unjust stepmother, a not-understanding father, fifteen children in a poor and crowded home, commitment to institutions; certainly these are not uniform and regular patterns of our American culture or even of any class or sect within it.

That Stanley became a criminal was not the inevitable result of his personality pattern. Some persons, under similar influences, elaborate inwardly their ideas of injustice and persecution, and thus become

* Clifford Shaw, *The Jack-Roller*, University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp. 190-191. By permission.

cranks rather than criminals. Occasionally they find a way to work off their grudge in some socially useful way; they become reformers and even statesmen. Others, finding no such outlet, retreat more and more into their own thought life. Ideas of persecution become *delusions* of persecution; that is, they now really believe them. Then some day they do some foolhardy act in response to a delusion, and their relatives commit them to the state hospital for the insane, as incurable schizophrenics or paranoiacs. Again, many of Stanley's personality pattern become hoboes—the paranoid type of hobo whom Nels Anderson describes so well, unable to hold a job because of disputes with employers, leaning to radicalism, often becoming eloquent soap-box orators.⁴

That Stanley became a criminal, and the mean cowardly type of criminal who robs drunks (i.e., "jack-roller"), was due to the fact that this pattern was fortuitously placed before him as a model at the time he was in need of some kind of escape. Such a pattern of behavior is a "social type." It is imitated. In Stanley's case a companion taught it to him, and they worked together, robbing drunken men, sexual perverts, and others whose weaknesses rendered them easy prey. Whenever Stanley's companion failed to appear at the proper time, he lost his courage and feared to carry out the crime. At other times Stanley had been a "truant," a "delinquent," a "hobo hitting the road" on the freights. These also are social types. Any of these modes of behavior could probably be invented by an ingenious and desperate individual without previous experience with them; but if they were dependent entirely on such personal originality, they would be exceedingly rare. Their great prevalence is due to their being imitated by novices from the groups already experienced with them.

Stanley at several times in his career became a law-abiding citizen. When working steadily and earning plenty of money, he liked to dress and act so as to attract attention. He even enjoyed it when former humble companions called him a "snob." His personality pattern could find self-expression through the law-abiding-successful-young-employee type as well as through the jack-roller type. That he repeatedly lost his job was due not to lack of intelligence and everyday industry, but to boredom and to failure to deal properly with social accidents. On one occasion he had overslept, on another he had played a practical joke upon a co-worker, on another had "sassed" back the bundle girl he was helping in the store. It appears that he could have held his job on these occasions had he taken an apologetic

attitude as soon as he found himself technically in the wrong. Another personality would have been able to take such an attitude, would have swallowed temporary pride for the sake of ulterior aims. But Stanley, under the strain of conflict, lapsed into his fundamental habit of thinking the world unjust and resenting all criticism. He impulsively reacted in such a way as to put himself still further in the wrong and arrogantly withdrew from the situation with all its promise for the future.

After several failures, Shaw finally succeeded in placing him in a social role which has appeared to be permanently successful. He got him a job as commercial salesman. In this work, for the first time, Stanley took no direct orders from his employer, and was rarely subject to criticism or correction. On the other hand his attractive manners, forceful mode of address, and ability to make friends were positive assets. He now has a wife and child.

Stanley was thus "reformed." But as Shaw points out, what had been done was simply to find a social role in which Stanley's fundamental personality could function without running into interferences. That personality pattern had not been changed. He says, "I get a great kick out of putting over a deal on a customer, especially a stubborn customer." One dreads to think of his coming again under the close supervision of a dictatorial superior, or getting into some accidental conflict which would re-excite his old grudges.

Every type of personality pattern is competent to play several, but not all, social roles. Every social role or type includes persons of several varied personality patterns, but some of these are more prevalent than others. As Stanley's case illustrates, the highly egocentric personality pattern does not fit easily into certain social roles, such as that of minor employee under constant orders and supervision. But, of course, a socially minded employer might create a different employee-role to which persons like Stanley could adjust.

"Social type" or "social role" is acquired at later ages; it may be changed even after maturity. It is usually acquired from some model which culture provides. Thus the clergymen, the movie actress, the wealthy society woman, the college boy, the football hero, the ambitious and over-Americanized young immigrant, the stenographer, the political radical, and so on, are social types. This does not mean that all clergymen, for example, are alike in personality. Their likenesses may be limited and superficial. But there are certain characteristics and reactions which can be fairly safely predicted in all clergymen. Society quickly recognizes it when a clergymen's appear-

ance and behavior depart from "type." There are more general social types of personality which belong to whole classes or cultures. They may be called cultural types. The "typical" Englishman, the typical Southern Mountaineer, the typical native New England farmer, for example, are more than mere statistical averages. They represent certain patterns of behavior, which, although they may not be followed faithfully by all members of the class concerned, nevertheless, serve as ideals and models for imitation.

Personality Pattern Formed by Childhood Interactional Role.—The personality pattern is determined by the childhood role rather than by this adult social role. The childhood role is not an imitation of a model; it is the result of action and reaction with family persons. It frequently is the opposite of the personality pattern of one's parent or one's nearest sibling. It has been held, indeed, that there is a certain tendency toward alternation of generations in this respect. For example, a self-reliant, zealous mother tends to indulge her daughter and create in her a pattern of dependency. This daughter, when she becomes a mother, tends to unload rather than to assume responsibilities, thus forcing her own daughter into the responsible, self-reliant role played by the grandmother. Among such childhood roles are the older sister role, the spoiled child role, the mother-dependent role, the bullying older brother, the father-antagonistic rebellious son. There are many intermediate types, and a person may play several roles. Some roles are commonly recognized, or stereotyped; others are unique variations peculiar to a particular family or individual. Perhaps we shall have in time a more definite classification.

Roles exert their influence largely through the expectations they create in the interacting persons. The man who is very taciturn in his daily family life may become a lively conversationalist when he is a guest in another home. He is now playing the guest role, he feels what is expected of him. He relates incidents and makes comments which seemed to him not worth mentioning in his own family group.

Partners may begin a marriage by playing the stereotyped social roles of bride and groom. These are social or cultural models and can be played faithfully for a time by almost any kind of personality. As time goes on the mates tend to drift into roles more closely related to those they played in childhood. In other words, their basic personality patterns begin to show beneath the adult social types which they have assumed. Home is the place where one "lets down," behaves most "naturally." Here is where the real test of compatibility begins.

Is there anything in the fundamental patterns of these personalities which is likely to lead to interferences and conflict? Any two persons can be harmonious when they are faithfully playing social roles designed for harmony. Can they be harmonious when they step out of these roles and become natural?

There is no question that many couples can be harmonious while being natural. With others, harmony requires the constant effort of the actor on the stage.

Basic Interactional Roles and Marriage.—Cottrell reports the case of a young man, Mr. A, whose mother and sisters were of active, dominating personality, and whose father like himself had played a meek and passive role. Mr. A, grieved by the death of his mother, married a woman who at first seemed to give him a sense of security, but who turned out to be of a dependent, clinging-vine type. He became unhappy with his wife and often went home to his sister with whom he found comfort. He could not "stand that sagging, droopy look" of his wife when she was tired. The wife, on the contrary, needed an independent, dominating man, and he failed to play this needed role.⁵

Let us see how psychoanalysis might interpret this case:

Mr. A reports that he slept with his sister frequently until the age of 16 but never had sexual feelings in regard to her. Consciously, at least, the satisfaction she gave him was one of security combined with affection, but devoid of any sexual element. With his wife Mr. A's sexual approach was clumsy and diffident, and their physical relations were never wholly satisfactory. Consciously, however, his desire was not for any homosexual or other abnormal sex object, but to escape playing the masculine role of aggressor. But the absence of any conscious sexual feeling toward his sister would be no evidence that it did not exist in the unconscious. It would constitute a challenge to the analyst to uncover it. The interpretation might be that the incestuous desire was strongly repressed, and that it gave rise to *feelings of guilt* in his married relation, because his wife was the unconscious substitute for his desired sister. His mother and sister fixation would not let him become interested in any woman who did not in some way resemble them and thus provide a substitute. At the same time his feelings of incestuous guilt would not let him use this substitute in a normal manner. His means of escape from the conflict was to identify himself unconsciously with his sister, and thus to assume a passive feminine role. Thus the subject *might* be diagnosed as a species of homosexual. Cottrell's published case record gives no evidence of Mr. A's having ever made homosexual approaches or shown any abnormal interest in other men. The analyst would presumably seek evidence on that point before making a final diagnosis.

But, on the face of the evidence, and without probing the subject's unconscious by psychoanalysis, it is possible to make a different interpretation, as Cottrell does. The method by which he comes to his interpretation is called *socio-analysis*. Like psychoanalysis this is a dynamic, genetic method. It thinks in terms of wishes, satisfactions, substitutions; it has much the same conception of personality. But it holds that the thing chiefly needing analysis is the social situation: the childhood roles, adult roles, and interaction processes in which the distressed partners have been engaged. Psychoanalysis, on the other hand, concentrates upon unraveling the complexities of the inner wish life of the individual. In so doing it tends, unintentionally perhaps, to assume certain conditions to be universal in family interaction and to overlook the variations which actually occur. It tends to overlook obvious social facts while getting at obscure psychological facts. The basis of criticism is not that these psychological facts are unimportant, but that they are to a large extent the *products* of the social interaction and could be learned, in their essential features, through analysis of this interaction.

Thus Cottrell interprets his case as a problem of two basic roles (or personality patterns) resulting from early family relationships, which come into conflict in marriage. He does not deny that incest repression may exist in the man, and that the specifically sexual attitudes of the two partners are part of the situation. But he sees these sexual features against a larger background. The basic desire of the man was for a "solicitous, protecting, aggressive, decisive, parent environment which the wife, who expects something of the same sort of environment, cannot supply." He admits that the man may be classed as homosexual if that word merely means a passive role, but points out that this classification fails to describe the "role pattern Mr. A represents. He is not only passive but has an infantile dependent attitude or role which is not necessarily characteristic of the homosexual." Further, other important features of homosexuality are lacking.

If we could classify each person in terms of childhood role, we might be able to offer good advice as to suitable mating. However, it may be a mistake to assume that the fundamental patterns of all personalities can be stated in terms of their childhood roles. It is possible that with many this role does not become central, and that they could adapt themselves equally well to several roles in marriage. In some persons the fundamental pattern may be founded upon some relation to the physical rather than the social environment.

Sexual Personality Patterns and Marriage.—Among the statistical findings of Hamilton's *Research in Marriage*, the most noteworthy is an apparent verification of one aspect of the Freudian Oedipus theory. Among the 100 men he found 17 who had married wives physically resembling their mothers. Of these 16 were in the happy group! A similar question to women failed to bring out any significant correlation. But 13 women mentioned unattractive qualities when asked to describe their fathers, and of these 12 were in the unhappy group.⁶

The striking result in the case of the men would be interpreted in strict Freudian fashion as follows: All or most men are unconsciously in love with their mothers. Hence they are much more likely to be happy with a wife who as nearly as possible is a substitute for the mother. But one could also interpret the result this way. Most men have preserved a happy relation with their mothers, but not so many have preserved a happy relation with their wives. Only those who are happy with their wives would be apt to note and admit a resemblance between their wives and their mothers. The assertion of a physical resemblance between two persons after all represents a very subjective judgment.

Gladys Terry studied Hamilton's cases, looking for *syndromes* or "patterns," that is, combinations of specific facts which were repeated in several cases. Since the number of questions asked was over 300, there was small probability that as many as 8 out of 100 cases would agree in a large number of specific details. Yet Mrs. Terry found 8 women whose histories agreed in the following respects, and differed in these same respects from those of a control group of 8 non-pathological women:⁷

They had frightening or repelling sexual aggressions during childhood or adolescence.

They tended to disparage their fathers.

They preferred their mothers.

They received evasive sex instruction during childhood.

They learned where babies came from at six to twelve years of age, rather than earlier.

They had nasty thoughts.

They had had sexual opportunities before puberty and were ashamed.

They still have sex daydreams.

Sex occupied their minds very much between eighteen and marriage.

They were distressed by the thought of their parents' sex relation.

Their husbands were unlike their fathers.

If by pressing a button they could dissolve their marriage, they would do so.

They attributed their distaste for sex to themselves.

They wished there were no sex desire in the world.

They do not like their husbands to see their sex organs.

They admit that other women might be attractive to them.

They lacked orgasm capacity.

Again, Hamilton found four other women who agreed in a very different pattern. They had inadequate orgasms, their husbands were sexually unattractive and undersexed; they masturbated, loved other men, had many love affairs; were narcissistic, literary, and artistic, fonder of their fathers than of their mothers, were unfriendly with their mothers, and jealous of other family females (mothers, sisters, etc.).

Hamilton found three men who agreed in a pattern including sex inferiority, lack of self-confidence, dislike of male affection, absence of any homosexual feeling in their history, slovenly personal habits, unsatisfactory father relation, greater fondness for mother.⁸

These findings together with general observation suggest the existence, among others, of the following type personality patterns:

1. The father-antagonistic, mother-centered woman, conditioned against certain aspects of the entire male sex, expressing her sex frustration by outwardly condemning or resenting sex desire in general.

2. The father-fixated, Electra type woman, narcissistic, jealous, inconstant, seeking male love but never satisfied.

3. The sexually adequate woman, loving both parents equally, but emotionally independent of them.

4. The father-disliking, mother-fixated man, lacking in sexual efficiency and self-confidence, but inclined toward rebellion; uneasy in relations to other men.

5. The man of unusually good father-adjustment, sexually well adjusted, enjoys male society and accepts its major values including a non-serious attitude toward sex, accepts authority normally, has little sympathy for pathological and peculiar personalities.

2. MARITAL FRUSTRATIONS

Personality patterns fail or succeed in marriage not because they are different or similar, but because they *interfere* or *do not interfere* with each other's basic wishes. Marital conflict is not a difference in traits but a *collision of wishes*. A dynamic and not a static picture of the personalities is necessary for the understanding of the conflict.

Mowrer's Type Tensions.—One of the most important analyses of marital conflict is that made by E. R. Mowrer.⁹ Following the cue from his study mentioned above, he attempts to describe each case of discord as a whole pattern situation, and not as an inventory of detailed dissatisfactions. He finds four major "type-tensions," as described below. He finds, however, that several of these tensions are usually present in each case. One tension leads to another. Again the tension felt by the wife may be very different from that felt by the husband. As a result, it appears to the present writer that these tensions cannot be usefully defined and identified in actual marriage situations as long as they are considered as *relations* or *interactions* between the partners. They can, however, be re-defined as *frustrations* within the individuals, with greater promise of results.

The type-tensions are:

- (1) Incompatibility in response.
- (2) Economic individualization.
- (3) Cultural differentiation.
- (4) Individuation of life patterns.

Incompatibility in response includes: differences in strength of physical sex drive, differences in cultural attitude toward sex, differences due to health or temperament, preferences for caresses rather than intercourse and the reverse, perversions, differentiation due to pregnancy or fear of pregnancy, impotence, substitution of child love for husband love, personal habits or sexual infidelities which lead to recoil of partner. Mowrer notes that 40 per cent of 100 cases he used in establishing these categories belonged to this class.

Economic individualization includes: differences in standards of living and choice of consumption goods, in the attitude toward the employment of the wife, vocational separation, economic independence, refusal of spending money to wife, unwillingness to work.

Cultural differentiation includes: religious, racial, and other social background differences, differences in recreational interests, folkways, and social contacts.

Individuation of life-patterns means differences in philosophy or scheme of life not directly related to the foregoing. Twins reared in the same home, Mowrer points out, would be culturally the same. But one might be an introvert and the other an extrovert, and the general schematization of their habits would differ. Life-pattern individuation often begins after marriage, and is not noticed until it has gone so far as to be dangerous to marital success.

Defining "tensions" as individual frustrations, the writer made a rough analysis of 115 cases, 58 derived from the literature of marital discord and 57 from personal observations of himself and students. The published cases

were taken from a great variety of sources such as Breckinridge, Keyserling, Waller, the Binkleys, Bartlett, Lindsey, and Reuter and Runner's various sources, representing divorce, desertion, reconciliations by social workers, and so on.¹⁰ The data were given rough treatment because the procedure was only exploratory.

As to outcome of the 115 cases: 32 per cent were reconciled or never had serious discord; 16 per cent remained in discord but not separation; and 52 per cent were divorced or separated. Thus 68 per cent were unreconciled.

Among the cases where it was possible to judge that one party was frustrated more than the other, 42 per cent showed the husband, and 58 per cent the wife, to have the chief frustration. It is interesting to note by way of comparison that Hamilton found women more dissatisfied, and that women get 71 per cent of divorces.

Each case was diagnosed as to the chief frustration of the husband and the chief frustration of the wife. In some cases it was necessary to tabulate several frustrations of one or both parties, so that the total figures refer to frustration items noted, which is more than the total number of cases. For 87 of the 115 cases this analysis was made by another judge independently, using a somewhat different set of categories and using only brief digests of many cases, prepared by students. This procedure with the 87 cases is hereafter called the first analysis; the main procedure on the 115 cases, the second analysis. Because of these ambiguities of method and the incomplete nature of the original data, it was decided not to work for any greater reliability in the classification of each individual case, but only to compare the mass results of the two analyses. These were substantially similar. For more specifically valid results it would seem better to get a fresh crop of original data than further to manipulate these.

In translating Mowrer's "tension" concepts into frustration concepts, some reclassification seemed necessary. Several were experimented with, and the one finally chosen divided all frustrations into three categories, as follows:

(1) *Non-interpersonal* frustrations, that is, frustrations of wishes which do not normally find their satisfaction through interpersonal relationships but rather through the individual's impersonal relations to his environment. These include most of what Mowrer implies under economic, cultural, and pattern-of-life tensions. They involve the general wish to be married or to have children, but not the wish for a particular person or a particular kind of love or spousal attitude. They involve the desire for general social approval and social status but not for superiority through the specific personal relationships involved in family life. They involve desires for financial security, intellectual or esthetic life, travel, higher living standards, and so on. They can be reduced to frustrations of the basic wishes for security, adventure, and some phases of the superiority wish. In such cases

the partner yields adequate sexual and love satisfactions and, as far as his direct behavior toward oneself goes, satisfies one's ego cravings; but he interferes with other aims, through his behavior toward work, society, or outside persons, or through some incompetence or defect in his personality. If one loses one's love toward him, one does so as an after-result of irritations, but not because he is unfaithful, unloving, cruel, or sexually inefficient.

(2) *Interpersonal* frustrations, that is, frustrations of the wish for love in its various forms, such as sex, romance, and affection; and inferiority frustrations in the marital relation itself or in the relation to the relatives, friends, and culture of the spouse. Here belong sexual dissatisfactions, such as those due to the partner's being oversexed, undersexed, or unskilful in sex; unrequited cravings for affection or spousal companionship; sufferings due to cruelty or sadism of the spouse; and most forms of jealousy. The interpersonal frustrations have been sub-classified into (a) *love* frustrations, and (b) *inferiority* frustrations, which latter are mainly described as jealousy. This distinction is important because the problem of a jealous person or person with "inferiority complex" is very different from that of a love-frustrated person. It is true that the former, like the latter, may be dissatisfied with the marital love life. But the love-frustrated person suffers from the objective inadequacy of the love behavior of the spouse, whereas the jealous one suffers from his own inability to enjoy the partner's love, which may be objectively quite adequate. His love frustration is thus indirect and subjective; his primary frustration is best described as inferiority rather than as unsatisfied love.

Non-interpersonal frustration characteristically expresses itself through anxiety and through *rebellious* anger; love frustration through "love sick," "clinging vine," or "overaffectionate" types of behavior, sometimes directed toward a third party; inferiority frustration through jealous anger, attempts to restrain or dominate the partner; and sometimes coldness and sulking. But these reactions vary enormously among individuals.

All "marital frustrations" are attributed by the frustrated partner to the spouse or to the marriage. A person may be frustrated as a result of something his spouse does or fails to do, but if he is not aware of the causal connection, he does not "blame" the marriage or the spouse, and his sufferings, though part of his general adjustment to life, are not practically involved in his marital adjustment.

Non-interpersonal frustrations constitute 52 per cent of all frustrations in our data; 44 per cent of the men's and 60 per cent of the women's. Love frustrations are about equally frequent in the two sexes, comprising 25 per cent of the men's and 26 per cent of the women's frustrations. Inferiority frustrations are 31 per cent of the men's and 13 per cent of the women's.

The greater proclivity of the men toward inferiority and of the women toward non-interpersonal frustrations is significant. It seems explainable in terms of culture. In the first place, our present marriage system conflicts with present-day women's desires, for personal freedom and higher standards of living, more than it does with these same desires in men. These desires may be stronger in women, or they may more often be in collision with marital duties. They are often interfered with by the dominance of the male in economic matters. Second, jealousy, to a man, more often remains a pure inferiority frustration. The attitude of possessiveness is outraged. Culture tends to throw scorn upon *him* for the unfaithfulness of his wife but does not equally scorn her for the unfaithfulness of her husband. If his jealousy could be relieved by his indulging in extra-marital relations himself, he has probably done so already, and encountered little restraint of this liberty. On the other hand, the jealous woman has greater difficulty in finding an outlet through personal freedom, because of the still lingering double standard, and hence her inferiority frustration is more likely to translate itself into a general freedom frustration, or rebellion complex, which is non-interpersonal.

Next, it was attempted to establish a new set of relationship or interactional categories rather than personality categories, by the simple device of using the nine possible permutation pairs of the three frustration types. Combining the first and second analyses, these nine permutations appeared in the order of frequency shown in Table 27.

TABLE 27
ORDER OF FREQUENCY OF FRUSTRATION PAIRS

Frequency rank, both analyses together (115 cases)	Husband's frustration	Wife's frustration	Frequency, by 1st analysis	Frequency, by 2d analysis	Frequency, both analyses combined, in per cent	Frequency, 31 fictional cases, in per cent
1	NIP	NIP	28	43	29.7	24
2	Inf	NIP	16	32	20.1	24
3	Inf	Lov	13	13	10.8	11
4	Lov	NIP	8	17	10.5	21
5	Lov	Lov	7	14	8.8	14
6	NIP	Inf	9	9	7.5	3
7	NIP	Lov	6	10	6.7	0
8	Lov	Inf	6	8	5.9	3
9	Inf	Inf	0	0	0.0	0
			93	146	100.0	100

NIP = non-interpersonal.

Lov = love.

Inf = inferiority.

Table 28 shows the actual frequency of these frustration pairs as compared with the distribution which would be produced by chance.

TABLE 28*
FREQUENCY OF FRUSTRATION PAIRS IN 115 MARRIAGES

	Chance distribution, in per cent			
	NIP	Lov	Inf	Total
H→.....				
W				
▼				
NIP.....	26.5	15.2	18.7	60.4
Lov.....	11.5	6.6	8.1	26.2
Inf.....	5.9	3.4	4.1	13.4
Total	43.9	25.2	30.9	100.0
	Actual distribution, in per cent			
H→.....	NIP	Lov	Inf	Total
W.....				
▼				
NIP.....	29.7	10.5 too low	20.1	60.3
Lov.....	6.7 too low	8.8	10.8	26.3
Inf.....	7.5	5.9	0.0 too low	13.4
Total	43.9	25.2	30.9	100.0

* See explanation in text.

The results demonstrate that there is no *generalized* tendency for a given type of frustration in one partner to produce the same type in the other partner. In only 38.5 per cent of the cases are the frustrations the same on both sides. Pure chance would make this figure 37.2 per cent. The presence of non-interpersonal frustrations in both partners together happens in only 29.7 per cent of the cases, slightly more than the chance 26.7 per cent.

In both analyses, the cases of inferiority coupled with inferiority were zero in number, whereas chance would call for 4.1 per cent. It may be that this result was somewhat determined by a bias inhering in the very definition of inferiority. Both judges held the *a priori* opinion that both members of a pair are not likely to feel an inferiority frustration from their personal relationship. While the superior mate might also have some inferiority frustration in relation to life as a whole, such frustration is likely to be inconspicuous in relation to the marriage situation, and to be overshadowed by other kinds of frustration which result from the greater inferiority feeling of the mate. The normal result of inferiority behavior by one party would seem to be, on socio-psychological grounds, to produce a non-interpersonal frustration in the other, who is likely to feel irritation or rebel-

lion. Theoretically, the inferiority feeling of the one person makes him abnormally sensitive; he has to be "handled with gloves." It may also cause him to make needless efforts to dominate, "needless" meaning that no end is served by the dominating behavior except the subjective satisfaction of the one who practices it. A person who is unduly sensitive or dominating has the effect of placing abnormal restraints upon the behavior of persons living with him. Their reaction to these restraints may be described as a rebellion complex rather than inferiority complex. They are pretty sure to sense that the domination is not altogether natural or successful, and apt to feel contempt rather than respect for the would-be dominator. They develop techniques of evasion and escape to secure greater freedom, and in so doing feel superior rather than inferior to the person they are evading.

A second result in which both analyses agree, is that a non-interpersonal frustration of either party is less likely than chance to be coupled with a love frustration in the other party. This also seems theoretically reasonable. If one mate is balked in his personal aims and ambitions, his pattern-of-life, by the marital situation, there is likely to be conflict with the other, but the other is more likely to interpret his own role as struggle for opposite external aims or as a role of inferiority, than as a frustration of his love desires.

Third, there is some tendency toward more than chance linkage of love frustration in one partner with inferiority frustration in the other, as we might expect theoretically.

Janet Cutler and Jane Wolf at Vassar College, using this same method, analyzed 31 fictional marriages portrayed in ten recent novels by Aldous Huxley, Jules Romains, André Gide, Jakob Wassermann, John Dos Passos, Glenway Wescott, D. H. Lawrence, Sinclair Lewis, John Galsworthy, and Sigrid Undset. They found proportions of marital frustration pairs roughly similar to those found in the 115 actual cases. Their findings are given in the last column of Table 27. The combination of love frustration of husband with non-interpersonal frustration of wife was much more frequent in the fictional than in the real cases. Love frustrations made up 41 per cent of all male frustrations in the fictional cases as against 25 per cent in the real cases.¹¹

Let us now consider some facts about interpersonal and non-interpersonal frustrations separately. First let us consider interpersonal frustrations.

Sexual Adequacy and Marital Success.—In the case of women one of the most important factors in personality and in married happiness is the ability to attain sexual orgasm in intercourse. Only 54 of

Hamilton's 100 married women were rated as adequate in this respect. Of these 54 women only one had ever been regarded as psychoneurotic. Of the remaining 46, 20 had at some time in their lives been diagnosed as seriously psychoneurotic, by other psychiatrists than Hamilton. Yet the correlation of orgasm capacity with general marital satisfaction was quite low. Sexually inadequate women were more likely to be adulterous than were the adequate women.¹²

Among Dr. Dickinson's cases, about 40 per cent were fully adequate, 20 per cent "sometimes," 40 per cent inadequate.¹³

Sexual inadequacy and psychoneurotic symptoms, thinks Hamilton, are not so much cause and effect as they are the joint results of an earlier cause. The earlier cause seems to be bad sexual conditioning in childhood. One of the most significant facts was that, of the women who learned *before the age of six* that babies were born of their mothers' bodies, 84 per cent were sexually adequate, while, of those who learned *at twelve or over*, only 42 per cent were adequate.¹⁴ The adequate women showed more often a history of parental encouragement of sex curiosity, whereas the inadequate more often had found their childish sex questions met with embarrassment and lies. There was a strong correlation between sexual inadequacy and the experience of premarital sex orgasm. Yet the emotional reaction to first sex information, and also to first intercourse, was not at all predictive of later sexual adequacy: those who were somewhat revolted or frightened on these occasions actually became somewhat more adequate. The important factors appear to be subtle psychological conditionings extending over a period of years in childhood.

Both Hamilton and Davis found that inadequate sexuality and inadequate expression of affection in the spouse were important causes of marital unhappiness. Only 5 of Hamilton's men and 9 of his women said that the spouse was too highly sexed, whereas 25 men and 15 women complained of the spouse being undersexed; 24 men and 30 women said the spouse expressed affection too little or in unsatisfactory ways.

Women tolerate sexual inadequacy in their husbands much less well than men tolerate it in their wives. This is natural since the man is not dependent upon the woman's adequacy for his own *physical* satisfaction.

According to Popenoe's experience at the Los Angeles Institute of Family Relations, a sexual maladjustment is present in practically every case of marital maladjustment. These sexual difficulties are said to be due in greatest number to the inconsiderateness of the husband;

next, to the wife's emotional block toward sex acquired in childhood, and in 15 to 20 per cent of cases, to psycho-sexual difficulties of the husband. It is the wife who feels the chief frustration in nearly all cases.¹⁵

Marital Failure and Jealousy.—We have already noted (Chapter XIII) the relations found by Hamilton between unhappiness and extra-marital sex relations. In several social classes, constituting perhaps the majority of our population, one can predict the almost certain failure of a marriage in which such relations are discovered by the innocent spouse. Even when the outside relation goes no farther than romantic companionship, the prognosis is bad. The marriage fails not because of any personality maladjustment *per se*, but because of a specific situation which the cultural ideology regards as intolerable. To "put up with" what the surrounding culture regards as intolerable subjects most persons to a serious inferiority frustration. This is particularly true of men, as the old derisive term "cuckold" illustrates. Women whose husbands are physically unfaithful often escape inferiority frustration where the "other woman" is of lower social status. If she be of the same status, however, serious inferiority frustration is probable in the form of personal jealousy, as distinguished from disgrace.

In the more libertarian circles, the reaction to the spouse's flirtations or infidelities is less direct and pre-emptory, and jealousy shows great variations among individuals. It may take considerable time before the ultimate results work themselves out. In Hamilton's group, not over 6 men and 11 women seemed to complain of the relation of the spouse to other persons of opposite sex, when asked various questions as to the causes of their marital dissatisfactions. Compared with these 17 complaints were 45 existing situations to complain about, as ascertained through the question, "Are you in love with some other person than your spouse?"¹⁶ Concealment of the relationships, and concealment of the jealousy, may explain the difference in part. Six men and 2 women complained of the spouse's jealousy. Six men and 11 women would reduce their spouse's flirting. Seven men and 6 women would increase! It is probable, on the whole, that women in our upper classes suffer jealousy more than do men. This may be due to the surplus of women in these classes. There is reason to suspect that in the lower classes, where there is a keener competition of men for women, the situation is reversed.

The relations shown in Chapter XII between divorce rate and occupation of husband suggest that frequency of contact of the husband

with other women is an important factor in divorce. Cahen, it will be remembered, estimated that about one-fifth of divorces are directly due to infidelity.¹⁷

The Importance of Non-Interpersonal Frustrations.—We noted that 52 per cent of all frustrations found in the sample of 115 cases were of the non-interpersonal type, that is, frustrations outside the realm of love and sex wishes and outside of personal inferiority feelings attributed to the marriage relation. These frustrations represent the deprivation of satisfactions which are incidental rather than essential to marriage itself. These satisfactions come under the wish-categories of security and adventure, and also under superiority in so far as this is external or incidental to the marriage relationship. They do not involve response satisfactions at all. Concretely, they involve wishes for higher living standards, possessions, clothes, "good times," travel, social prestige, educational advancement, vocational success, and other personal achievements and experiences. They are satisfactions which family life *per se* is not designed to yield, but which, nevertheless, many persons hope to secure by means of marriage or in spite of marriage. In a broad sense the frustrations of these wishes may be regarded as economic frustrations, since it is usually economic limitations which place them in conflict with the inherent family satisfactions. They are not apt to be described explicitly as economic frustrations, however, except where income is obviously inadequate or is reduced below expectations by the apparent personal fault of one of the partners. They include Mowrer's "cultural differentiation" and "pattern of life tension." They are of the same character as the conflicts between immigrant parents and their children caused by the latter's more rapid Americanization. We may say, in brief, that half or more of all marital unhappiness is due to the conflict between the wishes which are normally and inherently satisfied through marriage, and wishes which are in opposition to or only incidental to marriage. This second class of wishes represents modern individuation. Recent social changes have rendered marriage less compatible than it was with these non-interpersonal wishes of the individual personality. It is apparently more difficult than before to be a good spouse and a good parent, and at the same time to fulfil the other needs of one's personality.

One speaker at a conference on marriage stated the situation very well when he said that neither a woman nor a man can expect perfect marriage and at the same time to satisfy her or his other wishes as well as could be done by remaining single. Even the husband must

be content with a somewhat lesser degree of excellence or achievement in his vocation than would be physically possible to him if he remained unmarried, for the simple reason that time and money are limited. But although this principle may always be true, it is true in greater degree in our present society than in that of our grandparents.

Many psychiatrists and moral counselors attempt to solve the problem by preaching a philosophy of acceptance and inner adjustment. They argue that the individual cannot have everything he wants, and that happiness lies in learning to make a choice and to accept the inevitable limitations of life. While this philosophy is sound in general, many of its exponents fail to recognize that this intelligent choosing among the good things of life may be much more difficult in some cultures than in others, and that it is peculiarly difficult in our present culture.¹⁸ They overlook the facts of social change, particularly of modern individuation. This trend cannot be changed by preaching against it. The remedy lies in further social changes which will reduce the incompatibility between interpersonal and non-interpersonal wishes. Among such changes might be new employment arrangements suitable to married women, a reorganization of household labor, a reduced economic parasitism of children, social insurance, and family subsidies. When family members become more *independent* of one another economically their *dependence* upon one another for love may involve less frustration and greater happiness. Even though the greater economic independence of women has been a factor in modern family disorganization, still it may be that a further decline of the family as an economic unit may strengthen it as an emotional unit. In the past, family love was closely tied to authority. Hence, when authority was threatened, love tended to be smothered by anger and rebellion. When love is fully divorced from ideas of authority it may become more loyal and permanent as authority diminishes.

3. THE MARITAL INTERACTION PROCESS

If the personality patterns, basic roles, and major wishes of the two partners are compatible at the outset, can science predict marital success with reasonable certainty? Again, if we find that the discord between two married persons is based upon fundamental incompatibilities of their wishes or personality patterns, can we say that there is little hope of their making a happy adjustment?

The Need for Study of Conflict as a Process.—While there may eventually be found considerable predictive value in this knowledge concerning the separate personalities, we need also to study the interaction process itself. It may be that marital discord is one of those diseases which can be *cured* more easily than foreseen or prevented. In other words, symptoms appearing during the early stages of a marriage may offer the best clues as to what is likely to happen later, and also make possible a treatment which will prevent failure.

In every marriage there are serious conflicts of interest. Whether or not these shall wreck the marriage depends upon how the partners handle the conflict. This, again, depends partly upon general personality traits, but it may depend still more upon certain specific habits which function in interaction, in other words upon traits which would seem minor ones in a general inventory of the personalities.

Types of Marital Interaction.—Mrs. Harriet Mowrer thinks that the pattern of interaction in marital discord is determined by the form of personality disorganization in the individual. An individual who is frustrated in some major wish may make three types of attempted but unsatisfactory adjustment. The first is "personal conflict," or conflict of wishes within the person. It appears in the person who "doesn't seem to know what he wants" and is in perpetual tension between two incompatible goals. The second type is the "dual role." In this case the person suffers little inner tension; he keeps his two incompatible systems of behavior separate. An illustration is the man who carries on a secret life apart from his home, which would be incompatible with his family objectives if it became known. The third type is the "escape response." It is illustrated by the person who tries to escape conflict by banishing one of the conflicting roles through sickness, fantasy, drink, or some delinquency irrelevant to his problem. Suicide is an extreme case of this type.¹⁹

Although it is obvious that the form of the personality disorganization must influence the specific events of the discord process, it is difficult to see how genuinely *interactional* patterns can be formulated which will correspond respectively to these three categories. It would seem that Mrs. Mowrer is really analyzing *personal disorganization* throughout, and not interaction. The two partners may have different patterns, and the resulting interaction pattern is no mere mixture of these.

We need, therefore, a new set of concepts for analyzing the interaction process or relationship between two persons—concepts which shall be independent of wishes, frustrations, or other phenomena of

the separate personalities. These personality factors can never be left out of account in the reckoning, but they must be kept distinct, in our thinking, from the interactional concepts. We need also techniques for observing the interaction process.

To this end Groves has classified marital discord as concealed, acute, and chronic. In *concealed* discord, the conflict is entirely within one of the personalities. It is a psychic and not a social conflict. The other does not know of the existing frustration, or at least of its seriousness. Groves thinks this type was relatively more common in the authoritarian family of the past; with the greater freedom of women and children today the inner conflict is more likely to burst forth into the social arena. Still, there are families even today in which one partner carries his or her sufferings silently to the grave. *Acute* discord is the single, perhaps violent, attack, which may be healed, or may lead to *chronic* discord. Again, Groves distinguishes two sources of discord, one being in the strains of life apart from marriage, the other originating in the marital relation itself. The first situation occurs when partners use their interaction (conversation, etc.) as an outlet for irritations accumulated elsewhere. The second situation involves a frustration which is directly attributed to the mate.²⁰ Since the first frequently leads to the second, no clear dividing line is possible.

Bearing Groves' categories in mind, we might distinguish three important types of conflict in pure interactional terms: (1) gradually increasing or *progressive* conflict, (2) *acute* conflict, which is characterized by sudden onset, and (3) *habituated* conflict, usually chronic, which continues indefinitely on a dead level without getting worse. *Acute* conflict may be healed, and then recur. If it recurs frequently it becomes either *progressive* or *habituated*.

Are there corresponding types in the alleviation of conflict? Is there a sudden and a gradual recovery? Experience suggests that the recovery is usually rather sudden. In other words, if a curve be drawn to indicate the degree of conflict, high levels meaning harmony and low levels disharmony, it would seem that the upward movements of the curve are usually abrupt, while the downward movements may be either abrupt or gradual. The forces of love seem to behave like the spring mechanism of a curtain, always ready to jerk the curtain all the way back as soon as the external pulling force ceases to act at some point between the "catches." However, this elastic mechanism may be dislocated or broken by extreme pulling.

Increasing conflict may be called *estrangement*, which must be distinguished from the mere process of conflict on an unchanging level. Decreasing conflict may be called *reconciliation*; this is more usually thought of as a sudden event than as a gradual process, it is nevertheless a process.

There are, however, two or three variants of the process of reconciliation.

One may be described as *mutual rapprochement* and the other as *alternating approach and withdrawal*. In the first case, an increase in tenderness by one partner immediately brings a similar reaction in the other, and the reconciliation is hence very swift. In the second case, the partner who takes the initiative is rebuffed by the other, who feels a desire to inflict further punishment before yielding to reconciliation. The initiating party, being rebuffed, withdraws and waits for the next advance to come from the other. When that advance does come, he retaliates by rebuffing on his side. The result may be that the initiative zigzags several times from one side to the other before reconciliation finally occurs. In other cases, only one partner shows this rebuffing behavior, while the other shows only repeated initiatives. This alternating approach and withdrawal takes places also in the negative direction, when the partners are undergoing estrangement rather than reconciliation.

Illustrations of Progressive and Acute Discord.—These types of interaction are determined, in part at least, by the personalities concerned and the subjects of conflict. Progressive conflict is apt to be the result of accumulation of minor frustrations; acute conflict is likely to result from a single major frustration. Just what kinds of frustration are major and what minor depend upon the personalities concerned. Minor frustrations, accumulating without abatement, become major frustrations. The following case illustrates progressive discord based upon repetition of minor frustrations:

Mr. Q was of farm background, but had become a successful artisan in a small city, earning a comfortable living. He never became urbanized in his attitudes, preferring always to follow farm habits of living, with abundant food, old clothes, early rising, and hard manual work. Even after the family had a modern urban home, he liked to spend his evenings in the kitchen with his feet on the stove. He scorned urban amusements, and even when possessing considerable money, resented his family's spending it for these pleasures. He wished his wife to play the role of a typical old-fashioned farm housewife, kept full control of financial matters, was niggardly and arbitrary in allowing spending money to his wife and children.

Mrs. Q came from the same background. She reacted more favorably to the urban mode of life, and sought through meager amusements and esthetic activities a relief from the harshness of life in which she had been raised and which her husband continued to follow. A process of mutual irritation set in, marked by increasing nagging by the husband and a gradual cooling of the wife's affections. For years they held together as they raised a family. Children, religious revivals, and the man's periodic spells of elated generosity and kindness, suggestive of a cycloid type of personality, prevented many threatened breaks from becoming actual. Economic circumstances grew worse, with increasing tension. Response frustrations increased. After the children

had grown up, the partners separated without divorce and never saw each other again.

The following case came to a similar end through acute discord, based upon a single major frustration:

Mr. and Mrs. Conroy were both hard working, sober, efficient persons of the skilled working class. They were quiet, uncomplaining, and presumably happy together. Both had borne family illness and other difficulties with superb patience. On a modest income they raised two conscientious, industrious, unspoiled children. Their home was a model of cleanliness and good order, the most comfortable in their drab neighborhood. They had gone into debt to raise children and buy a home. Through scrupulous economy they had paid back all their debts except three hundred dollars still owing on the house.

Then came disaster in the guise of good fortune. A relative of Mrs. Conroy bequeathed her the small fortune of three hundred dollars. Mr. Conroy thought this should be used to pay off the remaining debt on the house. Mrs. Conroy thought it should be put in the savings bank and used as a fund for occasional luxuries, allowing the mortgage to be paid off according to the original plan. Neither had been extravagant, both had contributed all their time and energy to the joint enterprise. Mr. Conroy could not understand why Mrs. Conroy would not continue in the same policy. She, on the other hand, could not see why he did not want her to use the unexpected freedom that came with this little fortune. She was taking nothing from the family; this was something extra, and, moreover, was hers by legal right.

For six months they debated the issue ceaselessly. They nagged, they made the children miserable. Their attitudes began to polarize. Both, for example, had gone conventionally to church; now Mr. Conroy came to dislike religion and Mrs. Conroy to become more religious. They became self-conscious with each other; sex relations were disturbed. Finally they decided to rent a part of the home and live apart.*

How Acute Discord Arises after Prolonged Harmony.—There are at least two ways of conceptualizing the Conroy case. First, we may say that the *frustrations*, although not occurring until late in life, and not preceded by any preliminary estrangement, were actually *so severe* as would cause a break between any normal couple. We must measure a frustration not upon the observer's scale of values, but in terms of the actual emotional disturbance to the person who suffers it. The severity of this disturbance in the Conroy case will be appreciated if we realize that the question was not merely how to use

* Neva R. Deardorff, *A Puzzle in Cross Words, Survey*, 59: 288-290, Dec., 1927. Cited by Reuter and Renner, *The Family*, McGraw-Hill, 1931, p. 503.

three hundred dollars. Losing on that point might have been only a minor frustration even to one of the Conroys, large as the sum appeared in their modest economic situation. What made the frustration major was that each felt absolutely convinced that the other was selfish, unreasonable, and unjust. They lost respect for each other's personalities. This was an especially bitter pill to swallow after years of kindness and co-operation.

The second interpretation might be that the frustrations were not so bad, but that the Conroys had never learned a *technique of handling conflict*. Presumably they had had few if any quarrels. A real quarrel was a new situation which they could not handle. Mutual irritation spread to wider and wider fields of stimuli, estrangement grew, neither knew how to set into operation the process of reconciliation.

Either interpretation alone is too simple. To be sure the Conroys lacked a technique of adjusting conflict, but could they have learned that technique by mere practice in conflict? Persons who are able to reconcile serious quarrels between themselves do not possess that power by virtue of repeated experience in quarreling. Rather, each succeeding quarrel tends to make reconciliation more difficult. A man does not learn to swim through mere repeated experience in drowning. The peacemaking power comes through that peculiar understanding of another's wishes which we call *empathy* (see below), which can be developed only during periods of peace. It is possible, however, that if the Conroys could have had some experience in very minor quarrels, with time to think matters over during the interludes, plus some psychological education or advice, they might have been prepared to meet the larger conflict.

The first interpretation, that the outcome of conflict depends on the severity of the frustrations, is substantially correct if we understand the full meaning of "severity of frustration." This severity depends not only on the present attitudes of the person frustrated, but upon his power to change his attitudes. The weakness of the Conroy marriage lay not in their lack of practice in quarreling, but in their presumably rigid scales of values. Being hard-working folk, with limited education, and probably without even a conversational interest in psychology, they had had no practice in analyzing each other's personalities. When such a person finds another disagreeing with him, he either fights, or he accepts; but he cannot understand the reason. Getting out of debt was a goal near the top of both Mr. Conroy's and Mrs. Conroy's scales of values. But getting out of debt *immediately* was a goal which to Mrs. Conroy stood a little lower

than another goal which had recently become possible. Something might have happened to Mr. Conroy also which would have revealed to him a goal standing higher in *his* valuation than the immediate repayment of the debt. But he was unable to imagine such a situation, and to apply the principle to Mrs. Conroy. She also lacked the necessary psychological imagination to feel *his* attitude.

There is some wish in every person which temporarily and under certain circumstances will take priority over love. One must judge a person's unselfishness, if there be such a thing, by his behavior in the long run and not by behavior upon one particular occasion. To expect one's mate to put the love wish before the "selfish" wish on every occasion is expecting something of one's mate which one knows is not true of oneself.

The bitterness of this disappointment in one's mate would be much less if there were more real understanding of psychology. The frustration, therefore, would be actually much less severe, and the conflict more easily solved.

Although methods of treatment of family conflict differ in externals, one essential feature in all is the education of each partner to feel vicariously the motives of the other. When, as seldom happens, this empathy becomes complete, no human being can truly blame another for anything that person has done. Sometimes, perhaps, one will nevertheless bid a regretful farewell, but it will be a farewell purged of bitterness and resentment.

Major Frustrations Not Cured by Surface Adjustments.—Where there is acute or definitely progressive conflict, it is a great mistake to think the conflict can be solved through superficial politeness and self-control, resolutions to "be good to him," suppression of one's own feelings, and so on. Indeed, it would be better if many concealed conflicts came sooner into the open. Even if one thinks one is emotionally the stronger partner, he cannot hold indefinitely this position of strength if he continues to be frustrated. One cannot lift oneself psychiatrically by his own boot-straps. Some persons set their very jaws in muscular rigidity in an effort at supreme self-control. "No, I will not say anything, I *will* not say anything," the debt-harassed husband mutters to himself as his wife approaches with a new financial project. But the strained look on his face betrays him, and, as the popular saying goes, he "may as well out with it." There are, of course, better and worse ways of "coming out with it," also better and worse occasions.

We put faith in the power of kindness and good manners to allay

conflict. There is a feeling that if partners could only be kind to each other in their direct contacts, could control the sharp tongue and the irritable temper, then the conflict would solve itself. Certainly it seems that much can be said for the Quaker technique.

A husband thought that his wife was chiefly to blame for their conflicts because she used sarcasm and became emotional and vituperative in argument, while he presented his case with cool logic and little show of anger. Further investigation showed that basic frustrations were involved on both sides. To a seriously frustrated partner, the kindness or coolness of the other partner takes on a new meaning. It is no longer the symbol of love, but a weapon of combat. People of good breeding often try to deceive themselves as to the nature of the situation which exists. Conflict is conflict, whether fought with soft words or empty beer bottles. The soft words are more desirable for the sake of one's self-respect and the respect of the antagonist. But there is no solution until the basic frustrations are dealt with.

An acute conflict sometimes subsides apparently as the result of efforts at self-control and forbearance. These, however, are effective only as aids in approaching the real solution. This solution occurs only through (1) a change in the external situation, or (2) a re-education or reconditioning of one or both partners with respect to the frustrated wishes, so that he no longer wishes what he wished before with the same intensity, but has made some kind of substitution.

A Prolonged Major Frustration Is Seldom One-Sided.—Practically, serious discord always means that there is either actual or potential frustration of serious character on both sides. When *A* is seriously frustrated by *B*, one of three things must happen. First, the frustration may be concealed from *B*, and we have a case of concealed discord. Of course there must be a reason why *A* conceals his frustration. Usually it is because he realizes that making it known to *B* would hurt *B* but would not enable *B* to change the situation. If *B* were hurt by this knowledge, his unhappiness would react upon *A*, making *A* still more unhappy. In such a case of concealed discord, we may say that while only one partner suffers actual frustration, the other is *potentially* frustrated, that is, he would be frustrated if he knew the situation.

Second, *A* may tell his frustration to *B* and *B* may refuse or fail to remedy the situation. Usually this means that *B* cannot remedy it without suffering a major frustration on his side. If *B* could have relieved *A*'s suffering without serious frustration to himself, the chances are that he would have already done so and the case would

not have come before us as a problem. One of the great fallacies in thinking about human relations is to assume that self-denial for the sake of another individual will always bring happiness to the one who thus deprives himself.

Let us suppose, as the third alternative, that *A* does make known his suffering and that *B* does try to give up the offending behavior. Even where a change of behavior is called for by the general mores as well as by the personal need of one's mate, yet to "do the right thing," to "give up one's sins," to "reform and lead a better life," does not *automatically* bring happiness. It may be asserted that one should do so anyway, without expectation of happiness. The trouble is, however, that when the self-reformer decreases rather than increases his own happiness through reforming, he makes various substitute reactions which cause unhappiness to continue in his partner. He may, for example, make his sacrifice grudgingly, or with an expectation of compensating sacrifices by the partner. He may periodically lapse into his former offending habits. He is likely to become less kindly and generous in his general attitude toward his partner. His attempted self-denial, in other words, has not diminished the burden of frustration, but only served to transfer it somewhat to himself, or caused it to shift back and forth between his partner and himself. It is not a burden of fixed weight, however, and increasing the load on one partner does not always decrease the load on the other.

From this it cannot be concluded that the ordinary ethical rule of kindness and unselfishness is of no value. In the majority of conflicts, perhaps, that rule works. *Problem cases, however, represent a residuum in which the ordinary rules of personal ethics have already been tried and have failed.* Special treatment, re-education, is necessary. To deal with such cases by trying to enforce the mores or preaching the simple gospel of unselfishness is like treating a serious illness by recommending good food, adequate sleep, and exercise.

Let us consider a case typical of thousands of others, in which one partner is not only frustrating the partner's personal wishes, but is also, apparently, departing more widely from the community mores than is the injured partner.

A busy, seldom-at-home husband is made very jealous by his wife's friendly relations to another man. The wife gives her husband all the time and attention he can use; she holds him first in her love life, and performs faithfully all her positive obligations. He, however, is frustrated by the situation in his wishes for security and superiority, and invokes the conventions as an argument for the breaking of the wife's annoying friendship.

At first blush one reacts: "Why shouldn't the wife give up this friendship to make her husband happy? He is suffering a major frustration. With her it would be only a minor frustration to give up the friendship, for presumably she loves her husband and would rather keep that relation happy. If she actually loves the other man, of course, she ought to get a divorce and marry him. If not, she should do as her husband wants."

The answer is that if the sacrifice involved actually did appear as a minor frustration to the wife, she would be only too ready to make it. On the other hand, refusal to make the sacrifice does not imply that she is in love with the other man, or, even if she is, that she prefers him to her marriage. Yet her frustration upon giving him up might be truly as great as the husband's present frustration. The husband, indeed, suffers an inferiority frustration which is totally lacking in the ease of the wife. She, on the other hand, is threatened with other kinds of frustrations. For one thing, there would be a real deprivation of companionship which may have an important value in view of her husband's frequent and prolonged absence. Second, a certain unkindness and humiliation to two persons is involved in deliberately breaking such a relationship. Third, we discover, the husband did not object to the *principle* of such extra-marital friendships when he himself was involved in one, nor again, in another case where his wife was involved but the man did not arouse his jealousy. Now, however, he is appealing to those mores which in general he disregards, because of his jealousy of this particular man. Fourth, as a combined result of all these factors the wife feels that her respect and love for her husband would be lowered if his jealousy should break up this relationship which means so much to her. She cannot let herself believe that he would compel her to break it absolutely; she tries to compromise in various ways with the situation so as to diminish the annoyance to the husband but at the same time preserve what seems essential to her own wishes. Against her husband's inferiority complex she reacts with a rebellion complex. That is, the pressure upon her to surrender her unconventional satisfaction causes that satisfaction to take on an *additional value* which she verbalizes as "personal independence" or "reasonable self-expression." The pure response satisfaction ceases to be the whole motive for her behavior; that could, perhaps, be sufficiently obtained in her marriage. Her potential frustration has taken on a *non-interpersonal* character. Her rebellion is against being forced to sacrifice something, not by general principle, not by economic necessity, not by impersonal condi-

tions, but by the very personal, and seemingly arbitrary, wish of her husband. The very fact that the husband is jealous of this particular man gives the wife a sense of unjust discrimination which makes the relationship even more difficult to break. The wife will probably make the sacrifice if and when she finds it is the only way to preserve her marriage or to save her husband from a neurosis. By the time she is *convinced* of that, it may be too late. Again, if she does make the sacrifice, she is likely to have a changed attitude toward her husband. Her contempt for his jealousy will increase, and she will fall into the creditor's attitude of expecting some balancing concession from him in the future.

The situation is not helped by viewing it as "right versus wrong," nor yet by the solemn announcement that the partners were both at fault for allowing such a situation to develop in the beginning. They are already in the situation, and the way by which they entered does not necessarily indicate the best way out.

But the solution, again, does not necessarily consist in giving the wife everything she wants. Let us look at the situation from the husband's point of view. He may make the sacrifice, tolerate the hated relationship, suffer pangs of jealousy, and find that he cannot behave naturally toward his wife in their love life. She may grow cooler toward him, not because of the attractions of the other man, but because of the husband's own abnormal behavior. That may lead her to seek the other man as an outlet for her confidences. Eventually she may come to feel a prior loyalty to *him*. The husband will have *lost* everything, he anticipates, because he did not *demand* everything in the beginning. He must live in constant dread of this greater frustration to come. He asks himself: does generosity really pay?

Types of Accommodation or Conflict-Solution.—How, then, is a conflict to be resolved when there are major frustrations on both sides? Conflict is, at least temporarily, resolved in these ways:

- (1) Compromise on the immediate issue.
- (2) Long-run compromise: complete surrender on one issue in exchange for reciprocal surrender on some other issue.
- (3) Complete surrender of one party to the other, with an attitude of resignation.
- (4) Outward surrender with inner rebellion.

(1) Unfortunately, our culture does not permit successful compromise on many issues. They must be handled in all-or-none fashion. Where compromise is feasible, it is such an obvious solution that the partners are quite likely to discover it in the earlier stages.

(2) Long-run compromise is a promising solution provided some other situation may be anticipated in which the now yielding party may become the one who "has his way." In the case above mentioned, the wife could give up her friendship with the understanding that the husband would give up certain plans of his in order to spend a vacation with his wife. The difficulty is in finding situations which the partners can evaluate on the same scale, and which are near enough together in time to convince each of the other's unselfishness.

(3) Complete surrender is the most promising solution. It is very difficult, however, to effect it under modern individualization. If an adviser can bring either partner to make a willing surrender, the conflict is for the time being solved. The decision as to who is to surrender depends in practice upon who is psychologically most able to do so, not upon the fundamental merits of the issue. While the partner who makes the surrender should do so without thought of reciprocity, yet in practice if the other does not reciprocate, in one large or in many small ways, within reasonable time, conflict is likely to reopen on some other front.

(4) A frequent result is outward surrender with inner rebellion. The surrendering party becomes critical of the mate, and in some indirect way seeks the equivalent of retaliation. The conflict is not solved.

The Balance-of-Trade Analysis of Marriage.—The foregoing discussion implies a certain calculating analysis of the marriage relation which is repugnant to persons who have or expect to have a happy marriage. This method of analysis might be called the *balance-of-trade* method. Yet it is applicable to happy as well as unhappy relationships. It is employed skilfully by the Binkleys in their suggestive and optimistic book, *What Is Right with Marriage?*²¹ Nobody could accuse these writers of emphasizing the abnormal and the morbid.

The Binkleys stress the point that the positive, tangible contribution ("benevolent activity") of one mate to the other's happiness does not need to be balanced by an equal *tangible* contribution from the other side. It may be balanced by a compensating flow of *appreciation* from the other side. A husband may, for example, have everything to give, economically, educationally, and socially, while the wife's inferior ability and status make impossible an equivalent return. But if the wife appreciates the greater contribution of the husband, if she loves him the more because of it, and does not develop

a resentful inferiority feeling, the marriage may be very happy. Some persons enjoy giving more than receiving. It is doubtful, however, that any human being can indefinitely maintain an "excess of exports over imports" in benevolent activity, unless he is compensated by "invisible import items" in the form of emotion. The emotional return must be something more than mere habitual or conventional expressions of thankfulness; it must show genuine feeling, and must be responsive to the actual contributions given.

Sometimes the exchange of contributions both visible and invisible appears to be one-sided for a considerable period of time. In that case, as in economic exchange, something analogous to credit is piled up on the side whose contribution is greater. In time the other party is expected to pay back the debt. To apply this calculating economic analysis to a marital relation may seem the "wrong way to look at it." Nevertheless, people influenced by modern individuation do look at it this way, and practical helpfulness to them must *begin* with the thought-pattern they actually use. The real balance of contributions can perhaps never be measured; we may be dealing with incomensurable factors. By what criterion can we say that a certain number of expressions of loving gratitude are equivalent to two weeks' nursing on a sickbed or the sacrifice of a personal vacation program? Yet there is a very real balance sheet; it consists in the partners' own private estimates, and the estimates of observers. Selfishness and benevolence are actually assessed on a valuational scale even though these assessments have no objective validity. Trouble is especially likely when the two partners disagree widely on the state of the balance sheet. But usually there is a rough consensus of opinion among observers which supports the one more than the other party in his estimate. The balance sheet is seldom mentioned between the partners; indeed, they may be reluctant to think about it privately as long as love remains strong.

Yet whenever serious conflict comes into one of these happy marriages, a balance sheet is dragged forth into the open, revealing that "in the backs of their minds" the partners had been keeping accounts all the while. It influences the conflict in this way. If either partner feels that the other is in debt to him, he is likely to demand stiffer terms in the settlement of the dispute. He demands a sixty-forty settlement in his favor. The other partner is not likely to agree on his assessment of the balance sheet. He may feel that there is no debt either way, and hence that a fifty-fifty settlement is called for; or he may hold that the debt is on the opposite side, and demand a sixty-forty

settlement in his favor. In any case the concept of debt, unless both parties agree in its assessment, makes compromise more difficult to achieve.

In marital conflicts we hear expressions like these: "I've slaved for him all my life, now it's his turn to be a little generous." "He had his way, now it's time I had my way a little." "She married me for my money anyway, I don't owe her anything."

On the other hand, families which seem to the observer to present a very one-sided balance sheet may often be quite just in terms of the values of the persons concerned.

Observers describe Mrs. K as "a little tin god on wheels." Her husband and son "wait on her hand and foot," but she does most of the talking and monopolizes the attention of visitors. Her husband is simply her background, a devoted and willing servant to her every whim. He earns an excellent salary and stands well in his profession, but his wife spends most of his money and tells him how to spend most of his leisure time. A truly mid-Victorian, bourgeois, romantic family. By almost any objective standard, the wife here is the getter and the husband the giver. Yet the people concerned do not, cannot, in fact, feel that there is any unfairness. If they did feel so, trouble would develop and there would need to be a readjustment. Human beings do not go on suffering injustice year after year without showing "symptoms" of some kind. But in that family there are no symptoms. The answer to the enigma is that this husband gets a large vicarious satisfaction out of the role his wife plays. His wife is his hobby, his plaything. The money and time he spends on her are not spent for her satisfaction exclusively, but also for his own.

Does the Generous Policy Work?—Dr. William B. Terhune has pointed out that the quantitative appraisal of one's own and the other's services is a most dangerous enemy of the marital relation.²² He who wants to make a success of marriage will not go into it with a fifty-fifty attitude, but with a one hundred versus zero attitude. That is, he will be prepared to make one hundred per cent of the sacrifices. Of course, nobody thinks that any marriage will actually become so one-sided. In most cases a balance will find itself, somewhere near the fifty-fifty basis. The important thing is to have an attitude of willingness to go more than half way, so that the relation becomes a competition in giving rather than a competition in getting. A further point in this theory is that success may be obtained if only one of the partners at the outset takes this overgenerous attitude and adheres to it unflinchingly. This is really the theory of social interaction which lies at the core of Christian ethics. "Therefore if thine

enemy hunger, feed him; if he thirst, give him drink: for in so doing thou shalt heap coals of fire on his head.''²³

Most persons recognize that there is truth in this theory. Yet in practice they more often reject it. Recently psychology seems to have come out against this doctrine of self-sacrifice. It maintains that continued unselfishness toward a selfish person simply leads the latter to become more selfish. It is beyond question that children who get too much and give too little tend to become permanently "spoiled." Modern psychology cautions the parent against his own generous impulses to overindulge his child. Does one rule apply to adults and another to children? Where does the real truth lie?

The following fictional case illustrates the failure of generosity to awaken gratitude because of differing scales of values without empathy.

In the motion picture play *The Right to Love*, a young woman bears a girl child by a man whom she deeply loves, but who is killed before they can marry. The death of the man is indirectly caused by the girl's father, who also had prevented their marriage. A less attractive man who also loves the woman marries her and accepts her illegitimate child as his own. As the little daughter grows up the mother is determined that she shall receive that supreme privilege which the mother was denied: the right to love. So when the daughter becomes interested in a young man, who is opposed by the narrowly religious and unromantic foster-father, the mother deceives the father and permits the girl to elope. But at this moment the daughter learns the circumstances of her own birth. She is overcome with gratitude and admiration for her reputed father. She turns against her romantic-liberal mother, and instead of eloping with the young man she runs off with a group of missionaries, friends of her father, to convert the heathen. The mother, from her own point of view, has risked her own comfort and marital relation to give her daughter the supreme value, the right to love. The daughter, ungrateful wretch, has turned against her mother and rejected the precious gift, to subject herself to the prejudices of her narrow-minded foster-father and grandfather. But from the daughter's point of view, the right to love is no precious gift, her mother is a woman lacking in character. The real generosity lies in her foster-father who for love of his wife had borne silently through the years a situation which must have been very humiliating to him. Presumably, also, the mother's constant espousal of the "right to love," through the years when the daughter could have had no experience of what it meant, caused the latter to react somewhat against that ideal. Generosity failed to awaken gratitude because the "precious gift" was valued very differently by giver and recipient, as was also the price paid for the gift. (Later on, in far-away China, the daughter falls actually in love with a hero, and finding her love opposed by her missionary

guardians, learns for the first time the need of a right to love. Mother and daughter now dream of each other, but the mother dies without seeing her daughter again.)

Generosity Must Be Accompanied by Insight and Empathy.—Perhaps the answer to the enigma may be somewhat as follows. If two persons have perfect insight and empathy, or if, lacking these, they have the same attitudes and valuations, then overgenerosity by one will lead to gratitude and reciprocal generosity by the other. An interaction process of competitive unselfishness will actually be established in accordance with Christian theory. Insight is the ability to see one's own behavior or personal relationships from the viewpoint of a disinterested, psychologist-observer. Empathy is the ability to value another's feeling toward something as that other actually values it, rather than according to one's own feeling toward the same thing. For example, let us suppose that you experience an intense thrill of pleasure at the sight of a certain Turkish rug, and that I have the same kind of feeling toward a certain symphony. You, however, do not care for the symphony nor I for the Turkish rug. It is manifestly impossible that I can feel the same way that you do toward the rug. Possibly circumstances, or a psychologist, could condition me to do so, but that would take time. However, if I can observe your emotion toward the rug, and translate it into my own inner language by realizing that it is the same feeling I have toward the symphony, then I have empathy. *I feel into* your emotional life. I may then respect and evaluate your feelings as I do my own.

If one has empathy, one can value someone else's benevolence to him as the giver values it, regardless of its crude external value to the recipient. If one has insight, one can see how his own behavior appears to another, and thus banish any illusions he may have about the value of his own services or the attractiveness of his own personality.

If mates lack insight and empathy, and also differ widely in their attitudes and valuations, then there is no common denominator by which they can agree on what constitutes selfishness or unselfishness. *He* may perform what seems to him an act of generosity, but *she* may feel that this act was merely his duty, or may regard it even as a piece of disguised selfishness. At the same time she may be doing something for him which she regards as generous, while he blindly accepts it as part of the normal course of events. Each may deserve the gratitude of the other, yet neither receives gratitude. The conventional reserve on such matters sooner or later breaks down under the

continued strain, and they begin to accuse each other of ungratefulness. When the conflict reaches that stage, it becomes even more difficult for them to achieve mutual empathy. The more he accuses her of ingratitude, the more she is inclined to regard his benevolent actions as calculating selfishness, and hence the less grateful she becomes. The same thing is true in the reversed relation.

It may happen that one partner has more empathy and insight than the other. The person more deficient in those abilities tends to be the more selfish person by the judgment of outside observers. The generous one cannot arouse gratitude or reciprocity in the selfish one by performing merely what seem to him acts of generosity. To succeed he needs to have more empathy and insight than average, to compensate for the other's lack. His problem is to find the rare key which will unlock the other's inhibited gratitude. Perhaps no human being lacks utterly capacity to be grateful, kind, and generous. But there are some whose kindness cannot be called forth by any stimulus which the average person can discover. Their attitude toward the world is inferior, defensive, or suspicious. They carry a grudge. They are the persons we call "just naturally mean." The Christian treatment seems not to accomplish results with them because very few persons have the knowledge to adapt it to their peculiar needs. What is needed is not an abrogation of the Christian principle, but psychiatric knowledge in addition.

The same statements apply to the spoiled-child type of adult. He must be treated, in the minds of those who deal with him, as a child. One cannot expect him to appreciate what others do for him. He has no insight and no empathy. The ordinary kinds of generosity he merely takes for granted; they fail to awaken in him any gratitude. But this does not mean that we can awaken his gratitude by ceasing these generosities. That treatment may drive him from mere ingratitude into actual vengefulness. What he needs is re-education, and this requires an expert, or a living companion of unusual patience and skill. This re-educative treatment may involve the infliction of punishment upon the patient at certain points. He must be trained, like any child or animal, to know what society expects of the average person. His personal standard of justice, which is heavily weighted in his own favor, must be modified to accord with the objective standard accepted by society. His case does not prove that generosity does not pay. It proves merely that a certain training is necessary to teach what generosity is.

Perhaps the most difficult problem in dealing with either a mate or

a child is to know when to apply generosity and when to apply training through punishment. When a given conflict situation arises, will yielding to the other's wishes bring about his gratitude and hence greater co-operation, or will it lead him to expect the same or greater concessions on the next occasion, and in the end lead him deeper into dependency?

Needed: an Ethics of the Personal Relationship.—From the teachings of modern science many young people have drawn the conclusion that intelligent selfishness rather than Christian self-sacrifice is the sound policy in life. They say, let each person take care of the only person he can possibly know how to take care of, namely, himself. When he tries to sacrifice himself to another, he may do that other more harm than good, and in addition he risks the adjustment of his own personality. His unselfishness may turn out to be simply another bad investment. This philosophy, a phase of modern individualism, is mostly a new way of *thinking*. In practice, after all the qualifications and definitions are made, it often turns out to be not very different from the older idealism. The "self" which one is now counseled to look out for must necessarily include one's personal relationships and the welfare of those one cares about. Again, the word "intelligent" which prefaces "selfishness" saves in practice the essentials of the older morality. The chief value of this new philosophy is that it helps to relieve many persons from the burden of guilt which older ideologies saddled upon them.

Both the impractical self-sacrifice of the older ethics and the pretended selfishness of the new doctrine might be avoided by a still newer philosophy which makes the pair relationship, rather than either individual, the immediate ethical objective. Through such a philosophy we may be able to achieve a realistic ethics, avoiding the old hypocrisy and the modern reaction against hypocrisy. From this point of view, the relationship between two persons is the object to be cared for. If a given relationship cannot be made to yield emotional health to the persons involved in it, it may be broken. If it can be made valuable, then it is to be cultivated. This cultivation requires at times an overgenerosity. At other times it requires, not selfishness, but a thoughtful restraint or aloofness on one side for the sake of certain training results on the other side. If both partners have learned to think of their relationship as a reality apart from themselves, the old-fashioned recriminations about selfishness and unselfishness will appear ridiculous.

As Edna St. Vincent Millay renders it:

Looking askance you said:
Love is dead.

I have forgotten which of us it was
That hurt his wing.
I only know his limping flight above us in the blue air
Toward the sunset cloud
Is more than I can bear.

You, you there,
Stiff necked and angry, holding up your head so proud,
Have you not seen how pitiful lame he flies, and none to befriend him?
Speak! Are you blind? Are you dead?
Shall we call him back? Shall we mend him?*

Minor Conflicts: Mutual Annoyance.—A great deal of married unhappiness is caused by minor frustrations, which may cause either progressive or habituated conflict. Minor frustrations include everyday annoyances. Whether they be incidental to a major conflict, or themselves constitute the full extent of the trouble, they give rise to a process of *mutual annoyance*. Rarely can a person repeatedly annoy another without becoming himself annoyed in return. A husband may begin the process by some habit of untidiness in the home. For a time his wife's protests may rest lightly upon his nervous system. Sooner or later he is likely to find himself annoyed by the repeated nagging of his wife. He may come to think she is the original annoyer; and, indeed, by this time her nagging habit may be spread to so many things that the mere correction of his original mistake may not stop the process.

Mutual annoyance is often progressive; it expands its scope. When it does so, it is accompanied by an injurious process within the individual personalities. We may call this *irritation spread*. The nature of this process is that the minor anger reactions, or irritations, become conditioned to wider and wider ranges of stimuli. Each anger experience paves the way for an easier or more violent anger on the next occasion. Such couples develop irritations against each other's small mannerisms which at an earlier stage were actually pleasing.

* "There at Dusk I Found You," from *The Buck in the Snow*, published by Harper and Brothers, Copyright 1928, by Edna St. Vincent Millay. By permission.

Certain gestures and expressions of good cheer made a husband attractive to outsiders but were irritating to his wife. She herself was an optimistic personality and enjoyed symptoms of optimism in other persons in general. Outsiders failed to understand her irritation toward her husband. No general law of craving the opposite temperament explained the situation. Again, she did not resent the admiration he received from outsiders. The anger conditioning occurred rather through the medium of his dilatory behavior in performing small duties. Whenever he evaded a responsibility which she felt that he ought to assume, or put off until tomorrow what she wanted him to do today, he uttered these expressions of cheerfulness and good humor. The wife, frustrated repeatedly in many small wishes, had conditioned her irritation to the husband's accompanying mannerisms. These became annoying even in situations where his behavior was altogether cooperative and correct.

The Competing Stimulus-Spread of Irritation and Love.—Some persons, observing the frequency of this irritation spread in marriage, venture the theory that love is like a projectile fired upward into the air, which sooner or later must reach its peak, and then fall to the ground. Are those love relations which endure for life merely those which were impelled with more than ordinary force? Are they, too, on the down grade when death mercifully intervenes?

Such a picture assumes that the love forces act only at the beginning, and that this original love drive is all there is to counteract a lifetime of irritations. This is not the case, since love also may receive new propulsions from time to time by new conditionings. Love spreads to wider and wider ranges of associated stimuli as does irritation. This is what we call the "growth" of love. A wife may by conditioning come to love the awkward gait or raucous voice of a husband even though these stimuli at first were somewhat repulsive.

Yet it is true that marriage is a life-long contest between love and irritation (or sometimes disgust or fear). In the majority of cases love loses some of its original ground but holds enough ground to make the marriage seem worth while unto the end. If it survives certain critical periods (see p. 437) its enemies become weaker in the later years. In other cases the unpleasant emotions gain possession of the field, and the marriage is broken, or tolerated only for duty or necessity. No generalized curve of the course of the struggle will fit all cases. Each couple could, if it would, chart its own love history. One pattern seems rather common: the love curve rises to a zenith, then falls until there is a rather acute conflict, then a readjustment takes place upon a more or less permanent level of accommodation. It is suggested by some writers that some form of readjustment normally

takes place with every couple at some time between the fifth and fifteenth year after marriage. In the minority this readjustment takes the form of separation or divorce. In the majority it is a rather severe conflict, followed by a reconciliation on a new level, and a mutual decision that the marriage is after all worth preserving. How common such an interactional history is, however, is a question for future investigation.

Psychology might offer the following advice to the married couple:

Play together, fret separately. Tell each other the interesting things which have happened to you during the day. Don't hash over the disagreeable things except to get positive advice or help. Don't use your mate for a mere outlet. Spend your times of leisure and relaxation together. Spend your moments of anxiety or strain as much as possible apart. If you cannot, then, at least, don't get each other's personalities mixed up with the situation which causes the unpleasant emotion. If the wife is irritated over the behavior of a child, let her either handle the situation herself, or turn it over to the husband to handle, and retire from the scene. Let her not stand there in a state of irritable indecision until finally her anger spreads itself over the whole situation and she flings at her husband the acid remark, "Well, why don't you do something?"

The old-fashioned philosophy held that love is strengthened by the troubles we endure and the burdens we bear together. Love is strengthened by the knowing that your mate has endured something with courage; it is strengthened when you really can do something which helps him in trouble. But in the multitude of tensions and petty troubles, in which you cannot help, your mere useless presence on the scene does not strengthen love. Blessed are the conditioned reflexes of those who are together in joy, but apart during irritation.

Joint suffering may strengthen love when it consists in fear or anguish resulting from some larger problem. Physical pain, the death of a child, or the loss of property may bring the couple closer together. In such cases the partner's presence is a genuine comfort and mitigates the suffering. The conditioning process is thus favorable to love. But in petty sufferings which consist chiefly in anger (irritation), mild anxiety, or disgust, the partner is less apt to be helpful. The nobler attitudes of sacrifice and gratitude are not called into play. But the test is always in actual experience: does the partner's presence help the total relation or does it not? One cannot judge this by considering only the immediate effect upon the irritated person. The other's reaction must also be known. There is a sort of watershed divide in the field of interaction processes. A given policy usually either makes things better or makes them worse, for the total love

relation. It is seldom neutral. It is the task of the couple to find out which is true, and modify their policy accordingly. When a given policy of dealing with one's mate proves injurious to the relationship, it is a mistake to continue trying that same policy unaltered. In emotional engineering, the old proverb, "If at first you don't succeed, try, try again," is a very dangerous guide unless we add the words "by another method."

The Weapons of Conflict.—Among the common annoyers are the methods which the mates use when in conflict. When the conflict is a minor one, a secondary and more serious conflict often arises over the weapons (i.e., methods) used in the minor conflict. Each comes to dislike the other's style of fighting more than he dislikes anything else about the mate. What we have now is really a conflict about the conflict. The wife may threaten court action against the husband for his violence, while he may despise her for her sulking instead of coming out "straight from the shoulder." Severe injury and illness may be pretended as a device to make the other suffer remorse, and the pretense may be discovered, only to cause renewed conflict. There are cultural rules of marital conflict, the code differing as among social classes and nationality groups, but within each such code there is a wide latitude of permissible methods of combat. In marital conflict the contestants seldom use the same weapons, as is done in an athletic contest. Each party will naturally use the weapons with which he is most skilled.

Dr. G. K. Pratt thinks that the most important psychological cause of trouble in marriage is "emotional immaturity," in the form of parent fixation or neurotic ill health. Frequently this functions in both mates, in which case we have a competitive neurosis, each unconsciously trying to get sympathy through illness. Of second importance, thinks Dr. Pratt, is the class of "wills-to-power."²⁴ These represent the wish for superiority, and often function through the two mates' becoming rivals in the same activity.

Spousal Rivalry.—Many annoying marital habits are devices to satisfy the superiority wish or to relieve inferiority feeling. Among these are the belittling of the mate's enthusiasms, "showing off" one's own skill in some line to the point of boredom, sulking, "fishing" for compliments, especially for assurances that one excels some specific person, "bossy" manners toward the mate, boasting of various successes outside the home, great persistence in trying to win a trivial point in argument. There are families in which the struggle between the mates for superior feeling is amusingly obvious even to the visitor.

This rivalry is seldom great enough to constitute a major conflict, and, indeed, it may act as a check upon other disruptive tendencies, for a break in the marriage would deprive one or both of his only sure means of superiority satisfaction. The use of the marital relation itself for the satisfaction of this wish, however, tends to injure its power to satisfy love.

The Need for Interaction Research.—We need more study of marital interaction and the very specific habits and attitudes which it involves. Some shorthand or dictograph records of marital conversations and quarrels would be very enlightening. Dramatists rather than psychologists are skilled in the kind of observational technique which is needed in the study of marriage, but they have not organized their keen observations for scientific purposes. We may find that certain specific habits of conversation, and ways of handling emotions in oneself or one's mate, are more important than we have thought. If, for example, a person is conditioned to anger at the stimulus of another person's anger, he may be a poor marital risk despite high intelligence, thoughtfulness, and integrity of character, unless, perchance, his mate has the opposite conditioning. We need to know whether marital happiness is more a matter of technique or of fundamental personality.

We need to know further the precise relation between the cultural attitudes and the basic patterns of the personality. Thus Burgess cites a case of mother-daughter maladjustment in which there were three factors—the low intelligence of the girl, the emotional instability of the mother, and the cultural attitude difference between them. The mother tried to enforce Old World patterns of conduct upon the girl, who had been "Americanized" in the schools. Burgess urges that the "possibilities of cultural conditioning and conflict be exhausted before resorting to explanation in terms of intelligence quotient or emotional conflict."²⁵ Yet cultural disparities produce strikingly different results when associated with different personality patterns. It is necessary to show why one person easily *changes* his cultural attitudes when he is exposed to a new cultural environment, whereas another adheres stubbornly to his earlier attitudes. In one European-born man, the cultural attitude of domination over woman seems to be part of his basic personality pattern; he gives up a cherished love relation rather than that attitude; in another man from the same culture this attitude seems to be only skin-deep. One woman reared with puritan attitudes toward sex is never able to change them in spite of an intellectual wish to do so; another with the same cul-

tural background throws these attitudes overboard without difficulty as soon as her intellectual education brings critical light upon them.

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CHAPTER XVI

THE PARENT-CHILD RELATION

1. CHILDREN AND THEIR PROBLEMS

Relation of the Problem to the Preceding.—The maladjustments of the parent-child relation might be regarded as a fourth major problem of the modern family, ranking with the reproductive, the economic, and the love problem. In so far as the problem is economic, we have already considered it in Chapter X. It remains to consider the personal, interactional phases of the problem. These are better considered as problems of adjustment in individual situations rather than as alternative choices placed before society as a whole. Therefore the problem has been deferred to this point, instead of treating it in Part IV, as would otherwise have been done.

In Chapters XIV and XV we have already discussed certain principles of interaction in the family, and the formation and adjustment of personalities. These principles were discussed primarily with reference to the marital relation, but they also apply to relations between a parent and a child, or between siblings. A great deal that might belong in this chapter has therefore already been said.

Some Statistics regarding American Children.—Our American population has been continually increasing in its average age. In 1850, persons under 20 years of age constituted 52.5 per cent of the whole population; in 1930, they were 38.8 per cent; and in 1980, according to the medium estimate of Thompson and Whelpton,¹ they will be only 26.7 per cent. Persons of 65 and over were 2.6 per cent in 1850, 5.4 per cent in 1930, and will be 12.1 per cent, by estimate, in 1980. The average child thus has a greater number of adults to support him directly or indirectly.

About 5 per cent of a large mid-Western sample of native Americans of the generation born about 1900 are "only" children, about 14 per cent are members of two-child families, and 81 per cent of larger families.² This sample, being obtained from the families and near relatives of college students, probably represents smaller than average families.

A census report of 1923 reported 205,000 American children in children's institutions or receiving homes, 50,000 in free foster homes, 22,000 in boarding foster homes, 2500 in homes for unmarried mothers, and 2000 in alms-houses. In addition 121,000 were in their own homes receiving aid by way

of mothers' allowances (increased to 200,000 since then) and 35,000 were in institutions for delinquents.³ Altogether, 312,000 were being cared for apart from their natural parents, through action of the state or of private social agencies. This constituted about 1 per cent of all children under 16. An additional, unknown number were separated from their natural parents through purely private arrangements, living with relatives because of the parents' death, and so on. In New York State in 1931 the children being reared apart from their natural parents through the action of social agencies were 1.7 per cent of all children under 16, and an almost equal percentage was being helped by mothers' allowances.⁴

The Trend toward Small-Home Care of Dependent Children.—There is a pronounced trend in this country away from the children's institution and toward placement in foster homes as a method of caring for orphaned children and children whose own parents are unfit or unable to care for them. It is urged that foster-home care is not only cheaper for the state, but also far better for the development of the child.⁵ In the past 25 years, even many feeble-minded children and delinquents, which are classes commonly assigned to institutions, have been successfully placed in foster family homes.⁶ Massachusetts has been a leader in this trend. There is also a rapid increase in the use of mothers' allowances, by which children lacking the support of a father, who would otherwise have to be placed out, may continue to live with their mothers.

Experience everywhere seems to indicate the superiority of the small home, even if it be a foster home, to the larger institution. There is thought to be a mysterious "something" existing in the personal relation of mother to child which gives an advantage over the most sanitary and scientifically run institution. That "something," however, needs to be analyzed, not accepted with a mere sentimental reverence. It may consist mainly in the fact that a mother, or foster mother, is more sensitive to the physical condition and needs of the child from moment to moment, and that this flexible treatment is more valuable than a routine treatment even with better facilities and techniques. Again, the important thing may be the better satisfaction of the child's emotional needs for response and security. Theoretically, an institution could be so staffed and administered as to meet these needs, but under our culture such an ideal institution seems difficult to create. The obstacles to it are cultural rather than physical. In any case, it is recognized that both foster and natural homes vary greatly in their success with children.

The Scientific Study of Child Training and Child Problems.—Never before has there been so much scientific interest in children and their treatment. The research in this field is far more abundant than in any other field of family problems. It is a favorite activity at higher educational institutions which have nursery schools. It will be impossible in this chapter to do it justice. The interest in the subject is spreading far beyond academic circles. In fact child behavior has become the center of a definite culture complex. Eduard C. Lindeman has remarked⁷ that adults who seek further education in Europe are usually seeking personal culture, but those taking adult courses in America are largely parents interested in child psychology. To most Americans "the" problem of the family is the problem of raising children among the perplexities of modern science, ancient traditions, and the insistent demands of the children themselves.

One consequence of this situation is that some people have expected too much of science at short notice, and have been disappointed. There is need for greater mutual understanding between the psychiatrist and the layman. It may be helpful to point out two common obstacles to this understanding.

First, the layman does not sufficiently realize that most *practical* questions about child training can be answered definitely only by knowing the details of the individual case. The function of general knowledge of child psychology, such as can be given in books, is to provide the mental tools by which the parent can think out a particular problem for himself. There will remain other problems on which he needs to consult a specialist.

Second, "common sense" erroneously believes in some kind of sharp boundary line between normality and abnormality, which may be a carry over from the old belief that the righteous would be infallibly distinguished from the wicked in the hereafter. The concepts but not the pattern of thinking have changed. In consequence, the layman mistrusts principles derived from the study of the pathological and insane. He feels that his child, being "normal," is in an entirely different class of human beings and cannot be helped by methods derived from "abnormal" psychology. The fear of the "abnormal" is one of the most obstructive popular prejudices against which science has to contend.

Maladjustment is always relative. A personality which is badly adjusted in one situation may be well adjusted in another. Behavior is not inherently good or bad, and there is no *a priori* virtue in changing behavior rather than changing something else. The question is a

practical one: namely, what *can* be changed, the problem child's behavior, or some other person's behavior, or the surrounding environment in general? If more than one kind of change can be made, which is the more likely to be successful in the long run?

The Indicators of Juvenile Maladjustment.—Maladjustment has two kinds of indicators. First are the *institutional* or "objective" indicators: the child comes before the juvenile court or psychiatric clinic, is reported truant or fails at school, is formally complained about by neighbors, or causes some specific kind of trouble to his own family. These indicators result in sifting out three classes of problems: "behavior" or "social" problems such as delinquency, truancy, etc., which consist in overt anti-social acts; "personality" or "emotional" problems such as fears, shyness, and so on, which cause no social trouble but give anxiety to parents concerning the child's future welfare; and "habit" problems such as enuresis, thumb-sucking, and masturbation, which likewise cause family difficulty or anxiety. Second, there are *test* indicators: answers to questionnaires, laboratory behavior under controlled experiments, and ratings of behavior by unprejudiced observers. A test measures a given *sample* of behavior under some standardized condition, and may do this for any desired sample of children; an institutional indicator sifts out these children whose total behavior happens to lead to some specific social result, such as a court appearance; but it does not give us any accurate picture of what that behavior is, or does it tell us about the other children who have not come to court.

The Validity of Psychometric Tests and Clinical Diagnoses.—Hence we should not logically expect any *high* correlation between any test and any institutional indicator, such as a finding of all delinquent children to be within the lower half of the intelligence test scale. When moderate correlations are found between the two types of indicators, the result is of some scientific value. Thus Butcher, Hoey, and McGinnis found that a sample of delinquent boys had a median intelligence quotient of 75, as contrasted with 86 for *their own brothers*. In a test of mechanical ability, however, the delinquents surpassed their brothers and also surpassed an *unselected* sample of New York school children.⁸ On psychoneurotic questionnaire tests, such as the Woodworth-Matthews test, most investigators have found delinquents to make significantly higher (i.e., psychoneurotic) scores than non-delinquents.⁹ Chambers received by mail 20 records of Pressey X-O tests, knowing nothing about the subjects except that some were "good" boys and some were "disciplinary problems." In

17 out of the 20 cases he was able to judge, by the tests alone, to which class the boy belonged.¹⁰ Healy, Bronner, Baylor, and Murphy have made a most important study of the results of placing maladjusted children in foster homes in Massachusetts.¹¹ The children were carefully followed up, and when they did not adjust well in one home, were transferred to another. The cases were classified as: behavior problems 80 per cent, personality problems 14 per cent, habit problems 6 per cent. The placing method became eventually successful in about 90 per cent of the children who had "normal" intelligence and personality, but in less than 50 per cent of those who were "abnormal" in intelligence and personality. Abnormal personalities with 4 or more delinquencies showed only 24 per cent success. No one type of misbehavior was particularly liable to failure. Stealing cases were actually a little more successful than truancy cases.

To show that something real was discovered here, it must be pointed out that "normality" and "success" were two independent judgments. Normality or abnormality was judged by psychiatrists, through intelligence tests and clinical interviews, *before they knew the outcome of the treatment*. Normality was measured by test indicators; success by what was in effect an institutional indicator, namely, a record of the child's overt conduct in his new home.

Such is the general situation as regards tests and clinical diagnoses, which in a sense are tests. From expert clinical and laboratory examinations, one can state the probability of a child's behavior in actual life much better than by a chance guess. But *for any particular case* no absolute prediction can be offered; that case may be one destined to the "less probable" outcome. Tests, however, are not all that psychiatry has to offer.

The Influence of Bodily Constitution and Chemistry.—It has been abundantly demonstrated that physical defects and illnesses are important causes of several kinds of behavior and personality difficulties. Many cases have been cured by medical treatment alone. It cannot be too much emphasized that *a thorough medical examination should be given* before any conclusions as to a child's maladjustment are drawn, or any social treatment policy decided upon. The average parent will probably recognize this principle as regards the more obvious medical problems such as indigestion, eye defects, and so on. But not only laymen but many scientists are unaware of important recent discoveries in the relation between endocrine glands and personality. It is probable that most of what we call temperament is determined by inner chemistry, and that this is largely determined by

the under- and over-activity of various endocrine glands. It has been demonstrated that emotionally unstable persons show unusually great irregularity of chemical metabolism,¹² that deficient thyroid secretion produces sluggish metabolism, fatigue, and underdevelopment, that excess thyroid produces overactivity. Recently some evidence has been found that temper tantrums are related to deficiency of calcium, and some students of the problem think they are getting improvement by injecting parathyroid hormone, which controls the body's calcium metabolism.¹³ Endocrinology is still in the stage of experiment, but it probably holds more promise of adjusting human personality in the future than most of us have dreamed.

The Influence of Native Intelligence.—Levy, studying 700 cases coming to the Institute of Juvenile Research in Chicago, found that as one goes up the intelligence scale, the proportion of personality or emotional problems increases, while delinquency decreases. The same can be said if we substitute "wealth" for "intelligence." But Levy's significant contribution is that *this difference in type of problem is more closely related to intelligence test score than to socio-economic status* as measured by father's occupation.¹⁴ A group of 50 poor, intelligent children were 60 per cent "personality problems" and 40 per cent "social (delinquency) problems." A group of 70 rich, dull children were 41 per cent "personality problems" and 59 per cent "social problems."

Studies of this kind do not tell us the probability that a child of any given characteristics will become a problem. They tell us merely what the child's problem would be most likely to be *if* he should come before a social agency.

The Influence of Socio-Economic Status.—Whether native intelligence be the real determiner or not, it is proved that social classes differ greatly in the behavior and problems of their children. Practically all studies agree in showing that delinquent children are the products of the lower economic classes. Most striking are the ecological studies of Clifford Shaw in Chicago, showing that the rate of boy delinquency varies from 370 cases per 1000 boys of juvenile court age in certain downtown areas to a rate of zero in some of the suburban areas.¹⁵ The rate shows, with minor exceptions, a constantly downward movement as one proceeds from the "loop" toward the suburbs in any direction. Similar studies have brought similar results from other cities. It would seem that if one were asked to state the probability of a given boy's becoming a delinquent, and were allowed to ask only one question about the boy, that question should be:

“What is your address?” Of course, nobody thinks that mere latitude and longitude cause delinquency. The significance of Shaw’s study is that delinquency is not determined by social status alone, but by a complex of causes, economic status being among them, and that the boy’s address is the simplest and perhaps best possible indicator we can get of the total influence of all the combined causes. Some areas, because of the presence of criminal gangs and traditions, are much more productive of delinquency than other areas of the same social level. Shaw’s findings may ultimately be explained in terms of culture-patterns more than in terms of economic status or intelligence.

The native born of foreign parentage show unusually high delinquency rates. This may be partly a function of their low economic status, but it is also due to the conflict of cultures in the immigrant family and the resulting inability of the parents to control their children.

Truancy also is associated with low economic status and school retardation.¹⁶

Contrary to certain expectations from psychological theory, it was found by Munroe and Levy that socially inferior children are not given to compensating day dreams of popularity and heroism. On the contrary, they found a correlation of +.51 between children’s actual status (judged by school marks, spending money, and other objective criteria), and the degree of self-exaltation shown in the children’s reported phantasies.¹⁷ This does not disprove the theory that inferiority feeling produces compensating phantasies of superiority. It may indicate merely that the majority of children of the lower social classes do not actually experience pathological “inferiority feeling.” They may know they are socially inferior, but not develop a “complex” against it. That complex may be more common among persons who are actually on a high social level and trying to climb still higher.

Emotional problems are *relatively* more prominent in the upper classes. Some studies would seem to indicate that they exist at an absolutely higher *rate* there. Thus Hopkins and Haines, studying 100 child guidance clinic cases, found them superior in economic status to a control group taken from the general population. They also found that the control group had more disintegrating family conditions than the clinic group.¹⁸

Plant says that 80 per cent of the child clinic cases in one Essex County, New Jersey, district were from families which had recently moved to a “better” neighborhood where their children were not well received socially.¹⁹

The Influence of Broken Homes.—Most investigators have found that delinquency is correlated with broken homes. It is estimated that not over 20 or 25 per cent of all homes in the United States are broken (by death, divorce, desertion, etc.). Yet studies show that from 30 to 60 per cent of delinquents are from broken homes. One industrial school (containing more serious offenders) had 75 per cent of all its boys from broken homes. Most of these studies, however, have failed to take account of the very real class difference in broken homes. Do broken homes produce delinquency, or does poverty produce delinquency while it at the same time produces broken homes?

Clifford Shaw attempted to answer this question by comparing the home conditions of delinquent boys with those of a control group of the same age, nationality composition, and socio-economic status. The control group showed 36.1 per cent of broken homes and the delinquent group 42.5 per cent, a very small difference.²⁰ The suitability of the control group has been questioned by some. Shaw found that the incidence of broken homes rises rapidly as the child's age rises, and also that it varies greatly with nationality, from the Jews with 16.3 per cent to the negroes with 46.0 per cent. Delinquent girls show higher rates of broken homes than do delinquent boys.²¹

Matching 362 delinquent girls for age, nationality, and race with the same number of non-delinquent school girls from approximately the same parts of Chicago, M. Hodgkiss found that 67 per cent of the delinquents and 45 per cent of the non-delinquents came from broken homes. Thirty-eight per cent of the mothers of the delinquents and 29 per cent of those of the non-delinquents worked for wages. Yet when broken homes were held constant, there was no relation between delinquency and the fact that the mothers worked.²²

In brief, the relation between broken homes and delinquency is much less than the earlier crude studies showed, but has not been altogether disproved, especially in the case of girls.

Marian Campbell reports that broken homes have little effect upon a child's school achievement but some upon conduct, and that the average child is not affected by the broken home either in school achievement or in conduct after the period of stress is passed.²³

Bonapart reported on the relationship between adolescent children and their natural parents when they are placed in foster homes. He found that the separation tends to make the child the center of attraction, and that in its effect upon the child's emotional life it is neither so complete nor so deleterious as is popularly believed.²⁴

The chief risk of a broken home to the child lies in its frustration

of his wish for security. As Margaret Mead says, "Children who have learned to rely on their parents for all things cannot see the bond between the parents broken and the home disturbed without suffering a severe shock, and a profound disturbance of their sense of social solidarity."²⁴ In other words, the child may suffer from severe *nostalgia* (see p. 430) even though he remain in the same physical location and even though there are frequent and affectionate visits with the absent parent. The child has not lost any person or any concrete object out of his life; yet he has lost something which may be very real and emotionally very important. That something is a social pattern. How many experience this shock, and how easily it wears off, or how it is related to later maladjustment cannot be said. It seems probable from the above evidence that in the majority of cases it does no permanent damage to personality. In each particular case one always has to consider whether the effects of the broken home would be as bad as those of a chronically discordant home. There is much evidence to show that the personal relationships in the home are the most important influence upon the child's personality.

Eliot has pointed out that even the theory that *disharmony* between parents is a cause of maladjustment in the child is an opinion without definite proof. Many well-adjusted children come from disharmonious homes, and again, parents who are in perfect harmony may both be out of harmony with the child.²⁵

The Influence of Sibling Relationships and Ordinal Position.—Another question which has called forth an abundance of research studies is the relation between the child's adjustment and the fact of his being the older, younger, or only child. Before 1900 child psychologists were theorizing that the only child is at a disadvantage in adjusting to life. Bohannon in 1898 made the first statistical study to test this hypothesis, under the direction of G. Stanley Hall. He found the expected disadvantages, but his study has been discredited for faulty method: he sent questionnaires to teachers asking them to describe the "only" children in their classes and thus probably caused them to select outstanding cases.²⁶

Worcester, in 1931, found only children to be superior in courtesy, truthfulness, personal orderliness, and cleanliness, and equal to other children in several other desirable traits. He believed, however, that the superiority was due largely to the fact that only children come from more prosperous parents.²⁷

Goodenough and Leahy studied 293 kindergarten children, all from

**Broken Homes, Nation, 128: pp. 253-255, Feb. 27, 1929.*

a superior residential district, thus eliminating variation in socio-economic status. *Oldest* children were found relatively low in traits of aggressiveness and leadership, and tending toward seclusiveness and introversion. Middle and youngest children were more "ordinary." *Only* children were more aggressive and self-confident, more gregarious, fond of physical demonstration of affection, and somewhat more unstable in emotional mood. Not merely "onliness," but each ordinal position, involved special problems of adjustment.²⁸ Fenton corroborates the finding that only children are more self-confident.²⁹ Levy found that only children come to child guidance clinics at practically the same rate as other children. Among those who do come to the clinics, however, the only children are more apt to be intelligent and to be troubled with restlessness, food fads, and nail biting, and less given to lying, stealing, and truancy. This doubtless reflects the superior social status of only children.³⁰ Maller found, in a group of 802 children from all social classes, that only children excel in intelligence, moral knowledge, honesty, and cultural background. Children from large families excel only in persistence, and stand low in intelligence, moral knowledge, honesty, co-operativeness, cultural background, and inhibition. Here again is the class difference.³¹

The oldest child has a greater probability of becoming a clinic case than do children on the average, according to careful statistical analysis by Rosenow. The ratio of actuality to chance is 113 to 100 for two-child families, and 121 to 100 for three-child families.³² Other studies show that intelligence rises somewhat and continually with ordinal position, other factors being held constant. The oldest child tends to be the least intelligent.³³ It must be emphasized that these differences are very slight, and of no predictive value for any given child.

Studies at the college and adult level fail to show any certain relationship between maladjustment and size of family or ordinal position.³⁴

Matching 361 delinquent girls with 361 non-delinquents of the same age and nationality, Parsley found that the delinquents came from *smaller families*, contained a larger proportion of only children, and a smaller proportion of youngest children.³⁵

2. THE INTERACTION BETWEEN PARENT AND CHILD

Interpersonal Relationships Are the Important Factors.—These studies of the relation of behavior to social class, to broken homes, and to sibling position in family were undertaken to test particular hypotheses, originating several decades ago. It should now be clear

that these factors have little consistent, generalizable influence. The investigation of these simple, formal factors misses the factors which are really important in determining the child's personality. It is the *emotional relationships* to parents and siblings which really count. Those are more difficult to measure, and hence have been explored more through case studies and through the expansive type of questionnaire with more complicated questions or descriptive answers rather than check marks. Fortunately the trend of research is now toward the quantification, however crude, of these more important though less definite factors of personal relationship and interaction. The human environment matters much more than the material surroundings; and in that human environment, the actual behavior relationships matter more than formal status.

Sibling Jealousy.—Let us now examine some studies of the effects of interaction in the family.

Miss Sewall's study of jealousy among small children undermines the popular belief that if one prepares the child's mind for the coming of his little brother, he will not be jealous of him. From 70 cases she found that this made no difference. Whether the new baby was wanted or not by the mother also made no appreciable difference. Yet some factors did make a great difference. Jealousy was more frequent when the age difference between the new and the jealous child was between 18 and 42 months. Jealousy decreased markedly with each increase in the number of children in the family. Jealousy was highly associated with oversolicitous mothers, inconsistent discipline, and discordant parents.³⁶ Miss Foster found that jealousy was not usually an isolated form of maladjustment, but was strongly correlated with other personality difficulties in the child.³⁷

One of the most significant studies is that by Ruth Smalley showing that *jealousy is much more likely to occur when the siblings differ greatly in intelligence*. An older, duller, child is especially apt to be jealous. There were no jealousy cases where the I. Q.'s were within 5 points of each other; 27 per cent showed jealousy where there was an I. Q. difference of 6 to 14 points, 50 per cent where the difference was 15 to 24 points, 83 per cent where the difference was over 25 points. Miss Smalley used only 27 pairs, all from two-child families, of which 11 were jealous, 7 friendly, and 9 showed a protection-dependency relationship. Jealousy was most frequent in girl-girl pairs and least in boy-girl pairs.³⁸ All studies agree in finding more jealousy among girls than among boys.³⁹

Over- and Under-Protection.—We now come closer to the heart of the problem, namely, the relation between the child's personality and his early relation to his parents. We have already discussed some aspects of this under personality-patterns and basic roles in Chapter XV.

Mothers, in their relations to their children, may be classified as overprotective, normal, and underprotective or rejecting. About 25 per cent of all children have been overprotected, according to estimates made from three studies, agreeing rather closely.⁴⁰ Miss Brunk found that 41 per cent of overprotected children had been breast-fed for 12 months or more, while this was true of only 7 per cent of other children. The overprotective mother is distinguished by prolongation of infantile care, by excessive contact with the child, prevention of development of the child's independence, and by either a lack or an excess of control over the child.⁴¹ Brunk concludes that overprotection does not affect the child's physical development but is much more significant as regards the mother. Levy and Miss Foley both find, independently, that overprotective mothers are more likely to have had an unhappy childhood with lack of affection and early development of a responsible role, and to be maladjusted in their marital relationship.⁴² The overprotected child, more often, is a boy, is an only or younger child, has a high I. Q., and has some defect or peculiarity which in the mother's mind creates an extra risk.⁴³

Rejecting or underprotective mothers are also more likely than average to have had an unhappy childhood and to be maladjusted in marriage.⁴⁴ Their childhood, however, is more likely to have been one of *affection and irresponsibility* in contrast to the overprotective mothers.⁴⁵ Their unhappy marital situation is more characterized by thwarted social and professional ambitions, financial pressure and the necessity to earn, and dread of pregnancy. They nurse their children for a shorter period than normal,⁴⁶ that is, less than six months. Childers and Hamil found that children breast-fed beyond eleven months had fewer undesirable behavior traits than those weaned at one to six months, but all of the children in their study were pathological cases.⁴⁷

What Family Relationships Produce Good Social Adjustment?—J. O. Chassell had developed one of the best methods so far for studying the relationship between childhood interaction and later personality.⁴⁸ His questionnaire is answered by check marks, thus permitting statistical treatment, yet the questions asked refer to specific details of personality and personal relations, such as would

be covered in a thoroughgoing case study. What he gets from any one of his subjects is thus a standardized case record in statistical form, so that all his cases can be compared with respect to every given detail. He has collected these records for 75 men and 75 women students. Using these 150 cases he made a study of the correlation of "enjoyment of social intercourse during the early 'teens,'" and of "freedom from hyper-self-consciousness during the early 'teens," with several other important factors. These two central traits or variables may be regarded as indices of general happiness and social adjustment during the early 'teens. The association between the two indices themselves is +.83 (in terms of Yule's *Q*).

His results show that a boy, in order to have this kind of good social adjustment during his early 'teens, should have had:

A severe, punishing mother, rather than a mother who never scolds or nags, or who "talks things over with him."

A mother in whom he confides, rather than one to whom he lies.

A father in whom he confides.

A father who displays more or less physical affection toward him, rather than one who is reserved, embarrassed, undemonstrative.

A stable, well-adjusted, happy father, rather than one who is irritable, depressed, unhappy, discouraged.

More or less religious parents rather than parents indifferent or opposed to church.

A girl, in order to have this same social adjustment in her 'teens, should have had:

A mother who seldom scolds or nags, and who talks things over with her, rather than a severe and much-punishing mother.

A mother who encourages her to make her own decisions, and does not urgently demand strict obedience.

A tendency to disobey her mother, and follow her own inclination rather than to sacrifice personal wishes for mother.

A father who gives advice and encouragement, but does not insist autocratically upon obedience.

Considerable intimacy with father.

A docile rather than defiant reaction to parental discipline.

Freedom to decide things herself rather than a requirement of absolute obedience.

Religious parents rather than parents opposed or indifferent to religion.

Tolerant rather than dogmatic, arbitrary parents.

Kindly, companionable older brothers and sisters, rather than those who are teasing, bullying, domineering.

Lack of serious conflict with brothers and sisters.

The highest correlations were those between boys' social enjoyment and maternal severity (+1.00) and boys' social enjoyment and intimacy with father (+.81). However, the girls' adjustment, it seems, was related to a greater number of family interaction conditions than was the boys'. The girls were more influenced by relationships with siblings. In both sexes it appears that tolerant, even somewhat lenient, parents produced better results than domineering, severe parents; but there is the single and extreme exception that a lenient mother is bad for a boy. This result, taken with Hamilton's and Terry's findings discussed in Chapter XV, seems to give strong support to the Oedipus theory.

H. W. Newell, in a study of 107 juvenile offenders of 8 to 20 years, found that 80 per cent of the boys preferred their mothers, while only 53 per cent of the girls preferred their fathers.⁴⁹ This is significant not because the children were delinquents, but because it is probably true of children in general. All these Oedipus-supporting data do not prove that it would be desirable for boys to prefer their fathers to their mothers. They indicate merely that the boy-mother relation is especially strong in our present society and is especially in conflict with other cultural patterns. The remedy may consist in checking somewhat the intense development of this relationship, or of changing some other cultural factor so as to make the relationship less troublesome. Could it be remedied by the fostering of stronger boy-father relationships such as is done by the Y. M. C. A. and other agencies in their "father-and-son" activities? Or is the bad father-son adjustment a result, as per Oedipus theory, of this boy-mother fixation, so that this latter must be attacked directly? Or again, as several studies suggest, is the whole pattern a result of bad husband-wife relationship, causing the wife to compensate through undue affection toward her son? The latter seems quite probable. But if the marital relation is chiefly at fault, is not this due to the large number of husbands who are emotionally immature because of past mother fixations? The problem seems a vicious circle.

However, it must be noted that the index of good adjustment used in Chassell's study was "social enjoyment" and "non-self-consciousness." We need to know more about how these particular kinds of good adjustment are related to happiness in general and to personal achievement in general. How far can we go away from mother-son fixation without incurring the opposite risk of homosexuality? We need also a more careful analysis of the mother-son relationship. Freudian theory holds that the boy's intense affection for the mother implies the de-

velopment of sexual feelings which must be repressed and which also arouse the father's jealousy. Is this the focus of the problem, or is the focus rather the dependency relation which Jung has emphasized? A wise mother can give great affection and comradeship to her son while at the same time training him to "stand on his own feet." Chassell's finding does not indicate that the mother should be more severe with the boy than is the father, but that she should be more severe than the average mother now is.

Four Logical Categories of Bad Parents.—The errors of parenthood may be logically classified into four major types: (1) over-love with over-control, (2) over-love with under-control, (3) under-love with over-control, (4) under-love with under-control. "Over" and "under" are not simple quantitative excesses or deficiencies. We cannot measure the total affection or the total control involved in a parent-child relationship. It is usually some specific kind of love or control which is out of adjustment with the whole situation. Still, it may be helpful to think in terms of these four categories.

(1) Over-love with over-control is typical of the overprotective parent who also dominates the child's personality. Usually the over-control here does not appear as an arbitrary, tyrannical authority, since it is coupled with great affection. The control may be more powerful through its insidiousness than is a brutal tyranny. This situation commonly leads to the submissive, weak-willed child, emotionally dependent upon the parent,⁵⁰ never "growing up." The most serious results to the child may not come during his childhood but rather when he becomes an adult. Some children, however, eventually rebel under such treatment and become independent at the expense of their love for their parents.

Many parents apparently relinquish "authority" and treat their children as "pals," yet attempt to retain control in some matter which is more important than all the small privileges they have granted. They say in effect to the child: "I have given you many liberties and privileges which my parents would not have dreamed of giving me; now do this one thing to please me." This one thing often turns out to be something which frustrates one of the child's leading wishes. It may be to give up a certain friend or marriage plan, or to choose a certain vocation rather than another. Many of these demands represent the projection of unsatisfied ambitions of the parents. It would have been better for the child to hold him under greater discipline in the small things of life and to give him freedom in his major goals.

(2) Over-love with under-control commonly appears as "over-indulgence," and leads to the "spoiled," selfish, aggressive child. Such

a child, if a girl, is likely to become underprotective toward her own children later.⁵¹ It is commonly said that such a child lacks gratitude toward his indulgent parent, does not love the parent in return. The process is more likely than described on p. 492. The child does love his parent, but since he is not trained to responsibility and finds his wishes gratified with little effort on his part, he becomes resentful when the situation changes in later years, as it must. He tends to regard as unkind an environment which merely treats him as it treats the average person. Hence his originally normal affectionate attitudes may turn into ingratitude, grudges. His maladjustment to the world is more apt to be characterized by aimlessness and lazy parasitism than by purposeful or courageous rebellion.

(3) Under-love with over-control is especially typical of immigrant parents who cannot adjust to the American family culture. It is found also among "old-school" American parents who believe in authority and cannot adjust themselves to social change. We find it common among formerly rural families which have moved to the city. Their affection may not be deficient or their control excessive in the older culture pattern. In the new pattern, their stubborn efforts to retain their former control, against the forces of change, often cause their originally adequate love of their children to turn into antagonism. The child may react by rebellious acts, delinquency, running away from home, or sometimes by becoming submissive and seclusive. It is said that Thomas Jefferson was the product of an over-domineering father.⁵² Jefferson, rebelling against his father's domination, hated all authority and devoted his life to effecting an extreme decentralization of political and economic power in America. E. Klein has found a correlation of +.60 between radicalism of opinion, and father-antagonism.⁵³ Of course the situation is apt to be complicated by the relation to the mother, and a possible Oedipus complex.

The girl who has experienced early responsibility with lack of parental affection seems more likely than average to become an overprotective mother.⁵⁴

(4) Under-love with under-control is found with parents of all social classes. It is associated with underprotection or "rejecting mothers." The unwanted child who is neglected or allowed to shift for himself falls in this class. So do many children of broken families. But the situation may exist also with parents who try hard to do their duty to the child, but who cannot give the love and security that the child needs. They may be overworked, overambitious, or discouraged parents, with good intentions. The situation may spare the child from the

domination which is present in the previous type, but the child does not appreciate this as an advantage, for it is a purely negative freedom and is coupled with serious deprivations. He tends to resent his parents' neglect and regard them as unfit. From such situations arise many neurotic personalities which are known as unloving and unlovable.

Jessie Taft presents a classic case study which illustrates several important principles of parent-child interaction. It has characteristics of the third and fourth types above.

Mary, a pale, thin, nervous child, is found to be an habitual thief, and is brought by her mother to the psychologist. The father is a skilled mechanic with fair income, good habits, and a real fondness for his family. The mother is a dignified, intelligent, conscientious woman who devotes herself to the care of her family and struggles to maintain high social and moral standards. Mary is the oldest child. There are four others, all healthy, happy, well-adjusted children.

Mary's mother describes her as nervous, full of fears, very prying and curious, and full of wants. Nothing satisfies her for long. She craves personal adornment, is personally clean and neat. She is an efficient worker when interested, but is not very reliable or responsible. She teases and bosses the other children, and is always afraid she will not have everything they have. She is markedly without affection, which the other children show. She seems to care about nothing but herself. She has no special friends. She is afraid of punishment but shows no remorse. She lies habitually. Her intelligence is average but she is failing in school work. She has no constructive interests. She is essentially queer, difficult, unloving, and unlovable. What is the matter with her?

Clinical interviews with Mary show that she is extremely curious about sex, and that she has not been adequately informed. Her stealing episodes at school coincided with the periods when her mother had gone to the hospital to be delivered. When the psychologist satisfies Mary's curiosity about sex, Mary bursts forth in an attitude of exulting triumph over her parents. She has none of the ordinary adolescent emotion about sex, no interest in it on her own account, but only a joy in finding out what her parents had concealed from her. Soon Mary loses interest in the matter, and at the same time her stealing ceases and is not repeated. Her personality pattern, however, is unchanged. She continues to have a consuming hunger for possessions and a lack of objective interest in other persons and things. She wants to appear in the movies.

Mary was born at a time when her mother was passing through a serious disillusionment with her marriage. The birth was unusually difficult, and breast feeding ceased at three months. Mary suffered from indigestion and undernourishment, developed constipation, and for a long period her bowel habits were sources of conflict between her and her parents. Circumstances

had trained her to concentrate her attention on her own physical functions and to be resistant and antagonistic to other persons.

During this period the father became involved in speculations with his firm's money and lost his job. The shock of this situation, together with Mary's ill health, made it impossible for the mother to take any pleasure in her care of Mary. Mary, likewise, failed to get the normal pleasure of a child from its experiences with its mother. Mary until the age of twelve never cared much about food.

Mary has improved, and she has ceased stealing. Her personality continues to be egocentric, unloving, and unlovable. The psychologist doubts that it can be fundamentally changed. Adolescence and sex interest may succeed in transferring her "libido" to another person, but as Miss Taft remarks, one fears "a use of sex which will merely gratify her desire for power, possession, and ability to wound." If the personality pattern cannot be changed, then some useful expression must be found for the present pattern, as in skilful dressing, intelligent use of money, dancing, athletics, and so on.*

One may interpret this case, as the Freudians do, as "anal eroticism"; or in behavioristic terms, as an early, unpleasant conditioning to the majority of ordinary environmental stimuli, leaving only a certain narrow field of stimuli in which Mary can find any pleasure. Whatever terminology we use, Mary's pathological case illustrates the basic principles of all personality development. Namely, children, like all human beings, have wishes. One can describe these as wishes for specific goals, or as wishes for the pleasure which comes with the attainment of goals. Every human being will inevitably and ceaselessly strive toward that satisfaction, that pleasure. If he does not get it through normal, socially acceptable channels, his wishes turn into unacceptable channels and he becomes maladjusted. Whether we advise the patient to think about pleasure or not think about it, the only successful treatment is something which in fact will give him greater wish satisfaction, greater pleasure, or, putting it in negative terms, something which will relieve his frustrations. "To be good" may not always, in the immediate instance, be the same thing as "to be happy." But there is no real adjustment, no permanent goodness, and no permanent happiness, until being good and being happy can be reconciled.

There are no four types of maladjusted personality which can be assigned respectively to these four types of faulty parenthood. The child's personality-pattern is determined by many factors, and of course his mother-relation and his father-relation may be very different. There is more than one way of reacting to each situation.

*Jessie Taft, The effect of an unsatisfactory mother-daughter relationship upon the development of a personality, *Family*, 7: 10-17, 1926.

Miriam Van Waters says there are more than 19 ways of being a bad parent. Among the more significant are:

A parent is bad:

If he is not oriented to the modern world.

Whose imagination is colored by an uncritical belief in the vague rumors of scandal about young people.

Who makes a faulty characterization of a child (especially in the child's presence).

Who cannot shield a child from premature exposure to adult anxiety and perplexity.

Who does not realize that with adolescence comes a tremendous pull of loyalty towards friends outside the family group.

Who permits his own thwarted love life to pervert his relationship to his child.

If the goal placed before the child is too immediate, or too easy, or is so concerned with money and comfort that the children become bored with life.

Who permits the family atmosphere to become infected with his "inferiority complex."

Who will not let a child grow up, who does all the talking, makes all the decisions, meets all the issues, and exercises perpetual chaperonage.

Who does not wholeheartedly inculcate the idea of family formation for the next generation.*

The Role of Culture-Patterns in the Parent-Child Relation.—The specific content of a good or a bad parent-child relation cannot be stated in absolute, universal terms. Parental behavior must always be relative to the cultural patterns of the country, region, neighborhood, social class, and sect to which the family belongs. We may approve or disapprove this culture, but we must first understand it fully and use it as a point of reference in our judgments. Many parents are not aware of what the customs of their social environment really are, or of how they have changed since they were children. They have even forgotten certain cultural patterns which distinguish child from adult group life even when there is no social change. They are often not aware that their children are being torn between two conflicting and incompatible cultural standards, each coming to the child's mind with a certain voice of social authority. If certain kinds of language or ways of dress are actually the custom in the group with which a child associates, the parent cannot make them seem wrong to the child by telling him that *he didn't do these things when a child*. Again, if the

*Adapted from Miriam Van Waters, *Parents on Probation*, New Republic, 1927, pp. 61-99.

parent experienced severe corporal punishment in childhood and yet grew up loving his parents, it does not follow that the same treatment will produce the same results today. The child compares the treatment he receives with that received by other children. Any treatment is brutal and severe if it is generally *regarded* as brutal and severe in the culture in which one lives. Of course, one can educate the child to desire and work for better standards than the present ones, but he must accept the present standards as a point of departure.

The parent should first know the cultural norm. He need not necessarily follow it in every respect, and he may improve upon it, but he must *know* how behavior and interaction in his family depart from this norm.

The results of statistical studies vary greatly according to the sex, social class, or cultural group which is investigated. This does not prove their inconsistency, but merely illustrates the variety of cultural patterns which exist within even the same community. Differences between economic classes must be regarded as culture-pattern differences and not merely as mechanical results of differences in wealth. It is true that lack of wealth places certain limits upon the possible adjustments to life in the working class. But the way they *do* adjust is only one of several subcultural possibilities, and is determined by their specific customs and values. Thus delinquency is not caused directly by the *poverty* of the families of delinquents, but certain patterns of behavior arise in areas of poverty and those patterns are *imitated*. The boys who imitate them are not always from the poorest families, but are selected by their proximity and their personality maladjustments. Again, sex differences must be regarded as mainly cultural differences, that is, as due to the different roles which culture assigns to the sexes. That boys are more often delinquent than girls means absolutely nothing as regards any universal masculine or feminine trait. It is simply a reflection of the different social roles to which boys and girls are assigned by culture.

As Levy shows, in a small rich community, one-child homes may produce problem boys more frequently than larger families, while the same does not hold true for girls. In the city, boys come to the attention of the child psychiatrist more than twice as often as girls, and in a small wealthy section this rate is even higher.⁵⁵ Sender has shown that girls from poor homes show personality disturbances at first menstruation, such as hostility to society, in about half the cases, while girls from better homes show the same disturbances in only a few cases.⁵⁶

Negativism is more common among upper-class than lower-class boys, while the reverse is true among girls.⁵⁷

Thus several studies of different traits suggest that upper-class environment is especially hard on the boy's personality, and the lower-class environment on the girl. Shall we say that boys, being more natural little animals, require a rougher, cruder environment? But science is outgrowing the old theory of inborn differences between the sexes in matters of interest and attitude. A more probable interpretation of these sex differences is that upper-class culture tries to teach the boy two conflicting attitudes. It still encourages his "manliness" which to the boy means being more rough-and-ready, more adventurous, than girls. At the same time, it tries to teach the boy cleanliness, delicacy of tastes, criteria of class superiority, which require behavior of the traditionally "effeminate" kind. The boy, hence, is more exposed to inner personality conflict in that class. Yet, when the upper-class boy becomes an adult, he is probably less exposed to frustrations than his upper-class wife.

Lower-class boys are given relatively more to delinquency and less to personality problems. Lower-class girls experience both kinds of problems. They become sex delinquents and also suffer inner conflicts. As Levy says, every form of society and type of culture develops its own type of maladjustment.⁵⁸

In "Middletown," the Lynds find, business class mothers emphasize frankness, independence, and tolerance in teaching their children; working class mothers emphasize economy, good name in the world, good grades in school.⁵⁹

Luella Pressey, studying 500 students on probation in college, found that home difficulties were responsible for about a tenth of the student problems and were contributing factors in at least another three-tenths. She classified the home situations as: (1) the foreign-social-background home; (2) the inadequately financed home; (3) the lower-social-level-than-college home; (4) the high-pressure home; (5) the antagonistic-to-college home; (6) the interfering and clinging home; (7) the chronic-dissension home; (8) the favorite-child home; (9) the overly religious and narrow home; (10) the recently disrupted home.⁶⁰ Here again we see the importance of varying culture groups and cultural conflicts.

The Subject Matter of Parent-Child Conflict.—The writer asked a number of college students to state the chief causes of conflict in their families. The items in the replies were grouped as below. The conflicts appeared to be chiefly those between parents and children, or children and children. The question of who was to blame was not raised; the causes were stated quite objectively.

Tastes and attitudes which directly irritate another person, including differences between generations and between individuals.....	45
Material disorder, untidiness, etc.....	27
Tardiness, time-unreliability, schedule.....	23
Distribution and performance of household tasks.....	23
Friends.....	19
Money.....	19
Use of car.....	19
Annoyances of a mechanical kind caused by personal tastes and activities: use of equipment, hobbies, pets, noise, etc.....	19
Privileges, partiality, injustice.....	15
Meddlesomeness, prying into another's affairs, offering untimely advice.....	13
Borrowing.....	13
Poor co-operation in transmitting information, such as telephone calls.....	12
Late nights.....	12
Obedience, domination.....	9
Disagreements of parents in discipline of children.....	9

The Lynds secured questionnaire replies from 348 boys and 382 girls in "Middletown" high schools, showing the frequency of sources of disagreement with their parents. The results are shown in Table 29.

TABLE 29*

SOURCES OF DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN 348 BOYS AND 382 GIRLS AND THEIR PARENTS

Source of Disagreement	Per cent of boys who checked	Per cent of girls who checked
1. Use of the automobile.....	35.6	29.6
2. The boys or girls you choose as friends.....	25.0	27.0
3. Your spending money.....	37.4	28.8
4. Number of times you go out on school nights during the week.....	45.1	47.6
5. Grades at school.....	40.2	31.2
6. The hour you get in at night.....	45.4	42.7
7. Home duties (tending furnace, cooking, etc.).....	19.0	26.4
8. Clubs or societies you belong to.....	5.5	10.5
9. Church and Sunday School attendance.....	19.0	18.6
10. Sunday observance, aside from just going to church and Sunday School.....	14.4	13.9
11. The way you dress.....	15.8	24.6
12. Going to unchaperoned parties.....	15.2	27.5
13. Any other sources of disagreement.....	9.5	8.4
14. "Do not disagree".....	2.0	2.1

* Adapted from Robert S. and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace, 1929, p. 522.

Disciplinary Problems and Cultural Lag.—The parent-child problem of today, like the other problems of the family, may be viewed as a cultural lag. Here again the dynamic force is individuation. The forces working upon children through the school, the community, the movies, tend to differentiate their interests and attitudes. The traditional family culture, on the other hand, calls for assimilation, for

homogeneity of attitudes and values within the family group. Adjustment lies either in regaining genuine authority in substance as well as name, or in giving up the symbols, attitudes, and pretenses of authority. The giving up of family authority does not mean the giving up of all social control over children, and a régime of juvenile anarchy. There are other avenues of control. Progressive parents have already discovered these. The child, in practice, is controlled by the actual mores of the community, and through the school, his companions, and various community agencies. More boys and girls than ever before, through juvenile organizations and the schools, are conscious of *civic* duties. Again, children can be reasoned with as equals to a much greater extent than the conservative parent believes possible. One can recognize their rights to have independent wishes of their own, and at the same time demonstrate the necessity of accommodating their wishes to those of others. Mowrer has shown that whereas the interaction between married partners normally changes from accommodation to assimilation, that between parents and children, and children and children, normally makes the opposite change. That is, their goals and personalities grow more unlike rather than more similar with time, but these dissimilar personalities can nevertheless tolerate one another and live happily together.⁶¹ This technique of accommodation is even more important today than formerly.

The increased disharmony between parents and children is not an inevitable result of the decline of authority. It is due to the fact that parents, clinging stubbornly to the old methods of control, refuse to learn the new controls. They continue to demand a certain homogeneity of attitudes and values. What they want is not merely an adequate social control, but obedience to their very personal authority and compliance with their traditional code of values. The old-fashioned parent, for example, demands that adolescents shall never remain out after a certain hour at night. He complains that the youngsters are selfish to disturb his sleep by their late entry. The problem is a broader one than the parent's fear of undesirable late-night activities. He will sometimes show the same resentment if a youngster frequently goes out very early in the morning in pursuit of some activity whose "morality" is beyond reproach. The parent regards uniformity of sleeping hours as a value in itself. If, instead of demanding this like-mindedness, this uniformity of personal tastes and habits, the parent were to emphasize strict compliance with *objective* rules about noise, door-locking, lights, and so on, he might get real co-operation.

It has been said that modern liberal-democratic government is a

government of laws rather than of men. Within the family the old government of personal authority lingers on; it needs to be modified somewhat toward the liberal-legal-impersonal régime of the community.

Discipline is a means, not an end. Like death, taxes, and work, it is a necessary evil. A great obstacle to readjustment is the direct personal satisfaction which many parents derive from having someone obey them. Cultural anthropology suggests that there may be a basic sub-cultural incompatibility between authority and love. Thus the Troubriand father secures a remarkably affectionate relation with his son while the authority is in the uncle-nephew relation.

Practical Problems of Control.—While parental authority wanes, the number of specific points at which control is needed seems to increase. This is due to the increasing complexity of material culture. In a more rural culture there were less ways in which a child could disrupt the family efficiency by meddling with some household utensil. Also there were probably fewer *known* ways in which a child could get hurt or contract illness. Where control must be exercised, the more impersonal and mechanical it can be made, the less the chance for personal conflict and hostility. For small children, locked gates and doors may be better than frequent admonitions. A few consistent rules are better than many arbitrary commands. Many commands multiply the opportunities for conflict and maladjustment.

A child was in repeated conflict with her parents over the wearing of an overcoat to school. Morning after morning she protested that she was too warm, while the parents insisted that she might catch cold. Finally they all talked the matter over and the child agreed that 50 degrees Fahrenheit was a proper dividing line. It was then ruled that if the thermometer exceeded 50 degrees on a sunny morning, or 55 on a cloudy morning, she could go without the coat, and otherwise would wear it. There was a sudden end to the chronic mutual irritation at breakfast time. Instead, the child cheerfully went out and looked at the thermometer.

A common error is to be lenient with the little child and then "tighten up" with the older child, on the misleading theory that the older child can be held to greater responsibility for his acts. But the older child also has developed his wishes to a greater degree, and can less easily accept substitute satisfactions. He also can make comparisons of himself with other children, and has developed the abstract concept of justice. The progressive parent is less afraid to apply a certain mechanical, rigid training to the young child, and also more reluctant to thwart the individuality of the older child.

Insufficient attention has been given to the economic factors in child-raising. If children were put upon allowances, trained in the use of money,⁶² and when adolescent held rigidly within a financial budget, the greatest real strain upon the parents might be relieved, and the child's *personal* liberty (i. e., within the limitations of his budget) might cease to be so vexing a problem. As the Lynds point out, "At no point is parental influence more sharply challenged than by these junior-adults; so mature in their demands and wholly or partially dependent upon their parents economically but not easily submitting to their authority."⁶³

The Progressive Parent Not a Potentate or Child Idolater, But a Social Engineer.—Parent educators are now preaching that the trouble with modern children is their parents. The Rev. Lon Ray Call would rewrite the Fifth Commandment: "Honor thy sons and thy daughters and all the children of men, that their days may be blessed by what thou art able to accomplish for them and for those who shall come after them."⁶⁴ Many parents, responding to the appeals of modern psychology, are becoming "child idolaters" in place of "potentates," as Dr. John Levy recently pointed out.⁶⁴

The problem cannot be solved simply by transferring the emotional burden of guilt from the child to the adult. Today's parent is no more "to blame" than yesterday's child was "to blame." Both are the victims of maladjustments in culture. The parent must learn to satisfy the child's fundamental wishes without enslaving himself and surrendering his own efficiency as a person to the child's momentary whims. The problem calls not for the ideology of self-sacrifice but for the ideology of the engineer. This means, first, accurate observation of the situation as it actually is; second, courage to apply the treatment one judges desirable.

1. Accurate Observation and Insight.—Gertrude Laws, by a rating experiment, found that parents tend in general to *underestimate* the quality of their own treatment of their children and to judge overgenerously the responses made by the children. But there are three significant exceptions. The parent thinks himself better than he is and thinks the child worse than he is, when (1) the child's response is a source of continuous irritation to the parent, (2) higher standards are expected by the parents than by observers, (3) the response is one in which the child is apt to make a better showing outside the family.⁶⁵

If the parent needs a little Dutch-uncle treatment, here is an ex-

*R. L. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace, 1929, p. 142.

hortation which might be more helpful than many of the conventional type.

"Keep your eye on the road." The "road," in parent-child relations, is the relation itself. It is not the objective details of your own behavior nor of the child's behavior. "Should I kiss the baby or not?" or "Was this really a lie that Johnny told me?" are typical of the questions that preoccupy many parents. Perhaps you should not kiss one baby but should kiss another. A person driving a car around a corner does not think: "How far shall I turn this wheel?" The answer would differ for different kinds of cars and steering wheels. He keeps his eye on the road and guides himself by the *results* of his movements. The movement itself becomes almost unconscious. Learn, above all, to *observe* how each act of yours affects the child. Observe the child's reactions. It has been said that the wise parent is one who does not go to extremes, but chooses the happy mean, say between severity and leniency. In the long run this is true, but it is a misleading guide in an immediate situation. What *seems* an extreme measure to you at the moment may actually not be extreme enough, and again what seems a happy mean may be a very extreme measure in relation to the situation at hand. The best guide is observation of the results of your treatment. A car is kept in the road by occasionally extreme pulls to the right or left. The control of a personal relationship is not a prescribed ritual; it is steering. Learn to steer!

Don't sacrifice your avenues of observation for the sake of immediate control. Know what is happening to your child even if it means giving him immunity from punishment for certain acts. Don't appear shocked or resentful at *information* he brings you, or you may never receive such information again. Never place a child in a position where he feels that he is punished for telling the truth. Your statement of why he is punished will not change the situation as it appears to him. Don't be an ostrich!

2. COURAGEOUS TREATMENT.—This may be expressed in another sermonette.

Do you really give a fair trial to a theoretically reasonable solution before discarding it? A child, for example, had acquired the habit of being rocked to sleep at night through a prolonged illness. Now that she was well, how could the mother break this habit? The mother said she *knew* the proper treatment in theory, namely, to let the child cry herself to sleep, but that it was impractical for it had been tried and failed. This mother was very sensitive to her child's crying and could not endure it long. An adviser, however, encouraged the mother to give the theoretical remedy a fair trial, with the aid of a clock. On the first night of the trial the child cried 45 minutes. On the second night she cried 30 minutes. On the third, 15 minutes. On the fourth night she went to sleep without crying. The *mother* had been adjusted as well as the child.

But if, after a fair trial, a method fails to work, then it should not be repeated to the point of injuring the relationship with the child. Try another method!

The Future of the Parent-Child Relation.—Broadly speaking, there are three alternative directions in which the parent-child relation may move: a return to authority, a further decline of authority with increased affection and comradeship, and a decline in both authority and affection through the further transfer of parental functions to community agencies. It should be noted, however, that there can be considerable further transfer of economic and educational functions to non-family agencies without loss of affection. Indeed, many sociologists believe not only that there is more affection between parents and children today than a generation ago, but even that there will be still more in the future. Dr. Plant, from his intimate psychiatric knowledge of suburban families, thinks that there will be greater real affection in the future although the symbols may be disappearing.⁶⁶ There is probably, however, a lower limit to the time parents and children actually spend in each other's presence, below which even affection itself must become less intense. That limit is much lower than popularly believed, but it would probably be transgressed by the ideal attributed to Communism (not actual practice in Russia today).

Plant remarks that the clinic patient today "quite as shamefacedly 'admits' loving his parents and depending upon them as did he, one hundred years ago, 'admit' his abhorrence of his family group."⁶⁷

The alternative solutions of the parent-child problem are less clear-cut than those of the marital or economic problems. The problem is even more one of individual choice rather than of general social decisions. Yet it seems very probable that the solution will be mostly of the second variety, less authority and more affection. As we shall see in the final chapter, a return to authority is unlikely unless we have a movement away from liberalism and individualism in the general culture. Not every Fascist movement, however, promises the return of family authority; some might continue the trend toward state control of children.

On the other hand, a complete separation of children from their parents seems very improbable. John B. Watson gives us an extreme and challenging statement of the view that the home and the parent-child relation are doomed to disappear. He dreams of well-run nurseries, "institutions which smack not at all of the 'orphan asylum' or hospital for children, but institutions which will thrill our imaginations the way Aladdin's palace thrilled all beholders." "I would gamble my

all, too," he says, "that after three months in our nursery no youngster will want to go home even for a week-end."⁶⁸

The present writer believes that the giving up of affection between generations, and specifically, between a child and the mother who gives him biological birth, and the man who is more or less constantly associated with that mother, transgresses subcultural limits. It takes away one of the deepest of human satisfactions and offers no compensations except what could be gained by other adjustments. The limits of cultural variation are wide, but here is a pattern which the majority of mankind will never accept.

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CHAPTER XVII

EDUCATION AND INDIVIDUAL TREATMENT

Education and Treatment as a Solution of Family Problems.—The fourth major solution of the problem of love relationships (see p. 312) consists in education and treatment. Education, to be sure, is the universal remedy offered for all social problems. It seems to furnish a convenient escape for those unwilling to commit themselves to any specific remedy. When we get to the point of recommending education, our audience knows that our speech is drawing to its close. The real thinking is over, it is evaporating into the vague generalities in which everyone will agree.

But there is a more specific meaning in this proposal. It is that a large proportion of unsuccessful marriages, for which the only solutions the partners can see are divorce or supplementary love relations, could actually be successful monogamous relations under skilful treatment. Or, if it is too late now to mend them, yet these same matings could have been successful if proper marital education had been given at an earlier date. No one knows what proportion of our present failures could thus be prevented; it seems clear that the proportion is sufficient to justify much greater effort in this direction.

In this connection we shall consider also the education and treatment needed by the parent-child relation. Similar principles are involved. In the last three chapters we have already discussed or implied many of the principles of treatment of interpersonal relationships. In the present chapter we shall merely bring these principles together and discuss agencies and the practical procedure.

Education is a mass procedure. It is the communication of facts, ideas, and attitudes to a number of persons simultaneously through writing, public speaking, or classroom discussion. When information is given to a single individual according to his particular needs, the process is better described as consultation or case work.

Home Economics Education.—Broadly speaking, all education is in greater or less degree a preparation for family life, as it is for vocational life, community life, and life in general. There are, however, three special fields of subject matter of peculiar importance to family

relationships, and there is a trend toward increased emphasis upon these fields. One field is the study and practice of the material tasks of the household. There is a growing recognition of the need of *boys* for certain phases of this training, and of changes needed in the traditional household training for girls (see Chapter X). Groves says that the most important development in the American family situation in 1931 was in the field of home economics teaching in public schools and colleges.¹

Sex Education.—A second special field is that of sex education. Three stages are discernible in its history. In its early stage sex education aimed merely to bolster up the existing sex mores by teaching the dangers of illicit intercourse and the advantages of complete continence until marriage. The fears implanted by cultural sentiment were given corroboration through some factual instruction. In the second stage efforts shifted in the direction of removing pathological fears, but without condoning sex violations. It came to be realized that youth suffered a great deal from unreasonable fears about sex. Many sexologists believe that more harm is done, for example, by fears of the consequences of masturbation, than by the practice itself. We are now entering a third stage, in which emphasis is shifting toward the positive values of sex. "Behave yourself and don't worry about sex" is no longer the final synthesis of the instruction. To arrive at marriage physically and mentally healthy is not the final achievement. It is only the beginning. This third stage of sex education seeks to present two new kinds of practical knowledge: how to obtain genuinely safe contraception, and how to make sex experience fully satisfying to both partners. The latter objective is the most recent to be recognized, but it may gain the more rapid headway because it may be so stated as to evade the still lingering taboo upon contraception.

How Far Can Sex Education Be a Mass Procedure?—In recent years a number of books have appeared dealing with the techniques of physical love-making and of contraception.² For the present, the most practical avenues of reliable sex instruction are the book and the private interview with a physician, clinical expert, or some other adequately informed adviser. There is some oral instruction in schools and colleges, but this must be very general, academic, and impersonal, and it dare not answer many of the specific questions which will inevitably arise in the minds of its hearers.

Many persons rationalize that sex information is inherently unfit for broadcasting. They point out that individual needs differ, and that information needed by one might be dangerous to another. Yet we do

not demand that the chemistry instructor teach the subjects of explosives and poisons to individuals in private, because such knowledge might be dangerous in the hands of some individuals. In the last analysis, it is impossible to keep any department of human knowledge in a series of closed books, to be opened selectively for various ages and classes of persons. The more practical details of sexual instruction may seem to be appropriately reserved for persons who are married or about to be married. Yet if it is found that some of these facts are disseminated widely through uncontrolled and unreliable private conversation, it might be better to communicate them "prematurely" through authoritative channels. When this policy, however, is blocked by taboos, the best solution is perhaps to teach to the mass the attitude of seeking expert advice individually when problems arise. Every high school student could at least learn what are the authoritative sources of information. Some physicians are now giving premarital physical examinations and sexual counsel. These services could be widely extended if their existence were made generally known.

How Will Sex Education Affect Marriage?—Whether modern sex education will increase or reduce the volume of extra-marital sex relations we do not know. It will certainly make them less necessary as an escape from marital dissatisfaction. It may possibly cause them to be sought somewhat more, by a minority of persons, for the sake of curiosity or adventure. At the same time, it will tend to prevent premature experimentation by other young persons, by dispelling unreasonable fears of sexual inadequacy. Whatever effect it has upon the quantity of illicit behavior it will render it less devastating to marriage. If sex education seems to place marriage upon a more frankly sexual basis, it is also true that it places marriage in a better position to win in any sexual competition, for where the majority of persons are sexually well trained, repeated experience with the same partner has a large advantage over irregular relationships.

Sex education will not solve all the problems of marriage. Its value, however, is probably greater than generally realized. In Popenoe's experience at the Los Angeles Institute of Family Relations, practically all cases are said to include a sex difficulty; and the view is expressed that where perfect sex adjustment exists, there is seldom likely to be any serious marital disharmony. This does not tell us, however, how often sexual difficulties exist from the beginning of marriage, and how often they appear later as the result of psychological tensions. A fully satisfying sex life tends to overcome the tensions which arise from non-sexual causes. Those tensions may continue to exist, but being

periodically relieved by nature's supreme physiological mechanism of nervous release, they become chronic ailments which can be tolerated, and not acute ailments which get progressively worse and lead to a marital break.

Early Sex Education as Emotional Preparation.—The above comments are concerned with the sexual instruction which is a more or less specific preparation for marriage and which should normally be given to the adolescent or young adult. Quite a different problem is that of teaching younger children the basic facts about sex differences and reproduction. This knowledge, it is now agreed by most sex educators, should be given at an age much earlier than our traditional culture has favored. The purpose of this early sex education is not technical, but is rather emotional preparation for adult life. Many investigations have shown that women who received this basic sex information before six are better adjusted sexually than those who received the information at twelve or later. The reason for this lies not in any practical need for such information before twelve, but in the emotional shock which is likely to occur when the information is belated. The late-informed child has spent several years in near proximity to a closed book about whose contents he has had more or less curiosity. During this period of ignorance he has developed certain personal attitudes and ideas concerning these contents, often of a more or less esthetic sort. When the book is finally opened, there is a great discrepancy between the reality and the imaginary picture he has built up. Disgust or shock often results, and in many, especially women, there follows a life-long antipathy to sex, predisposing toward non-marriage or toward unhappy marriage. These unhealthy attitudes are fostered, moreover, by the self-consciousness and embarrassment of the parents in talking about sex.

Helen Witmer describes an experiment conducted by the Women's Co-operative Alliance of Minneapolis in the *education of parents to give sex education to their children*.³ This organization follows the sex educational program of Dr. Maurice Bigelow and Dr. T. W. Galloway,⁴ which is typical of the "modern" policy now advocated by many educators. This policy is as follows:

1. Sex education should be given at home by *both* parents as a natural, casual part of the "home drama."
2. It should start at the beginning of the child's life through training in habits of cleanliness and in the use of the proper sex vocabulary.
3. Questions should be answered truthfully as they arise.
4. Although any item of information should not be given before it can be comprehended, yet information should *precede* somewhat the asking of

questions, should *anticipate* questions, so that there is never any accumulated feeling of great curiosity about sex.

5. Parents should make use of the incidents of everyday life in giving sex instruction.

6. The first question as to where babies come from should be answered by "they come from the joining of a father and mother cell in the mother's body." Comparison with the flowers and the birds, and teaching that "God lets a little seed grow under the mother's heart," are regarded as inferior methods. To say the babies come from the hospital or from fairyland, or to say that "you are not old enough to understand, and I will tell you when you are old enough," are utterly disapproved by this modern policy.

7. The best way to teach the child the anatomical difference between the sexes is to let him, quite casually, see his parents undressed while bathing, etc. To approve his seeing other children undressed is somewhat less desirable, the use of pictures and statues still less so, and the seeing of other children undressed without the parents' approval is the worst method.

8. Seminal emissions and menstruation should be explained to the child of the appropriate sex *before the event first occurs*, and by the parent.

The organization, making home visits to a number of mothers, invited them to attend a course on sex education in which this program was presented. Careful measurement of the mother's opinions before and after the course showed that the course did not significantly change their opinions as to the desirable policies of sex instruction of children, although it did contribute to their factual information. But those mothers who completed the course were definitely more progressive to begin with in their opinions than were those who dropped out of the course without completing it. The main effect of the course thus seemed to be to select out for instruction those who already held the opinions which the course taught.

The best practical book for parents on this question which has yet come to the writer's attention is the Groves' *Sex in Childhood*.⁵

Education for Interpersonal Relationships.—The third special field of education for family life is that of practical social psychology, or the art of getting along with people in general. This applies to both the marital and the parent-child relation. While family case work gives some of this kind of instruction to individuals, mass education in this field is much less developed than in the other two fields. The field is well adapted to mass instruction and is not limited by taboos as is the field of sex education. It is surprising that it is not better developed.

Of course much that goes by the name of "moral education," "religious education," and "education for citizenship" performs this function. Most of this traditional education is colored by the moralistic

ideology which classifies persons or motives as "good" and "bad." This interferes with the genuine understanding of one's fellows and one's adjustment to them. It may be, after all, a taboo which is hindering the development of the art of getting along with people, but this taboo works in a very subtle and indirect manner. It is the taboo against seeming to "condone" or "excuse" behavior which is regarded as morally wrong. Indeed, the person who condones certain kinds of behavior is often regarded as more dangerous and more hopeless than the one who practices them. Again, the person who merely "explains" another's bad behavior with complete intellectual honesty is often accused of condoning, tolerating, and encouraging that behavior.

Education in the art of getting along with people needs to be based upon two basic patterns of thought: first is recognition of the primary importance of the wishes of individuals, and of pathological behavior as the result of frustration of wishes; second is the viewing of interpersonal conflict as an interactional (i. e., super-personal) process, which cannot be understood or controlled merely by knowing the personalities involved and determining who is at "fault."

Agencies of Mass Education for Family Life.—In colleges and universities several courses are being given which deal specifically with the problems of marriage and the family. One of the most notable of these pioneer courses is one given by Professor Ernest R. Groves at the University of North Carolina. The interest among college students and administrations is spreading.

High schools are giving courses in child care. The work of the public schools is more largely confined to instruction in the material phases of family life, and this work has been greatly extended in recent years.

Churches are moving toward a more positive policy in education for family life. Instead of merely attacking the factors which are injurious to the family, many are giving lectures and courses in the art of family-making.

The parent education movement is a leading avenue of mass education for family life. This movement operates through nursery schools, parent-teacher associations, and other agencies. The movement is a good example of a new social invention deliberately designed to meet a new social problem created by cultural lags. When parental authority was unquestioned and parent-child relations fairly uniform throughout society, there was relatively little need for a special parent education. With the waning of parental authority, the increasing control of the school over the child, the conflicts between the ideology taught in the home and that taught in the school or acquired from juvenile

companions, a new social gap has been erected. To bridge this gap parent education was designed.

Individual Treatment.—Mass education, however, will never be enough. It needs to be supplemented by individual treatment or case work. This treatment has long been provided, according to their special points of view, by clergymen and physicians. The Catholic clergy, through confessional, make family guidance a regular part of their service to their parishioners. The Protestant clergy have performed this function in a less formal and authoritative manner, and some of them, notably Dr. Harry Emerson Fosdick, have recognized the value of the confessional and established a similar procedure. Teachers, social workers of various kinds, lawyers, and individuals in a non-professional capacity have helped in the performance of this important social function of case treatment.

More recently have arisen certain agencies devoting their whole time to the performance of family guidance or closely related functions. Four important types of such agencies may be mentioned here: domestic relations courts, family welfare societies, psychiatric child guidance clinics, and marriage clinics. These deal, to a greater or less extent, with the whole problem of a family; there are in addition agencies limited to special phases of family problems, such as birth control clinics, legal aid bureaus, child-placing agencies, and medical social service agencies.

Family Courts.—Courts of domestic relations, or family courts, have been established in several cities. This innovation began in 1910 in Buffalo and in New York City, where the domestic relations courts were established mainly for desertion and non-support cases but did not treat juvenile delinquency. This is the general practice in New York, Massachusetts, and Illinois. On the other hand, in New Jersey and Virginia family courts were established by adding to the juvenile courts certain powers to deal with adults. Offenses which contribute to the delinquency of children, or which are committed by one member of a family against another, are dealt with by this expanded juvenile court and may be treated by the flexible procedure used in dealing with juvenile delinquents. The system differs greatly among the several states and cities. In some cities special family powers are given to the regular city court without setting up a separate family court. In 1932, according to Bridgman, there were some 50 courts in the United States having jurisdiction solely over domestic relations problems or over juvenile and domestic problems combined.⁶ These are ex-

clusive of divorce courts, which are usually the regular county or circuit courts dealing with civil and criminal matters in general.

A few of the family courts employ trained social workers, and some of their judges and social workers effect family adjustments without using legal compulsion. The Domestic Relations Courts of Chicago, of Cincinnati, and of Dayton, Ohio, are especially notable. In general these specialized family courts do not have divorce powers. They are popularly regarded as desertion courts and as the resort of the working class. It is alleged that the judge who is trained to deal with such cases is not the same man who should adjudicate divorce. Divorce is a procedure associated with a somewhat higher social level, and is legally a *right* rather than a matter for judicial discretion. The function of the divorce judge is to decide whether the plaintiff has or has not a right to divorce, under rigid rules of law, and not according to equitable judgment or discretion. A few divorce courts employ investigators to discover facts, but none employ social workers. The flexible procedure used in the family courts, if following careful investigation by social workers, would be a more humane method of deciding divorce cases than is the present method. Our legal system, however, resists such a change.

Although domestic relations courts accomplish good in some instances, in general any method involving court action with its compulsory measures does little to rehabilitate family life.

Juvenile courts, not covering domestic relations, began in 1899 and are now practically universal throughout the United States.

Family Welfare Societies.—Family welfare societies, formerly known as "Associated Charities" and by other titles, were designed for the material relief of destitute families. Their funds are obtained by voluntary contributions, and they supplement the work of tax-supported government relief agencies. Their function has been changing from one of pure relief to one of economic rehabilitation through social adjustment. Recently they have tended to leave to government the families which need relief only, and to concentrate their work upon families whose economic problem is complicated by personality and interaction problems. Leaving aside the great mass unemployment of depression years, many cases of family poverty are due to personal maladjustments which express themselves in desertion, non-support, the personal inability of the breadwinner to hold a job, or in the unwise use of money and time by the home-maker. Sometimes a marital conflict is the cause of the economic dependency. When these personality difficulties are remedied, the family is able to maintain itself without

charity. The family welfare agency is becoming increasingly a socio-psychiatric agency, and is using more and more psychiatry in its case work.

Child Guidance Agencies.—Child guidance clinics serve primarily the families whose children have "personality" or emotional problems. Many delinquents also are treated, although the bulk of these are handled by juvenile courts without special psychiatric study. Child guidance clinics began in 1909 with the work of Dr. William Healy with delinquents in Chicago. In 1932, 674 such clinics were listed in a directory.⁷ Harper says that probably 40 to 50 of every 1000 elementary school children are seriously maladjusted and may become delinquents or problems in other ways. Possibly three-fourths of these, he thinks, can be handled by visiting teachers; the other one-fourth require the clinic.⁸ Much child guidance work is done by visiting teachers connected with school systems, and some is done by probation officers and juvenile court judges. The clinics themselves get their cases from the schools, courts, parents, and other social agencies. Their work often involves making adjustments among the parents and other family members.

Habit clinics deal mainly with pre-school children, whose problems consist more largely of physical habits.

Child guidance clinics, whose function is personality adjustment, must be distinguished from the child-placing agencies known as "child welfare societies," "children's service bureaus," etc., whose function is to initiate court action or to find foster homes in behalf of dependent or neglected children.

Marriage Clinics.—The newest and most significant type of agency for dealing with family problems is the marriage clinic or family consultation center. Such an agency deals with the personal marriage relationship as a whole problem, in all its aspects, as it can do since the seeking of advice is voluntary and there is no compulsory decision to be rendered. These clinics have been established by universities, churches, courts, and several kinds of social agencies. They are so far experimental, and there is no uniformity in their organization and procedure. Robert Foster lists nine outstanding clinics in the United States.⁹

Family Consultation Center. Institute of Child Development, Teachers College, Columbia University, New York.

Court of Domestic Relations. Dayton, Ohio. Elinor Hixenbaugh, Consultant.

Merrill-Palmer Advisory Service for College Women. 71 East Perry Avenue, Detroit, Michigan.

Institute of Family Relations. 304 Consolidated Building, Corner 6th and Hill Streets, Los Angeles, California. Paul Popenoe, Director.

Marriage Consultation Service. Old Stone Church, Cleveland, Ohio. Mrs. Elgin Sherk.

Detroit Homemakers Advisory Bureau. Young Women's Christian Association, Detroit, Michigan. Dr. Edith Hale Swift, Consultant.

Washington Life Adjustment Center. 1420 Columbia Road, Washington, D. C.

Committee on Marriage and the Home. Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, 105 East 22nd Street, New York. L. Foster Wood, Secretary.

Illinois Social Hygiene League. 9 East Huron Street, Chicago, Illinois. Rachelle S. Yarros, Executive Secretary.*

The most comprehensive service rendered by a single agency in the United States seems to be that rendered by Dr. Popenoe's Institute of Family Relations in Los Angeles. Besides its marriage counseling, this Institute now has the functions of making recommendations in child adoptions, helping unmarried mothers, and handling many juvenile delinquents. It helps persons to find jobs and to secure medical or psychiatric service.

American marriage clinics give advice as to sexual relations in marriage, but they are under considerable restraint as to contraceptive information. This important function is therefore left to completely separate agencies, the birth control clinics, and to private physicians. A few private physicians give the valuable combination service of contraceptive and psychiatric advice.

In Germany family consultation service was given an official status by a regulation in 1924. The German clinics have been freer than the American to treat the problem as a whole. Some have incorporated contraceptive service and are willing to give specific help toward getting divorce where they regard that as desirable. They are consulted also by persons desiring advice as to choice of mate, courtship, vocational choice, love affairs, and parent-child relations.^{10†} There has been a large development of family consultation centers in Europe, but in many countries they have emphasized chiefly the medical aspects. Over 200 were in operation in Europe in 1931.

* Robert G. Foster, A national survey of family consultation centers, *Jour. Soc. Hygiene*, 19: 355-366, 1933. Quoted by permission of the *Journal of Social Hygiene*.

† It is reported that this work has been considerably limited by the new National Socialist policy.

The Professions and Family Counsel.—Five professions contribute more or less to the work of family adjustment: the ministry, law, education, medicine, and social work. Of these the first three are more or less cramped in style by culture-patterns and taboos. It is to medicine and social work that we must look mainly for adequate solutions of individual problems. The physician is peculiarly the servant of modern individualism and liberalism. He has no other gods before the welfare of the individual he is treating. In several forms of social work the central objective is the welfare of the interpersonal relationship, and we have seen that concentration on this aim may be the best approach to individual welfare.

Physicians and social workers, of course, must necessarily respect the culture patterns of the community and group in which the patient lives. No proposed solution is a solution if it obviously and directly violates those patterns. A psychiatrist in South Carolina or in a predominantly Roman Catholic community might not advise divorce although he might conceivably do so in a similar case in California. Still the patient is more likely to have confidence in an adviser who is independent of any great institution with cultural values to defend. Having no cultural axe to grind, the physician and some kinds of social workers may give their prime loyalty to human beings as *individuals*. It is seldom that a patient can or will "tell everything" to his clergyman, his lawyer, or his college dean. He will more often tell everything to a physician or psychiatrist. The Hippocratic oath is the Magna Charta of humane case treatment. To be sure, the members of other professions can generally be trusted to respect personal confidences given as such, but their institutional duties and conscience may make it impossible for them to help many individuals in the only way they can be helped. In social work also, the aim of service to the individual family, of adjustment in the individual case, is gaining over the aim of protecting cultural norms. Social workers are still not sufficiently trusted by many classes of persons because it is believed they are in league with the agencies of compulsion.

The educator, like the minister and the lawyer, must necessarily observe a certain loyalty to an institution. It is hopeless, therefore, to expect a school executive to perform the function of individual guidance with the completeness and singleness of purpose which some difficult cases require if they are to be helped. The function of enforcing general laws, rules, or mores cannot be joined in the same person with the function of adequate treatment of maladjusted individuals. This might not be true in a rigid homogeneous culture (see Chapter XVIII),

or in a 100 per cent liberal culture, but is true in partly liberal cultures such as ours.

The Techniques of Case Treatment: Socio-Analysis.—The Mowrers have described some actual techniques for the treatment of domestic discord.¹¹ Their method begins with a thorough socio-analysis. This includes a study of premarital environment, parental family, culture-patterns, social interaction of the couple, factors in their conflict, and their rationalizations. This may be distinguished from psycho-analysis and other common psychiatric methods in that it places more emphasis upon the interpersonal relationships involved and less upon the detailed explanation of the individual's motives. The question as to which method is better has little practical bearing at present; more often the real question is which method is actually *possible* in the given situation and with the given equipment. A physician practicing individual psychiatry has no time to go about interviewing relatives, employers, and so on; practically his job is to cure by working directly upon the attitude of the individual who comes into his office. Having learned to do this as well as can be done, his natural course is to apply this method to as many patients as possible. On the other hand, the social worker both by training and by office arrangements is equipped to deal with persons other than the client in whom the problem centers. She interviews more individuals for each case presented. She learns the symptoms of faulty personal relationships and acquires a technique of dealing with them.

Helen Myrick describes an illustrative case in which a wife needed a rest cure. There was no difficulty in deciding what treatment this individual needed; the problem was to treat the social situation so as to enable the individual to get the treatment. Financially the rest treatment was easily arranged; but the wife refused to leave home because she believed that her husband was unfaithful and was trying to get her out of the way. When the husband talked over the telephone with a woman relative concerning his wife's welfare the wife accused him of arranging a rendezvous. The social worker, studying the situation through interviews with several persons, diagnosed it as a case of paranoid trend in the wife, based partly upon a former infidelity of the husband, and decided that he could now be trusted to put his wife's welfare first. She arranged a joint interview with the couple, at which, with the husband's help, she disarmed the wife's suspicions, and persuaded her to go immediately to a convalescent home, with results satisfactory in every way.¹²

Mrs. Mowrer treated 20 cases of marital discord through careful socio-analysis and adjusted 60 per cent successfully. By comparison,

she notes that among 569 similar types of cases handled by two leading family welfare organizations in Chicago, only 6 per cent were successfully adjusted.¹⁸

The Failure of the Older Common-Sense Techniques.—The simpler treatments which were used, and with little success, by these busy agencies, included: taking case to the Court of Domestic Relations, securing physical or psychiatric examination, holding joint conference, persuasion, and the "ordering-and-forbidding" technique.

The joint conference technique, often used in the past, brings the discordant couple into the office together and attempts to solve the problem by a supposedly impartial hearing of both sides as in a court room. This method, as Mrs. Mowrer points out, is based upon a false assumption. The theory was that a sense of justice was obtained through the fact that each partner could hear and reply to everything which was said against him. Actually such a joint hearing becomes not a revelation of truth, but a stage for the reopening of the conflict, which may be further embittered by the shame of exhibiting it to a third person.

The modern policy is separate interviews with the discordant mates. The sense of fairness can be obtained through the adviser's showing a sympathetic, non-moralizing, non-coercing attitude toward each party separately; the flames of conflict are not fanned by the direct hearing of mutual accusations. The open debate pattern may often be suitable for making decisions where the important objective is the decision itself and not the relationship between the antagonists. In family conflicts it is the relationship itself which is important; an objectively just decision is of secondary value, even if it is definable, as it usually is not (pp. 487 ff.). Indeed it could often be said quite appropriately to the partners: "Do you want justice or do you want reconciliation, peace, and love?" Moreover, even in most legal, non-family issues, a *better* decision could probably be rendered by a judge who investigated through private interviews than by one who merely hears the contradictory debate of the litigants in open court.

The persuasion technique includes getting the parties to make pledges, the appeal to fear, the appeal to love of the children. The ordering-and-forbidding technique includes implicit coercions, the prestige mechanism (using the worker's own prestige, or appeal to the "better self" of the client), and declaring to the clients that their conflict is a trivial one.

All these methods, so simple and natural from the common-sense point of view, are comparatively useless. Indeed, there is hardly any

more conspicuous failure of common sense than the oft-repeated failure to produce a change in someone's attitude by merely appealing to his "better self" or telling him that he has nothing to complain about when he is in fact complaining. In the emotional subtleties of human relations, common sense, to use the celebrated words of Dickens' Mr. Bumble, is, like the law, "a ass—a idiot."

Is there a Magic Secret of Interpersonal Adjustment?—From many strands of evidence too numerous to state here, the author suspects that there is one trait which is more or less a master key to all the personality factors which favor marital adjustment. This suspected key is primarily intellectual. It is favored but not guaranteed by general intelligence and by a generalized attitude of compassion for suffering. Essentially this "magic secret" is an intellectual emancipation from the whole ideology of "blame," this being replaced by a habit of viewing oneself, one's family, and all human beings from a socio-psychiatric point of view. This truly "understanding" person will not necessarily be able to tolerate anything and everything that his spouse might do. His viewpoint will not always prevent his becoming angry at the *act* of another person, but it will prevent his becoming additionally angry at the other's *motive*, for the person with the socio-psychiatric viewpoint has empathy for others' motives, and with this emotional understanding he cannot "blame."

This viewpoint may be acquired through education in cultural sociology and psychiatry. But perhaps the fact that one is obliged to acquire this viewpoint through special education is not universal, but is a special burden of our Euro-American culture. The ideology of blame is merely our age-old ideology of "sin" in a more generalized and non-theological form. It is not subcultural or universal. In Samoa, says Margaret Mead, the terms for "good" and "bad" are applied to human behavior as an objective phenomenon only. The motives or "character" which lie behind behavior are not described as "good" and "bad," but rather as "easy" or "difficult."¹⁴ A child may behave badly, but this is not from bad motives but from some inner difficulty of mind. This is not to say that Samoans acquire through simple folk-teaching the same knowledge of psychology that we acquire through higher education. It is merely to second Miss Mead's suggestion that they may be free from one intellectual burden with which we are handicapped when we begin the study of psychology. Our traditional classification of human motives, so obstructive to tolerance, forgiveness, and mutual understanding, may be merely the result of an "historical accident."

In place of the "blame" ideology, we need to apply the concept of

illness. Many marital shipwrecks would be prevented if persons learned to look upon their maladjusted or misbehaving partners not as "bad" or "wicked," but as mentally sick. As the old fallacious distinction between sane and insane breaks down, and people become less afraid of the bugbear of "abnormality," this new ideology will be easier to accept. This will not cure all conflicts directly, because one may have an uncontrollable emotional antagonism to some trait of his spouse even though he intellectually accepts it as illness rather than wickedness. But in that case something may be done with the other partner also, by convincing him that his spouse's antagonism is emotional and not due to ignorance or malice. Intellectual understanding is not a sure cure for all marital problems, but among all *general* remedies known to us today, it offers the greatest hope.

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PART VI
THE CULTURAL FUTURE

CHAPTER XVIII
THE FUTURE OF THE FAMILY SYSTEM

Summary: Culture Change in the Family.—Let us now draw together the main threads of our discourse. We have seen the modern family system as a dynamic, changing pattern. We have seen a picture somewhat as follows.

The Euro-American family pattern is not essentially richer or more complex than those of primitive peoples. There is no "grand scheme" of family evolution passing through successive stages to some kind of final perfection. Except in very limited respects, the study of the family in history and among backward peoples does not show us *the direction* in which we always moved and must continue to move; it does, however, show the possible *range* of variation, and it illuminates the *processes* by which change takes place. It is mainly in material culture, the economic system, and science, that the content of modern culture differs characteristically from all primitive cultures.

Two major groups of cultural changes have been taking place during the last hundred years. First are the mechanical inventions, whose general social effect is increased machinery, urbanization, and higher material standards of living. Second are the discoveries in the biological and psychological realms, which have replaced the older theology with a scientific ideology of Man and the Cosmos, and have led toward an unprecedented individuation of the personality and life-patterns. All these changes have affected the family system. The usual tendency is to overemphasize the total importance of the mechanical and economic changes and to underemphasize the effects of biology, psychology, and *general scientific ideology*.

These changes, all together, have greatly shifted the roles of men and women and of adults and children. The family has become less an economic unit and has lost many of its processing functions. The school has removed also some educational functions from the home, but its tremendous growth is due largely to the addition of *new* educational functions. The family retains its functions of reproduction and response satisfaction, but is sub-

jected to increasing and more highly individuated demands for these love satisfactions. The family is becoming increasingly an agency for both adult heterosexual love and parent-child love. The increase of the latter function is entirely consonant with the reduced rate of reproduction.

This transvaluation of the family away from economic functions and from rapid biological reproduction toward personal response functions, has led to an apparent instability in family life. This instability is better pictured as an increased mobility of individuals, or as a making, breaking, and remaking of particular family units, rather than as a general disorganization of the family system as such. Higher divorce rates have been accompanied by remarriage and by a general decrease in the percentage of persons who are single.

The apparent increase in "free love" reflects: (1) the decline of the patriarchal double standard with its rigid classification of women, and (2) a general raising of the social valuation of love between the sexes. Increased free love may be regarded largely as a by-product of individualized tastes and increasing demand for perfection in love experience, whose norm continues to be monogamous marriage. Departures from this norm are less concealed, more tolerated, partly as a result of a new psychiatric humanitarianism stimulated by Freud; but the belief in the norm itself continues undiminished.

Summary: Problems of the Family.—Out of the differential rates of change among these various factors, cultural lags have arisen, presenting new social problems. The future of the family system can be more intelligently discussed by studying these lags and their possible adjustments than by the simple projection of past trends into the future. Suffering among any considerable class of individuals tends to force change in some direction calculated to relieve this suffering. This is probably more true than ever before because science has weakened the valuation of cultural forms for their own sake and has emancipated the personal wish-life of the individual.

The major problems which have thus arisen in the modern family system may be said to be: (1) the problem of achieving a more perfect and universal control of reproduction; (2) the problem of lessening the economic burden of child-rearing, and the wish frustration involved in modern home-making, especially among those classes whose more rapid reproduction is biologically desirable; (3) the problem of improving the personal love relationship of marriage; (4) the problem of adjusting the parent-child relationship. This fourth problem may be resolved into problems (2) and (3); it is in part a phase of the general economic problem of the family, in part a problem of personal relationships similar to those found in the marital relation.

The solution of these problems involves certain choices or alternatives. No one problem is limited to a single solution. To some problems there seem to be two or more alternative solutions almost opposite in character. In-

telligent, far-sighted readjustment is hindered by cultural sentiments, or "prejudices," which offer a stout resistance to changes in some directions though not to other changes. These sentimental resistances always rationalize themselves as a concern for the ultimate good of mankind; but yet the intensity of our present feeling about a given change furnishes no certain indication of its ultimate desirability or possibility. Neither can we be sure that *all* present cultural sentiments will eventually disappear; some in fact may be destined to grow stronger. It is in the judging of the ultimate durability of various sentiments that a knowledge of other cultures is most valuable.

Let us review the major alternatives in the solution of the major problems.

(1) In solving the problem of reproduction control we have the possibilities of abortion, contraception, sterilization, infanticide, increased sexual abstinence, various unnatural sex habits which would not cause impregnation, and, finally, the *laissez-faire* alternative of allowing population to grow until it reaches its world limit and brings a new era of famine and pestilence. Unless there is a reversal of the trend now moving toward individuation and humanitarianism, and a new era of colossal warfare, pestilence, and catastrophe, it would seem that contraception will be the major solution in the future. Contraception has already gone so far in the Western world that the problem of overpopulation there is fast disappearing; the main problem now is a humane and eugenic distribution of birth control among classes and individuals. The under-reproduction of the more intelligent classes presents a new problem which is really a phase of the economic problem to follow.

(2) In solving the economic problems of the family there would seem to be three major alternatives. These are not altogether mutually exclusive, and they do not apply equally to the various phases of the problem. But, roughly, we may have: (a) a return of many former economic functions (agricultural and manufacturing) to the household or to community groups of households, relieving the dependence of the family upon the central economic system, providing interesting and productive work for women in or near their own homes, and employing some of the time of the children; (b) a greater specialization of labor among women, with fewer married women devoting themselves exclusively to the direct service of their own families, with more communalization of child-care, food preparation, and other domestic functions, but without re-domestication of processing functions as contemplated by the first alternative; (c) a continuance of the single-family household, with greater mechanical efficiency, while the wife becomes more administrative and less specialized in her duties, rendering a greater variety of services to her husband (also children), and helping to economize his time and maximize his financial earning power. This third solution especially would seem to require as a corollary some kind of family subsidy or increased economic security which would enable the biologically

desirable families to hire more domestic service, secure adequate housing, and raise larger numbers of children.

The choice would seem to depend largely on what happens in the economic system and in mechanical invention. But it also depends upon the limitations of the average human personality in adjusting itself to various patterns of work. It is doubtful, as we noted in Chapter X, that many persons could adequately play the role to which the married woman seems destined if the evolution of the single-family household proceeds to its logical extreme. These limitations are subcultural, and we do not yet fully know them. Present cultural sentiments offer certain resistances to both the second and third alternatives; the economic system probably limits the application of the first.

(3) In the solution of the love-relation problem, we may have: (a) more scientific and organized mating followed by a more perfect and permanent monogamy; (b) more liberal and less painful divorce on the theory of inevitable trial and error; (c) the legitimization of certain kinds of unmarried love relationships to prepare for, and to supplement, marriage (or, improbably, to supplant marriage); (d) better education and training, rendering all the other solutions less frequently necessary; (e) a going backward toward repression and sublimation, through a reversal of the present trend toward greater valuation and stimulation of love desires. The last of these is discussed in this chapter and in Chapter XIII.

(4) In the solution of the parent-child problem we may have: (a) a return to authority with affection secondary to authority, (b) a further decay of authority accompanied by more intense affectionate relations, (c) a weakening of both phases of the parent-child bond, tending toward community responsibility for children and the elimination of intense love relationships between generations.

The Future of the Family Depends on the General Cultural Ideology.—While the future with respect to the economic problem of the family depends very much on the future of the economic system in general, the outcome with respect to these love and child problems depends largely upon the future of the *whole cultural ideology*. This involves not only economic organization, but also nationalism and internationalism, religion and philosophy. It may seem far-fetched to hold that how we shall solve our love problems in the future depends upon the possibility of international peace. Yet the connection will appear presently. The general cultural ideology will also have considerable influence upon the choice of alternatives in *all* the family problems.

As Ruth Benedict¹ has brilliantly set forth, one of the most important characteristics of a given culture is its *dominant drive*, or as we might call it, its *supreme ideal*. Such were the Roman drive toward political empire building, the Greek ideal of symmetry and balance, and the Egyptian preparation for life in the hereafter. Such are French clarity and reverence for

form and method; the Russian frank exposure and expression of the emotions;² English emotional reserve, "character," and self-control; Northwest Indian personal prestige through wealth rivalry, and so on. Some of these drives and ideals relate to external achievement, some to the management of human personality and emotions. A culture may have one or more dominant ideals in each of these two spheres. Yet every society contains a wide range of personality-patterns and types. Those personalities whose wishes fit the dominant cultural drive have unusual opportunity for self-expression; personalities incompatible with the dominant drive are suppressed, or regarded as insane or abnormal, or manage to ignore or violate the ideal in clandestine fashion.

Modern Euro-American culture, especially of the varieties found in Anglo-Saxon countries and Western Europe (also Winnebago Indian culture) is distinctive in possessing as a dominant drive the *free development of the individual personality*. To this individualism are closely related the rather remarkable decline of physical cruelty during the past century; the declining use of the death penalty; the humanitarian movement of nineteenth century England; and its sequel, modern social work, especially psychiatric social work. Individualism, viewed from the standpoint of the culture rather than of the person, is called *liberalism*. Economic individualism, or the freedom of the small business man, and political democracy, were phases of the development of liberalism. When pursued as ends in themselves, however, they have hindered somewhat the attainment of the larger liberalism, and they have been or will be somewhat modified.

If we read the ideological pronouncements of Fascist leaders in Italy, Germany, and other countries, one of the most striking characteristics we note is the attitude that liberalism is out of date and needs to be supplanted by a newer philosophy. This Fascist attitude is not merely a condemnation of the economic liberalism of free trade and private enterprise, but of the whole philosophy of personal liberty, democracy, and individualism. For this it would substitute the ideal of a highly integrated, well-disciplined group, the "totalitarian state," with a much greater uniformity of personal goals and values. Fascist governments are putting this ideal into practice; they will have none of free speech, they vigorously censor the newspapers, they suppress dissenters, including even world-respected men of learning. Liberalism encourages each individual to think out his own values, and checks him only when his overt behavior actually injures his fellows. It checks him only when he violates the letter of a specific criminal law, and it places the burden of proof upon society to show

that he has violated it. His thought, speech, and attitudes must not be restrained. Non-liberalism, on the other hand, would mold the individual's thoughts and desires from the beginning, through homogeneous values or ideals inculcated by the school, the church, the family, and the political party.

Liberalism versus Homogeneous Cultures.—Leaving aside for the moment Russian Communism, which we shall discuss later, the issue seems to lie between two great philosophies or *Weltanschauungen*. On the one side is liberalism. On the other side, at first blush, we see Fascism. More careful analysis, however, shows that Fascism is not the essence, the content, of anti-liberalism. Fascism is rather a *method*, used in certain countries which have already gone far toward liberalism, of reversing the liberal trend. Fascism is hardly an appropriate term to apply to Japan, yet Japan stands beside Italy and Germany against liberalism. The point is that Japan has never advanced so far toward liberalism, and hence requires no Fascist movement to take her back again.

The anti-liberal side represents not some one kind of culture, but rather an array of many varying cultures each having its own dominant drives and ideals. They are alike simply in being anti-liberal, that is, their dominant drives do not include the high valuation of personal liberty or personal diversity. They would include, indeed, the vast majority of the world's cultures, past and present. The immediate and outspoken enemies of liberalism, however, are peoples which have experienced it and are now reacting against it.

It is questionable whether a liberal culture, extending over a large area such as Western Europe or America, is *a culture* in the sense used in referring to primitive peoples and most past civilizations. It is highly organized in its economic system and has certain wide uniformities in its material culture, owing to factory production and extensive trade. But its family, social system, and ideology are exceedingly diverse, heterogeneous. Writers such as Spengler³ and Sapir tend to use the term "culture" in a narrow sense, implying a certain *uniformity of values* throughout a whole nation of people. We Americans have *culture*, but not *a culture*. In Fascism, there is a desire, for the present, to limit the culture area to the nation or supposed blood-group, and to establish a uniformity of values or ideals within that group, while expecting other nations to have other values. In other words, Fascism is a movement not toward world-wide cultural uniformity, but toward smaller, distinctive culture areas, with great homogeneity within each, such as existed more or less in the primitive

world. On the other hand, the effect of modern industrialism and liberalism is to cause a greater similarity among world culture areas and at the same time greater dissimilarity among individuals and groups within each area. This result is already observable. Euro-American culture traits are diffusing rapidly in Asiatic countries, and many differences which distinguished Europe, America, and Asia, are lessening. Yet while this world *assimilation* is taking place, sociologists find an increasing cultural *differentiation* within a single city, such as Chicago.

Liberalism is a characteristic which in general develops late in cultural evolution. Spengler holds that some sort of liberalism has appeared many times in history, and that when it appears in any great civilization, it is a sign of impending decay and downfall. The individualism which preceded the fall of Rome is illustrative. By the same token, we are now on the eve of the "Decline of the West."

It is worthy of note, however, that *modern* liberalism accompanies an era of unprecedented scientific discovery. Spengler, like many other philosophers, overlooks the importance of material culture and science, which may profoundly alter the sequences of social change. Indeed, liberalism may spell the decay of "culture" in Spengler's "pure" sense of the word. But this cultural decay, if such it must be called, has been rather naïvely taken to mean a decay of man himself.

In the past, the decay of a culture usually brought the subjugation of its people by a new people with a "fresh, virile" culture. This was because, under past conditions of warfare, superior military efficiency usually went with a homogeneous, nationalistic ideology and not with a liberal, individualistic, pleasure-loving ideology. But today military efficiency depends more upon material techniques, which are most advanced in liberal countries. Further, if this area of liberal, diffuse (yes, decaying!) culture continues to increase, there must come a time when there are no more outside "virile" peoples of sufficient size to conquer it.

Apart from the necessities forced upon mankind by war, are pure, homogeneous, non-liberal cultures, such as existed in the past, and as Spengler and the Fascists idealize, desirable? It may be that as long as warfare continues, peoples with such cultures have a better chance to survive, or at least to dominate. A nation like Germany or Japan, which had used the most advanced, material culture and at the same time had a great internal homogeneity of values, might seem to have a great military advantage. Apart from that, it would seem that the

most desirable culture would be a liberal one. For under liberalism, culture is a *means* to the enrichment of varied individual lives; whereas, under homogeneity of values, culture itself is the *end* and individuals must conform more narrowly. Non-liberal cultures, to be sure, differ greatly among themselves in the values they dictate to the individual. The Plains Indian's supreme value is courage; the Northwest Indian's is wealth prestige. The Chinese ideal is to raise large families to the honor of one's ancestors; the Japanese ideal to glorify Nippon and its Emperor. But all non-liberal cultures assume either a uniformity of all individuals, or else individual differences *prescribed in advance of the actual development of the individual personalities concerned*. That is, they predestine each individual to one of several classes or life-roles, each prescribed in advance. A woman may be either a prostitute or a dutiful, wish-less wife. A man may be a celibate priest, a warrior, an agriculturist, or a man of business. The population may be divided into rigid castes or social classes, with no escape for the individual from the class in which he is born. Liberalism, on the other hand, makes *personality* the independent variable to which other things must adjust. The individual, to greater or less extent, chooses his role in life according to the personal wishes he happens, through the accidents of circumstance, to develop. Classes may exist in a liberal society, but the individual may change his class status and his role. In a sense, the issue is *Culture versus Man*.

Arguments against Liberalism.—Besides the military argument, which holds good only on the assumption that comparative international peace cannot be achieved, there are two other arguments against the desirability of liberalism. These, if they are valid, may be valid for all time.

First there is the *social control* argument. It is argued that a liberal culture will eventually destroy itself through crime and other internal conflict. The high crime rates of the United States are related to our great heterogeneity of cultural values. Our *professional* criminals represent a culture within a culture. They are not isolated pathological individuals at war with *all* society; they are rather members of a small society of their own, the underworld, behaving according to its own rules and governed by its own mores. There is "honor among thieves." Our society is obliged to exercise control through a multitude of *coercive laws*, in place of the older unwritten values or mores which governed us when we were more homogeneous. These laws, however, in accordance with the cardinal principle of liberalism, apply

to *acts* only, and make no attempt to control men's words, thoughts, or feelings. Liberalism weakens the mores or differentiates them among sub-groups, and thus throws upon law a greater share of the burden of social control.

Again, the failure of political democracy in Italy and elsewhere to arrive at decisions, to get things done, was one great stimulus toward Fascism. It is argued that liberal techniques of jurisprudence and legislation will not work, will not actually make social decisions and secure obedience to these decisions; that it is necessary to have a certain conformity of values, and to attain this society must mold personalities from the beginning, must control speech and press as well as attempt to control action.

The second argument against liberalism is the *mental hygiene* argument. It is claimed that liberalism does not really produce greater happiness through the great latitude it allows in the development of individual personalities. On the contrary, it allows wishes to develop which cannot be satisfied. It takes away the individual's sense of integral membership in society, and with that, an important emotional support in times of trouble. He can secure less happiness through group achievements; in times of stress he has nothing to lean upon emotionally except himself.

The Japanese and the American suicide rates are not widely different. They have very different psychiatric implications. Japanese suicide is largely cultural suicide.⁴ It is dictated by cultural values. It is a way to honor and glory. A Japanese, for example, committed suicide on the steps of the American Embassy to express the national protest against our enactment of a law curtailing Japanese immigration. American suicide, on the other hand, is the act of an individual who through "liberty" has established his own personal life goal and then failed to attain it, and who can find in group values and ideals nothing that he wants to live for. The Japanese suicide felt that there was something worth dying for; the American merely that there was nothing worth living for.

The Answer of Liberalism.—All the arguments against liberalism may be answered by showing that liberalism has power to compensate for its own disadvantages by making relatively slight modifications of its principles. Modern France and Great Britain, outstanding liberal countries, have shown no incapacity in *defensive* warfare, nor lack of temporary psychic unity when it was believed that the country was actually threatened. Adequate social control may be obtained under liberalism through the cultivation of homogeneous values in certain

limited essential spheres (as in the attitudes toward murder, crime, etc.) while leaving other values free to vary with the personality. Mental hygiene may be obtained through scientific psychiatry, and through the cultivation of liberalism itself as a universal ideal.

Arguments which might be valid against liberalism in a backward culture are less cogent against a liberalism associated with leadership in science. One trend in cultural evolution is irreversible: the progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge. With trifling and dubious exceptions, humanity as a whole has never forgotten any new discovery or invention. Science has the power to overcome many of the disadvantages of the liberalism it inevitably produces. Science continually discovers *new* solutions of problems; it multiplies the alternatives.

The most serious indictment of Fascism and non-liberal cultures is their attitude toward science. In speaking of science, we must distinguish between particular scientific discoveries and the general thought-pattern which results from discoveries and also furnishes the soil out of which new discoveries arise. To be sure, Fascism, and all non-liberal cultures which have had contact with Western science, such as Japan, promote certain kinds of research and strive to make use of whatever they can find in science to serve their ends. Yet their attitude is hostile toward the general ideology of science; of their people they require faith and intellectual obedience; they condemn the skeptical, experimental attitude toward life. Were they to succeed in destroying the liberal culture of the West, they would be killing the proverbial goose; and could not replace her from their own intellectually barren soil.

It is doubtful that a culture can adopt much of modern science without drifting toward the greater liberalism which is the inevitable product of science. Even if this liberalism carry disadvantages from the standpoint of military rivalry, social control, and mental hygiene, the disadvantages might be overcome through the further development of science and not through a return to the non-liberal past.

Superorganic Sciences Recently Added to the Organic and Inorganic.—We have noted in Chapters VII and VIII two major spheres of modern discovery and invention—the inorganic or mechanical, and the organic or biological. We have seen how each of these led toward greater individuation. But there is a third and more recent type of scientific discovery whose full effects are yet to be felt. This is discovery in the *superorganic* realm; indeed, the discovery of culture itself! To be sure, man had known culture and written about

it since the time of the first Greek historians, but only recently has he become explicitly conscious of it as an entity distinct from himself. This new enlightenment is much more than the use of an old word in a new sense, as we shall presently see.

It might seem that this discovery of culture might have an influence opposite to that of the biological and psychological discoveries. When peoples become conscious of their cultures will they not attempt even the more to respect them, to purify them, to make them more homogeneous, as Germany is now doing? A full understanding of the nature of cultural discovery leads rather to the guess that it will give further impetus toward liberalism. The scientific study of culture breeds a certain sense of humor; sooner or later one is apt to see the ridiculous phases of *his own culture*.

It is difficult to single out a particular name as deserving the initial credit for superorganic discovery. Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904), the German ethnologist, might be especially honored. Ratzel founded a special science of anthropogeography. He traveled and explored extensively, and is best known through his great work the *History of Mankind*. As Wissler says: "The consensus of opinion seems to be that the work of Ratzel stands as a new approach to the problem of man, the particular insight in this case being, that in environment and migration are to be sought the determining factors of culture . . . he set his face against the idea that there is an inner functional development of man by which culture can be explained; he believed that the whole of culture is forced upon man from the outside, claiming that in migrations, and in the borrowing of culture, by one tribe from another, can be found the full explanation of any tribal culture."^{*}

Ratzel was followed by a vigorous development of the geographic or diffusionist school of anthropology. This *social anthropology* became distinct from the physical anthropology of race, *cephalic index*, and bodily measurement. It linked itself with sociology. This whole cult of thought has been chiefly German and American, with some adherents in England. Some, like Graebner, went to extremes in holding that diffusion explains everything. In America, Kroeber vitalized the term "superorganic"; he with Lowie, Wissler, and others pushed forward the study of geographic distributions of culture traits.

What really new and dynamic idea has been added by this social anthropology? For many years we have been aware of the process of

* Clark Wissler, *An Introduction to Social Anthropology*, Holt, 1929, pp. 303-304. By permission.

imitation, the fact of cultural differences, and the fact that the personal freedom of the individual is limited by culture. The new idea is that *any particular culture represents an arbitrary choice among several possible alternatives, this choice having been made through the accidental circumstances of invention, group contacts, and migration, rather than by any inherently superior suitability of the alternative chosen.* Corollary to this is the idea that a race or a people has no inherent distinctive "character," but that nearly all of what we call its character is simply its culture, whose origin lies in external circumstances rather than in inner qualities.

Superorganic Science Gives Further Impetus to Liberalism.—The effect of this new culture-diffusionist ideology has been to change somewhat the patterns of thought which even Darwin and Freud accepted from the pre-scientific era. The discoveries in organic science tended to substitute certain biological imperatives and ethics for the religious and "categorical" imperatives of the past. Social anthropology, or ethnology, destroys a great deal of even the biological and psychological imperatives. It tends to make the human mind, and human morality, to a much greater extent a *tabula rasa* upon which the vicissitudes of migration, contact, and other chance events write their arbitrary record.

Whatever the effect has been so far, we may guess that it will be much greater in the future. Just the other day the writer overheard one high school youth scolding another for his "inferiority complex." The writer reflected that the concepts of Freud and Adler are now just beginning to take hold upon the *popular* mind some twenty years after their first promulgation in scientific circles. The concepts of Darwin have attained a much farther popular spread, because they started earlier. The concepts of diffusionist social anthropology originated roughly fifty years later than Darwinism. We may expect that they too will eventually invade the thinking of the masses. When that time comes, it will be no longer possible to control human behavior by biological and psychological concepts alone, as it is now no longer possible to do so by theological or authoritarian moral concepts alone. Even the man in the street will then understand, much better than now, that he is subject to many arbitrary social dictates which arose long ago by chance combinations of historical circumstances. He will, more than now, throw the searchlight of reason upon such dictates. He will demand that these arbitrary cultural requirements justify themselves in terms of universal subcultural human needs.

The situation may be illustrated by the nudity taboo. This taboo is now breaking down somewhat under the influence of new biological and psychological ideas. Bodily exposure is recognized as having certain health values;

and shame is regarded as a psychological rather than a moral reaction and therefore as something which might be overcome. But when the full force of the new social anthropology makes itself felt, we may expect a somewhat different reaction. Those who wish to be nudists will not feel so much the need of a health excuse or of the psychological excuse of conquering the unworthy emotion of shame. They will rather point out, in effect, that nudity is legitimate and practical in *some* human societies and subculturally harmless (i.e., harmless except for cultural sentiments); therefore why shouldn't a group of Americans practice it for the sole reason that *they wish to do so*?

In view of all these considerations, the present writer would guess that liberalism will probably become further extended over the world and will also become more intensive in the countries where it now obtains. He cannot believe that Fascism is more than a temporary setback due to economic and political difficulties, or that the Western world will reject the whole of liberalism merely because liberal economic and political mechanisms have failed. If this guess be correct, what will be the future of the family system? Which alternatives will be chosen in solving its economic and its love problems?

The Essence of the Future Family Pattern, under Liberalism, Will Be Diversity.—In accordance with the general pattern of liberalism, the choice will be *all or most of the alternatives simultaneously, and probably also new remedies still to be discovered*. The future will bring not any one pattern, but a *greater differentiation of patterns*.⁵ The decision between solutions will become increasingly an individual, not a social, matter. This does not mean that all will be equally chosen. There will probably be a majority or normal solution, with greater tolerance for minority solutions, so that each particular family shall have a more genuine range of choice. In solving the love problem we have looked favorably upon the fourth alternative, namely marital education and expert counseling. But even this solution involves a certain freedom of choice as regards the individual case. Psychiatric case work, which this would involve, implies a supreme respect for individual difference of personality and need.

If there is any single formula for trends in the family system, it is a trend toward extremes, toward greater variation, away from uniform standardization. Possibly one of the most troublesome cultural resistances is a certain fear of extremes. The traditional Greek ideal of the balanced life interferes with social adjustment. Of course, balance as a principle must apply in *some sense* to every human life, and in *some sense* to every human group. But the idealization of balance for its own sake leads us to apply the principle too arbitrarily.

In the days when single-celled animals were the highest forms of life, an ameba might have had a very simple conception of what constituted a normal animal with a well-balanced career. This ameba would have indeed been surprised if it could have looked into the future and seen the elephant, the oyster, and the myriad forms of life now existing, each maintaining within itself such balance as is essential. By the same token, we today might be greatly surprised if we could look into the cultural future and see the myriad of diverse social organization patterns which may come into existence.

There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

Liberalism Does Not Destroy All Uniformities, But Changes the Areas of Uniformity.—Liberalism does not imply the liberty of each individual to live as he pleases wherever he may be or with whomsoever he associates. His liberty is to be obtained rather by a choice of the place in which he shall live, the group with which he shall associate, or of the social role he will play. Once having made such a choice, he must necessarily observe certain cultural rules-of-the-game applying within his group. Liberalism is not the destruction of all standards, all uniformities among individuals. It means rather a change in the fields of uniformity in such manner that the individual may in practice make a choice. Liberalism destroys national, tribal, and geographic homogeneity in most values; but it may retain, for many or most values, homogeneity within particular classes, sects, neighborhoods, or "social sets." The unit family culture of the future will be technically a *sect*, as opposed to a region, nationality, or economic class. To some extent these family sects will correspond to economic classes, and to religious sects, as they do now, but it is likely that we shall have further differentiation along other lines independent of those boundaries. Liberalism implies that the individual's choice of life policy in one sphere, such as family culture, shall not be predetermined by his birth or by his chosen status in another sphere, such as the economic system. Some liberals seem to think that each family will make its own culture regardless of its friends and social neighbors. It is not likely that the individual or even the single family group will ever achieve such a complete freedom. The field of homogeneity in family culture need not be so large as in the case of economic culture, but it must be larger than the single family group. Families must needs live in larger social groups. The unit must be large enough to provide for the group play of children, for

a sufficiently wide range of selection among the mate-seeking generation, and for social hospitality and recreation among married adults. Many of the values associated with love, home, and family require a certain emotional agreement among sizable groups. For example, some persons will doubtless always gain emotional satisfactions from more or less ritualized activities of courtship and marriage. Formal debuts, social seasons, announced engagements, elaborate weddings, ritual exchange of gifts, and so on, have their values. The realization of such values depends upon the *participation* of a dependable group in the appropriate activities and ideology, just as the values of our football complex require not only isolated groups of football players, but also large crowds to act as spectators and to participate in the spirit of the activity. Yet in close geographic proximity there may be a group which is indifferent to such values and secures its satisfactions in other ways.

If courtship be regulated by chaperonage in one social circle, why need it be regulated by the same conventions in another circle? If certain classes of people favor the employment of wives outside the home and the care of children by hired specialists and communal institutions, why need this practice prevent the maintenance of the traditional home among another class? Some advocates of communal housekeeping are firing a barrage of ridicule at the separate family kitchen. Separate family housekeeping, though an inefficient method of getting the purely material result of cooking and serving food, has other than material objectives. There may be certain emotional values in separate cooking and eating which large numbers will continue to hold worth the sacrifice of some material efficiency. But freedom to indulge one's personal taste will always be subject to the rule that he shall not exhibit his indulgence to those who are annoyed by it. If the taste in question involves a social activity which actually or potentially affects a large group of persons, then freedom to indulge this taste requires bringing together enough like-minded individuals to make it in fact practicable. It requires also a certain segregation of these individuals in their social and recreational activities, though not necessarily in their economic and political activities. If persons allow their spouses or children a "shocking" freedom in Liberalia Manor, why need the conservative families of Old Suburbia be urged to do likewise? Or again, why, in a truly liberal society, need they be worried by what the others do, as long as they have a sufficiently large group of their own kind? It is illogical under liberalism to hold that one's own custom is best, and at the same time to fear that it will be destroyed by a custom one regards as inferior. If the one custom is really "better" for all the better will supplant the worse. If the difference is one of taste, or of individual suitability, both customs will survive among the groups which prefer them.

De gustibus non est disputandum is a formula which has been preached for centuries. Perhaps in the future we shall *institutionalize* it. The crude formula of personal liberty is inadequate. Too many have interpreted it as meaning the right of each individual to do what he wishes, wherever he happens to be. A much greater personal liberty than we have is possible, but only through group agreement and some group segregation in limited respects. Liberty in the future will mean the *right to join whatever group one wishes*. The nudist societies are illustrative of the principle involved.

Liberalism Permits the Individual to Change His Mind.—This free choice among several ways of life might be of questionable value if the individual were compelled to choose once and irrevocably for his whole lifetime. Liberalism means much more than such a choice; it gives opportunity for the individual to try different ways of life *at different periods in his life*. Perhaps the greatest weakness of our present, semi-liberal culture is its failure to provide enough of this kind of opportunity. In many matters, such as housing and the method of caring for children, a rather frequent shifting from one pattern to another might benefit our mental hygiene. One of the leading sources of mental ill health today is to be found in the repeated conditioning of annoyances and irritations to some particular place or situation. The physician advises the tired business man to take a vacation from his desk, not because the man's physical energy is depleted, but because the desk itself and its surroundings have become conditioned stimuli which keep him in a state of tension even when the more serious problems are absent. By the same token, more marital and parent-child vacations might keep many persons out of the mental hospital. A more perfect liberalism would provide practical arrangements by which the individual can have his vacation, change his social role or his pattern of daily life, *whenever his health needs it*. Indeed the fast and confining pace of modern economic life is largely responsible for the creation of this need, but that same life also produces the liberal valuations which alone will permit the needed adjustment. Hunting, pastoral, or agricultural life is in itself adventurous; but when man is confined to industrial, indoor life, he needs new substitutes for the old adventure satisfactions. The only substantial substitutes industrialism has so far offered are in the variety of material commodities, in vicarious enjoyments such as the movies, and in a limited amount of travel. To satisfy adequately the wish for new experience, to prevent boredom, irritation-spread, and their pathological effects upon human personalities, there is need of a much

greater variation in the *total environment* of the average individual, a variation which shall occur at intervals of weeks or months rather than of years. Liberalism offers hope of a social mobility adjusted to the needs of individuals, rather than to the exigencies of business establishments or to cultural sentiments.

Summary.—Let us summarize the argument of the foregoing. Mankind is becoming conscious of culture as a thing apart from himself, determined by historical accidents, and arbitrarily imposing certain uniformities of behavior which on purely biological and interactional (subcultural) grounds do not need to exist. Basic interactional conditions do require certain uniformities of behavior and cannot permit complete individual liberty. But these *rational* uniformities would have a very different distribution from the older culturo-sentimental uniformities. In economic and political patterns the rational areas of uniformity would probably be wider than the present areas. We may expect greater centralization of economic control and greater internationalism. In family patterns the rational areas of uniformity would probably be smaller and more numerous than today. The scientific discovery of culture, added to the other dynamic forces of social change, will tend to hasten this substitution of rational uniformities for arbitrary sentimental uniformities. These rational uniformities, moreover, will permit the moving about of individuals according to their temporary needs, and not bind them for life to a choice once made.

If Fascism Defeats Liberalism, What of the Family Future?—Let us now suppose that the writer's guess is wrong; that the future holds not a further development of liberalism, but a return to national homogeneity of values under the impetus of Fascist and nationalist movements. In that case the future of the family system is more difficult to predict than under the assumption of increasing liberalism. It will differ greatly among the several nations according to their dominant values. The tendency will be to limit the alternatives in the solution of each family problem and to discourage variety.

The German National Socialist Family Culture.—In Germany, for example, there is a distinct move to discourage the extra-domestic employment of women, and to force all women back into the home. This would block one important solution of the economic problems of the family which seems likely to increase in liberal countries. As we have seen, this still leaves two alternatives open: a return of some of the processing (agriculture, manufacture, etc.) functions to the home, or a further elimination of these functions by machinery, with

the wife devoting herself to miscellaneous administrative and service functions. The most frequent outcome in Germany, in the immediate future at least, would seem to be the former. In some respects the pattern would be like that recommended by Borsodi. Germany has never gone so far as America in the use of labor-saving devices in the home or in the removal of its processing functions. It is likely that a larger proportion of the home-maker's time will continue to be spent in manual household techniques, with less time for elaborate mental, social, esthetic, and recreational services to husband and children. If the Nazis have their way, there may even be a revival of spinning and weaving in the home. How far this program can actually go is another question. The Nazis have met with such resistance in their efforts to put woman back into the home that they have had to modify it considerably. Employers have insisted that in many occupations women are superior, and have stoutly resisted the substitution of untrained men for women already trained to their duties. Numerous exceptions have been made. Authorities are going slowly with the dismissal of women teachers where this would work a hardship to the family. It was found that 72 per cent of women teachers were supporting their parents.

The German program calls also for the abolition of woman suffrage and the complete retirement of women from politics and public office. The women doctors have been excluded from the physicians' organization.⁶ The right to vote, says Dr. Nicolai, a spokesman for the National Socialist policy, is the privilege of German "Aryan" men able to bear arms. He claims that effeminism has permeated German legislation during recent years, and that it, together with the "sickening cry for 'women's independence,' run counter to the high esteem in which, according to the Nordic manner, man should hold woman."⁷

A writer in *Der Deutsche* (in the year A.D. 1933!), said:

Even among children the following can be proved: A real boy loves uniforms, smoke and battle; he does not play with dolls. But the little girls trot around with their little babies; they wash their dolls' clothes and want most of all to be little mothers.⁸

As regards the reproductive and economic problems together, Minister of the Interior Frick is reported as urging German women to bear strong children and many of them. He promised governmental aid in the form of better salaries and lower taxes for families with numerous children.

"Exaggerated scientific education of women is as harmful to the

founding of families of numerous children as exaggerated participation in sports," said the Nazi Minister.

"The German people glorify the mannish woman too much in athletics and professions and care nothing about the mothers with flocks of children," he said. Dr. Frick added that Germany's neighbors in the East were rearing twice as many children on the average as the Reich.⁹

The German sterilization policy (see Chapter IX), however, indicates that in this respect at least the new program is not a mere turning backward of the clock, but a bold adventure in the untried. The radical direction of change in this sphere is a product of the race ideology of "Aryan" supremacy which has characterized German culture for several decades. If we describe the National Socialist policy merely as "reactionary," we are bound to note that it conflicts on this and some other points with the Roman Catholic family pattern, which is also "reactionary." This illustrates the point made above, that movements against liberalism are not all in the same direction; the specific cultural ideals (dominant drives) which are to be substituted for liberal individualism vary with the particular culture involved. Italy, also Fascist and anti-liberal, would find sterilization (even of the unfit) quite out of keeping with her ideals.

As to the love function, the National Socialist policy is less explicit. In general the tendency would seem to be to discourage divorce and extra-marital love, to encourage early marriage by the help of subsidies, and in some degree to devalue love in general, at least, to reduce the emphasis upon the importance of sex and love life for its own sake. The National Socialists hold the Jews largely responsible for the sexual immorality which has been reported as abundant in Germany during recent years. They encourage out-of-door-life, the "manly" virtues, and a re-enrichment of life within male groups. Lewisohn suggests that there is a great deal of homosexual feeling involved in these virile activities of male groups with their devotion to their "leaders."¹⁰

We must analyze this problem without prejudice. Anyone who has spent much time in summer camps or out-of-door activities with one's own sex knows that the desire for the opposite sex becomes less imperative in many persons. At the same time certain feelings of affection develop toward companions of one's own sex which are absent in ordinary urban, heterosexual life. This does not imply physical homosexual practices. It is partly the result of the unusual physical activity and the satisfaction of the wish for adventure through the unusual mode of life. Again, the athletic combats,

personal rivalries, and group enthusiasms, with one's own sex, furnish keen satisfaction of their own which temporarily reduce the need for intense sexual or affectionate satisfactions. The revival of the custom of the *Mensur* (wounding but not fatal duels) is significant. To a certain extent the great valuation placed upon heterosexual love in urban, sedentary life is a result of the lack of other kinds of "excitement" in such a life. Warfare and other "virile" activities supply this need for emotional stimulation, and thus in a very broad sense are partial substitutes for sex and affection, for the male sex. On the other hand, it must be recognized that many males, confined too exclusively to such a "virile" life, develop definite homosexual love conditionings. Others, although never developing homosexual feelings, develop the attitude that sex in general is unimportant, with the result that they never become the adequate love-makers which ideal marriage demands.

These tendencies are what is meant by our fifth alternative solution of the love problem, the devaluation of heterosexual love (see pp. 312, 422, 552).

The Nazis doubtless aim still further to reduce prostitution; whether this and "free love" can both be reduced at the same time is uncertain. In one kind of situation the National Socialists encourage divorce: where an Aryan man is married to a Jewess. It is reported that Aryan public officials have been asked to divorce Jewish wives as a condition to holding their jobs.¹¹ This, of course, is a far cry from facilitating divorce as an adjustment to the needs of individual personalities, after the manner of the liberal culture of Scandinavia. At the same time it is a definite symptom of the policy of subjecting the family to the state.

Other Anti-Liberal Movements.—Fascism has temporarily, at least, vanquished liberalism in Austria, liberalism being represented there by the Socialist party. Hungary has not technically gone "Fascist" because she had already reverted to a non-liberal culture immediately after her Communist uprising in 1919, but this culture is similar in many respects to the aim of Fascism. Among these Danubian reactionaries special emphasis is placed upon the desirability of a rigid social stratification such as existed there in medieval times. The following gives a glimpse of the culture which the more extreme elements there would like to see established:

Thus the Society of Awakened Magyars, a body through which Nazism has operated in Hungary since its introduction in 1919, has just issued a program embodying its notions of fitting Nazi principles to Hungarian needs. The program has forty-six points. It is frankly stated the idea underlying them is to restrict liberty by abolishing "so-called liberal rights" now existing and returning to the medieval structure of Hungarian public life.

This is to be done by dividing all persons into classes—the number is not specified—according to occupation or profession and race. Nobody can leave his class to enter another, including, of course, marrying outside it, without the consent of the authorities. Privileges are to be bestowed according to class. Jews are to be in a special class by themselves.

But it is when it comes to details that the program is most interesting. For instance, Point 20 makes it obligatory for every married couple to have at least five children. For every child below this minimum after a specified number of years the couple will be assessed an additional 50 per cent income tax. . . .

But absurdity goes even further in this program. Clause 16 provides that every girl, on reaching the age of 12, shall be put in a belt appliance such as was imposed on temporarily deserted wives during the Crusades. Her father "or other competent authority" is to keep the key until after the signing of her marriage contract, when it is to be delivered to her husband.

Thus medievalism would return to Hungary with a vengeance if this Nazi program, seriously propounded and seriously issued, were to be carried out, which, of course, seems impossible.*

While these movements toward rigid homogeneous cultures may possibly retard for a time the advance of liberalism, it seems very improbable that they will utterly and finally defeat it. If they should do so, however, even then there might be as wide a variety of family systems in the whole world as under liberalism. The unadjusted individual could theoretically find somewhere a pattern to his liking, but he could do so only by migrating to another country. Under liberalism he can do so by moving to a different neighborhood or entering a different social circle.

In any case, the question which interests us is: will liberalism finally prevail? Perhaps the best guess that can be made in the near future will come from a study of Russian culture. Russia may hold the key to the great enigma.

The Crucial Significance of the Russian Family Policy.—In Russia, as in Germany, a new collective enthusiasm, a new ideology, was born under the pressure of economic conditions.¹² Communism was a new cultural dynamic. Its promoters wanted a certain uniformity of culture not only in Russia but throughout the world. More lately they have been learning to leave the rest of the world alone. But their ideology involves a family pattern very different from the German. Communism is not interested in sterilization because it believes that economic circumstances, rather than race or biological heredity, are the main causes of the differences among men.

**New York Times*, Nov. 21, 1933, dispatch by F. T. Birchall. By permission.

It legalizes abortion and encourages contraception, but it also breaks down all distinction between legitimate and illegitimate children. It facilitates a high birth rate but has no need of special measures to do so, since the birth rate now far exceeds that of Western Europe and the net increase of population is apparently the most rapid in the world (about 2 per cent per year). The natural increase exceeds that of Asia, however, because of lower death rates rather than of higher birth rates.

To the economic problems of the family, communism's solution is collective housekeeping, with women working like men in specialized occupations, and families living in large apartment houses or other grouped arrangements. It discourages the return of crafts to the home, and discourages also the "bourgeois" type home of America. Lenin said: "No nation can be free, when half of the population is enslaved in the kitchen."¹³ There has indeed been some difficulty in getting women to use the collective arrangements: the small private kitchens are preferred by many. Expectant mothers, working in factories, are given vacations at full pay for two months before and two months after the birth of the child, are given free medical attention and some baby clothing. Factories have nurseries in which mothers may leave infants during the day. The mothers are allowed time off every three hours to nurse them.¹⁴

In handling the love problem Russia apparently gives the greatest individual freedom known in Euro-American civilization. Marriage is easy and so is divorce. Both are mere acts of registration before a clerk, not ceremonial acts. Divorce is not even a *judicial* procedure; it is performed by an administrative officer who simply issues the divorce on request of either party. Premarital and extra-marital sex relations are tolerated, and actually very common as questionnaire statistics indicate. However, the extreme promiscuity artificially fostered in young groups after the Revolution has died down. It is common to defer the registration of a marriage until after a child is born.

On registering a marriage the partners may adopt the surname of either, or may keep their respective surnames as previous to marriage. Thus in theory the hoary Euro-Asiatic pattern of patriliney is abolished. The partners must be eighteen years of age, of normal mentality, have no close consanguinity, and no other marriages at the time. They must declare that they are informed concerning each other's health. Legally their place of residence must be fixed by mutual agreement; if one moves to another locality, his partner has

no legal obligation to follow. Either party, if incapacitated, has the right to material support from the other, and housekeeping is a joint responsibility. All property acquired after the marriage is divided equally.¹⁵

The Russian tendency is to weaken the parent-child bond, to make the primary loyalty of children a loyalty to the state. Where the parents are anti-Communist the children are encouraged to break off their relations with them. In practice the great majority of children are still left in the custody of their own parents, and the parents are held responsible for their support. Experience with institutions has convinced the Russians that care by individual parents is superior.¹⁶ It is notable that children of ten years of age and over cannot be adopted except by their own consent.¹⁷ Kindergartens are maintained for children of three to eight; in them children are fed three meals daily, given medical inspection and communist ideals.¹⁸ The Communists have extended education and reduced illiteracy to a degree hitherto unknown in Russia. In the schools, however, all instruction revolves about the Marxian ideology, and the minds of Russian children are being standardized as truly as in any ecclesiastical school system with its dogmas and catechism. No instruction contrary to communism is permitted. Thus the school system is used as an agency to mold personalities according to the dominant cultural drive. In addition the Consomol and Pioneer organizations provide training for children somewhat after the fashion of our Boy Scouts; of course the ideological content is communism.

Possible Interpretations of Russian Family Culture.—How shall we interpret this Soviet family pattern? Two extreme and opposite interpretations are possible.

First, we might say that there will not be true liberty even in family behavior; that really the Russians are being led into a very homogeneous, rigid family (or non-family!) pattern in which all personal love relationships shall be casual and subordinate to other activities and satisfactions. Probably all members of a society cannot be compelled to be sexually promiscuous by law, any more than all can be compelled to be monogamous. Neither can law compel emotional independence of parents and children. But it may be that a code of *mores* will develop which will treat faithful monogamous lovers, and parents who want their children always with them, in the same fashion as our traditional culture treat adulterers, deserting fathers, and unfilial children. That such a thing is possible is suggested by Samoan culture, where, Miss Mead tells us, constancy and

sexual exclusiveness between two adolescent lovers are looked upon with derision.¹⁹ Some Communists have said, indeed, that their aim is to break up the family altogether, because family loyalties tend to weaken allegiance to the state. Their theory is that the state can perform most of the functions which the family performed, and do so with greater satisfaction to individuals. The present freedom to choose between monogamous marriage, serial polygamy through divorce, and simultaneous unregistered polygamy, may be merely a step toward a final family-less uniformity. As regards the economic functions of the family, at least, it is quite clear that communism hopes to universalize a *single one* of the alternative patterns we discussed, namely, communal dwelling, with all women engaged in specialized tasks, and none in general "home-making." It wishes to abolish the other two patterns.

The second interpretation is that Russia is moving toward a *general liberalism of culture in all except the economic and political system*. The present dictatorship and attempts to compel uniformity of values may represent merely a temporary phase, whose aim is to build a centralized, efficient economic machine. When that communist economic system is established beyond danger of upset by counter-revolution, then communism may encourage liberty and variety of personal behavior in thought, recreation, and love. Russia may represent a new step forward in the world trend toward individualism, a step made possible by overcoming the obstacle of capitalism. Although capitalism is commonly called individualism, it involves mainly the liberty of the business entrepreneur; and this tends to destroy itself as capitalism grows.

Elsewhere the present author has maintained²⁰ that liberty in the carrying on of business is not linked with true "personal" liberty, but that indeed these two spheres of liberty are more or less incompatible. Several years of further thinking have modified his views in some respects but have not weakened his belief in the reality and importance of this principle. Economic liberty is *instrumental*, personal liberty refers to choice of the *goal-satisfactions* of life. If this belief be correct, then it is possible to look upon Communist Russia not as another reaction against liberalism, to be classified with Germany, Italy, and Japan, but as the cradle of a more genuine liberalism of the future.

Some evidence for this view is furnished by the *methods* used in Russia to develop desired attitudes and to deal with human personalities. The Communist, as compared with other types of fanatics,

seems to show a little more of *ridicule*, and a little less of *personal hatred*, toward his enemies. When he hates, he hates people for *what they do* rather than for *what they are*. He is functionally minded. He does not, like the German National Socialist, tend to identify good and evil with particular races or nationalities. Indeed, he identifies evil with a social class (the bourgeoisie), but this concept is more rational than race. Communism, when attempting to convert others, appeals to reason and ridicules all that is traditional; Fascism condemns the intellectual approach and while also claiming to be "new," it appeals to old cultural sentiments. It frankly praises "emotion" and scorns "rationalism." This difference in *technique* may be symptomatic of a basic difference in the *content* of the cultural goals.

Incidentally, there is a significant element in Russian culture which comes down from Czarist days. This is a certain *motif* described by Sapir which might be called the naked exposure of the individual personality.²¹ The Russian desires to know, to commune with, his fellow man as that man actually is, unhidden by the wall of conventionality with which Englishmen and Frenchmen surround themselves. Russian literature is noted for its detailed and realistic portrayal of human emotions. In effect Russian literature, as well as the Russian science of Pavlov and Bechtereiv, has been unusually interested in what takes place in human nerves, muscles, and glands. A phase of this *motif* is the free emotional expression which is characteristic of Russians, so in contrast with the self-control and reserve of Anglo-Saxons and also of Japanese. This attitude toward human personality is thought by Sapir to be one of the most important and pervasive characteristics of Russian culture. It is, in other words, a kind of "dominant drive." It may provide an unusually good foundation for true liberalism.

Only time will tell which of these interpretations of the Russian cultural trend is the more correct. Statements of their purpose by practical Communists are of little value in answering this question; as are also the statements of their enemies. An intimate, socio-psychiatric study of Russian life would be more illuminating.

Will Liberalism and Individualism Prevail?—Whether and when liberal individualism shall resume its advance in human culture generally depends very much upon two contingencies. The first is international peace. The second is the possibility of controlling the business cycle so as to prevent depressions and unemployment. If man is successful in these objectives, the universal need for security will be better satisfied than now, and wishes for adventure and love will have

freer play. We may expect, in that case, a still greater individuation of human personalities and a richer variety of life-patterns among individuals and small primary groups. If, on the other hand, the future brings more of war and of economic insecurity, we may expect individuals to seek security and happiness through solidarity and like-mindedness within nations and conflict-groups. Possibly we may have a period of these relatively homogeneous cultures followed by a new advance of liberalism in the distant future.

If so, *What of the Family Future?*—If and when liberalism finally prevails, what will be the family pattern of the *majority*? In the writer's guess, it will embody monogamy; a fecundity nicely adjusted to population and eugenic needs through contraception; female labor which is more specialized and more evenly distributed through life than at present, with somewhat more communalization of domestic services, but with the retention of just enough of the private home and of parental care to yield the *maximum emotional values* of the parent-child and the mate-mate relation. This majority pattern will prevail through a rational understanding of its inherent subcultural advantages, and not by surrounding itself with a halo of cultural sentiment or a protective armor of taboos. Maladjusted individuals will find relief and cure through easy mobility and through temporary vacations from their usual mode of life. *Liberty and diversity will be used not to destroy but to protect and enrich the essential, subcultural, human values.*

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Journal of Heredity, Baltimore.

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Journal of Juvenile Research (formerly, of Delinquency), Claremont, Calif.

*Journal of Social Hygiene, New York.

Journal of Social Psychology, Worcester.

Mental Hygiene, Albany.

Parents Magazine, New York.

Proceedings National Conference of Social Work, Chicago.

Publications American Sociological Society, Chicago.

Smith College Studies in Social Work, Northampton, Mass.

*Social Forces, Chapel Hill, N. C.

Survey, New York.

United States Government Publications:

*Bureau of the Census.

Children's Bureau.

Women's Bureau.

*Starred items are of more general importance.

Suggestions for the following-up of developments in the field of the family.

The *American Journal of Sociology* publishes annually or oftener (recently in the November issue), lists of current research projects in sociology. Of especial interest from the standpoint of the family are the projects listed under the headings: *Human nature and personality*, *The family*, *Social problems and social pathology*, and *Research methods*.

The same journal publishes annually or oftener (latest in July 1934), a list of doctoral dissertations and masters' theses in preparation in the field of sociology. These include important research projects in family sociology.

In May of each year the *American Journal of Sociology* devotes its principal space to a review of the social changes in the United States during the preceding year. A section is usually included on changes in the family.

SUGGESTED RESEARCH PROJECTS

Projects dealing mainly with personality variables, and the change or selection of personalities.

1. The statistical measurement and intercorrelation of personality traits of the kinds postulated by psychiatry and psycho-analysis, such as "narcism," "sadism," "paranoid trends," etc.
2. The collection of autobiographies of love-life, with the attempt to discover patterns or syndromes, and the formulation of a quantifiable questionnaire after sufficient preliminary case study.
3. Description of "the most ideal romantic situation" by a number of persons representing different groups and cultures; significant differences and similarities among groups to be ascertained.
4. Analysis of housework processes into steps and situations which are more specific from a psychological point of view than are such units as "dish-washing"; the investigation of these situations as causes of nervousness or strain.
5. Personalities of divorced and discordant partners as compared with a control group, to be studied so as to determine significant differences, if any.
6. Questionnaire study of the emotional effect of romantic motion pictures upon adults living in various marital states and emotional relationships.
7. The occupational and social status of unselected samples of 40-50 year old bachelors and spinsters, in several regions or communities.

Projects dealing mainly with interaction.

8. The construction of an adequate case record schedule for the recording of cases of marital discord and of control cases of happy couples.
9. Analysis of cases of marital discord to determine similarities or polarities of attitude as between the partners.
10. Study of cases in which there has been marked improvement of the relationship between conflicting partners, with the attempt to discover the factors causing such improvement.
11. Ditto, cases of parent-child interaction.
12. Inventory of typical dilemmas in love and marriage.
13. A study of the after-effects of reconciliations effected by social agencies, counselors, etc.
14. Further investigation by questionnaire of similarities or differences of attitude in happily married couples, conflicting couples, control pairs, friends, etc.
15. Verbatim records of parent-child and mate-mate interaction.
16. The parent preferences of various groups and classes of children.

Projects dealing mainly with cultural variables.

17. Tabulation of family culture traits of primitive and civilized cultures which have been sufficiently studied; computation of indices of similarity between each and every other; establishment of a hierarchy of similarities.
18. Plotting upon maps the geographic distribution of various family culture traits.
19. Analysis and inventory of the mores of family life as communicated by parents to children.
20. A comparison of the more detailed effects upon the family pattern of Russian Communism, German National Socialism, and Italian Fascism.

21. Assembling historical and ethnographic data as to sex ratios, and the correlation therewith of family patterns and love mores.
22. Sex ratios in various nativity and social classes, and nationalities and sects, in the United States, and their relation to marriage and to love mores.
23. The assembly of all published data on the marriage, birth, and divorce rates of college graduates, and the selection of some typical institutions for continuous follow-up study.
24. The number of "dates" of men and women students, in relation to social class, scholarship, personal characteristics, etc.
25. A more intimate study of the causes of the low marriage rates of persons born about 1870.
26. Analysis of the statutory causes for divorce in the several states, revealing the presence or absence of significant phrases such as "mental cruelty," "indignities," etc., which might be better indicators of regional differences than is the mere number of causes. Distributions of significant elements should be mapped.
27. Further study of the relation between divorce rate and occupation, religion, nationality, and socio-economic status.
28. A more intimate study of the love mores of different groups by asking persons to rank or rate the morality of various specific situations, rather than to pass judgment upon generalized values or alternatives.
29. The charting and analyzing by a number of persons of their total complexes of interpersonal emotional relations at a given time; measurement of intensity and extensiveness of love-life, etc.

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

In the appropriate chapters of this book the author has called attention to several recent research studies. Some of these represent only the beginnings of series of studies which their authors may be expected to produce during the next decade. The investigation of family problems is launched upon a career of brilliant promise. The methods of research and the points of attack which characterize the present day studies give hope of much better results than did the methods used a decade ago.

As this book goes to press, the author feels that he has not done and cannot do justice to all the recent and current research work in the field. He gives brief mention below to a few additional studies and projects which seem to involve something new or significant.

Although most research projects involve the gathering of fresh data, some important studies can be and are being made with the use of official data already gathered, or by the re-analysis of data gathered by investigators such as Hamilton and Davis. C. W. Margold reports a comprehensive study of statistical source materials on marriage and divorce during the past 75 years, which is to form part of an international study of changing trends in marriage. Age at marriage, remarriage of the widowed and divorced, and intermarriage between religious and nationality groups are to be given special attention. Hornell Hart at Hartford Theological Seminary is making a synthesis of the results of four previous studies and of relevant census data, in regard to "happiness in relation to age at marriage." Constantine Panunzio at the University of California at Los

Angeles is studying international and interracial marriages in Los Angeles County from 1925 to 1934.

Leo Haak at Harvard is studying the characteristics of 2000 New England families which have disappeared (i.e., a married couple fails to produce at least one member of the succeeding marrying generation), and comparing these families with biologically related families which have continued.

Richard Bolling at the University of Oregon reports a study in progress of birth-control clinics from the standpoint of cultural diffusion, and Norman E. Himes is studying the diffusion of contraceptive knowledge through social classes in the light of new evidence. Beatrice M. Lightbowne at Columbia is analyzing the opposition (i.e., cultural resistance) to the birth-control movement. Her results will be interesting to compare with those of Ella R. Schneideman (Graduate School of Jewish Social Work), who is studying the opposition to sterilization legislation in New York State from 1909 to 1932. F. M. Vreeland at DeFauw has been studying the history and present status of the birth-control movement.

Nels Anderson at Columbia is studying the history of Mormonism as a cultural phenomenon, and Mack Nicolaysen at the University of Utah is making a socio-genetic study of Mormon polygamy. Susan M. Kingsbury and Mildred Fairchild of Bryn Mawr, having spent about a year in Soviet Russia studying women in factory industry, will give us more specific knowledge than we have had concerning certain human effects of Communism. Jitsuchi Masuoka at Iowa and Reiichi Sakakibara at Chicago are studying the change and disorganization of the Japanese family, the first being concerned with the Japanese in Hawaii. Cheng Wang at Stanford reports a study in progress upon "the disintegration of the Chinese family system under the impact of Western ideologies."

Our understanding of the divorce problem will be advanced by Leon C. Marshall's (Johns Hopkins) method of analyzing some 4000 statements made by the parties in divorce cases in Ohio; by Charles R. Metzger's historical study of divorce in Indiana (at the University of Indiana), and by Charles G. Gomillion's (Fisk) attack upon the neglected problem of divorce among negroes. There may be mutual illumination between the last study and William H. Jones' (Chicago) "study of negro morality." Harmon Stephens' (Wisconsin) work upon the "changing attitude toward morality" should add greater definiteness to our picture of the "new code" sketched in Chapter XIII of this book. Dawson F. Dean at the New York University School of Education is completing a study of "the homosexual attitude."

Cynthia Cohen at Chicago is applying the ecological method, made so popular by Shaw in his study of delinquency and by Mowrer in his study of family disorganization, to the field of venereal disease. Evelyn Buchan Crook has already reported (Amer. Jour. of Sociol., 39: 493) her study of "cultural marginality in sexual delinquency" and is going farther, at Chicago, with the study of "delinquency triangles." The "triangle," in this sense, is formed by the residences of the two sexually delinquent persons and the place of the delinquent act.

The statistical method is being applied in new ways to the study of family attitudes and family interaction. Arthur R. Mangus at Wisconsin has given an interesting test to the Freudian theory that a girl's conception of her ideal mate is determined largely by her father's personality and her relation to her father in childhood. By having a large number of young women check personality trait items for their fathers, ideal mates, etc., he finds tentatively that "the ideal

husband . . . is more nearly like the most intimate male companion who is not a blood relative than like either the father or the most intimate male relative other than the father." Mervin Shafer at Haverford will statistically compare 255 social agency case records of families showing no disorganization with 255 records of those showing family disorganization. William G. Mather at Cornell makes "a statistical analysis of family relations based on students' autobiographies."

A most important approach, as suggested in Chapter XV, is to ascertain whether there are definite and recognizable type-patterns of interaction in family life, and if so, what these are. Such an approach is suggested by Howard W. Beers' (Cornell) study of "forms of family interaction," and Robert G. Foster's work at the Merrill-Palmer institution in Detroit (see p. 541). The latter studies newly married couples over a period of years to observe the process by which family structure or habitual interaction develops. Mrs. Evelyn D. Cope at Kansas is studying "parent-child relationship differences between parents and children and their causes." Mrs. Harriet R. Mowrer at Chicago is completing her study of "the relation of personality disorganization to domestic discord," testing a hypothesis referred to on p. 477. Faith Moran at Syracuse is investigating what appears to be the same problem, "the relation between marital maladjustment and the development of psychopathic trends."

If Clarence Schettler, at Chicago, can increase our knowledge concerning the "age at which personality type becomes fixed," we shall be less uncertain in our treatment procedures with maladjusted persons and their families.

From the continuing work of Dr. Robert Latou Dickinson the technical problems of sexual adjustment and contraception may be expected to advance farther toward solution.

The relation between cultural patterns and the psychoanalytic view of individual behavior, illuminated so well by Malinowski, Ruth Benedict, and others, should receive additional light from the studies of Thomas D. Eliot (Northwestern) and John Dollard (Yale—see "The psychotic person seen culturally," Amer. Jour. Sociol. 39: 637).

The main trends of thought in the field of the family indicate the special need for research which combines the sociological and economic approaches with a psychiatric approach. The term "social psychiatry" in a sense reflects the growing awareness of this need of viewing situations simultaneously from these two angles. A significant study pointing in this direction is Robert Lynd's (Columbia) project, "the impact of depression on white collar families of \$6000-10,000 income group in 1929." The families are to be interviewed for objective indices of changed behavior produced by their reduced income, and are also to be given psychiatric interviews by Dr. John Levy. A study by Robert C. Angell at Michigan, while not so explicitly psychiatric, will examine 50 intimate case histories of families which have suffered severe decrease of income. Both of these studies reflect also a growing awareness of the seriousness of mental suffering in that social class where the absolute physical standard of living is high and even luxurious.

In July 1934, was held at Teachers' College a conference on family relations, organized jointly by the American Social Hygiene Association and the American Home Economics Association. Newspaper reports of this conference indicate a strong feeling on the part of leaders in family education and counseling that their work is already bearing fruit. Dr. Ernest R. Groves and Dr. Paul Popeno

gave further evidence for the view stated in Chapters XII and XVII that adequate education tends to reduce divorce and marital discord. According to Dr. Popenoe divorces are now relatively fewer than they were among young couples, and relatively more numerous among those married ten years or more. He attributes this in part to the greater reading of books on sex and marriage among the younger persons, and to more stringent marriage legislation. Dr. Popenoe also gave some interesting data on the relation of marital success to domination in the family. Among 3000 marriage histories, he found that 87 per cent are happy where there is a "fifty-fifty" relation, 61 per cent where the man dominates, and only 47 per cent where the woman dominates.

Dr. Groves of the University of North Carolina, who in 1925 taught the first college course in "marriage," is reported as saying that he had observed only one unsuccessful marriage between college men and women (see *New York Times*, June 28, July 1, 3, 1934).

In general, there is reason to believe that the era of the most acute suffering due to family discord has passed, and that American society is on the way to getting control over one of its most serious problems.

INDEX OF NAMES

Bibliographical references are italicized. The Preface, Appendix, and Summaries on pp. 549-552 are not indexed.

ABBOTT, EDITH, *499*
ABELARD and HELOISE, *149*
ABRAHAM, *60*
ADLER, ALFRED, *82, 86, 87, 560, 90*
ALBRECHT, HANS, *425*
ALLPORT, F. H., *59, 106, 109, 90, 110*
ANABLE, ANTHONY, *212*
ANDERSEN, HANS CHRISTIAN, *338*
ANDERSON, JOHN E., *530*
ANDERSON, NELS, *460, 499*
ANDREWS, B. R., *311, 530*
ARISTOTLE, *113*
AXEL, ROBERT, *528*

B

BABER, R. E., *255, 322, 268, 528*
BACHOFEN, *113*
BALLINGER, W. J., *355*
BANKER, H. J., *336, 355*
BARASH, M., *425*
BARKER, R. H., *531*
BARNARD, EUNICE F., *212, 310*
BARNES, HARRY E., *530*
BARNOUW, A. J., *269*
BARTLETT, G. A., *468, 499*
BAUM, MARIE, *297, 310*
BAXTER, CELENA A., *170*
BAYLOR, E. M. H., *505, 528*
BEAM, LURA, *66, 453, 499*
BECHTEREV, *573*
BECKER, HOWARD, *575*
BEHREND, HARRIET, *141*
BENEDICT, RUTH, *149, 223, 552, 170, 574*
BENSON, JOHN G., *439*
BERNARD, JESSIE, *436ff, 453*
BERRY, G. H., *191, 212*
BESANT, ANNIE, *247*

BHASA, *119*
BIGELOW, MAURICE, *535, 546*
BINKLEY, F. W. and R. C., *273, 468, 487, 499*
BIRCHALL, F. T., *569*
BLANCHARD, PHYLLIS, *256, 288, 407, 110, 268, 310, 426*
BLANSHARD, PAUL, *212*
BLANTON, SMILEY, *531*
BOCCACCIO, *149, 230, 406*
BOHANNON, E. W., *509, 529*
BONAPART, JOSEPH, *508, 529*
BONNERJEA, BIREN, *171*
BORSODI, RALPH, *297, 310*
BOSANQUET, HELEN, *171*
BOSSARD, J. H. S., *325, 327, 447, 354, 453*
BOWERS, A. M., *77, 82, 83, 90*
BRADLAUGH, CHARLES, *247*
BRANDT, LILIAN, *439, 395*
BRECKINRIDGE, SOPHONISBA P., *468, 212, 213, 499*
BEEUER, JOSEPH, *222*
BRIDGMAN, R. P., *538, 546*
BRIFFAULT, ROBERT, *116ff, 110, 142, 426, 575*
BROMLEY, DOROTHY D., *367, 415, 393, 394*
BRONNER, AUGUSTA F., *77, 505, 82, 83, 90, 52*

BRUNK, CHRISTINE, *512, 530*
BRUNO, F. J., *421, 426*
BRYANT, LOUISE S., *268*
BURGESS, E. W., *41, 445, 498, 41, 53, 500*
BURGESS, J. S., *170*
BURNHAM, W. A., *233*
BUTCHER, W. M., *504, 528*

C

CABOT, ELLA, 419
 CABOT, HUGH, 426
 CABOT, RICHARD C., 251
 CAHEN, ALFRED, 375ff, 475, 394, 453, 499
 CALHOUN, A. W., 154, 170
 CALL, LON RAY, 525
 CALVERTON, V. F., 116, 250, 142, 268, 398, 426, 427, 531
 CAMPBELL, MARIAN, 508, 529
 CAPPER, SENATOR, 372
 CARLSON, A. J., 56, 90
 CARPENTER, NILES, 170
 CARR-SAUNDERS, A. M., 240, 260, 263, 267, 269
 CARY, W. H., 269
 CATO, 145
 CATELL, J. McKEEN, 256, 268
 CAVAN, RUTH SHONLE, 574
 CHAMBERLIN, W. H., 575
 CHAMBERS, O. R., 504, 528
 CHAPIN, F. S., 179, 311
 CHASSELL, J. O., 512 ff, 530
 CHESTERTON, G. K., 181, 212
 CHILDERS, A. T., 512, 530
 CLARK, ELIZABETH, 450ff
 CLARK, MARJORIE, 310
 CLEOPATRA, 144
 COIT, ELEANOR, 288, 310
 COLCORD, JOANNA, 440, 453, 454
 COLLINS, J. E., 258, 269
 COLUMBUS, 405
 COMSTOCK, ANTHONY, 247
 COTTRELL, LEONARD S., 445, 463ff, 499
 COUGHLIN, FATHER, 236
 COX, HAROLD, 268
 CROMWELL, OLIVER, 151
 CRUX, J., 449, 454
 CUNNINGHAM, BESS V., 531
 CUTLER, JANET, 472
 DANIEL, G., 170
 DANN, ROBERT H., 256, 381, 390
 DARWIN, CHARLES, 45, 178, 221, 223, 560
 DASHIELL, J. F., 90

DAVID-SCHWARTZ, H., 454
 DAVIS, KATHERINE B., 2, 66, 249, 397, 398ff, 407, 435ff, 473, 268, 425, 453
 DAVIS, MURIEL, 451
 DAWSON, C. A., 188
 DAYTON, N. A., 269, 453
 DEARDORFF, NEVA R., 480
 DEBRICK, C. L., 395
 DELL, FLOYD, 410ff, 426
 DE PORTE, J. V., 453
 DE SCHWEINITZ, KARL, 547
 DICKENS, CHARLES, 545
 DICKINSON, ROBERT LATOU, 66, 436ff, 473, 268, 453, 499, 547
 DIKE, S. W., 378, 394
 DOUGLAS, PAUL, 311
 DOWNING, ELEANOR, 332
 DRUMMOND, ISABEL, 394
 DUBLIN, L. I., 265, 270
 DURAND-WEVER, ANNE-MARIE, 546
 DYSINGER, W. S., 406

E

EAST, E. M., 239, 261, 267
 EAST (and JONES), 104, 110
 EBERSTADT, 202
 EDIE, L. D., 212
 EDIN, K. A., 269
 ELIOT, T. D., 509, 311, 500, 529
 ELIZABETH, QUEEN, 150, 244
 ELLIOTT, MABEL, 400, 267, 425
 ELLIS, HAVELOCK, 408, 90
 ELMER, M. C., 453
 ELY, RICHARD, 202, 212
 EPSTEIN, ABRAHAM, 311
 ERNST, M. L., 268
 EVANS, WAINWRIGHT, 401, 393, 499
 EXNER, M. J., 546

FAIRCHILD, H. P., 499
 FENTON, N., 529
 FERNALD, W. E., 260
 FERRIS, RALPH II., 439
 FIELD, ALICE, 241, 267
 FIGGE, MARGARET, 530
 FLINN, H., 446, 453
 FLUGEL, J. C., 104ff, 110

FOLEY, PATRICIA, 512, 530
 FOLSOM, J. K., 38, 53, 90, 211, 454, 575
 FOSDICK, HARRY EMERSON, 538
 FOSTER, JAMES H., 528
 FOSTER, JOSEPHINE C., 530
 FOSTER, ROBERT G., 434, 540, 453, 541, 546
 FOSTER, S., 511, 529
 FRANK, L. K., 416, 232, 426
 FRAZIER, E. F., 171
 FREEMAN, MARGARET, 530
 FREUD, SIGMUND, 38, 58-66, 75ff, 104-109, 141, 178, 221, 465, 518, 560
 FRICK, DR., 566
 FRITZ, MARY A., 500

G

GALLOWAY, T. W., 535, 546
 GALPIN, C. J., 384, 355
 GAMBLE, S. D., 170
 GARRETT, H. E., 448, 454
 GEE, WILSON, 311
 GETTYS, W. E., 188
 GIBSON, EVELYN S., 334
 GINSBERG, M., 4, 122ff, 34, 143
 GIVENS, M. B., 232
 GLOVER, R. J., 387
 GOLDENWEISER, A. A., 89
 GOODENOUGH, FLORENCE L., 509, 529, 555
 GOODSELL, WILLYSTINE, 334, 170, 355
 GRAEBNER, 52, 559
 GRAY, GRETA, 282, 310
 GREEN, G., 2, 34
 GROVES, E. R., 330, 349, 373, 411, 435, 478, 533, 536, 537, 90, 267, 354, 355, 394, 426, 453, 499, 531, 546, 547
 GROVES, GLADYS H., 531, 546. See also GROVES, E. R.
 GUETT, DR., 262
 GUREWITSCH, Z. A., 425

H

HAEGER, F., 449, 454
 HAINES, ALICE R., 507, 529
 HALL, F. S., 351, 355
 HALL, G. STANLEY, 80, 509
 HALLE, RITA, 395

HAMIL, B. M., 512, 530
 HAMILTON, G. V., 2, 66, 78, 249, 397, 398ff, 407, 435ff, 465, 473, 90, 268, 425, 453, 499
 HAMMETT, F. S., 528
 HANAU, STELLA, 250
 HANDMAN, M. S., 267
 HANKINS, FRANK H., 264, 171, 269, 393
 HARDING, ESTHER, 417, 426
 HARMSEN, HANS, 264, 269
 HARPER, ELSIE, 288, 310
 HARPER, ERNEST B., 540, 528, 546
 HARPER, R. M., 336, 355
 HART, HORNELL, 154, 174, 211, 353, 406, 170, 212, 214, 232, 355, 425
 HARVEY, O. L., 66, 264, 399, 90, 425
 HARVEY, P. N., 354
 HAUSHEER, HERMAN, 338, 355
 HAUSWIRTH, FRIEDA, 171

I

HEALY, WILLIAM, 77, 82, 505, 540, 83, 90, 528
 HECKE, WILLIAM, 170
 HENRY VIII, 150
 HICKSON, W. J., 439
 , JOSEPH A., 192, 213
 HIMES, NORMAN, 247, 268
 HINDUS, MAURICE B., 425, 574
 HIPONAX, 145
 HIXENBAUGH, ELINOR R., 393, 443, 540, 395, 453

I

HOBHOUSE, L. T., 4, 133ff, 141, 34, 142
 HODGKISS, M., 508, 529
 HOEY, J. M., 504, 528
 HOFFMAN, C. W., 439
 HOFFMAN, F. L., 426
 HOOVER, CALVIN B., 575
 HOOVER, HERBERT, President, 212
 HOPKINS, CORNELIA, 507, 529
 HOUGH, ELIZABETH, 530
 HUGHES, 398
 HULL, BRADLEY, 439
 HUNTINGTON, ELLSWORTH, 260, 269
 HURLIN, R. G., 232
 HUTTON, ISABEL, 546

I

IWASAKI, YASU, 169, 170, 395

INDEX OF NAMES

JACOBY, A. L., 446, 453
 JEFFERSON, THOMAS, 516
 JENKINS, GLADYS, 446, 453
 JENKINS, R. L., 529
 JOCHELSON, 123
 JOHNSON, ROSWELL H., 334, 269
 JONES, ERNEST, 104, 110
 JONES, H. E., 448, 454
 JUDD, C. H., 207, 213
 JUDY, HELEN, 311
 JUNG, CARL J., 107, 515

KAHN, ERNST, 447, 453
 KEMPF, E. J., 94, 96, 110
 KENYON, B., 334
 KEPPEL, F. B., 196, 213, 214
 KEY, ELLEN, 207
 KEYSERLING, HERMANN, COUNT, 414,
 468, 170, 426, 499
 KIPLING, RUDYARD, 168, 170
 KIRKPATRICK, CLIFFORD, 547
 KLEIN, E., 516
 KLINEBERG, OTTO, 269
 KNEELAND, HILDEGARDE, 190, 192, 213,
 311
 KNIGHT, M. M., 110
 KNOWLTON, CHARLES, 247
 KNOX, JOHN, 151
 KOMAROVSKY, MIREA, 212
 KRETSCHMER, E., 449, 454
 KROEGER, A. L., 559, 53
 KRUEGER, E. T., 500
 KUCHYNSKI, R. R., 257, 269
 KULP, D. H., 123, 164ff, 110, 142, 170
 KYRK, HAZEL, 192, 195, 287, 299, 300,
 212, 310

LAIRD, D. A., 528
 LAMPORT, NATALIE, 450ff
 LANGDON-DAVIES, JOHN, 78, 156, 90,
 170, 171
 LA PIERE, R. T., 157, 170, 212
 LASHLEY, K. S., 250, 268
 LAWRENCE, D. H., 75, 406

LAWS, GERTRUDE, 530
 LEAHY, ALICE M., 509, 529
 LEE, IVY, 575
 LEE, MARY, 395
 LEE, 448
 LENIN, 570
 LENROOT, KATHERINE, 267
 LESSER, A., 142
 LEVANTHAL, M. L., 270
 LEVY, JOHN, 506, 507, 510, 512, 520,
 521, 525, 528, 529, 530
 LEWENBERG, MARTHA, 530
 LEWISOHN, LUDWIG, 426, 574
 LEYBURN, J. G., 143
 LICHTENBERGER, JAMES P., 365, 372,
 384, 391, 394, 453
 LINDEMAN, E. C., 207, 503, 213, 574
 LINDQUIST, RUTH, 300, 311
 LINDSEY, BENJAMIN B., 358ff, 383,
 400, 468, 393, 499
 LOOMIS, C. P., 322, 354
 LOTKA, A. F., 255, 268
 LOWIE, R. H., 102, 117, 127, 131, 133,
 135, 136, 138, 140, 141, 559, 142
 LOWEY, L. G., 531
 LUBBOCK, 113
 LUBLINSKY, PAUL, 391
 LUMPKIN, KATHERINE D., 500
 LUNDBERG, EMMA O., 267
 LUNDBERG, G. A., 212
 LUTHER, MARTIN, 150
 LYND, R. S. and H. M., 187, 191, 197,
 200, 202, 210, 225, 250, 522, 525,
 170, 212, 233, 268, 530

M

MACGOWAN, KENNETH, 407
 McCCLURE, W. E., 268
 MCCORMICK, ANNE, 310, 575
 McDougall, WILLIAM, 67, 90
 McGARRAGHY, F. L., 211
 McGINNIS, J. A., 504, 528
 McINERNY, MARY A., 188, 212
 McKay, H. D., 529
 MCKENZIE, R. D., 213
 McLENNAN, J. F., 104, 113, 110
 MAINE, SIR HENRY, 113
 MALINOWSKI, BRONISLAW, 3, 109, 112,
 34, 110, 142

INDEX OF NAMES

589

MALLER, J. B., 510, 529
 MALTHUS, T. R., 238
 MANASSES, CARLYN, 256, 288, 407, 268,
 310, 426
 MANGOLD, G. B., 528
 MARETT, R. R., 212
 MARGOLD, C. W., 427
 MARSHALL, LEON, 373, 376, 394
 MARVIN, D. M., 447, 453
 MAY, GEOFFREY, 367, 376, 355, 394, 427
 MEAD, LAURA L., 529
 MEAD, MARGARET, 80, 509, 545, 90, 110,
 142, 143, 547, 575
 MERRILL, FRANCIS E., 400, 267, 425
 MESSEY, MARY B., 171
 MILLAY, EDNA ST. VINCENT, 494
 MILLER, H. A., 171
 MILLER, NATHAN, 143
 MILLS, W. B., 211
 MILTON, JOHN, 151
 MIRA, EMILIO, 162
 MITCHELL, FRANCES, 339
 MITCHELL, T. W., 76
 MONROE, DAY, 189 ff, 212, 310
 MORENO, JACOB, 42
 MORGAN, J. J. B., 531
 MORGAN, LEWIS H., 113, 115, 117, 131,
 142
 MORGAN, WILLIAM L., 439
 MOSELEY, JESSIE O., 338, 355
 MOWRER, E. R., 188, 204, 205, 383, 386,
 391, 443, 467, 475, 212, 394, 395,
 453, 499, 530, 546
 MOWRER, HARRIET R., 433, 477, 543,
 499, 546
 MUDGETT, MILDRED D., 355
 MUNROE, 507
 MURCHISON, CARL, 531
 MURPHY, GARDNER and LOIS, 258, 269,
 528
 MURPHY, J. P., 505, 528
 MYERSON, ABRAHAM, 261, 269, 310
 MYRICK, HELEN L., 543, 547

N

NEUMANN, HENRY, 421, 426
 NEWCOMER, MABEL, 384, 386, 269, 395
 NEWELL, H. W., 514, 530

NICOLAI, DR., 566
 NIEDERLE, 170
 NIENBURG, B. M., 212
 NIMKOFF, M. F., 531
 NOCK, A. J., 204, 213
 NOETZEL, ELINOR, 529
 NOTESTEIN, F. W., 256, 324

OGBURN, W. F., 175, 178, 211, 316-330,
 375-389, 212, 214, 232, 268, 354,
 394, 395, 453, 499
 O'NEILL, E. F., 387, 395
 O'ROURKE, DOROTHY, 454
 OWEN, ROBERT, 280

P

PARK, R. E., 41, 171
 PARKER, IDA R., 268
 PARRAN, THOMAS, 426
 PARSLEY, M., 510, 529
 PARTEN, MILDRED, 189, 212
 PAVLOV, I. P., 37, 231, 573
 PEARL, RAYMOND, 66, 249, 268
 PEARSON, G. H. J., 530
 PEARSON, KARL, 448
 PECK, M. W., 398, 401, 425
 PERRY, JOSEPHINE, 141
 PETERS, C. C., 406, 426
 PETERS, IVA L., 110
 PHELPS, H. A., 232, 395
 PHILLIPS, JOHN C., 255, 260, 268, 355
 PIEXOTTO, JESSICA, 311
 PINKEVICH, A. P., 426
 PLACE, FRANCIS, 247
 PLANT, JAMES, 188, 202, 210, 507, 527,
 212, 214, 529, 531
 PLATO, 113, 417
 POPENOE, PAUL, 339, 343, 473, 534,
 541, 269, 355, 499
 PRATT, G. K., 497, 500
 PRESSEY, LUILLA, 521, 530
 PRUETTE, LORINE, 292, 310, 500

Q

QUEEN, S. A., 528, 546

R

RABELAIS, 230, 406
 RAINWATER, CLARENCE, 272, 310
 RATHBONE, ELEANOR, 171
 RATZEL, FRIEDRICH, 559
 REAM, M. J., 451, 454
 REID, 287
 REITMAN, BEN, 399, 402, 425
 REUTER, E. B., 468, 499
 RICE, STUART, 256, 213, 268
 RICHMOND, MARY E., 351, 355
 RIPLEY, W. A., 454
 ROBINSON, VIRGINIA P., 547
 ROGERS, ROBERT CAMERON, 418
 ROLLINS, W. A., 256, 268
 ROSENOW, CURT, 510, 529
 ROSS, BERTHA M., 529
 ROSS, EDWARD A., 255, 288, 322, 171,
 268, 310, 528
 ROUSSEAU, 111
 RUBINOW, I. M., 380, 381, 394
 RUCKMICK, C. A., 406
 RUML, BEARDSLEY, 430
 RUNNER, JESSIE B., 468, 499
 RUSSELL, BERTEAND, 403, 175, 397, 427
 RUSSELL, DORA, 414

S

SADGER, 60
 ST. PAUL, 147
 SALVESEN, LORD, 393
 SANDERSON, DWIGHT, 376, 434, 394, 453
 SANGER, MARGARET, 179, 248
 SAPIR, EDWARD, 423, 554, 573, 426, 574
 SCHEUMANN, F. K., 546
 SCHIELDS, WILMER, 353, 355
 SCHILLER, BELLE, 449, 451, 454
 SCHMALHAUSEN, S. D., 426, 427, 531
 SOHUSTER, 449, 454
 SCOPES, JOHN T., 221
 SELLING, L. S., 427
 SENDER, S., 520, 530
 SEWALL, M., 511, 529
 SHAW, CLIFFORD, 458 ff, 506, 508, 499,
 528, 529
 SHEFFIELD, ADA E., 500, 547
 SHERK, MRS. ELGIN, 541

SLINGERLAND, W. H., 528
 SMALLEY, RUTH, 511, 529
 SMITH, EDITH L., 419, 426
 SMITH, ELLIOT, 52
 SNEDDEN, DAVID, 277, 310
 SOBOKIN, P. A., 384, 355
 SPENCER, HERBERT, 104, 111, 113, 114,
 117, 125
 SPENGLER, J. J., 256, 269
 SPENGLER, OSWALD, 554, 555, 574
 SPRANGER, EDWARD, 224, 233
 STACK, HERBERT, 311
 STANTON, ELIZABETH CODY, 372
 STAPLES, RUTH, 282, 310
 STAUFFER, W. H., 311
 STECKEL, MINNIE L., 529
 STEIN, I. F., 270
 STEINER, J. F., 197, 213, 214, 267, 310,
 425
 STEPHEN, J. M., 528
 STONE, C. P., 94, 90, 110
 STOPES, MARIE C., 248, 546
 STUART, J. C., 529
 STURGIS, LAURA L., 500
 SULLIVAN, H. S., 426
 SUMNER, W. G., 170
 SWIFT, EDITH HALE, 541
 SYDENSTRICKER, EDGAR, 256, 232, 426

TAFT, JESSIE, 517, 518
 TAGORE, RABINDRANATH, 170
 TAYLOR, W. S., 86, 90
 TERHUNE, WM. B., 489
 TERRY, GLADYS, 465
 THARP, BERTHA B., 337
 THOMAS, DOROTHY S., 316, 531
 THOMAS, W. I., 39, 86, 88, 53, 90, 171,
 531
 THOMPSON, W. S., 240, 253-266, 319-
 329,
 THOREK, M., 90
 THORNDIKE, E. L., 38
 THUROW, MILDRED, 434
 THURSTONE, L. L., 529
 TIBBITS, CLARK, 268
 TILLOTSON, H. S., 394
 TILSON, M. A., 530
 TILTON, BENJAMIN, 241

TOOPS, LAURA C., 454
 TOZZER, A. M., 142
 TYLOR, E. B., 113, 115, 131, 141, 142

UCHARD, MARIO, 426
 USILTON, LIDA J., 426

VAN DE VELDE, T. H., 500, 546
 VAN KLEECK, MISS, 336, 355
 VAN RENNSLAER, MARTHA, 530
 VAN WATERS, MIRIAM, 519
 VEBLEN, THORSTEIN, 154, 186, 212
 VETTER, G. B., 105, 110
 VILLARD, O. G., 574

W

WAGGAMAN, MARY T., 311
 WAITE, W. C., 311
 WALLER, W. E., 373, 468, 394, 499
 WANG, CHENG, 157, 170, 212
 WARD, LESTER F., 73, 154, 170
 WARNER, A. G., 528, 546
 WATSON, G., 2, 34
 WATSON, G. B., 275, 310
 WATSON, JOHN B., 222, 250, 527, 268, 531
 WATSON, MAUD E., 531
 WATSON, ROSALIE R., 531
 WATT, JAMES, 179
 WEISSENBERG, S., 403, 426
 WELLS, F. L., 398, 401, 425
 WEMBRIDGE, ELEANOR, 339, 355
 WESTERMARCK, E. A., 103ff, 111, 115, 117, 125, 110, 142
 WHEELER, G. C., 4, 122ff, 34, 142

WHELPTON, P. K., 262, 265, 319-329, 501, 269, 354, 528
 WHITNEY, LEON, 269
 WHYTE, ANNE H., 529
 WIETH-KNUDSEN, K. A., 155, 170
 WILE, IRA S., 529
 WILLCOX, WALTER F., 375, 384, 392, 394
 WILLEY, M. M., 213
 WILLIAMS, FAITH, 190
 WILLOUGHBY, R. R., 256, 268
 WILSON, MAUD, 194, 296, 300, 212, 310
 WINSTON, SANFORD, 268
 WIRT, W. A., 277
 WIRTH, LOUIS, 171
 WISSLER, CLARK, 34, 559
 WITMER, HELEN L., 535, 546
 WOLBARST, A. L., 170
 WOLF, JANE, 472
 WOOD, L. FOSTER, 541
 WOODHOUSE, CHASE G., 434, 444, 453
 WOODY, T., 575
 WORCESTER, D. A., 509, 529
 WOROSCHBIT, A. J., 426
 WRIGHT, HELENA, 546
 WUNDT, WILHELM, 104

YARROS, RACHELLE S., 541
 YOUNG, DONALD, 171
 YOUNG, KIMBALL, 85, 275, 457, 90, 395, 499
 YOUNG, LILLIE, 311

ZIMMERMAN, C. C., 384, 311, 355
 ZNANIECKI, FLORIAN, 171
 ZORBAUGH, HARVEY, 171

INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Bibliographical references are italicized. The Preface, Appendix, and Summaries on pp. 549-552 are not indexed.

Abortion, 5, 147, 240ff, 263
Accidents, children's, 284ff
Adolescence, 80
Adoption, 22
Adrenals, 58
Adultery, 20, 26, 75, 79, 139ff, 163, 362, 368, 377, 397ff, 444, 474
Affection, 21, 33, 139ff, 416, 512, 528.
See also Love.
Age at marriage, 322ff, 353
Age differences, 8, 437
Age distribution, 501
Age of consent, 350
Age requirements, 13, 350
Aged, status of, 165, 167, 311
Algonkin, 133
Alimony, 373, 377
Allo-erotism, 63
Alternating approach, pattern of, 479
Ambivalence, 84
American family, history of, 170
Anal eroticism, 60ff, 76ff, 518
Anatomy, 36
Andaman Islands, 137, 138
Animals, sexual behavior of, 110
Annoyance, *see* Irritation.
Annulment, 361, 370, 374, 389
Anthropology, 559ff
Apartments, 199ff
Appreciation in marriage, *see* Gratitude.
Art, 30
Artifacts, 44
Aryans, 144, 566ff
Asceticism, *see* Celibacy.
Asiatic family patterns, 164ff
Athabaskans, 127, 138
Atherton case, 370
Attitudes, 39, 48
and mate selection, 451ff
cultural, *see* Culture.
group, 49
Australia, 102, 117, 130, 135
Austria, 568
Authority, parental, *see* Children.
Auto-erotism, 63
Automobile, 196ff
Autonomic nervous system, 57
Avoidances, 34, 96ff, 140ff
Avunculate, 134

B

Bachelors' quarters, 16
Balance-of-trade analysis, 487ff
Balanced life, 561
Baltimore, 250
Basques, 51
Behavior, 36, 38
 appetitive, 57
 defensive, 58
"Behavior" problems of children, 504ff
Behaviorism, 222
Bereaved family, 500
Betrothal, 15
Bigamy, 351, 371
Biological discoveries, 219ff
Biologically adequate stimuli, 59
Birth, 5, 22, 241
 control, *see* Contraception.
 illegitimate, *see* Illegitimacy.
 order, 529
 rate, 188, 262ff
 differential, 253ff

Bisexual initiative, 345
 Blackfoot, 102
 "Blame"-ideology, sin, 440, 525, 537, 545
 Blood-grouping test for paternity, 244
Book of Marriage, The, 170
 Borneo, 121
 Brattleboro plan, 311
 Bulgaria, 362
 Bundling, 161
 Burden-carrying (analogy), 48
 Business cycle, depression, 183, 185, 316
 California marriage law, 352
 Cancer, 218
 Canon law, 347
 Case work, social, *see* Treatment.
Case Work, Changing Psychology in, 547
 Cathexis, 63, 79
 Catholics, *see* Religious sects.
 Celibacy, asceticism, 126, 147, 161, 169, 242
Century of the Child, The, 207
 Change, 36
 cultural, social, 37, 117, 123, 173ff, 235ff, 425, 430ff, 549ff
 initiating, 175ff
 of rôle or life-pattern, 564ff
 personality, 79ff, 356, 455ff, 498
 populational, 216ff, 238ff, 501
 Chemistry, bodily, 56, 505
 Chicago, 188, 189, 374
 University of, 41
 Vice Commission, 104
 Child, *see* Children; Parents.
 "cult of," 206
 guidance clinics, 540
 "idolatry," 525
 labor, 21, 207, 275ff
 placing, 528
Child in Primitive Society, The, 143
Child Marriages, 355
 Childbirth, *see* Birth.
 Childlessness, 9, 127, 273
 Children, care of, 20, 271ff, 501ff
 cost of raising, 265, 272ff
 discipline, 20, 105, 160, 168, 205ff, 503ff, 515ff, 522ff
 divorce and, 382
 rôle of, 138, 154, 158ff, 204ff, 276ff
Children's Bureau Publications, 531
 Children's institutions, 501, 527
 China, 77, 122ff, 137, 145, 157, 164ff, 177, 184
 filial piety, love, 77
 Chivalry, 20, 73, 149ff, 158, 368, 378, 417
 Choice of mates, *see* Marital selection.
 Christianity, Christian ethics, 147, 242ff, 489ff
 Chuckchi, 118
 Church, the, 148ff, 157ff, 347ff, 360ff, 370
 Circumstantial factors in discord, 441ff
 Civilization, 35, 112, 115
 Classes, *see* Social classes.
 Classical theory, 113
 Clothing, 30
 Cohabitation, unmarried, 357ff
 College graduates: marriage and divorce, 333ff, 385ff, 355, 395
 College students, maladjustment of, 521
 Collusion in divorce, 366ff
 Common law, 244
 marriage, 348, 357
 Common sense, 1, 118, 503, 544
 Communism, 424, 527, 569ff
 Companionate marriage, 358ff, 383, 411
 Compensation (dynamism), 87, 507
 Compromise, 486
 Concealment of sex behavior, 28, 100, 412
 Concubinage, 126, 145
 Conditioning, 37, 60, 221, 495
 Conference technique, joint, 544
 Configurations, 36
 of culture, 170
 Conflict, in general, 41, 48, 97, 423
 marital conflict or discord, 19, 312ff, 431ff, 463ff, 478ff, 497
 weapons of, 497
 Conroy case, 480ff
Consumers' Research, 301

Consumption, *311*
 "competitive" or rivalrous, *186, 282*

Contraception, *6, 220, 239ff, 247ff, 323*
 clinics, *248ff*
 laws, *247ff*

Conversion (dynamism), *81, 88*

Co-operation of mothers, *283, 290*

Country Life in South China, 110

Courtship, *12, 14, 23, 24, 71, 342ff, 451*
 initiative in, *345*

Cousin, cross, *12, 102, 132*
 marriage, *351*
 parallel, *102, 132*

Couvade, *51, 115*

Cranio-sacral, *57, 69, 75*

Credit economy, *186*

Criminals, crime, *556*

Crow Indians, *130, 136, 140*

Cuba, *363*

Culture, cultural, *35, 44, 52, 54, 457, 519, 554ff*
 attitudes or sentiments, *49, 236, 326, 392, 542*
 differentiation in marriage, *467ff*
 diffusion, *46, 52, 134, 141, 559*
 dominant drive, *149, 223*
 dynamic, *175ff, 235ff, 289*
 homogeneous, *554ff*
 lag, *175ff, 235ff, 292, 412, 522*
 maladjustment, *175ff*
 material, *44*
 pastoral or nomadic, *124, 133ff*
 patterns, *see Culture*.
 readjustment, *175ff, 238ff*
 resistance, *176ff, 235ff, 306, 314, 345, 369, 423, 542*

Czechoslovakia, *156, 158, 196, 221, 391, 170*

Dakota Indians, *130*

Dancing, *28*

Date-booking bureau, *345*

Day nursery, *280*

Death rates, mortality, *183, 217ff, 316*

Debut, *23*

Decameron, The, 149

Decline of the West, The, 555

Defloration, public, *100*

Delinquency, juvenile, *504ff, 508, 528ff*

Denmark, *415*

Denver, *309*

Dependence, *63, 107, 476, 512, 515*

Depression, *see Business cycle*.

Desertion, *374, 377, 387, 439, 440, 395, 453, 454*

Diabetes, *218*

Diffusion, *see Culture*.

Discipline, *see Children*.

Discord, *see Conflict*.

Discoveries, biological, *219ff*

Disorganization, *see Family; Personality; Social*.

Displacement, *81, 84*

Dissociation, *84*

District of Columbia, *379, 389*

Diversity of family pattern, *561ff*

Divorce, *8, 127, 148, 157, 169, 220, 317, 318, 356ff, 411, 414ff, 438, 539, 568*
 and children, *508*
 "bootleg," *360*
 law, *360ff*
 legal causes, *364, 377*
 migratory, *373, 378*
 probability, *375*
 uniform law, *372ff*

Divorce Court, The, 394

Domestic Relations Courts, *538*

Dominant drive, *see Culture*.

Downey W-T test, *451*

Drives, *see Wishes*.

Dynamisms, *80ff*

Ecological patterns, processes, changes; ecology, *198ff, 205, 271, 294, 506*

Education, schools, *22, 112, 207ff, 276ff, 309*
 and birth rate, *254ff*
 for family life, *532-536, 310, 311*
 home economics, *309, 532, 310, 311*
 parent, *537ff, 213*
 sex, *533ff*

Educational sociology, *310*.

Effect, law of, *38*

Ego, *81ff*

Egypt, *128, 144, 247*

Electra complex, *108, 466*

Electricity, *194ff*

Elkton, Md., 352, 353
 Elopement, 12
 Emotional problems, *see* Personality.
 Emotions, 56
 and metabolic stability, 528
 Empathy, 481ff, 491ff, 545
 Endocrine glands, 505
 Endogamy, 10, 128ff, 169, 446
 Engagement, *see* Betrothal.
 England, divorce in, 361, 414
 homogamy in, 448
 Equal Rights Amendment, 204
 Eroticism, *see* Anal; Auto-; Oral; Sex.
 Escape response, 477
 Eskimo, 138
Ethnography, Handbook of, 143
 Ethnology, 559. *See also* Culture.
 Europe, divorce and love mores, 360ff,
 391, 414ff
 Euthanasia, 243
 Eve, the "temptress," 147, 151
 Evolution, 45, 111ff, 133ff,
 Evolutionary theory of family, 113ff
 Ewe, 139
 Exhibitionism, 65
 Exogamy, 10, 102ff, 128ff, 169
 Expectation of life, 216, 263
Experience Variables, The, 530
 Extroversion-introversion, 449

Familiarities, 34, 140ff
 Family: allowances, *see* Family subsidies.
 areas, 205
 courts, 538
 disorganization, 374, 429ff
 farm families, 453
 financial problems, 434, 444, 467, 475,
 525
 history, 170, Ch. VI
 immigrant, 171
 pattern, diversity of, 561ff
 problems in general, 179ff, 235ff,
 312ff, 420, 550ff
 Relations, Institute of, *see* Los Angeles.
 romance, 108ff
 size, unit, 188ff

Family—(*Continued*)
 subsidies, extra-wage, 279, 566, 511
 successful, 433ff, 463
 Welfare Societies, 539
 Fascism, 174, 527, 553ff
 Fatherhood, 5, 52, 121, 244
 Fecundity, *see* Birth.
 Feeble-mindedness, 260ff, 446, 269
 Feminism, 152ff, 203
 Fetishism, 65
 Feudalism, 148
 Fiction, novels, literature, 226, 231, 406,
 412, 421, 500
 Finances, family, *see* Family.
 First-born, *see* Ordinal position.
 Fisher Act, 280
 Fixation, 62, 79
 Flirting, 474
Folkways, 170
 Fondness, 76
 Foster parents, foster homes, 22, 501ff,
 508
 France, 152, 156, 160, 263, 279, 363
 Fraternities, 341
French and Oriental Love, 426
 Friendships, children's, 453
Fruits of Philosophy, The, 247
 Frustration, 79ff, 185, 238, 332, 422,
 440, 466, 483ff
 in love, 467ff
 interpersonal, 469ff
 major and minor, 482ff
 non-interpersonal, 468ff, 475
 Function, functional point of view, 36,
 54, 175, 282, 303

| Gary system, 277
| Geisha
| Generosity in marriage, 486ff. *See also*
| Gratitude.
| Genetic study of personality, 455ff
| Genitals, 30, 60ff
| Gens, gentes, 129
| Gentling of reactions, 68
| Germany, 261, 294, 402, 416, 541, 565ff
| Gestalt, 443, 444, 449, 454
| *Getting a Divorce*, 594

Ghetto, The, 171
 "Gin marriage law," 352
 "Glass-of-water" concept, 424
 Goals, 39
 instrumental, 39, 572
 Grandparents, care by, 286
 Gratitude, 487ff, 516
 Greeks, 135, 144ff
 Greenwich Village, 357
 Gretna Green, 351
 Group marriage, 122, 132
Growing Up, 547
 Growth process, 36, 81
 Guilt, sense of, 74, 525. *See also* Blame.

H

Habits, 39
Haddock case, 370
 Happiness, 173ff, 224, 243, 275, 397, 429ff, 438, 484, 518, 510
 and age at marriage, 355
 Harvard, 255
 Hawaii, 131, 186
 Health, desire for, 218, 243
 insurance, 311
 Hebrews, ancient, 135, 145ff
 Hetairae, 145
 Heterosexuality, 23, 65, 91, 94
Hobo, The, 499
 Home, household, 570
 broken, 508, 453
 building, Conference on, 194, 195
 economic functions of, 159, 190ff, 287ff, 299
 time spent in housework, 192ff, 290ff, 304ff
 economics, 309, 532, 310, 311
 ownership, 202ff
 rating scale, 311
Home Economics, Bureau of, 192, 194
Home Life in Grove Manor, 188
 Homogamy, 448ff
 Homosexuality, 23, 65, 145, 243, 416, 463, 567
 Hopi, 141
 Hormones, 56. *See also* Endocrine glands.
 Hospitals, foundling, 244
 maternity, 245
 Household, *see* Home.
 Housework, *see* Home.
 Housing, 16, 199ff, 281ff, 294, 310
 Human nature, 35, 50, 116, 120
Humanity Uprooted, 426
 Hungary, 568
 Hunger, 56
 Hupa, 138
 Hysteria, 81, 88
 Id, 81, 82
Ideal Marriage, 546
 Identification, 85
 Ideology, 44, 177, 219ff, 242ff, 552ff
 Illegitimacy, 10, 162, 244ff, 354
 Imitation, 46, 457
 Immigrants, *see* Nationalities; Family.
Immigrants and Their Children, 170
 Impotence, 96
 Incest, incest taboo, 32, 65, 67, 102ff, 141, 147
 Incompatibility, 362, 443ff, 467, 500
 India, 119, 128, 144, 165ff, 171
 Individualism, individuation, 180, 223ff, 342, 467ff, 476, 522, 527, 553ff
 economic, 467
 Indonesia, 121
 Industrial Revolution, industrialization, 152ff, 180ff, 189ff
 Infant mortality, 217
 Infanticide, 6, 20, 145, 167, 242, 263
 Infatuation, 69ff, 72
 Inferiority feeling or complex, 469ff, 507, 560
 Inheritance, 13
 Initiating changes, *see* Change.
 In-laws, taboos upon, etc., 140ff
 Insanity, *see* Mental diseases.
 Insight, 459, 491ff
 Instalment buying, 186, 196
 Instinct, 47, 100ff, 121
 Institutionalization, social institutions, 3, 48, 564
 children's institutions, 501, 527
 Intelligence, native, 258ff, 505, 506
 and economic status, 528
Intelligence test for parents, 531

Interaction, social, 40, 48, 91ff, 104, 449, 477

Intercourse, *see* Sexual intercourse; Adultery.

Interstimulation, 42

Introjection, 85

Introversion, 449

Invention, 51, 177ff, 183ff

Inviolability of soul and body, 243ff

Iroquois, 130, 133, 135

Irritation, spread of, 494ff

Italy, 554, 557

Jack Roller, The, 458

Japan, 164, 169ff, 390, 403, 554, 557

Jealousy, 72, 105, 116, 161, 292, 413, 470, 474, 485, 511

Jennie gets her man, Why, 355

Jews, 453, 454. *See also* Religious sects.

Jus primae noctis, 149

Juvenile courts, 539

K case, 489

Kai, 127, 137

Kariera, 130

Kent-Rosanoff test, 449

Khasi, 135

Kikuyu, 127

Kindergarten, 208, 210

Kinship organization, 11, 113, 129
terminology, 130ff
see also Sibs.

Kirghiz, 138, 141

Kissing, caressing, 28, 61ff, 70, 79, 407

Koryak, 123

Kuhlman-Binet tests, 530

Labor, market, 293
-saving devices, 299, 303
subdivision and specialization, 188, 227, 291ff, 298ff

Latin America, 156, 245

Learning, 36

Leisure, 228, 289, 306, 563
Leisure, a Suburban Study, 212
Leisure Class, The Theory of the, 212

Levirate, 12, 181ff

Liberalism, liberty, 527, 553ff, 571ff

Libido, 58ff

Life-task, 107

Limited possibilities, principle of, 89

Literature, *see* Fiction

Longevity, *see* Expectation of life.

Los Angeles Institute of Family Relations, 473, 534, 541

Love, 58ff, 430
affairs, 70, 78, 81
cardiac-respiratory or excited, 24, 64-74
competition with irritation, 495
constancy, loyalty, 72, 95
dermal or tender, 23, 64-67ff, 106
falling in love, 70, 78, 81
free, *see* Love mores.
frustration, 467ff
mores and taboos (also sexual), 23, 98ff, 112, 139ff, 146, 160-167, 229ff, 358ff, 392, 396ff, 485, 563-570
Platonic, 76
romantic, 24, 149, 408, 416
security in, 232
tender, *see* Love, dermal.
Love in the Machine Age, 426

M

Machinery, household, 195ff, 297

Magic, 32, 112
"Magic secret," 545

Magyars, 568

Malabar,

Maladjustment, juvenile, 504

Malaria, cause of (analogy), 181

Manchester, N. H., 159, 191

Mankind at the Crossroads, 267

Mann Act, 402

Manus (Melanesia), 139

Marriage, marital, 8, 71, 312ff
ceremony, ritual, 14, 121, 145, 148, 347
clinics, 540
conflict, discord, *see* Conflict.

Marriage—(Continued)

- failure, *see* Marriage success.
- forced, 354
- group, 122, 132
- interaction, 477ff
- inter-racial, 351
- laws, legislation, 346ff
- license, 349ff
- market, 344ff
- of non-residents, 351
- qualifications for, 13, 350, 405
- rates, 316ff
- selection, choice of mates, 10, 12, 102, 131, 135, 158, 165, 315ff, 342ff, 447ff
- “shot-gun,” 246
- social status, relation to, 338
- status, 7, 316ff, 347
- success and failure, 435-440ff, 454
- trial, 356ff

Marriage and Morals, 427

Marriageability of occupations, 339

Married Love, 546

Mary (ease), 517

Masochism, 65

Masturbation, 23, 60, 87

Match-makers, 12, 343

Material culture, 44

Matriarchy, 135

Matriliney, 13, 116, 129, 132ff

Matrilocalism, 16, 133

Matronymy, 130

Medicine, medical discovery, 215ff, 405

Melanesia, 3, 121, 138

Menstruation, 520

Mental defectives, *see* Feeble-mindedness.

Mental diseases, insanity, 269, 445

Mental hygiene, 224, 286, 557ff, 564

Merrill-Palmer Advisory Service, 541

Metabolic stability, *see* Emotions.

Mexico, 163, 363, 371

Middle Ages, medieval culture, 148, 243, 569

Middletown, 187, 191, 200, 202, 207, 210, 225, 250, 522, 525, 530

Migration, 559, 560

Mobility, social, *see* Social mobility.

Modern Youth and Marriage, 426

Modesty, 30

Mohammedan culture, 145, 166

Monogamy, 115, 125ff, 146, 408, 424

Montenegro, 122

Moors, 156

Mormons, 154

Mortality, *see* Death rates; Infant mortality.

Mortgages on Homes, 213

Mother-daughter relationship, 517

Mothers, The, 116, 148

Mothers' allowances, 502

Mothers' co-operation, *see* Co-operation.

Motion picture, 210, 231, 406

Murder (analogy), 108

Mutual annoyance, 494ff

Mutual consent, 359ff, 378

Mutual rapprochement, 479

N

Nairs, 121

Namburuti, 121

Names, 13, 23

Napoleonic code, 152

Narcism, 63, 76, 86

National income, 183

Nationalities, immigrants, Americanization, 323, 328, 387, 475, 498, 507, 516

Natural increase, 263

“Nature,” “natural,” 50, 93, 127, 267

Navaho, 141

Nazis, National Socialists, German, 566ff

Nebraska marriage law, 352

Needs, *see* Wishes.

Negativism, 521.

Negro, 351, 384, 447.

Neo-Malthusianism, 247

“Nervous” energy, 59

Nervous Housewife, The, 310

Nervous system, 37

Nervousness in housework, 299, 303

Nevada divorce, 371, 378

‘New’ code of love mores, 408, 419

New England, 154, 161, 348

New Girls for Old, 310

New Guinea, 121, 137

New Jersey divorces, 384
 New York City, 198
 New York State, divorce, 379, 382, 389
 Training School for Girls, 42
 New Zealand, 217
 Nomadism, *see* Culture, pastoral.
 Non-marriage, failure to marry, 338ff
 Non-personality factors, 444
Normal Mind, The, 233
 North Carolina marriage law, 352
 Northwest Indians, 556
 Nostalgia, 430, 509
 Novel, *see* Fiction.
 Novelty, desire for, 40, 69, 103, 422
 Nudity, nudism, 25, 30, 231, 560
 Nursery school, 280, 310
 Nursing, 100

Obligations, economic, 14
 Occupations, and divorce, 384
 and mate selection, 447
 Oedipus complex, mother-complex, 108, 169, 465, 514, 516
Old Love and the New, The, 394
 Only children, *see* Ordinal position.
 Oral: eroticism, love, stage, 60-66ff, 108
 Ordering-and-forbidding technique, 544
 Ordinal position, 501, 509ff, 529
 Oregon, divorces, 392
 home-makers, 194, 296, 300
 sterilization case, 261
 Organic, organism, 36, 45
 Orgasm, *see* Sex.
 Orphans, 502
 Over-protection and under-protection, 512ff

Parallelism, 51
 Paranoia, 87, 459
 Parent-child relation, 57, 100, 138, 458, 502, 510ff
 conflict in, 521
 emotional aspects, parental love, 67ff, 100-105ff, 266, 510ff, 571

Parent education, 537ff, 513
 Parent-in-law, *see* In-laws.
 Parents, progressive, 524ff
 Part-time jobs, 292
 Patria potestas, 146
 Patriarchy, 114, 155ff, 410ff
 Patriliney, 13, 116, 129, 132ff, 570
 Patrilocalism, 16, 133
 Patronymy, 102
 Pattern-of-life tension, 467, 475
 Pattern situations, 443
 Patterns, 36. *See also* Culture.
 psychodynamic, 499
 Pawnee, 132
Peking, 170
 Persecution, ideas of, 459
 Persians, 144
 Personal-social influences, 457
 Personality, 36, 38, 48, 429ff
 change, 79ff, 356, 455ff, 498
 defects, 441-445
 differences, differentiation, 43, 441ff
 disorganization, 431ff, 459, 477
 patterns, 455ff
 problems, 504ff
 Persuasion technique, 544
 Petting, 231, 407, 410ff
 Phantasy, unconscious, 85
 Physical type and marriage, 449
 Physicians, 216
 Piano (analogy), 35ff
 Play movement, 310
 Poland, 160, 362, 391
 Polarization, 42
Polish Peasant, The, 171
 Polyandry, 121ff, 154
 Polygamy, polygyny, 7, 97, 119, 122ff, 154, 424
 Population, 261ff, 238ff, 501, 267, 268, 269
 Poverty, 185ff
 Preferential mating, 12, 102, 131ff
 Pregnancy, 5, 6, 17, 22, 161
 Pressey tests, 504
 Prisoners, 163, 380
 Professions and family counsel, 542
 Progress, 173ff
 Project method, 278

Projection, 85
of parental ambition, 275

Property, 13, 19

Propinquity, 447

Prostitution, 27, 164, 400ff. *See also* Love mores; Sex.

Protestants, *see* Religious sects.

Providence, R. I., 256

Pseudo-family, 427

Psychiatric clinics, 546

Psychiatry, social, *see* Social Psychiatry.

Psychic economy, 38, 70

Psychoanalysis, Ch. III, p. 222, 463, 90, 110

Psychodynamic patterns, 499

Psychological geography, 42

"Psychologizing" fallacy, 51, 116, 119

Psychometric tests, 504

Puberty, 23, 80

Purchasing function, 301

Puritanism, 75, 150ff, 230, 348

Q case, 479

R

Race suicide, 262ff

Races of Europe, The, 454

Radburn, N. J., 284

Radio, 211

Rank, 13, 19, 112, 338

Rationalization, 87

Rats, 56, 90

Reaction formation, 84

Rebellion complex, 469, 487

Recent Social Trends, 196ff, 319, 322

Reconciliation, 478, 395

Reconstructing Behavior in Youth, 528

Recreation, play, 271ff, 289, 563

Re-education, 483ff

Reflexes, 38

Regional differences, 154, 155, 200ff, 256, 323, 327, 362, 388

Regression, 62, 79

Reincarnation, 5

Rejection, maternal, 512ff

Relationships, interpersonal, education for, 536
ethics of, 493
mother-daughter, 517
social, *see* Interaction; Social structure.

Religious sects, Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Jews, 128, 161, 241ff, 262, 348, 361ff, 390ff, 447ff, 538, 567

Remarriage, 380ff

Renaissance, 149, 230

Repression, 84

Reproduction, 5, 121ff, 220, 238ff. *See also* Birth rate.
dysgenic, 253ff

Research in Marriage, A, 268, 397

Response, *see* Love.

Right to Love, The, 490

Rivalry, spousal, 497
social, *see* Social rivalry.

Roles, 500
childhood, 462
dual, 477
interactional, 43, 455ff
of children, *see* Children
of the sexes, 137, 153-165, 203, 228, 408, 566, 214

Romans, 135, 144ff, 181, 230

Romantic complex, 73ff, 158, 231, 417ff

Romantic love, 24, 149, 408, 416

Rosary, The, 418

Rural and Urban Standards of Living, 311

Russia, 156, 161, 163, 241, 278, 294, 297, 402, 424, 569ff
divorce, 364, 391

S

Sacrifice, ideology of, 274, 486, 493

Sadism, 65, 76

Samoa, 80, 100, 138, 139, 545, 90

Sanctions for sex control, 423

Satisfaction, 56ff

Scandinavia, 157, 363

Science, 112, 177ff, 220ff, 422, 558

Scientific men, birth rate of, 256

Segregation, 16, 137ff, 165, 208

Self-gifts, 148
 Selfishness and unselfishness, 225, 273, 484, 490
 Sensitive zones, 59ff
 Sentiments, 39
 Separation, 375
 Servants, 159, 195ff, 290, 294
 Sex, sexual: adequacy, *see* Sex orgasm. aggression, 32, 409
 attraction, 30
 conversation, joking, 29
 desire, passion, eroticism, stimulation, 23, 28, 59ff, 71, 96, 108, 139, 231, 420ff, 466, 535
 differences, 92, 470, 508, 511, 520
 division of labor, 18, 138, 193, 228, 308ff
 drive, 56, 92, 148, 420, 473
 education, 533ff
 hospitality, wife lending, 28, 118, 139
 intercourse, 5, 31, 65-75, 92, 264, 408
 free or "promiscuous," 27, 114, 118, 140, 396, 570. *See also* Adultery.
 premarital, 24, 79, 139ff, 155, 160, 397ff
 mores, *see* Love mores.
 orgasm, 92, 466, 472.
 perversions, 32, 65ff, 140
 psychology of, 90
 questionnaires, 425
 ratio, 114, 122-127, 252, 327ff, 390
 ratios at birth, 268
Sex Freedom and Social Control, 427
Sex Hostility in Marriage, 500
Sex in Childhood, 536

 i, 137, 140
 Sibs, 11, 129
 Sicily, 162
 Sin, *see* Blame.
Sin and Sex, 426
 Slavs, 155
Smith College Studies in Social Work, 529ff
 Social: change, *see* Change.
 classes, class differences, 50, 126, 157, 159ff, 183, 191, 209, 246, 264, 295, 323, 384, 446, 506-510, 520
 Social—(*Continued*)
 disorganization, 182ff
 insurance, 280
 mobility, 188ff, 225ff, 274, 386, 430, 564
 problems, *see* Family problems.
 psychiatry, 429ff.
 rivalry, "climbing," 185ff, 197, 274, 286, 341, 507
 sects, 562. *See also* Religious sects.
 status, socio-economic status, *see* Status; Rank.
 structure, relationships, 10, 37, 40, 128, 177, 432ff
 type, 458ff
Social Change, 233
 Socio-analysis, 464, 543
 Sororate, 12, 131ff
 Soul, *see* Inviolability.
 South, Southern states, 128, 154
 South Carolina, 379, 414
 Spain, 78, 156
 Spanish woman, 90
 Sparta, 145
 Spoiled child, 462, 490ff, 515ff
 Standard of living, 183ff
 Status, social or socio-economic, 13, 506, 528. *See also* Rank; Social classes.
 Sterility, 264, 268, 269, 270
 Sterilization, 261ff, 567
 Stimuli, 37
 Stockholm, differential birth rate in, 260
 Storage function in home, 302
 Structure, in general, 36
 social, *see* Social structure.
 i. c.
 i. sublimation, 81, 86, 242
 Subsidies, *see* Family.
 Subsistence, minimum of, 184
 Suburbanization, suburbs, 197ff
 Suffering, 56ff, 82, 238, 431ff, 496. *See also* Frustration.
 Suicide, 432, 557, 574
 Sumerians, 144
 Sumptuary laws, 186
 Superiority, biological or native, 258, 266

Superorganic, 45, 558ff. *See also* Culture.

Surrender, 486

Suttee, 168

Svapnavasavadatta, 119

Sweden, *see* Scandinavia.

Sweet Briar College, 334, 450

Switzerland, 381, 447

Symbols, 44

Sympathetic nervous system, 57, 69, 75

T

Taboo, *see* Incest; In-Laws; Love; Sex in sex education, 426

Taboo and Genetics, 110

Technique of handling conflict, 481ff

Teknonymy, 138

Telephone, 197

Temperaments, 449ff, 455ff, 505

Tenderness, *see* Affection; Love.

Tensions, 55, 59, 467

Teutons, 148, 155

Thonga, 136

Thought-pattern, *see* Ideology.

Thousand Marriages, A, 453

Thrill, 68

Tibet, 122ff

Todas, 121ff, 327

Tonga, 121

Tools, 44

Torres Straits, 135

Totemism, 130

Toys, toy-complex, 209

Transference, 84

Transportation as household function, 302

Transvaluation, 182ff

Treatment, individual or case, 538ff, 543ff, 561

Trial-and-error learning, 56, 94

Triangle, love, 73

Trobriand Islands, 3ff, 109, 111, 121, 524

Troubadours, 73

Truancy, 528

Tuberculosis, 218

Turkey, 157

Turnbox, tour, 244

Type, social, *see* Social type. tensions, *see* Tensions.

Types of Men, 233

U

Ugly Civilization, This, 310

Unemployment, 294

Uniformities, 562

Universal traits, experiences, needs, 46, 51, 54, 91ff

Urbanization, 187ff, 376

V

Values, 48, 50, 174, 419, 424, 554ff

Vassar College, 334, 339, 386, 450, 451, 472

Vedda, 137

Venereal diseases, 218, 352, 353, 404ff

Vicarious enjoyment, 210

Victorianism, 152ff, 322, 419, 424

Visiting teachers, 540

Voyeurism, 65

W

Waiting period, 349

War and peace, 555, 557

Washington, D. C., 192

Waverly, Mass., 260

Way of All Women, The, 426

Welfare, 174ff

West, Western states, 154

What is Right with Marriage? 487

White Shadows in the South Seas, 88

Who's Who in America, 256, 337

Widowers, widowhood, widows, 9, 167, 317, .

Wife capture, 12, 136

Wife lending, *see* Sex hospitality.

Wife purchase, 14, 136

Will-temperament test, 451

Will-to-power, 497

Winnebago, 129, 130, 224

Wisconsin divorces, 395

Wishes, needs, drives, 39, 55, 81ff, 237, 418ff, 466, 482. *See also* Frustrations.

four wishes, 40, 55

Women, employment of, 158, 190ff, 287ff, 566
National Woman's Party, 203
status, 214. *See also* Roles of the sexes.
suffrage, 203
Women and Leisure, 310

Woodworth-Mathews test, 504
Worries, family, 434

Y

Youth: activities, segregation, culture, etc., 208, 409
Yukaghir, 140

